The National Interest August 6, 2024 Topic: Security Region: Global Governance Tags: 2024 ElectionU.S. Foreign Policy Where is U.S. Foreign Policy Headed? Four distinct, but not necessarily exclusive, strategies present themselves for the next administration. by Lawrence J. Korb Follow @LarryKorb on TwitterL Stephen Cimbala

 The National Interest 

August 6, 2024  Topic: Security  Region: Global Governance  Tags: 2024 ElectionU.S. Foreign Policy

Where is U.S. Foreign Policy Headed?

Four distinct, but not necessarily exclusive, strategies present themselves for the next administration.

by Lawrence J. Korb Follow @LarryKorb on TwitterL Stephen Cimbala

The first presidential debate between Joe Biden and Donald Trump resulted in a media blitzkrieg of hysteria about Biden’s performance, which continued through the Republican convention and led to Biden’s eventual withdrawal from the race. The New York Times editorial board and other prestige media sites, supported by some leading Democratic fundraisers and politicians, including from the Democratic Senate and House leaders, called for Biden to withdraw from the race for the White House. It’s understandable to some extent that the media, whose professional obsession is with communication, and the many Democratic members of the House and Senate, who are concerned about their own elections, would declare Biden’s performance a disaster. On the other hand, with respect to the substance of policy, as opposed to the optics of stage performance, the debate was one blip in a journey that will require more months of campaigning and electioneering between former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris to sort out.

Of particular importance in this regard are the candidates’ and parties’ respective positions on foreign policy and U.S. military strategy. The world is transforming an immediate post-Cold War euphoria of American triumphalism and liberal democratic hubris to a more complicated picture. The return of wars and other conflicts among major powers, especially with respect to the rising capabilities and aspirations of China and Russia, creates uncertainty about the United States’ political objectives and military readiness in Europe and Asia. In addition, unprecedented challenges in climate change and pandemics; efforts to dethrone the dollar as the benchmark currency for international transactions; mass migration in unprecedented numbers; and new technologies for cyberwar, artificial intelligence, and the military uses of space all contribute to a possible bow wave of political regime destabilization and military planning vexation. Today’s certainties for politicians and their military advisors are tomorrow’s guesswork. 

Therefore, in choosing among competing presidential candidates, we need to understand their perspectives on this international environment of political complexity and military uncertainty. No country has unlimited resources, and even the United States, facing a cumulative deficit of more than $35 trillion, cannot continue unrestrained binge spending on domestic and foreign policy priorities. What, going forward, is America’s preferred geopolitical orientation or grand strategy? What military commitments and obligations derive from that grand strategy? And third, what assumptions should drive military preparedness for deterring wars and, if necessary, for fighting them?

Broadly speaking, the options for U.S. grand strategy include: (1) Godzilla Rex, or what has sometimes been termed “liberal hegemony”; (2) offshore balancing; (3) globalization unlimited; and (4) selective engagement and enlargement. Isolationism is eliminated as an option because, in today’s world of complex interdependence and media saturation, it would not be possible, even if deemed desirable by some.

Godzilla Rex was the U.S. position in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. An end to history and the perpetual triumph of liberal democracy was assumed by optimists about the post-Soviet world. The United States was a singular global superpower with no serious military rival. However, President Clinton reduced national focus on security and defense, including intelligence, which came back to haunt us after the attacks on 9/11. Nonetheless, the United States invaded Afghanistan to depose the Taliban in 2001 and struck down the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003. A Global War on Terror was declared, and both conflicts became “forever wars” that lasted well into the second decade of the present century. 

Offshore balancing was an alternative grand strategy favored by some academics and prominent policy analysts. From this perspective, the United States should limit large-scale military intervention to threats by a hostile power to dominate an essential region in ways inimical to U.S. and allied vital interests. Regional rivals would include a resurgent Russia in Europe, a rising China in Asia, and lesser but still dangerous disruptors in Asia (North Korea) or the Middle East (Iran). Under this approach, the United States would first seek to rely on regional allies to take the lead if they were prepared to do so, although the United States would otherwise act if our vital interests were threatened.

A third grand strategy, favored by many postmodern politicians and a worldwide community of activists, would emphasize transnational challenges over national rivalries and argue for moving issues such as climate change, poverty, migration, urbanization, pandemics, and disarmament to the front end of national policy agendas. From this perspective, great power rivalries and wars for hegemony are outdated relics of hyper-nationalism and excessive military influence over policy. Resources spent on defense and war-fighting should be diverted to international scientific collaboration and peacekeeping overseen by the United Nations or other international bodies. 

A fourth grand strategy is selective engagement and enlargement. This approach was supported by some in the Bill Clinton administration and emphasized economic growth through international cooperation and investment. Although there was broad agreement among Democrats and Republicans in the 1990s that liberalized free trade would be a rising tide that lifted all boats, it eventually became clear that some states would benefit much more directly than others. Military interventions were undertaken in the wake of a famine in Somalia in order to curb the power of warlords, resulting in the “Blackhawk Down” episode that led to a U.S. military withdrawal from that failed state. Elsewhere, the United States and NATO intervened to restore order in Bosnia in 1995 and waged war against Serbia in 1999 in order to prevent ethnic cleansing and sectarian strife in Europe. NATO’s attacks on Serbia in 1999 enraged the Russian government and its otherwise U.S.-friendly President Boris Yeltsin, a precursor of later objections to NATO enlargement by his successor, Vladimir Putin.

Among these competing grand strategies, the foreign and defense policies of the Biden administration have included some elements from each of the first three options. A Harris administration would most likely expand them. Growing defense budgets and robust U.S. and NATO military support for Ukraine against Russian invasion show that Godzilla Rex remains aspirational among both Democrats and many Republicans in Washington. U.S. support for Israel in the Middle East is close to offshore balancing against dangerous regional rivals (Iran and its proxies). Also, it reflects the historical American commitment to defending Israeli sovereignty against regional enemies. 

But so-called progressives in the Biden administration, including globalists as described above, have objected to Israel’s military tactics in the war against Hamas in Gaza. With regard to China, the Biden policy has been divided between options one and two: emphasizing a U.S. defense buildup and greater preparedness for an attempted Chinese military takeover of Taiwan or seeing China as more of an economic and informational competitor than an immediate military threat—although China’s growing capabilities for cyberwar and in space are admittedly of major concern. Still, others see China’s rise as a science and technology challenge that does not have to evolve into an arms race or war, which is more like option three. 

Where would a second Trump administration place itself in selecting among these grand strategies (or others)? It’s unknowable at the moment because Trump relies on his personal ability to engage with other heads of state in order to resolve international disputes. Some of his comments seem to endorse option one, Godzilla Rex. Still, he also prizes his ability to woo hostile leaders into more favorable alignments by grand summitry and selective engagement. Trump promises to crack down on illegal migration and on trade deals that disadvantage U.S. producers and manufacturers. 

In this respect, he combines old-style nationalism with an aggressive globalism turned upside down. He claimed credit for keeping the United States out of major wars during his administration, although he did authorize selective strikes against terrorists and rogue regimes. In public events during this year, he asserted that he would end the war in Ukraine between the time of his election in November 2024 and his inauguration in January 2025. Whether Ukrainian president Zelensky and Russian president Putin are on board with this timetable remains to be seen. In addition, during his term in the White House, some members of Congress and other commentators worried about Trump’s finger on the nuclear button should a Cold War-style nuclear crisis present itself. However, others noted that the U.S. decision-making process has safeguards against any presidential impetuosity.

Stephen Cimbala is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous books and articles on international security issues. 

Lawrence Korb, a retired Navy Captain, has held national security positions at several think tanks and served in the Pentagon in the Reagan administration.