American Enterprise Institute – AEI
Russia and Venezuela—Toward a New Yalta?
Angela Stent
Author by Angela Stent
Author Title : Senior Fellow
Date : January 08, 2026
Publisher ; Post | AEI deas
Category : Foreign and Defense Policy
The Kremlin’s response to Nicolas Maduro’s ousting has, so far, been notably muted. Aside from pro forma Foreign Ministry criticism of US actions and expressions of solidarity with Interim President Delcy Rodriguez Gomez’ government, neither Vladimir Putin nor his ubiquitous press spokesman Dmitry Peskov have uttered a word. And yet Venezuela has for decades been a significant Russian client state and anchor of Russian influence in Latin America. Could it be that Putin sees a silver lining in this latest apparent blow to Russia interests?
Putin has praised the Yalta system—when the USSR and the United States divided the world between them—as the model for international order: “The Yalta system was truly born in travail. Let’s be fair: it helped humankind pass through turbulent, and at times dramatic, events of the last seven decades. It saved the world from large-scale upheavals.” He understands that the reassertion of US dominance in the Western hemisphere will enable Russia to achieve two major goals—it will reassert its right to dominate its sphere of influence, after three decades of US attempts to prevent that. And it will have reduced incentives to make concessions on Ukraine.
Since Hugo Chavez’s rise to power, Russia has viewed Venezuela as a key client state in the United States’ backyard. It provided intelligence support to Venezuela, training its security forces and selling arms to Caracas. Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin was Russia’s point man in Venezuela, loaning billions of dollars to the country and in partnership with PDVSA seeking to revive its faltering oil industry. Rosneft had to pull back after the imposition of energy-related sanctions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Venezuela now owes Rosneft upwards of $2 billion out of a $6 billion debt to Russia—none of which may ever be repaid.
The Kremlin also helped Maduro to remain in power after the disputed 2018 election, when the Trump administration recognized his opponent Juan Guaido as the legitimate president. After the attempted 2019 uprising by forces loyal to Guaido, Russia dissuaded Maduro from leaving the country to go into exile.
Despite decades of investment in Venezuela, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s official response to Maduro’s ouster was weak: “We reaffirm our solidarity with the Venezuelan people and our support for the course of their Bolivarian leadership, which is aimed at protecting the country’s national interests and sovereignty.” Perhaps the muted response reflects Putin’s desire not to antagonize Donald Trump while negotiations to end the Russia-Ukraine war continue and Russia wants to avoid U.S. additional punitive measures.
Moreover, Russians also expressed admiration and envy for the US success. The Z-bloggers—who enthusiastically support the war in Ukraine—argued that Washington had carried out a successful “special military operation”, much more effectively than Russia’s operation in Ukraine. After all, what took US forces a few hours to accomplish has taken Russia four years—and it still has not ousted Zelensky or won the war. Their message: “Maybe it’s time we started hiring American generals and planners to serve Russia.” Others pointed out that, in view of the US seizure of the Maduros and intention to take over Venezuela’s oil fields, Washington can no longer criticize Russia for its actions against Ukraine.
It would be premature to conclude that Russia has lost out in Venezuela. The interim government will continue to have good ties with Russia, and, as long as the same people occupy key posts in the security apparatus, Russian influence will remain. It would only be curtailed if a new government comes to power, one that does not share Maduro’s political outlook and replaces the Chavista security apparatus.
US actions also carry new promise for the Kremlin. Together with ideas expressed in the administration’s new National Security Strategy, Trump’s insistence on America’s right to dominate the Western Hemisphere implies that other great powers have the same rights in their respective spheres of influence, as the US and USSR did during the Cold War.
Putin has argued that there are only three truly sovereign powers—Russia, the United States and China—and that all other, smaller countries have limited sovereignty and must bend to the will of their great power hegemon. This appears to be the Trump administration’s view as well. If the United States can oust leaders in its sphere of influence, then surely Russia can do the same in its sphere of influence—the former Soviet states and into Central and Eastern Europe. Will Venezuela usher in a new Yalta system? The Kremlin is hoping that it will, and that Moscow will have greater leeway in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. It hopes that Trump will accept its right to subjugate Ukraine as the administration continues to press for a quick end to the war.
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