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ECFR Council ( European Council on Foreign Relations Trump strikes Venezuela: Three conclusions for Europe - Carl Bildt - & January 2026

 ECFR Council ( European Council on Foreign Relations

Trump strikes Venezuela: Three conclusions for Europe

Trump’s military action in Venezuela highlights America’s hemispheric turn, its disregard for international law and the president’s growing reliance on force. Europe faces tough choices to defend its interests



Carl Bildt @carlbildt on X

Co-chair of ECFR’s Council

Former Prime Minister and Former Foreign Minister of Sweden

Commentary View from the Council 6 January 2026 3 minute read

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Captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro arrives at the Downtown Manhattan Heliport, as he heads towards the Daniel Patrick Manhattan Courthouse. January 5, 2026Image bypicture alliance / REUTERS | Eduardo Munoz ©


On January 3rd 2026, Donald Trump conducted a militarily successful but politically fraught intervention in Venezuela. For Europeans, three conclusions stand out. None are sensational, but all are important.


1.    Keep an eye on the western hemisphere

First, the US National Security Strategy’s prioritising of the western hemisphere really applies. This change is profound—it will shape many American policies during the second Trump administration.


At the turn of the 21st century, the security of Europe and the strength of the transatlantic relationship led US security concerns, with the former Soviet Union and later Russia its core focus. A decade ago, however, America started to pivot to Asia as a consequence of the spectacular rise of China, although it still retained attention on Europe. Now, suddenly, the western hemisphere is a distinct priority and Europe is sinking fast on the list of concerns.


The old Monroe doctrine, unexpectedly back in fashion, was meant to keep European powers away from the western hemisphere. In the mid-19th century, France had intervened militarily in Mexico and Britain’s Royal Navy was still ruling the waves. But in 2026, Trump’s renewed version—lately dubbed by the president as the “Donroe doctrine”—seems to focus primarily on securing US economic and business primacy, with an indirect aim at a Chinese state which is rapidly gaining ground.


When Trump met the media after the US military entered Venezuela and captured its president, Nicolás Maduro, he gave more attention to the importance of gaining control over the country’s oil than to fighting its drug smuggling.


Furthermore, Trump seems to believe that Russian and Chinese ships surround Greenland—there is, in fact, nothing of the sort. While Russia obviously cannot exit from its northern harbours through the north Atlantic, this is far away from Greenland. There is no doubt that, geographically, Greenland is in the western hemisphere: but equally clear is that it is a constituent part of Denmark and has been so for longer than California has been part of the United States. Its people are citizens of the European Union.


But Europe needs to be prepared for a confrontation with Trump over Greenland. He is obsessed with the western hemisphere; grossly ignorant about the facts at issue, but in warrior mode after the initial Venezuela success. Europe needs—figuratively, if nothing else—to load the guns.


2.    State sovereignty is sacred

Second—and hardly sensational—is that, according to Trump, international law has no role in the foreign and security policies of the US. After the events of January 3rd, there is a vigorous debate over whether his intervention was in accordance with domestic laws and constitutional practice. But that is for the US to sort out: the issue did not seem pressing to the country’s decision-makers.


For Europe, international law is not always sacrosanct. But it is generally seen as fundamental to any global order in which Europe feels it has a secure place. The Kosovo intervention in 1999, in which European NATO troops launched strikes against Yugoslav forces, was not legal by these standards. However, it was still judged to be legitimate since it took place within a coalition and was at least related to a broader process within the UN.


But overall, European states tend to believe that armed intervention in other sovereign states is, by all reasonable standards, a gross violation of international law. And state sovereignty is independent of the nature of the regime—or the nature of its rulers.


Maduro certainly lacked democratic legitimacy, with the president himself most likely a bandit; but neither of these mean that Venezuela is not a sovereign country. And to claim that the US was the object of aggression from Venezuela by criminal actors, with the right to act in self defence, simply does not hold water.


3.    Why use peace when force will do?

Trump has transformed from a self-declared champion for peace into a believer in the use of force to reach his objectives and enhance his standing


Third, Trump has transformed from a self-declared champion for peace into a believer in the use of force to reach his objectives and enhance his standing.


Many “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) Republicans campaigned against foreign interventions and forced regime change, which they saw as cardinal sins of previous administrations. And while Trump is probably still adverse to deploying the US army at large scale in foreign countries, he seems happy to use stealth bombers, cruise missiles and special forces to demonstrate his power.


If he perceives that Christians in Nigeria are under threat from the so-called Islamic State, a couple of cruise missiles launched into a field somewhere in the country’s northwest is his answer. If negotiations with Iran over the nuclear file turns out to be too complicated, stealth bombers can do the job. If people die in horrific numbers of overdoses on America’s streets, sending US special forces into Venezuela should do the trick.


Using force stimulates the hormones, but seldom sorts out the issue in question. The need remains for a diplomatic dialogue and deal with Tehran; the issue of Islamist violence in the Sahel requires long-term solutions; the challenge of crime cartels in Latin America or drug use in the US and Europe must be taken seriously. Nevertheless, action of a kinetic sort is now becoming nearly as popular a Trump tool as his beloved tariffs. In all probability there is more to come.


*


None of these three conclusions are entirely new. However, Trump is demonstrating that existing trends in US policy are being accelerated into more extreme versions. America is paying even less attention to Europe, showing even more disregard for international law, and becoming even more addicted to quick kinetic action.


The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.


Author


Carl Bildt @carlbildt on X

Co-chair of ECFR’s Council

Former Prime Minister and Former Foreign Minister of Sweden





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