Thursday, August 29, 2024

August 29, 2024 Remarks by APNSA Jake Sullivan in Press Conference | Beijing, People’s Republic of China Beijing, People’s Republic of China

 August 29, 2024

Remarks by APNSA Jake Sullivan in Press Conference | Beijing, People’s Republic of China

Beijing, People’s Republic of China


MR. SULLIVAN: Good evening. As I said at the very start of these meetings, President Biden has been clear that he is committed to managing this important relationship responsibly.


Our aim in every engagement with China is to deliver for the American people. Under President Biden’s leadership, the United States has and will continue to advance its interests and values, look out for its friends. And as we do, we believe that competition with China does not have to lead to conflict or confrontation. The key is responsible management through diplomacy.


Beginning in May of last year, that diplomacy has been an all-hands-on-deck effort across the U.S. government and the Cabinet, which has included four meetings between myself and Director Wang Yi, as well as engagements between Secretary Blinken, Secretary Yellen, Secretary Raimondo and their counterparts, and many other Cabinet secretaries and their counterparts.


Those discussions helped lay the foundation for a productive summit between President Biden and President Xi in San Francisco at the end of last year. There, our leaders agreed on concrete steps on issues that matter to the American people and, for that matter, matter to the world.


This week, I traveled to China for the first time as National Security Advisor to take stock of where we have made progress and what work there still remains to be done, and also how we can responsibly manage the difficult issues and the differences that we have in this relationship. That’s been the focus of my meetings with President Xi, with Director and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and with CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Zouxia [sic] — excuse me, Zhang Youxia.


This was a true working visit. Over the course of 14 hours of meetings, we discussed progress and next steps on implementation of the Woodside commitments, including our work on counternarcotics and efforts to reduce the flow of illicit synthetic drugs into the United States; military-to-military communications including an upcoming engagement between our theater commanders; as well as work towards another round of AI safety and risk talks. Among other issues of global concern, we discussed the recent efforts to reach a ceasefire and hostage release deal in Gaza.


These meetings were also about managing tough issues, as I said, and areas of disagreement. And I was direct on these issues as well.


The United States will continue to take necessary action to prevent advanced U.S. technologies from being used to undermine our national security without unduly limiting trade or investment. We have continued concerns about China’s unfair trade policies and non-market economic practices.


We remain deeply concerned about China’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base and its impact on both European and transatlantic security, not to mention on Russia’s brutal aggression against Ukraine.


It is a top priority for this administration to resolve the cases of American citizens who are wrongfully detained or subject to exit bans in China. And this was another opportunity for me to raise those cases, as I have done in my prior engagements.


I also underscored the longstanding U.S. commitment to universal human rights and fundamental freedoms.


In all of my meetings, I stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait; emphasized the United States’ commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and I reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to our Indo-Pacific allies including our concerns about destabilizing actions against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea.


These were constructive, candid, substantive conversations. We believe that keeping lines of communication open is critical. And to that end, we began planning towards a leader-level call in the coming weeks where I expect these discussions to continue.


And with that, I’d be happy take your questions.


Yeah.


Q Throughout your meetings with Chinese officials, including Xi Jinping, did you get a sense of how Chinese leadership is feeling about the race for the White House? Obviously, the election would be a looming issue for them.


MR. SULLIVAN: I didn’t really get a feeling for that. We didn’t discuss the American election. That’s obviously something for the American people to decide and not for any other country to get involved in. So, neither in my meetings with Director Wang nor in the meeting with the President, or, for that matter, with the CMC Vice Chair, did we specifically talk about the American election.


Yeah.


Q Hi there. Marc Stewart from CNN. As you mentioned, you talked about some of the maritime issues. I don’t have to tell you, obviously, things are very tense right now in the South China Sea, especially with the Philippines and some of these reef issues. Reading the readout, it said you discussed some of this with Xi Jinping himself. Other than diplomatic speak, is there a reasonable roadmap or blueprint for the future? Because I think that the level of tension is reaching an extremely high level.


MR. SULLIVAN: So, first, we believe that the order of the day should be de-escalation, and we support direct discussions between the Philippines and the PRC to that end. We also have made very clear that our mutual defense treaty applies to public vessels, including coast guard vessels, that are operating in the South China Sea and in other waters. It also applies to aircraft, for that matter.


So the PRC well understands the longstanding commitment the United States has under its mutual defense treaty to the Philippines, and the Philippines well understands that we have an ironclad commitment to support them in their lawful exercise of their rights, their maritime rights.


At the same time, nobody is looking for a crisis — not the Philippines, not the United States, and we hope not the PRC. But I did raise our concerns about some of the destabilizing actions that have taken place, including the ramming of coast guard vessels and unsafe intercepts near Scarborough Shoal.


It’s something we’ll continue to discuss with our Chinese counterparts. It’s something we will continue to consult closely with our Filipino counterparts on. And in fact, before I came here, I had the opportunity to call my Filipino counterpart, the National Security Advisor, Secretary Año, and I will stay in close touch with him, as will other members of the U.S. government.


So we will do our best to try to contribute to managing this issue in a responsible way so that de-escalation is the order of the day.


Yeah.


Q Hello. This is Rae (ph) from The Paper. So, I wonder, since the San Francisco summit, you know, more than 20 communication mechanisms have been established or assumed, maintaining the momentum from (inaudible) dialogue between the two countries. So following this visit, what will be the key focus of the U.S. diplomacy towards China through next January? And what specific interim achievement does the Biden administration hope to secure during this period? Thank you.


MR. SULLIVAN: Well, first, at a macro level, the most important thing and a core part of my extended engagement with Director Wang, not just here but in multiple meetings dating back to the beginning of last year, is overall responsible management of this relationship so the competition doesn’t veer into confrontation or conflict. That is ongoing work. And being able to reach the end of President Biden’s administration with the relationship on a stable basis, even though we have areas of difference and areas of difficulty, this is something we will work towards.


More specifically, we’re going to look for further progress on counternarcotics and reducing the flow of illicit synthetic drugs into the United States. We are going to look for a deepening of the military-to-military communication so that we can pass that on to President Biden’s successor. And, in fact, a very positive outcome of the sessions here is that there will be a call between the theater commanders, the INDOPACOM commander and the Southern Theater commander for the PLA.


Having the opportunity today to sit down with the CMC Vice Chairman, something that has not happened for a U.S. official in eight years, is itself significant because it allows us to give impetus and momentum to those military-to-military lines of communication, and that will be an important priority for us as we go forward.


There are other issues as well, of course, that we’ll deal with, and we’ll have to manage the risks and flashpoints too: cross-Strait relations, the South China Sea, the Chinese support for the Russian defense industrial base. And we’ll continue to work on all of those in the months ahead.


Yeah.


Q Welcome to Beijing. My name is Laura Baker. I’m from BBC News. I’d like to ask you: You talk about a call between the two leaders within the coming weeks. Will there be a last meeting between President Biden and President Xi?


And also, back to those talks with General Zhang: How important is it for you to have those talks with a leading general? And what was the tone of those talks?


MR. SULLIVAN: It is likely that both President Biden and President Xi will be at APEC and the G20 later this year. I don’t have any announcements to make on either President Biden’s travel or a potential meeting, but the likelihood is they’ll both be there, and if they are, it would only be natural for them to have the chance to sit down with one another. So we’ll have to await any confirmation or any announcements, but I think things pointing in that direction seem logical and reasonable.


I think the meeting with Vice Chairman Zhang was very important. There is no substitute for actually being able to sit across the table, not just with the Vice Chairman but with his whole team, and be able to hear from them their perspective on critical issues, and them be able to hear from us our perspective on those same issues, whether it’s cross-Strait relations or the South China Sea or cyber issues. And being able to have that exchange, which is rare, I think allows us to clarify our intentions and our concerns and hear theirs, and try to use that in service of responsible management of the relationship going forward.


Yeah.


Q Thank you. From the Wall Street Journal. Just to follow up on the question about the U.S. election, I’m curious about what questions, if any, did the Chinese ask you about what a potential Harris administration would represent for U.S.-China relations.


And connected to this, did you raise the issue specifically of potential election interference by China during your trip here today?


MR. SULLIVAN: Every time I meet with Chinese officials, I raise the issue of election interference and laying down a clear marker that it’s unacceptable for any nation to interfere in the U.S. election. And this trip was no different in that regard. I made that point once again.


I won’t characterize what the PRC’s questions were with respect to Vice President Harris. They’ll have to speak for themselves on that. But what I will say is that Vice President Harris has been a central member of the Biden foreign policy team, a leading member, and has been part of the design and execution of the overall strategy in the Indo-Pacific and with respect to the responsible management of U.S.-China relations.


She has had the opportunity to engage herself with President Xi and with Premier Li. So she is known to both of the top leaders in China. And she shares President Biden’s view that responsibly managing this competition, so it doesn’t veer into conflict or confrontation, is essential. And she also shares the view that maintaining high-level, open lines of communication is the way that you can achieve that responsible management.


So I was able to share my experience and my perspective of working closely with the Vice President and the role that she has played over the course of the past four years.


Yeah.


Q Thank you. I’m with Phoenix TV. The Biden administration has announced arms sale to Taiwan 15 times now since taking office and surpassing the Trump administration’s 11 times. So, China believes that the continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and other actions have increased tensions in the Taiwan Strait. So how do you respond to this? And what is the U.S. willing to do to de-escalate? Thank you.


MR. SULLIVAN: Our One China policy has not changed, and our approach to this issue is guided by the One China policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances. That remains true today, and that has remained true on a bipartisan basis through multiple administrations. And that policy has actually helped contribute to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait for decades, and we intend to keep it that way.


Let’s see. Yeah.


Q Ken Moritsugu with the AP. I want to ask about the 100 percent tariff that the Canadian government put on Chinese EVs earlier this week. It was reported that you had met with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and encouraged Canada to go forward with that. Did that come up at all during these talks? Did the Chinese side complain about it or the timing? And if so, how did you respond?


MR. SULLIVAN: First of all, Canada is a sovereign country that makes its own sovereign decisions, and it would be quite an extraordinary power to show up on a Sunday evening and produce a major trade policy move on a Monday morning. So, I think the right way to look at this is: I was there for a pre-scheduled cabinet retreat to speak with them. They took independent action. It was not at my behest or anything that I did or said that made that happen. That was a determination that they made.


I did make the point while I was in Canada, and I’d make it standing here today, that we have concerns relative to EVs, both with respect to security issues and overcapacity issues. We’ve been public and transparent about that. But this was a decision they took on their own, and I won’t characterize the conversations with the PRC on this issue; I’ll let them speak for themselves.


Yeah.


Q Janis Mackey Frayer with NBC. A follow-up to the election-related question from Brian. The Chinese leadership and Chinese officials are about stability and consistency in their relationships. Did they at all signal to you any hesitation, nervousness, or concern about an upcoming change of administration at the White House?


MR. SULLIVAN: They recognize that elections are sensitive periods and transitions are sensitive periods, and responsible management through an election and transition is important. That’s something we believe as well. And my visit here during this period helps contribute to try and sustain that responsible management over this coming sensitive period.


I will refrain from commenting on their perspective about what comes next. I think that’s something that they’re going to have to speak for themselves on.


Yeah.


Q Thanks. Trevor Hunnicutt, Reuters. Jake, could you talk a little bit about the status of the Middle East hostage and ceasefire negotiations?


MR. SULLIVAN: I could, but it’s moving hour by hour, and I haven’t gotten an update in the last several hours. What I would say is that the negotiators are bearing down on the details, meaning that we have advanced the discussions to a point where it’s in the nitty-gritty. And that is a positive sign of progress, but at the end of the day, nothing is done until it’s done, and so we’re just going to keep working at this until we finally get the ceasefire and hostage deal across the line. And I’ll have the chance, when I get on the plane, to check in with our negotiating team who’s participating in these talks in the region even as we speak.


Yeah.


Q Thank you. Evelyn Cheng from CNBC. On the issue of tech restrictions, I know that’s something that the U.S. side has remained very firm on and that the Chinese side has repeatedly asked for changes on. If the trajectory is still going to be more restrictions, was there — you know, can you give some more details on what that discussion looked like?


And then, just on the aspect of cross-Strait tensions and southeast — South China Sea, was there any specifics on what would look — what a de-escalation might look like? Thank you.


MR. SULLIVAN: We had extended discussions about economics and national security, and I won’t characterize the PRC position on that, other than to say it wasn’t — it was consistent in the room with what they have said publicly on the issue.


For our part, I laid out our approach, which is rooted in the concept of small yard, high fence. I explained why it is that we feel we have to take some targeted restrictions to ensure that advanced technologies aren’t used against U.S. national security. I explained that our approach is one of de-risking, not decoupling, and described in some detail how we saw de-risking in practice. And I also raised our concerns about steps that the PRC has taken with respect to the intersection of economics and national security and the impact that that has had on Western businesses and on supply chains.


And so, we had a vigorous give-and-take on the issue. Obviously, we didn’t come to agreement on certain aspects of things. But I think the dialogue is very useful because it clarifies the concerns of each side and also gives us the opportunity to explain what it is that we are doing and what we are not doing. And I thought that was valuable.


We didn’t reach any specific agreements on the South China Sea. You know, for one thing, it’s not for the United States to reach agreements with China over the heads of parties like the Philippines. For another, you know, there’s no substitute for that direct diplomacy between the two of them. But we did indicate and reiterate our longstanding commitment to our ally and our longstanding commitment to the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and the free exercise of maritime rights in the South China Sea. And we’ll continue to do that.


I’ll take one more question. Yeah.


Q China Media Group speaking. Sir, we noticed that almost all of your accompanying staff can speak Chinese. Do you think this helped you to communicate with your Chinese counterparts? And does this help you accurately understand China’s core concerns? Thank you.


MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. (Laughter.) The answer is yes. No, having a team here, many of whom do speak fluent Mandarin, have deep experience on issues related to the PRC and the U.S.-China relationship, this is — you know, it makes my job a heck of a lot easier and makes me much better than I would otherwise be. And I stand on the shoulders of those experts because, you know, they’re the ones with the insights and the wisdom that drives forward the conversations that we’ve had here over the last three days. So —


All right, we’ll do two more. Yeah.


Q Yes. Keith Bradsher for the New York Times. Have you made any progress with China in discussing what might be a possible resolution for the war in Ukraine? Thank you.


MR. SULLIVAN: I can’t say that we did make progress on that issue. The PRC has been very public in its view that the war should end through diplomacy. They’ve laid out various principles, both unilaterally and in separate communication with the Brazilians.


We had the opportunity to exchange views on the war against Ukraine over the course of the last three days. We didn’t reach any particular plan with respect to diplomacy, in large part because the United States very rigorously adheres to the simple maxim of “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.” So, ultimately, it will be up to Ukraine to decide how it wants to proceed with diplomacy and negotiations.


Yeah.


Q (Inaudible.) Perhaps an overarching question. Several months ago, Chinese/Sino-U.S. relations was very intense, especially around the time U.S. imposed kind of additional tariff on Chinese EVs or semiconductors. And China is facing this trade war nowadays with Europe. But all of a sudden, you came and U.S.-China relations seems to be on better track, especially for the last few months of this year. What’s behind this change? Does that have anything to do with Vice President Harris taking over the presidential race or any other factor from the Chinese side?


And looking forward, do you see U.S.-China relations turning marginally for the better for the next few months, or potentially next few years, compared to a potential second Trump term? Thanks.


MR. SULLIVAN: I can’t characterize the Chinese side on this issue. They’re going to have to speak for themselves. What I can tell you is that we believe, in the Biden administration, that intense diplomacy matters — because it doesn’t resolve every issue, it doesn’t mean that we are going to agree on everything, but it does mean that we can improve understanding, we can clarify misperceptions, we can reduce the risk of miscalculation, and we can identify areas to work together where our interests align that might previously have been hidden.


So, the relationship remains a competitive relationship. We need to responsibly manage that competition, and we’re doing that through this very detailed, painstaking, multiple rounds of diplomatic effort. And it’s not to arrive at a certain end result where everything is just resolved. It’s rather to arrive on a stable basis so that each of us can stand up for our interests, we can stand up for our friends, we can defend our values, we can take the actions we feel we need to take in service of our national interests, but we can also work together to ensure that the relationship is managed responsibly. That is what this trip was about. That’s what the diplomacy of the last two years have been about. And we do believe that it puts us in a position to increase the prospect of stability in the relationship.


But we have to keep in mind, too, that there are always risks — risks of escalation, risks of misunderstanding, risks of something going awry. And we’ve seen that before in the U.S.-China relationship. And we discussed those risks, too, at some length, whether it’s to do with cross-Strait relations or the South China Sea, or European security and the war in Ukraine, or many other issues, including issues that were not previously foreseen, like incidents from a year or two ago.


So this is something we will have to keep working at, and it’s a work in progress. Today is not the end of anything. It’s just the continuation of a sustained pattern of intensive diplomacy led by President Biden and President Xi and carried out by many of us across our administration and the Chinese government, and we’re going to keep at it.


Thank you, guys

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