There is a sobering wind of change in the air. The Russian threat, once minimized by European politicians, is clear; US politics may become more insular and less willing to fund European security while growing cooperation between China’s communists and the Kremlin has made the issues of Asian security increasingly inseparable from European security.

This is a difficult landscape for anyone to navigate, but European countries might find a way if they’re willing to reconsider the fundamentals.

Much of the recent debate about NATO’s future has focused on the rebuilding of its military capabilities, implementing the new regional plans, and integrating new members — Finland and Sweden — into the alliance’s military and political structures. 

The US has a keen interest in this, but it cannot view global events through a mono-continental lens. It must also think of the Asia-Pacific region.

If Europeans want to remain secure under the American nuclear umbrella, the national security priorities of the United States’ allies in Europe must include the Pacific and they must be ready to contribute to stability in that theater. This is not simply a matter of geopolitical need (though that is acute.) It is also a matter of self-interest at a time when Americans are, with some reason, asking Europeans to make a greater contribution to the common good.

Until now Europe, especially Germany, has sought to separate the economic aspects of its relations with China from the military threat posed by its drive for regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. France too has hesitated — blocking efforts to open a NATO office in Japan last year. “Whatever people say, geography is stubborn,” President Macron said at the time.

This year though, there were some signs of change. At the 75th anniversary summit in July, NATO took the unprecedented step of rebuking China for its critical role in aiding the Russian war machine in Ukraine (according to US officials, Russia imports nearly 70% of its machine tools and 90% of its microelectronics from Beijing) and for its “deepening strategic partnership” with the Kremlin.

In the final communiqué, the allies referred to China as a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war and warned it poses “systemic challenges” to European interests and security. 

For NATO’s European allies, this marked the first tangible step to recognizing the comprehensive nature of the threat China poses to all democracies. The summit declaration demonstrates that China is fast becoming a part of the European security equation and that for NATO to hold its place as the premiere collective defense alliance in the world, it must recognize the threat China increasingly poses to its security, and act upon it.

Deepening Chinese-Russian cooperation underscores that security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are linked. There is now no way to separate the Atlantic and the Pacific theaters. The Sino-Russian challenge to the US-built world order will be keenly felt across the world. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida gave expression to this sentiment when he declared that the “Ukraine of today may be East Asia of tomorrow.”

The 32 NATO members stated that China “cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without negatively impacting its interests and reputation.” This was the closest the Europeans have come thus far to putting Beijing on notice that it needs to change its approach if it wants to maintain close economic ties with Europe. 

The discussion makes China edgy. It responded to the alliance statement by accusing NATO of seeking to bring chaos to Asia and of interfering in Chinese internal politics. Predictably, it made no mention of the Chinese troops exercising in Belarus in July, close to the Polish border, or its regular and growing military drills with Russia in the Pacific region.

There are signs Europe recognizes that countries must look beyond their backyards. The UK sent a carrier task group to the region and plans to do so again next year, while also signing a stationing of forces agreement with Japan. France and Italy have also sent naval task groups. Defense industrial cooperation is increasing, with South Korea’s $23bn arms sales to Poland one example, and the multibillion-dollar UK-Japan-Italy Global Combat Air Program another.

As part of the AUKUS agreement, the UK announced that Australian submariners would receive training aboard Astute-class submarines, and earlier this year Australia selected the UK’s BAE Systems to build the country’s fleet of nuclear-powered submarines – part of a landmark pact between Canberra, London, and Washington that will also see Australia buy up to five nuclear submarines from the US in the early 2030s.  

It is also telling that four partners in the Indo-Pacific region — Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, sometimes referred to as the Indo-Pacific Four, or IP4 — have participated in the last three NATO summits. This engagement is likely to expand going forward, especially if China’s pressure on Taiwan builds. 

NATO is sometimes compared to a massive aircraft carrier when it comes to decision-making — it cannot turn on a dime and there are multiple moving pieces that must work in sync to reach the desired end-state. 

In this sense the Washington summit, though it failed to outline a specific path to NATO membership for Ukraine, may yet be transformative. Historians may look back at the gathering as the first step toward building a larger global alliance to counter not just Russia, but also China.  And while there is much to complain about when it comes to the tenuous allied unity these days, the Washington summit suggests that a larger anti-Russia and anti-China coalition could be forming, and with it a new strategy — long overdue — for the world’s democracies. 

Chels Michta is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Chels is a former CEPA Title VIII Fellow and is currently a military intelligence officer serving in the US Army.   

The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Army, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.