EURASIA DAILY MONITOR The Jamestown Foundation Iran’s Paradoxical Expectations for Political Developments in Armenia Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 105 By: Vali Kaleji July 17, 2024 04:58

 EURASIA  DAILY  MONITOR

The Jamestown Foundation

Iran’s Paradoxical Expectations for Political Developments in Armenia

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 105

By: Vali Kaleji

July 17, 2024 04:58 PM Age: 6 days

(Source: Primeminister.am)

Executive Summary:

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is moving Armenian foreign policy away from traditional alliances with Russia and Iran, favoring closer ties with the West which could be an important paradigm shift in its foreign policy after dependence on Moscow and Tehran.

Yerevan’s new foreign policy orientation has made relations with Moscow and Tehran ambiguous. Both capitals worry about reduced cooperation based on Yerevan’s withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization and increased Western influence in the region through increasing political and economic cooperation with European Union and development of military and defense cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States and France.

Pashinyan seeks peace with Azerbaijan and Türkiye and to increase regional trade. A return of nationalist leaders in Armenia, however, could revive ties with Russia and stoke regional tensions, complicating Iran’s position in the South Caucasus.

Six years after the “MerzhirSerzhin” (RejectSerzh) movement brought Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power in May 2018, the Armenian political scene is still turbulent. In the latest development, demonstrations and protests led by Armenian Apostolic Church clergymen occurred in response to Yerevan’s decision to hand four deserted border villages to Baku to settle decades-old territorial disputes between the two neighbors (see EDM, April 8, May 14, June 5; Al Jazeera, June 10). Relations between Armenia and its traditional ally Russia have grown cold and tense. While Yerevan is developing relations with new partners such as France and India, the reverberations of Armenia’s withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has become louder than ever (see EDM, March 5; Anadolu Agency, June 12). Additionally, Speaker of the Armenian National Assembly Alen Simonyan has suggested that Armenia might soon hold a referendum on pursuing EU membership (OC Media, June 28). Regardless of the implementation of such decisions, a “paradigm shift” is taking shape in Armenia’s foreign policy, which differs significantly from the country’s traditional approach from 1991 to 2018. Russia is undoubtedly not satisfied with Armenia’s current approach and has repeatedly protested Pashinyan’s government. Iran’s perception and attitude toward developments in Armenia is a significant factor in the region’s geopolitics which has received less attention. The advantages and disadvantages of Pashinyan’s government staying or falling for Iran are yet to be seen.

Following Armenia’s independence, Tehran’s balanced approach in the South Caucasus and the Karabakh conflict led to a close relationship between Iran and Armenia. All three of Armenia’s previous leaders—Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Robert Kocharyan, and Serzh Sargsyan—enjoyed close relations with Iran and Russia. The “unwritten agreement and alliance” between Tehran, Yerevan, and Moscow had a crucial role in balancing power dynamics in the South Caucasus (Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, June 15, 2023). In this regard, Armenian leaders were cautious in developing relations with the West, especially Israel.

When Pashinyan came to power in May 2018, the prevailing view in Iranian conservative media was that his government was the result of a Western-backed “color revolution” (Tabnak News Agency, June 27, 2018). While the Iranian government was trying to maintain close and traditional relations with Armenia, the tensions in relations between Armenia and Russia and Yerevan’s proximity to the West, especially the development of Armenia’s ties with Israel, strengthened this conviction in Iran (Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, September 10, 2020).

Pashinyan’s current approach toward Russia, especially Armenia’s announcement of withdrawal from the CSTO, is not desirable for Iran (Interfax, June 13). From Tehran’s point of view, this approach will further weaken cooperation between Iran, Armenia, and Russia. Additionally, it will change the balance of power in the region in favor of Türkiye, the West, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Iran is against the intervention of extra-regional forces in the South Caucasus and thus proposed the “3+3” format (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia “plus” Iran, Türkiye, and Russia) for cooperation in the Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War (see EDM, June 16, 2021). Unsurprisingly, former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi spoke out against “the presence of outside forces” in the region when he met with Pashinyan in Tehran in November 2023. Raisi’s remarks followed the first deployment of EU monitors to Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan (Sahakian, March 23, 2023; see EDM, March 11).

The latest agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pashinyan plays a significant role in this regard. Both sides agreed to withdraw Russian forces and border guards from various parts of Armenia earlier this year (see EDM, April 22, May 2). Specifically, the Russian border guards stationed in the Tavush border area between Azerbaijan and Armenia are withdrawing from the area. While it was thought the agreement included Russian guards on Armenia’s border with Iran and Türkiye, in May, Alexander Bortnikov, head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), announced that “Russian border guards will continue to carry out service on Armenia’s borders with Türkiye and Iran” (Public Radio of Armenia, May 14). Furthermore, according to the challenges of the Zangezur Corridor for Iran, a power vacuum could be created on the common border if the Russian guards were to leave abruptly. Such a vacuum could be filled with new foreign forces, especially Western forces and NATO (see EDM, October 14, 2022). The recent military agreements between France and Armenia, as well as the joint military exercises between Armenia and the United States, have also intensified concerns in Tehran and Moscow.

Despite disagreements, the Pashinyan government, unlike previous governments, is willing to make peace and normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. This could lead to the end of ethnic and territorial conflicts around Iran’s northwestern borders, the development of transit and trade routes via Iranian territory in the South Caucasus, the revival of a Soviet-era railway, and Iran’s renewed access to the Caucasus railway network after three decades (Baku Dialogues, Fall 2022). Additionally, with the reduction of relations between Armenia and Russia, which could lead to the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly in the Russian gas market, Iran will have the opportunity to increase gas exports to Armenia and even Georgia.

On the one hand, if Pashinyan’s government falls, the coming to power of more nationalist Armenian leaders could revive the traditional alliance between Armenia and Russia. Under those circumstances, Armenian participation in the CSTO would likely continue, and the process of Armenia’s rapprochement with the West, NATO, and Israel would be slowed. Additionally, if the current opposition came to power, it would likely halt any talks of opening and developing the Zangezur Corridor, which has been a major concern for Iran (see EDM, October 11, 2023, March 27). The background of Armenian nationalist and conservative leaders also indicates a positive attitude toward Iran. Thus, if the opposition came to power, it could revive the “unwritten agreement and alliance” between Iran, Armenia, and Russia. That development might help return the original power balance in the South Caucasus and strengthen the economic and commercial relations of Iran, Armenia, and Russia in the Eurasian Economic Union.

On the other hand, the nationalist and traditional movements of Armenia could stop, or at least slow down, peace negotiations and the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The Armenian opposition could also make the 3+3 format weaker in its current fragile state, and the revival of Iran’s involvement in South Caucasus transit and trade, especially restoring the Soviet-era railway, could face serious uncertainty and ambiguity.

Iran faces a paradoxical situation in determining Armenia’s future course. Tehran has expectations and interests in the South Caucasus, which neither Pashinyan’s government nor the opposition, nationalist, or conservative political leaders of Armenia can fulfill. These conditions have put Iran’s geopolitical calculations in a paradoxical position. While it seems that Iran’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus will not change significantly with its new president, Iran’s new government must consider different scenarios in the political developments of Armenia to acheive its goals and interests in the South Caucasus.