Biden will leave an enduring legacy of linking economic and national security
This is part of a series of articles in which our experts offer “first rough drafts of history” examining US President Joe Biden’s policy record and potential legacy as his administration enters its final months, following Biden’s July 21 announcement that he will not seek reelection.
Three years ago, Brian Deese, then the director of the National Economic Council at the White House, came to the Atlantic Council to announce the Biden administration’s new “industrial policy.” Considering that the term had largely been taboo in economic orthodoxy in recent decades, the announcement took many of us at the Council—and throughout Washington—by surprise. But what Deese outlined that day will turn out to be one of the enduring legacies of the Biden administration: coordinated policy to steer public and private capital toward revitalizing domestic manufacturing and prioritizing the technologies needed to compete with China.
The legislation that made up the backbone of this industrial policy will have ripple effects for the rest of the decade: the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. In total, the legislation authorized more than two trillion dollars in spending and tax incentives over ten years. But it wasn’t just the money; it was also the fact that major subsidies were directed to US companies producing semiconductors, clean energy, and electric-vehicle batteries. The Biden administration will point to the eight hundred thousand manufacturing jobs and fifteen million total jobs created in the past four years as proof of the success of these policies. Critics will say that the spending was misallocated, fueled the deficit, and contributed to inflation.
The final verdict will come in the years ahead, when all the investments finally pay off—or don’t. But already, the legacy of the decision is clear: There is a bipartisan consensus now on investing in domestic manufacturing. Whether former President Donald Trump or Vice President Kamala Harris becomes the next president—and even if the sectors he or she chooses to focus on are different—that kind of economic policymaking is not going away.
What motivated the Biden administration’s economic framework wasn’t only creating jobs at home . . . The equally important ambition was competing with China.
Of course, the rest of the world took notice of the world’s largest economy making a major macroeconomic shift. The Inflation Reduction Act in particular alarmed European allies who saw their own companies racing to set up US subsidiaries and take advantage of the new law’s incentives to manufacture in the United States.
The administration tried to explain that this new economic approach wasn’t about the United States going it alone. Two years ago, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen announced the administration’s “friendshoring” strategy at the Atlantic Council. She spoke in detail about how one of the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic was the need to rethink supply chains and work more closely with partners and allies to achieve economic security and resilience, not just maximize speed and reduce cost. Her choice of the term “friends” was intentional. It was meant to be an outstretched hand to countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia, not just traditional US allies.
Being a friend didn’t mean being a full partner—at least in the ways other countries had come to expect during the previous decades. The Biden administration has remained unwilling to open the US market to allies and other countries any further and has instead pursued trade-facilitation dialogues through plurilateral arrangements, in particular the Trade and Technology Council with the European Union and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity with the Asia-Pacific. While these were welcome steps, officials from several countries who met with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center team over the years said privately that it wasn’t enough.
What motivated the Biden administration’s economic framework wasn’t only creating jobs at home, although that certainly was a goal. The equally important ambition was competing with China. Biden maintained Trump’s unprecedented tariffs on Chinese goods and added to them earlier this year. The lines between economic policymaking and national security continued to intertwine—and will be impossible to disconnect in the years to come.
Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo best encapsulated this dynamic when she discussed Chinese electric vehicles at the Atlantic Council in January. Raimondo pointed to the unfair trade distortions created by Chinese subsidies, which could hurt US automakers. (That’s the domestic part of the Biden administration’s economic policy.) Then she pointed out that sensors in those cars could be used for surveillance; Chinese authorities, in fact, are worried enough about US surveillance that they do not allow Tesla cars near secure facilities. (That’s the national security argument.)
It would be a mistake to say that Biden created a new paradigm in economic policymaking. Instead, he helped rediscover an old idea—one that was part of the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944, but that the United States largely had the luxury of forgetting in recent decades: Economic security and national security are deeply interconnected. Whatever policies come next, that lesson won’t be forgotten again anytime soon.
Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser at the International Monetary Fund.
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