Week of August 26, 2024 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council A week after Iran’s parliament granted a vote of confidence to Masoud Pezeshkian’s entire cabinet, the new President has begun implementing some of his campaign promises. Among the most notable appointments is that of Abdulrahim Hossein-Zadeh – a Sunni Kurd – as Vice President, the highest position a Sunni has held since the 1979 revolution. Pezeshkian has also added several women to his cabinet, signaling potential shifts within the Iranian political landscape. These changes come amid new comments from conservative politicians and support from Ayatollah Khamenei, which played a crucial role in securing parliament’s unified vote of confidence for Pezeshkian’s proposed ministers. However, the extent and direction of these developments within the Iranian government remain uncertain. During a recent meeting with Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, expressed a reformist approach towards those who have committed offenses, emphasizing rehabilitation over punishment. Mohseni-Ejei stated, “Our approach to members of society who have made mistakes, without intent of enmity, should be reformative and inclusive. We need to consider how many individuals we could have reformed and included, but neglected, pushing them to the opposition.” Amid these developments, Pezeshkian and Mohseni-Ejei are reportedly considering lifting the house arrest of Green Movement leaders. Hossein Karroubi, the son of Mehdi Karroubi, stated, “Last week, we received a message from President Pezeshkian and Judiciary Chief Mohseni-Ejei indicating efforts to end my father’s house arrest, with some progress being made. Following this message, we sought my father’s opinion.” Karroubi expressed gratitude for the efforts but stressed that the lifting of his house arrest should be simultaneous with the release of Mir Hossein Mousavi. In a related development, Tehran’s Friday Prayer leader, Ali Akbar Abotrabifard, in an interview with state media, emphasized the need for a problem-solving approach in governance. “The Islamic Republic has accumulated unresolved issues. If we do not think about reforming today, tomorrow will be too late,” he stated, urging parliament to cooperate with the government to address the country’s unresolved challenges. Meanwhile, conservative figure Mojtaba Zolnour, known for symbolically burning the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) text during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, recently commented on the fate of the nuclear deal. “Whether the JCPOA proceeds or not is a supra-organizational decision, not within the authority of any one entity. Various bodies, such as the Supreme National Security Council and the heads of the three branches, must reach a consensus. Whatever decision they make—whether to continue negotiations, stop them, or revive the JCPOA—we will support it.” Despite this support, influential conservative media outlets like Kayhan continue to oppose Pezeshkian’s government. In contrast, Amirhossein Shahani, head of the Supreme Leader’s office in the Basij Ministry and Administrative Affairs, urged Basij members to support the government rather than become its opposition. “Friends in websites and social media should be cautious not to weaken the Islamic Republic’s government, as this is certainly not the wish of Basij officials,” Shahani said. On the reformist front, Abbas Abdi, a political activist close to Pezeshkian, issued an open letter to former President Mohammad Khatami, calling for a change in the reformist approach. Abdi criticized the radical language and combative stance of some reformist voices, arguing that such rhetoric is incompatible with the principles of reform. Some prominent reform figures, in recent years, have disavowed change from within and argued for the need for a transition from the Islamic Republic. Abdi’s comments appear to push back on this approach.
Abdi stated, “The voices that are often recognized as representing the core of the reformist movement—voices that are prominent among some members of the Reform Front—tend to use radical and combative language. In my analysis, this language is not in alignment with the principles and strategies of reform. My intention here is not to criticize or dismiss the approach of confrontation, but to point out that, whether this rhetoric is right or wrong, it is not suitable for the reformist agenda. This approach seems more focused on defeating and replacing the opposing side rather than fostering reform. It falls into a binary view of good versus evil, which hinders the creation of mutual understanding and empathy. The language of confrontation has its own particular requirements, including a focus on heroism and courageous acts, where expressing a position is seen as an act of defiance. In this rhetoric, those who bear the cost are valued and even seen as just. However, a politics based on reform is directed toward the benefit and well-being that politics should bring to society as a whole. The politics of confrontation typically frames the situation in binary terms, defining good and evil as absolute and intrinsic. This kind of rhetoric often has a parallel or counterpart within the power structure, either nurturing or reflecting it. The politics of confrontation is essentialist, lacking in analytical and sociological perspectives, and is disconnected from relativistic thinking. Essentialism leads to dogmatism, which is inherent in the politics of confrontation,” Abdi wrote. As Iran enters what Pezeshkian has termed a period of “national unity,” the effectiveness and impact of this new political approach will become clearer in the coming months. The motivations behind Ayatollah Khamenei and other power structures in Iran for the recent policy shift remain unclear. However, there are signs that the Woman, Life, Freedom movement may have triggered concern within certain factions of the Islamic Republic. The government’s recent efforts to engage with some reformists, increase the presence of women and ethnic minorities in leadership, and address longstanding issues such as the house arrest of Green Movement leaders suggest an attempt to mitigate public dissatisfaction and rebuild social capital. While early in the 2022 protest movement, some officials hinted at the need for reforms, those voices quickly fell silent. Now, after the presidential election, elements within the government appear to be moving in the direction of implementing at least some limited changes. Whether they are able to achieve this, or are undercut, will become clearer in the near future. Following the death of Mohammad Mirmosavi in police custody in Lahijan, northern Iran, and the dispatch of a special delegation from Tehran to Rasht to investigate, the Iranian Police Information Center released a statement this morning. The statement, based on the inspection team’s findings, attributed his death to the “lack of control over anger and emotions” by officers and their “disregard for the detainee’s condition.” On August 29, videos of Mirmosavi’s funeral and the washing of his body were circulated, showing wounds and marks on his body that appeared consistent with severe beatings and possible torture. A person in the video pointed to two spots on Mirmosavi’s back, stating, “These areas are punctured.” In a published photo, autopsy marks were visible on Mirmosavi’s chest, but no official report from the forensic authority has been released yet. According to BBC, a source close to the family said they are under intense pressure to refrain from sharing details about Mirmosavi’s death. This source also claimed that based on the condition of the body, the family is certain that Mirmosavi’s hands were bound for hours. Local sources familiar with the Lahijan police station allege that after his arrest, Mirmosavi was taken to the back of the station, an area without surveillance cameras, where he was severely beaten. These local sources further reported that Mirmosavi had repeatedly requested medical attention during the night, but his pleas were ignored. According to Iran’s Judiciary News Agency, the police initially reported that on Thursday, August 22, residents of Naserkiadeh village in Lahijan repeatedly informed the local station about a violent altercation. The police claimed that Mirmosavi was the instigator, and that his vehicle had been completely destroyed and set ablaze, as was shown in images. The statement noted that after the police arrived, Mirmosavi and all other parties involved were arrested. It further stated that Mirmosavi began “cursing, resisting police orders, and engaging in a physical altercation with officers” from the station until he was placed in detention. The Iranian police command acknowledged that the incident is under review by forensic experts to determine the exact cause of death, considering the events before police involvement and Mirmosavi’s physical and mental state. The police condemned the actions of some officers involved as unprofessional and unacceptable, announcing that those responsible have been handed over to the judiciary. The police chief of the station has been dismissed, and other involved officers have been suspended from duty, as per orders from Police Commander General Radan. The statement also warned that if negligence or inattention by other police managers is confirmed, appropriate disciplinary measures will be enforced. In a part of the statement addressing Mirmosavi’s death, the police referenced his “several previous records of misconduct and violence” and a nine-month prison sentence. On the previous day, the President, Interior Minister, and Police Commander of Iran had ordered the formation of a special committee to investigate and report on the incident. The Iranian state news agency reported that a delegation, led by the Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Law Enforcement, had arrived in Rasht and convened a provincial security council meeting. In a historic move, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has appointed Abdulrahim Hossein-Zadeh, a Kurdish Sunni member of parliament, as his Vice President for Rural Development and Deprived Areas. This appointment marks the first time a Sunni has held a cabinet-level position in post-revolutionary Iran, representing the highest political rank achieved by a Sunni Muslim in the Islamic Republic. Hossein-Zadeh, who currently represents Naqadeh and Oshnavieh in the Iranian Parliament and serves on the Infrastructure Commission, was chosen by Pezeshkian for his “commitment and valuable experience.” In the decree issued on August 26th, Pezeshkian instructed Hossein-Zadeh to focus on improving rural living conditions and enhancing rural development indices, emphasizing the role of villagers in achieving a resilient economy. Pezeshkian’s election victory had raised hopes for greater inclusion of Sunnis in government positions, with promises of a “National Unity Government” that would collaborate with capable individuals across the political spectrum. However, the release of his proposed cabinet list, which lacked Sunni representation at the ministerial level, sparked disappointment and criticism from religious leaders and Sunni representatives. During a recent Friday prayer in Zahedan, prominent Sunni cleric Molavi Abdolhamid voiced concerns, stating, “The people’s expectations were not met at the first step, and many voters and those who encouraged participation are now worried.” Born in 1980 in Naqadeh, Abdulrahim Hossein-Zadeh holds a master’s degree in urban planning from Iran University of Science and Technology. He is a reformist politician, the head of the Parliamentary Citizen Rights Caucus, and a veteran of both the ninth and tenth terms of the Iranian Parliament. Hossein-Zadeh has also been active in several parliamentary friendship groups with countries such as Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina, and Canada, and has served in various committees focused on ports, maritime industries, and the environment. Two years ago, during the nationwide protests following the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini in custody, Hossein-Zadeh expressed his condolences in an Instagram post featuring a photo of Amini, lamenting, “I testify that this current state of countless compatriots, regardless of their language, ethnicity, religion, or culture, was for you. They wept and mourned for you with all their hearts. I saw how they felt—an entire nation grieved for its daughter, and all of Iran wept for you.” In another significant development, Fatemeh Mohajerani has been appointed as the spokesperson for Pezeshkian’s government, making her the first woman, and the first without the traditional chador, to hold this prominent position in the Islamic Republic’s government. Mohajerani’s appointment was announced alongside the selection of Elyas Hazrati as head of the Government Information Council. Mohajerani, who previously led Iran’s National Organization for Development of Exceptional Talents, gained attention during Pezeshkian’s campaign rally in her hometown of Arak, where she spoke out against the violence that claimed the life of protester Mehrshad Shahidi. In her speech, with former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif standing behind her, she declared, “As a mother, I will not allow another Mehrshad Shahidi to fall. We will not let a few extremists fill our streets with the blood of our youth.” Her appointment has drawn mixed reactions on social media, with some praising her as a “lioness” while others, particularly those aligned with the conservative camp, labeled her a “supporter of sedition.” Additionally, Mehrshad Shahidi’s father, Amir Shahidi, criticized Mohajerani’s remarks as “political exploitation” of his son’s name and “unethical behavior.” Mohajerani, born in August 1970 in Arak, entered university in 1989, earning her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in mechanical engineering from Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman. She later pursued a master’s degree in strategy at Heriot-Watt University in Scotland and completed a Ph.D. in business management. She has held various leadership positions, including as president of the National Organization for Development of Exceptional Talents since 2017. Her appointment is seen as part of Pezeshkian’s broader effort to diversify his cabinet, which had promised at least 20% of the nominees would be women and minorities. So far, four women have joined the cabinet: Farzaneh Sadegh Malvazhd, as Minister of Roads and Urban Development; Zahra Behrouz Azar, as Vice President for Women and Family Affairs; and Sheena Ansari, as head of Iran’s Environmental Protection Organization. The selection of Mohajerani, 54, and Hazrati, 63, also prompted renewed scrutiny of Pezeshkian’s campaign promise to promote youth in government roles—a promise that remains largely unfulfilled. Zahra Rahnavard, in a statement from house arrest, criticized Pezeshkian’s cabinet, calling for the release of female political prisoners and the repeal of the “arbitrary” mandatory hijab law. Rahnavard, the wife of 2009 Green Movement Leader Mir Hossein Mousavi who has been under house arrest for 15 years, described mandatory hijab as a “symbol of the regime’s autocracy.” In her message criticizing Pezeshkian’s cabinet, she wrote, “A ‘National Unity Cabinet’ can only be credible and meaningful if it takes fundamental steps to envision a brighter future for women, such as the release of political prisoners, especially the many courageous women detainees, the repeal of the arbitrary mandatory hijab law and its disreputable apparatus across the country, and the drafting and implementation of civil, political, and social laws concerning women’s rights.” In her statement, published on September 8th on Kalemeh – a website close to the leaders of the Green Movement – Rahnavard mentioned prominent women’s rights activists Mehrangiz Kar and Shirin Ebadi. She stated, “National unity first and foremost requires recognizing the equal rights of all citizens and ensuring their effective participation in the political, economic, social, and cultural destiny of the country, especially for those groups and movements whose rights have been unjustly violated and who have been excluded from the political sphere and governance.” On the other hand, Kayhan newspaper criticized some figures in Pezeshkian’s cabinet as “problematic,” calling the new appointments “a distribution of positions among riot supporters disguised as national unity.” The paper added that “with the start of appointments in the fourteenth government, concerns about employing individuals who lack even the slightest belief in the principles and core values of the regime and who played a role in the unrest have been growing.” Kayhan also warned that “these inappropriate appointments raise concerns about creating distractions instead of serving the public in the new government.” After the initial criticism of the cabinet lineup subsided, some voters have expressed support for the inclusion of women and a Sunni Kurd in the government. Mohammad Sahafi, a former press director at Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, shared photos of the women appointed in Pezeshkian’s government on X, stating, “It is no exaggeration to say that the presence of women in high-ranking positions in Pezeshkian’s government is primarily owed to the Woman, Life, Freedom movement.” The four women in Pezeshkian’s cabinet include a minister, two vice presidents, and a spokesperson for the Islamic Republic’s government, marking the highest level of female representation in government since the 1979 Revolution. In another significant move, former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif announced his return to Pezeshkian’s team as Deputy for Strategic Affairs following “negotiations and written instructions” from Pezeshkian. Zarif’s return, alongside Abbas Araghchi’s continued role at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signals an apparent desire to shift towards improved relations with the West—a stance that appears to have the tacit approval of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. During a meeting with Pezeshkian’s cabinet, Khamenei remarked, “We can engage with the enemy where necessary, but the issue is that we must not place our hope or trust in them.” The Iranian judiciary’s official news agency, Mizan, has reported that a legal case has been filed against prominent actress Baran Kowsari and acclaimed director Rakhshan Banietemad for allegedly “violating the hijab law.” According to the report, the two figures had attended a film review session without wearing a hijab, prompting the authorities to open a case at the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office in Tehran. Images of Bani Etemad and Kowsari participating in the discussion of the film Someone Always Gets Lost without the mandatory head covering were widely circulated on social media, attracting significant attention. This is not the first time Iranian actresses have made headlines for appearing in public without the compulsory hijab. Several actresses, including Pantea Bahram, Katayoun Riahi, Baran Kowsari, Fatemeh Motamed-Arya, and Afsaneh Bayegan, have previously faced legal action for similar reasons. Despite the legal pressure, these well-known figures, along with many other women in Iran, assert that choosing their own attire is a fundamental right. Some have spoken openly in interviews or social media posts about engaging in “civil disobedience” to secure the “right to choose their clothing” in Iran. While increasing numbers of Iranian women routinely flout the nation’s hijab laws, Iranian authorities have targeted individuals with prominent followings – including actresses – as part of their continued efforts to claw back adherence to the hijab mandate. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s newly appointed Foreign Minister, has stated that the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the six world powers “is not feasible in its current form.” In his first public comments since taking office, Araghchi told state television that rather than simply reviving the JCPOA, “the agreement needs to be reopened” to allow for modifications. He clarified that his remarks should not be interpreted as signaling “the death of the JCPOA.” Araghchi, who has been part of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team since the early 2000s and served as Deputy Foreign Minister during the initial JCPOA negotiations, emphasized that the agreement must be revised. “The JCPOA can serve as a guide, but it cannot be revived as it was,” he said. Reflecting on the negotiations during the final months of Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, Araghchi noted that in late 2020, after Joe Biden became U.S. President, the United States expressed interest in rejoining the JCPOA. According to Araghchi, Iran did not reject the offer outright, but instead set conditions for its return. During that period, the Iranian parliament also passed the “Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect the Rights of the Iranian Nation,” a law that Rouhani’s government opposed but which played a significant role in shaping the country’s nuclear program and position on negotiations. In recent weeks, former senior officials of Iran’s previous administration have harshly criticized this law, blaming it for obstructing the JCPOA’s revival. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, however, defended the law, calling it a “very correct move” and condemning those who criticize it. Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, a key architect of the JCPOA, and former President Hassan Rouhani, have both labeled the law as a significant obstacle to restoring the nuclear deal. Rouhani even described it as “the worst law in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The JCPOA, which was reached in the summer of 2015, led to the lifting of international sanctions against Iran in exchange for limitations on its nuclear program. However, in May 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement and re-imposed sanctions on Iran, including unprecedented restrictions on its oil and gas sectors, which severely impacted the country’s primary revenue source. Iran has since gradually scaled back its commitments under the agreement and now possesses uranium enriched at levels far exceeding those allowed under the JCPOA, including enrichment up to 60%. Additionally, Iran has largely abandoned the agreement’s supplementary oversight provisions, leading the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to describe its monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program as being conducted in a “void” and “black hole.” Araghchi highlighted the changing global landscape as a reason for revisiting the JCPOA. “The situation today is not the same as before; the world has changed. The Ukraine war and the conflict in Gaza have altered the conditions. Therefore, the JCPOA cannot be revived in its current form, and certain parts of it must be revised.” Iran’s sale of drones to Russia, which have been used in the Ukraine conflict, has led to additional sanctions against Iran from the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These sanctions target individuals and military entities involved in the drone sales. Araghchi reiterated that while the JCPOA negotiations can serve as a reference, the agreement itself cannot simply be revived as it was. “We must approach this with a different perspective,” he stated. One of the challenges in reviving the JCPOA is that several key dates for obligations within the agreement have passed without compliance from either side. For example, the agreement’s restrictions on Iran’s research and development of new uranium enrichment centrifuges were not observed, making a return to the original terms difficult. Similarly, the European Union was supposed to lift all remaining restrictions, including arms embargoes, but this did not happen. Following his television interview, Araghchi later clarified that he did not declare the “death of the JCPOA” but emphasized that the agreement in its current form is not revivable. However, he indicated that other forms of agreements might be possible, which Iran would pursue. If the JCPOA had been fully implemented without violations, the agreement was set to remove many restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program by October 2025 and permanently lift the United Nations Security Council sanctions that are currently suspended. The three European countries that sponsored a resolution this past spring concerning the IAEA’s “unsatisfactory” monitoring of Iran’s program have submitted a report to the United Nations Security Council, which could pave the way for the re-imposition of prior UN sanctions on Iran. The United States, a key player in the JCPOA negotiations, faces a presidential election in November 2024. Both Republican candidate Donald Trump and Democratic candidate Kamala Harris have taken a tough stance on Iran’s foreign policy, though neither has yet provided a clear position on whether they would pursue a new comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran or seek to revive the current JCPOA, though many U.S. observers similarly believe that the window to revive the 2015 agreement in its prior form has likewise passed. Ali Entezari, the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Allameh Tabataba’i University, has been dismissed from his position following his use of the phrase “nefleh shodan” (a derogatory term meaning “being wasted”) to describe the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini while in the custody of the morality police. Entezari had previously apologized for his remarks, which sparked widespread controversy, including criticism from Amini’s parents. According to IRNA, Iran’s official state news agency, Entezari was removed from his post, and Abdullah Motamedi, the university’s president, appointed Ahmad Ghiasvand as the acting dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences. The decision to remove Entezari was attributed to his “use of inappropriate language that is inconsistent with Iranian and Islamic cultural norms” during an appearance on the state television program Shiveh. Entezari appeared on the program alongside Taghi Azad Armaki, where he discussed the 2022 protests. He remarked, “The enemy’s expectation was that when young people take to the streets over the killing or death or ‘wasting’ of a young Kurdish Sunni woman, the regime would be forced to resort to violence.” The use of the term “nefleh shodan” provoked significant backlash, leading Entezari to issue an apology. In a statement shared by Shiveh on the filtered platform X (formerly Twitter), Entezari explained, “I intended to present the issue from the perspective of the protesters, but I should have chosen my words more carefully and not relied on local colloquialisms.” Despite his apology, Entezari criticized the media for what he called a “malicious” portrayal of his comments. Mojgan Eftekhari, Mahsa Amini’s mother, condemned Entezari’s remarks in an Instagram story, describing them as “an insult to all Iranians” and suggesting that “hatred is deeply ingrained in his mind.” Amjad Amini, Mahsa’s father, also reacted to Entezari’s comments in an Instagram story, stating, “In response to the vulgar, insulting, and entirely false remarks made by Ali Entezari, so-called professor and dean at Allameh Tabataba’i University on the Islamic Republic’s state television regarding Mahsa (Jina) Amini and the Kurdish Sunni community, all I can say is ‘shame on him,’ and it’s best to leave it at that. To call Mahsa, a Kurdish Sunni girl, ‘wasted’ comes from a base mind.” During the same program, Entezari described the government’s response to the protests as “paternal,” claiming that the Islamic Republic did not act harshly towards protesters and that no one was expelled from universities. In contrast, Azad Armaki, who also participated in the discussion, responded to Entezari by saying, “We shot pellets at people, so many died, both supporters and opponents, so many were killed, there were poisonings in schools… Who did all of this? Was it not us?” According to estimates by the Iran Human Rights organization, at least 537 people were killed during the protests known as “Woman, Life, Freedom.” Thousands were imprisoned, and many students and professors lost their jobs. Dozens of protesters continue to suffer from injuries such as loss of eyesight, and several remain under threat of execution. |
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