Mismanaged rather than forgotten
FIIA (Finnish Institute of International Affairs)
BRIEFING PAPER 417 - September 2025
The war in Sudan in the era of a multipolar world
Introduction
Well into its third year, the war in Sudan shows few
signs of abating. The armed power struggle between
the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their loose
coalition of allies on one side, and the Rapid Support
Forces (RSF) and their network of affiliated groups
on the other, continues to drive a catastrophic
humanitarian crisis and erode the democratic
momentum generated by the nonviolent revolution
of 2018–2019. The main parties remain entrenched
in their positions, consolidating territorial lines of
control and declaring rival governments. Analysts
warn that the country faces the threat of partition.1
Since the start of the war, there have been several attempts at
negotiations facilitated by multiple
international and regional actors, the latest led by
the United States in early autumn 2025.2 However,
none of these dispersed initiatives have succeeded in
halting or significantly de-escalating the conflict.3
The faltering conflict management attempts and the
horrifying level of destruction have earned the war
the nickname of the forgotten war, a reference to
1 Khalafallah, Hamid (2025) “The Civilian Façade in Sudan’s War:
Rival Governments and the Battle for Legitimacy”. The Tahrir
Institute, 6 August. https://timep.org/2025/08/06/the-civilian
facade-in-sudans-war-rival-governments-and-the-battle-for
legitimacy/; Horner, Jonas (2025a) “Split decision: Why Sudan
is on the brink of partition – again”. Policy Brief, 27 February,
European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/
split-decision-why-sudan-is-on-the-brink-of-partition-again/.
2 After a cancelled meeting of the same group, the Sudan Quad,
i.e. the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Uae, announced
a shared roadmap for ending the war, on 12 September.
See U.S. Department of State (2025) Joint Statement on
Restoring Peace and Security in Sudan. https://www.
state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/
joint-statement-on-restoring-peace-and-security-in-sudan/.
3 Khalafallah, Hamid (2024) “Breaking the cycle:
Can Geneva Succeed
Where Jeddah Failed in Sudan?” The Tahrir Institute, 14 August.
https://timep.org/2024/08/14/breaking-the-cycle-can-geneva
succeed-where-jeddah-failed-in-sudan/.
the inadequate attention that the conflict receives
from major global powers.4 Overshadowed by the
wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, Sudan has
certainly received scant attention in foreign and
security policy discussions in Europe, for example.
Although the forgotten war narrative stems
from understandable frustration, it is not particu
larly well suited to the crisis in Sudan and, at worst,
may undermine efforts to address its enablers. As
noted by numerous reports and analyses, rather than
being forgotten, the conflict is closely monitored
and subjected to direct interference from an array of
neighbouring, regional, and international actors.5
For many of these actors, the political, economic,
and security dynamics in Sudan present valuable
opportunities to advance their core interests and
strengthen their regional and international influ
ence. The apparent inattention of Western powers
and liberal peacebuilding actors, including the
European Union (EU), ultimately reflects their shift
ing geoeconomic and geostrategic interests as well
as the changing power dynamics of the international
system.
This Briefing Paper analyses the war in Sudan in
the context of the shifting international order and its
implications for conflict dynamics and their man
agement. From this perspective, the war emerges as
a key battleground in the intensifying geopolitical
competition in a world characterised by multiple
poles or nodes of regional and international power.
4 See Booty, Natasha and Farouk Chothia (2025) Sudan war:
simple guide what is happening, BBC News, 4 July.
https://www.bbc.com/ news/articles/cjel2nn22z9o.
5 For an overview, see International Crisis Group (2025) “Sudan’s
Calamitous War: Finding a Path toward Peace”. Briefing N
204. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/
b204-sudans-calamitous-war-finding-path-toward-peace.
3
FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 417 The war in Sudan in the era of a multipolar world
The paper highlights three prominent features
of conflicts amid the shifting international order.
First, while the internationalisation of armed
conflicts is not a new phenomenon in Sudan or else
where, it is intensifying as the unipolar order gives
way to a multipolar one with more assertive powers.
Second, rather than taking the form of proxy wars,
these conflicts increasingly involve external actors
entangled in the primary conflict and its political
economy, yet less locked into fixed adversarial
positions with each other. This both complicates and
leaves room for conflict management.
Third, conflict management efforts are ever
more centred on the positions, (geo)economic and
(geo)strategic interests, and relative strength of the
armed actors and their backers. This risks further
marginalising local civilian agencies and leaving the
causes of conflict unaddressed. Without multilateral
efforts to address the geopolitical drivers and
support Sudanese civic actors, conflict management
will, at best, produce deals that repeat past mistakes
of forging elite-level, unsustainable pacts.
War embedded in political and conflict legacies.
The current war in Sudan escalated in April 2023,
when the power struggle between General Abdel
Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan
“Hemedti” Dagalo erupted over the issue of
integrating Hemedti’s RSF into the national army
(SAF). The two generals had risen to power in spring
2019 after ousting their former patron, authori
tarian leader Omar al-Bashir, following a massive
pro-democracy uprising. Having initially agreed to a
civil-military-led democratisation process, the two
generals launched a coup d’état in October 2021,
only to find themselves increasingly at odds with
one another over future power distribution. Notably,
the military heads had significant foreign support in
their rise to power, particularly from Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which saw
the events as an opportunity to advance their own
regional and strategic interests.6
6 Horner 2025a; Perteghella, Annalisa (2020) “A Pax Arabica
for Sudan?”. iSpi. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/
pax-arabica-sudan-26189.
The roots of the war lie in the historical legacies
of oppressive military rule, politically manipulated
regional and ethnic tensions, and violent conflict in
Sudan.7 Since independence, state power in Sudan
has most often been seized through military coups,
with security, political, and economic spheres of
power increasingly concentrated in the hands of a
few. This was the case under the al-Bashir regime
(1989–2019), which presided over the Second
Sudanese Civil War and the subsequent partition of
the country, a genocide against non-Arab groups in
Darfur, and the consolidation of wealthy, powerful
paramilitary leaders, such as General Hemedti. The
growth of a broad-based, unarmed pro-democracy
movement from 2018 to 2019 provided distinctive
momentum to sow the seeds for more pluralistic
governance in Sudan.8 However, to have had any
chance of succeeding, the transition towards demo
cratic rule would have required the military elites to
give up substantial power and face accountability for
their abuses of power. Sudanese experts and activists
repeatedly warned the international community
that this would not happen without significant and
concerted pressure on the generals.9
The war was initially concentrated in Khartoum,
but quickly spread to other regions in Sudan. The
RSF and its allies have gradually consolidated control
in Darfur and West Kordofan, although the besieged
city of El Fasher remains under SAF control. Since
spring 2025, the SAF has controlled the north and
east of the country, including Khartoum. In July
2025, the RSF declared a rival government to the
SAF-led one in Port Sudan and presented a transition
plan for the country, heightening concerns about its
fragmentation.
The humanitarian toll of the war has been
catastrophic. Over 150,000 people have died, and
over 12 million people have been forced to leave their
homes, creating the world’s worst displacement
crisis. Famine has been declared in multiple areas
7 Flint, Julie and Alex de Waal (2007) Darfur: A New History of a Long
War (revised and updated). London: Zed Books.
8 Mustasilta, Katariina (2019) “Three Scenarios for Sudan: From
nonviolent revolution to democratic reform?”. EUISS Conflict Series
Brief, 10. European Union Institute for Security Studies (eUiSS).
9 Luck, Taylor (2023) “Sudanese to world: Violence in Khartoum
shows strongmen can’t be trusted”. The Christian Science Monitor,
18 April. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2023/0418/
Sudanese-to-world-Violence-in-Khartoum-shows-strongmen-can-t
be-trusted.
FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 417 The war in Sudan in the era of a multipolar world
4
in Darfur, and approximately half of the population
(25 million people) face acute hunger. Both parties
stand accused of war crimes against the civilian
population, including the use of rape as a weapon of
war. The RSF and allied militias, in particular, face
accusations of genocidal violence in Darfur.1
Not a proxy war but a reflection of the multipolar world.
Rather than mobilising large-scale popular support
among the Sudanese people, the continued armed
struggle is enabled by a plethora of internal and
external affiliates and supporters with diverse, and at
times competing, economic, political, and security
interests. Internally, uneasy coalitions of armed
and political actors have formed behind the two key
parties: the SAF is backed by members of the former
al-Bashir government and Islamist groups, as well
as some of the armed groups that formerly rebelled
against the state. The RSF, in turn, has allied with
rival political elites and armed militias, and has
recently established the Tasis alliance with the prom
inent armed group, the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement-North (SPLM-N). The networked nature
of the warring parties further complicates negotia
tions, accelerates localised violence against civilians,
and risks spoiling any agreements that are reached.
The co-optation of civilian groups has fragmented
and weakened the pro-democracy forces, yet
grassroots groups such as the Emergency Response
Rooms (ERRs) continue to present an alternative to
the military-led factions.11
Entangled in these domestic networks, Sudan’s
war is fuelled by the interference of multiple exter
nal actors and the transboundary and international
flow of goods, arms, and financial and political
support. The UAE is widely considered the key ex
ternal enabler of the RSF’s armed struggle, including
through the provision of arms, which it denies. The
10 See Booty, Natasha and Farouk Chothia (2025) “Sudan war: a
simple guide to what is happening”, BBC News, 4 July.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjel2nn22z9o; Mishra, Vibhu (2025)
“Sudan faces unprecedented hunger and displacement as war enters
third year”.
Un News. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/04/1162096.
11 See Khalafallah, Hamid (2025) “Sudan’s Counterrevolutionary
War: The Systematic Targeting of Pro-Democracy Activists”. The
Tahrir Institute, 15 April. https://timep.org/2025/04/15/sudans
counterrevolutionary-war-the-systematic-targeting-of-pro
democracy-activists/.
SAF’s chief supporters include Egypt, Iran, and Saudi
Arabia. Neighbouring countries and other interna
tional actors – from Chad, Libya, Kenya, and Ethiopia to
Russia, Turkey, and Qatar – have also allegedly
sided with, and at times shifted support to, different
sides in the conflict. Figure 1 presents a simplified
mapping of the key external states involved.
As Figure 1 shows, Sudan is a prime example
of a highly internationalised civil war in that the
primary conflict parties receive support, including
weaponry, from foreign state actors. While foreign
interference in civil conflicts is not a new phenom
enon, the scope and nature of internationalisation
are shifting compared with the Cold War’s bipolarity
and the post-Cold War unipolar moment of liberal
order. In 2000, only four out of 40 internal conflicts
were internationalised, whereas in 2024, they were
19 out of 61, in addition to an increased number of
inter-state armed conflicts. 12 As Sudan illustrates,
more state powers are involved than before, and
a defining feature is the relatively even-handed
interference of regional and aspiring great powers,
sometimes alongside and sometimes replacing global
power rivalry. Far from being a forgotten war, Sudan
is a crowded battlefield of the shifting world order.
“Far from being a forgotten war,
Sudan is a crowded battlefield of the
shifting world order.”
External interference in Sudan is driven by
a series of factors, including its strategic location
between the Red Sea and the Sahel, as well as its
position as a bridge between Sub-Saharan Africa and
the Arab world. Other drivers include its rich natural
resources, particularly gold, as well as security and
political rationales, such as opposition to or promo
tion of political Islam.13 These factors are not new,
12 Davies, Shawn, Therese Pettersson, Margareta Sollenberg and
Magnus Öberg (2025) “Organized violence 1989–2024, and the
challenges of identifying civilian victims”. Journal of Peace Research,
62(4); Hellmüller, Sara and Fanny Badache (2025) “Children of
their time: The impact of world politics on United Nations peace
operations”. Contemporary Security Policy 46 (2): 177–196. https://
doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2025.2470590; Mustasilta, Katariina
(2021) “The future of conflict prevention – Preparing for a hotter,
increasingly digital and fragmented 2030”, Chaillot Paper, 167.
European Union Institute of Security Studies (eUiSS).
13 Horner 2025a
FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 417 The war in Sudan in the era of a multipolar world
5
SUDANESE ARMED FORCES (SAF)
RAPID SUPPORT FORCES (RSF)
THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE):
Alleged military support
Russia (Wagner, first year of the war),
Chad, Libya (Libyan National Army, LNA),
Ethiopia (reports of changing position),
Kenya and Uganda.
EGYPT: Alleged military support
IRAN: Alleged military support
SAUDI ARABIA: Political backing
Russia (especially since 2024), Turkey, Qatar, Libya
(Government of National Accord, GNA), Tigray People’s
Liberation Front (TPLF in Ethiopia) and
External interference in the war in Suda
The United States (US): Negotiation efforts; sanctions on warring sides; geopolitical focus on the “Quad”
(Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the US); criticised for outsourcing conflict management to the Gulf States.
China: Growing economic partnership role before the war; called for cessation of hostilities, yet also brought up Western
double standards over Gaza; Chinese weapons reportedly used by both parties; politically leaning towards the SAF.
The African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD): Key regional organisations – facilitated inter-Sudanese dialogue; conducted shuttle diplomacy and field visits; called for cessation of
hostilities and external interference; struggled to lead peace efforts and maintain a unified approach.
The European Union (EU): Humanitarian relief focus; sanctions; support for civil society; support for African-led
and other peace efforts; increasingly important EU-Gulf States relations complicate conflict response.
Figure 1. External interference in the war in Sudan. The figure lists the alleged external state supporters of the two main parties, organised from
key backers to other actors reportedly aligning with either side. The list is not exhaustive and simplifies the complex networks among these
actors. The third section outlines the role of key global powers and regional organisations.
Source: The figure builds on several research and news reports on
international dynamics in the Sudan war; see, for example, Hornet
(2025a) and existing ties, such as those between Egypt and
the SAF leadership, continue to shape the direction
of external support. Nevertheless, the fragmenting
international system makes these aspects ever more
attractive – or vulnerable – to foreign interference in
conflicts: great powers, aspiring great powers, and
regional powers strive to secure strategic advantages
and regional influence in an environment character
ised by declining trust in established international
norms and institutions. Political upheavals create
opportunities to expand influence, and the involve
ment of external actors becomes a vicious cycle in
which a state’s deeper involvement in a conflict fuels
the involvement of others. However, this does not
make the conflict in Sudan a proxy war. It is primarily
a power struggle between Sudanese actors, rooted in
the question of the nature of governance in the country.
Moreover, the concept of a proxy war misrepresents the
logic behind external actors’ interference in many of
today’s armed conflicts. Such interference is often
driven less by ideological battles or deep enmity
between foreign powers on opposing sides, and
is more complex and context-specific regarding
the underlying international relations. Take the
interference of the UAE and Egypt in Sudan, for
example. The two countries support opposite sides
in the war. Yet outside of the conflict, their rela
tionship is more cooperative than conflicting, with
the UAE being a strategically important partner for
Egypt. This reflects a more general feature of today’s
international system: partnerships are opportunistic
rather than deeply ideological and often issue- and
sector-based, and therefore amenable. While this
6
FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 417 The war in Sudan in the era of a multipolar world
makes multilateralism difficult and agreed settle
ments more unstable, it can also create opportunities
for negotiation, both at the general geopolitical level
and regarding specific issues.
Implications for conflict management attempts
As Sudan’s conflict history testifies, the shortcomings
and weak implementation of past peace deals have
contributed to the current protracted conflicts. There
is little point in romanticising the past US-led order
during which liberal values and norms, such as the
promotion of free-market democracy, human rights,
and inclusion, may have been more dominant but
were often poorly implemented in peace-making
practice. Rather, the point here is to underline some
of the implications of the shifting international order
for conflict management dynamics. In this regard, the
shift towards a multipolar order shapes peace efforts
in Sudan, and more broadly, in two primary ways: by
increasing the number of actors – “the chefs in the
kitchen” – that have the influence and incentives to
initiate conflict management efforts, and by inten
sifying the contestation of established norms and
institutions.
There have been several rounds of negotiation
efforts regarding the war in Sudan, facilitated by
various international and regional powers: for ex
ample, by Saudi Arabia and the US in Jeddah in May
2023; by Arab intelligence services in Manama in
early 2024; by the US, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland
in Geneva in August 2024; by Turkey in early 2025;
and by the US in July 2025. These talks have brought
together different sets of primary conflict parties and
external states, but have shown little coordination
and connection between initiatives. Regional and
neighbouring countries have also hosted talks
between and among the diverse Sudanese coalitions,
while the EU and the UK have hosted conferences
on the humanitarian situation and facilitated talks
among Sudanese civil society actors.
A notable feature of conflict management efforts
is the dual role played by regional actors. For ex
ample, both Qatar and Saudi Arabia have presented
themselves as neutral peacemakers while reportedly
supporting the SAF, whereas Egypt – the SAF’s key
supporter – is considered essential in facilitating
relations between the UAE and the SAF. Biased third
parties with leverage over certain warring actors
taking on mediation roles is nothing new. Such
involvement can be effective in pressuring their
favoured side to commit. Yet achieving credible
commitments becomes difficult when multiple
conflict management initiatives overlap and regional
powers act as peacemakers while continuing to
support parties to the conflict.
This is particularly the case when – as in
Sudan – there is no coordinated pressure on the
external powers themselves. This stems in part from
intensifying great-power competition and norms
contestation within the UN Security Council, which
has prevented a strong global multilateral response
to the war.14 It also stems from the intertwined
interests of global and increasingly assertive regional
powers. For the US, and likewise for the EU as dis
cussed below, economic and security relations with
the Gulf States have become increasingly important
in today’s more competitive world. Both actors now
have less leverage over these states and seemingly
less willingness to exercise that leverage.
“Negotiation efforts have largely focused on geopolitical
issues, without much consideration for the deep andjustified
grievances and mistrust that Sudanese civil society
has towards the military elites.”
Meanwhile, the region’s key multilateral
actors, particularly the African Union (AU) and
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD), have struggled to assume leadership and
provide credible, acceptable frameworks for coor
dinating conflict management efforts. The existing
rules and institutions, such as the arms embargo
on Darfur, as well as peacebuilding norms, such as
inclusivity in peace processes, have been grossly
neglected. Consequently, negotiation efforts have
14 Thus far, the Security Council has called for an end to the siege of El Fasher and has extended the Sudan sanctions
regime, including targeted sanctions and an arms embargo
(on Darfur). See Security Council Report (2025) September 2025
Monthly Forecast for Sudan.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-09/
sudan-37.php.
FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 417 The war in Sudan in the era of a multipolar world
largely focused on geopolitical issues, namely the
interests of external backers and key Sudanese
military leaders, without much consideration for
the deep and justified grievances and mistrust that
Sudanese civil society has towards the military
elites. President Trump’s attempt to bring together
the Sudan Quad – the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
and Egypt – is apparently modelled on his peace
agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, with natural resource control
and power- sharing deals in exchange for peace.15
Again, such transactional deals are not new to the
field of peace-making. Yet there was a time in the
post-Cold war period when the dominance of lib
eral values and norms helped in putting pressure on
both national and international actors to strive for
inclusion and to address the root causes of conflicts
in negotiations. Now, the balance is shifting (back)
to the side of the armed actors and their backers.
The way forward: Carving out space to support Sudanese peace
In a system marked by growing power competition
and declining multilateralism, ad hoc efforts and
transactionalism seem to prevail and characterise
conflict responses. The most realistic scenario
for a brokered deal may well be a Trumpian-style
settlement centred on control over and benefits from
Sudan’s key strategic (natural) resources, with little
regard for what happens next or beyond the geopo
litical dynamics. This will not bring about sustainable
peace, however; at best it may buy time, and at worst
it risks derailing Sudanese efforts to create the condi
tions for peace and legitimate governance.
The resulting dynamics of conflict management are
particularly challenging for Sudanese grassroots de
mocracy and human rights activists and groups. They
are also difficult for multilateral organisations, such
as the AU, and for traditional liberal actors, particu
larly the EU, whose roles as conflict responders are
built on commitments to multilateralism, facilitative
and coordinating (rather than highly manipulative)
mediation, and an inclusive approach to peace pro
cesses. To gain any leverage over the armed parties
15 See Mohammed, Abdul and Alex de Waal (2025)
“Only the Sudanese Can Save Sudan – Even if Trump
Stops the War”. World Peace Foundation, 16 July.
https://worldpeacefoundation.org/blog/
only-the-sudanese-can-save-sudan-even-if-trump-stops-the-war/.
or their external backers, these actors would also require unity
among their members, which is difficult to attain in the current
international climate.
The situation in Sudan is particularly challenging
for the EU. On the one hand, it has tried to main
tain the moral high ground on the war by stepping
up humanitarian support for the Sudanese, imposing
sanctions based on UN SC mandates, and publicly
supporting the AU and other regional efforts. On
the other hand, the EU has paid relatively little
attention to Sudan in its geopolitical engagement
with the Gulf States, for example, with whom it
simultaneously seeks to deepen economic relations
through bilateral and multilateral frameworks.16 This
tension between its conflict-response identity and
its geopolitical agency ultimately risks weakening its
credibility as an actor on all fronts.
Even if united, the EU and its member states
could not, on their own, pressure the key external
actors to stop fuelling the war. Yet, given its evolving
relations with the Gulf States and its networks with
Sudanese civil society actors, the EU could be well
placed to help connect the different tracks of conflict
management and, in particular, to convince regional
powers of the futility of continuing to unequivocally
support Sudan’s military actors. This does not
need to be done from a position of moral authority.
Rather, the EU should build its diplomatic engage
ments around the long-term strategic interests and
political reputation of all key external actors.
In concrete terms, the EU and its member
states could also step up support for Sudanese
pro-democracy groups and civic actors. Local civic
actors, such as the ERRs, have become increasingly
important grassroots governance actors during the
war, and are consequently trusted and regarded as
legitimate by many Sudanese.17 More broadly, they
represent a much-needed localised model for aid
delivery, from which valuable lessons can be drawn
in the current context of weakening international
16 Sidło, Katarzyna (2025) “Calibrated engagement: Evolving
relations between the eU and the Gulf Region”. EUISS Brief 18,
eUiSS. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025-
07/Brief_2024_18_gCC_3.pdf.
17 Khaid, Kholood (2024) “Local aid groups are keeping Sudan
alive”. The World Today, Chatham House. https://www.
chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2024-12/
local-aid-groups-are-keeping-sudan-alive; Horner, Jonas (2025b)
“The falcons and the secretary bird: Arab Gulf states in Sudan’s
war”. Policy Brief, 30 July, eCfr. https://ecfr.eu/publication/
the-falcons-and-the-secretary-bird-arab-gulf-states-in-sudans-war/.
FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 417 The war in Sudan in the era of a multipolar world
8
cooperation regimes. The abolition of USAID, the US
foreign aid agency, has undermined their ability to
work, and increased EU support would be well in
line with both its values and its pragmatic interests.
In a world of transactional deals and realpolitik,
calls for inclusive processes, civilian empowerment,
and efforts to address the root causes of conflict may
seem old-fashioned. Yet in Sudan, as elsewhere,
whether these factors are addressed or neglected
will determine what happens after agreements
are signed. Support for pro-democratic and local
human rights groups should not be seen as taking
the moral high ground, but rather as a strategic
priority in the long-term perspective – both for the
stability of Sudan and for international security.
This is particularly true from the perspective of
international actors such as the EU, for whom global
democratic backsliding and the rising militarisation
of international politics present serious geopolitical
and security challenges.
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