What History Tells Us Will
Happen to Trumpism
Populist movements have a knack for sticking around
long after their leaders leave office.
FEBRUARY 16, 2021
GETTY / THE
ATLANTIC
Since leaving office,
Donald Trump has been acquitted in a second impeachment trial, and has
reportedly considered launching a new political party, investing in a social-media app, and, perhaps more predictably,
making another run for the White House in 2024. In a statement following his acquittal, Trump
declared the trial “yet another phase of the greatest witch hunt in the history
of our Country,” adding, “Our historic, patriotic, and beautiful movement to
Make America Great Again has only just begun.”
There are plenty of
reasons to take Trump at his word. If populist movements have proved anything,
it’s their remarkable staying power, even after their leaders have been removed
from power, democratically or otherwise. From Berlusconism in Italy to Perónism
in Argentina and Fujimorismo in Peru, personality-driven movements rarely fade
once their leaders have left office. In the face of victimization, real or
imagined, they often thrive.
What, then, of Trumpism?
While these movements differ in ideology and context, they can be instructive
in anticipating what happens next.
SILVIO BERLUSCONI
Of the world’s most notable populist leaders, perhaps none has garnered
more comparisons to Trump than the former Italian prime minister. Berlusconi
was Trump before Trump: a billionaire businessman
and television personality who rose to power by railing against the political
establishment and pledging to represent the interests of ordinary people.
Though his career of more than two decades has been dogged by scandals,
investigations, and trials—evidence, Berlusconi claimed in 2009, that he is “the most
persecuted” person in history—he has nonetheless remained a political force
since his (most recent) resignation from the premiership in 2011, both within
his center-right Forza Italia party, of which he remains leader, as well as
in national politics more broadly.
A notable difference
between Trump and Berlusconi is that the latter has lost elections without incident. Still, there
are elements of Berlusconi’s long tenure that Trump could seek to emulate, not
least his ability to stage multiple political comebacks (his latest, as a
lawmaker in the European Parliament).
But perhaps Berlusconi’s
greatest success has been in his ability to retain his base of loyal
supporters—a personality cult that continues to see him as akin to a god. This
is one outcome Trump can likely rely on: Even in the aftermath of last month’s
deadly insurrection on Capitol Hill, Republican voters still approve of the
former president in overwhelming numbers, as do many of
the Republican state parties across the
country.
JUAN PERÓN
To understand the
importance that a loyal base can play, look no further than Perónism. The
populist movement, which dates back to the rise of former Argentine President
Juan Perón in the 1940s, continues to be the preeminent political force in the
country, more than four decades after its namesake’s death. This has to do
largely with how Perón came to power and, crucially, how he lost it.
Like most populist
figures, Perón cast himself as an advocate of ordinary citizens, and, in many
ways, he was: In addition to advancing workers’ rights, he oversaw the
enfranchisement of women in Argentina. But, like other populists, Perón became
more and more authoritarian over the course of his rule, jailing his political
opponents, vilifying the media, and restricting constitutional rights. By 1955,
after nearly a decade in power, Perón was deposed in a coup and sent into exile
in Spain; his party was banned.
His supporters continued
to be extremely loyal to him, though—so much so that by the time Argentina’s
constitutional democracy was restored nearly two decades later, Perón won
reelection by a landslide.
Part of Perón’s enduring
appeal had to do with the circumstances under which he lost power: His forced
exile created a narrative of victimization, which “can really actually help to
solidify political identities,” James Loxton, an expert in authoritarian
regimes, democratization, and political parties in Latin America, told me. A
similar sense of grievance seems to be taking over Trump supporters. An overwhelming majority of Republicans have
subscribed to the former president’s unfounded claims that the 2020 election
was stolen from him. Early polls show him to be the favorite of the
2024 Republican contenders. “This idea that he didn’t really lose and that
everybody is out to get him,” Loxton said, “add[s] up to this actually quite
compelling martyrdom story.”
Irrespective of whether Trump runs again,
Trumpism as a movement is all but certain to be on the ballot. Indeed, a number
of Trump acolytes—among them Republican Senator
Josh Hawley, former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley, and former Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo—are already jockeying to succeed the former president. Should they
be recognized as the “Trumpist” candidates, the movement could take on a
Perónist quality: one that is highly mobilizing, highly polarizing, and highly
durable.
ALBERTO FUJIMORI
Another populist
movement that has endured long after its namesake is Fujimorismo. Named after
Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, whose decade of authoritarian rule ended
in a corruption scandal in 2001, Fujimorismo remains a dominant force in
Peruvian politics. Unlike Perónism, however, Fujimorismo has largely remained
within the family: Fujimori’s children, Keiko and Kenji, lead rival factions of the movement, though
neither has managed to succeed their father in the presidency. (Fujimori
himself, who was convicted of human-rights abuses in 2009,
remains in prison.)
With at least some
of Trump’s children and extended family eyeing
political careers of their own, it’s possible that Trumpism could end up
resembling Fujimorismo more than Perónism. In some ways, it already does: All
three of his eldest children have held roles in the eponymous family business.
Should any of Trump’s children seek political office, it’s all but assumed that
they will do so not as regular Republicans, but as heirs to the Trumpist
throne.
From the October 2019 issue: The heir
But success isn’t a
given. While the Trump name would almost certainly be an asset in any primary
or Trump-leaning district, his children would also need to be able to rival
their father’s emotional connection with his supporters. “Keiko Fujimori
benefited massively from her surname and the fact that there was still a large
chunk of the Peruvian population that really identified with Fujimorismo and
the accomplishments of Fujimori’s government,” Loxton said. It helps, he added,
that she is also “really good at politics.” Yet she still has not yet ascended
to the heights of her father.
Whatever model Trumpism
ultimately follows—whether it’s Berlusconism, Perónism, Fujimorismo, a
combination of the three, or none at all—it’s widely accepted that the movement will continue to exist in
some form.
Dan Slater, the director
of the Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies at the University of Michigan,
told me that what form it takes will depend on whether American politics
chooses to reorient itself not on party lines but, rather, in terms of whether you
are pro- or anti-Trump, a shift not too dissimilar to how British politics
realigned between those who opposed or supported Brexit.
“In the same way that Perónism versus anti-Perónism has shaped and
structured Argentinian politics for decades,” Slater said, “it strikes me as
quite likely that a fundamental conflict between Trumpism and anti-Trumpism is
going to shape American politics for a long time to come as well.”
YASMEEN SERHAN is
a London-based staff writer at The
Atlantic.
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