CHATHAM HOUSE The Fatah–Hamas agreement increases Chinese influence in Palestinian affairs. But the road to unity is rocky For Palestinian factions a new agreement is more about short term ideological and political priorities than establishing a genuine united front.

 CHATHAM HOUSE 

The Fatah–Hamas agreement increases Chinese influence in Palestinian affairs. But the road to unity is rocky

For Palestinian factions a new agreement is more about short term ideological and political priorities than establishing a genuine united front.

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PUBLISHED 24 JULY 2024 3 MINUTE READ

Ahmed Aboudouh

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

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The national unity agreement signed by Hamas and Fatah in Beijing on 23 July will not put China on a par with the United States in the Middle East or establish it as an alternative mediator. 

Washington has no role in this game, as it can’t speak directly to Hamas. Similar conditions facilitated the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian normalization of March 2023. China’s aims in brokering the declaration are more strategic and long-term.

In this case, negotiations have only achieved broad principles, not a comprehensive agreement. True Palestinian unity requires a structural change in the Palestinians’ political and ideological heritage; deep reform and inclusion of all factions in their institutions; democratic elections; and, above all, an end to the war in Gaza. 

Like other previous declarations, this one is likely to be a mirage. But China, Fatah, and Hamas have each clinched their own victories.

A win-win statement

China’s obvious motivation in hosting the negotiations is to demonstrate a desire to play a responsible role as a major power. This has been the linchpin in Beijing’s Middle East strategy. 

China wants to convince Palestinians (and Arabs broadly) that there is a contrast between its approach – seeking unity among Palestinians – and that of the US: Washington is widely perceived in the region as having implicitly supported Israeli efforts to keep Palestinians divided. Before 7 October, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supported Hamas’s control of Gaza, seeking to perpetuate the split in Palestinian leadership. And Washington chose to turn a blind eye.

This new agreement reflects China’s belief that the establishment of a Palestinian state requires internal unity between the Palestinians, with no exception.

China also perceives regional stability as predicated on the end of the war in Gaza and the establishment of a Palestinian state. 

That stability is crucial to preventing a regional conflagration, keeping oil flowing from the Gulf, ensuring freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Red Sea, and protecting and growing its regional Belt and Road investments. 

This new agreement reflects China’s belief that the establishment of a Palestinian state requires internal unity between the Palestinians, with no exception. In effect, it rehabilitates Hamas as an internationally recognized political entity that represents a significant part of the Palestinian population.

This is hugely significant to Hamas, which has been decimated by the war with Israel. A senior Hamas official told me: ‘China’s recognition as a major power is crucial for us’.

Hamas also sees the talks as a mitigating mechanism against Biden’s ‘lame-duck’ situation in the US, which they fear could weaken prospects of a ceasefire agreement. If Trump becomes president, Netanyahu may get free rein to prolong the war further.

Fatah’s compromises

In February, Fatah and Hamas nearly agreed to form a unity government. But Fatah’s leader, President Mahmoud Abbas, ignored the talks and appointed Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as head of a new government composed chiefly of technocrats. The prospect for alignment collapsed as a result. 

In the new declaration, Fatah compromises on most of Hamas’s demands, including forming a unity government overseeing the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

During the first round of talks in Beijing in April, the two groups initially reached an understanding over an eight-point document as a basis for negotiations in the next round. But this was followed by a rift that postponed a second round of talks in June. 

In the new declaration, Fatah compromises on most of Hamas’s demands, including forming a unity government overseeing the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. It agrees to general elections, and the right to ‘resist the occupation’ by all possible means (including armed struggle, which contradicts Fatah’s doctrine). It even calls Hamas and al-Jihad ‘valiant resistance’ movements.

Necessity

For Fatah, these significant compromises are a pragmatic necessity. Abbas wants to achieve three objectives: to soothe the anger of a Palestinian population widely supportive of Hamas’s resistance narrative; to procrastinate on reforming the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and keep Hamas and the Islamic Jihad out of it (they aspire to take it over); and to prepare for future upheaval with Washington if Trump wins the elections. Abbas also wants to keep the PA’s security cooperation with Israel alive, despite the two groups’ objections.

The viability of reconciliation relies on the US’s ability to get a ceasefire deal over the line before November.

The declaration language reveals that its implementation has been shrewdly made conditional on a decree from Abbas, putting the whole process at his mercy. Another spoiler is the absence of any specific time frame or implementation mechanism to make it reality.

  

Thus, the Beijing agreement is related primarily to the uncertainties coming from Washington, both groups’ popularity and ideological priorities and the relationship with Israel under the Oslo Accords. It is much less about establishing genuine unity in Palestine.

Another takeaway is that the viability of reconciliation relies on the US’s ability to get a ceasefire deal over the line before November. There is now a broad consensus in the international community that a deal has to be structured as an initial stage of a peace process that leads to a two-state solution.  

China’s objective

This is where China’s ultimate objective lies. Beijing is vying to play a central role in any long-term conflict resolution. Hosting Palestinian unity talks paves the way for a united Palestinian political and social front as a condition for the state’s stability. It also increases Beijing’s influence over Palestinian factions and, subsequently, the future state and its institutions. 

Image — Mahmoud al-Aloul of Fatah, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Mussa Abu Marzuk of Hamas at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on July 23, 2024. (Photo by PEDRO PARDO/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)

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Article 2nd half

China’s influence over Israel was already limited. It has further diminished after castigating Israel and siding with the Palestinians since 7 October. It’s significant that while Palestinians were meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Netanyahu was on a plane to Washington to meet with President Biden and address the Congress. 

By brokering Palestinian unity, China hopes to become the representative of Palestinian interests on the international stage.

Israel’s political and military establishment have no interest in replacing the US as the sole arbiter in the peace process. 

By brokering Palestinian unity, China hopes to become the representative of Palestinian interests on the international stage in any peace arrangements. 

That would put its influence over the design of a future settlement on a par with the US. Beijing’s most favourable scenario is to oust the US from its unique privileged position as peacemaker in favour of a multilateral UN-led international peace conference where China and the US are equals at the centre.    

Chinese diplomats will host more Beijing meetings with the Palestinians. They will also visit Doha and Ramallah to build momentum following this agreement. But much is uncertain. 

For this agreement to mean anything, there must first be a ceasefire in Gaza and a favourable outcome in the US presidential elections – followed by successful implementation of the measures agreed. That still seems a very long way off.