CSS February 2021 no: 277
South-East Asia:
A Hotspot in Great Power Rivalry
In South-East Asia, the emerging great power
China is challenging the supremacy of the US, which is clinging to its leading
role in the region. Although the countries of South-East Asia agree that the
great power conflict is harming them as individual countries and as a region,
they are, nevertheless, seeking mainly selective, country-specific solutions in
response to their shrinking room for maneuver.
By Linda Maduz and
Simon Stocker
In South-East Asia, the escalating US-China
conflict is clearly moving into the spotlight. China and the US have
incompatible goals and ideas about the political order and view each other as
potential military opponents. In the competition for influence over the
countries in the region, technology and infrastructure policy are playing an
increasingly important role alongside security and trade. These different
policy areas are becoming inextricably linked.
The new US
president, Joe Biden, will come up against a South-East Asia that has aligned
itself strongly with China in economic terms over the past few years while
still relying on the US as an important strategic partner. America’s Asia
policy has been anything but straightforward during past US presidencies – for
example, one of the first official acts by Biden’s predecessor, Donald Trump,
was to formally withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal
(TPP), which had been an achievement of the Obama presidency. By contrast,
China has been able to gradually strengthen its position in the region and is
now the dominant trading power and an important investor.
The power
shift in South-East Asia poses risks to the stability of the region. While the
economic order of South-East Asia is increasingly oriented toward China, the
security order will remain dominated by the US for the foreseeable future. Due
to the ever more open great power conflict, the countries of South-East Asia
(see map) are increasingly having to make difficult choices and are unable to
develop relations with China and the US simultaneously as they once did.
This not
only challenges the countries of the region individually, but also
collectively. They share a strong interest in a rule-based order, which they
see as the foundation for peace, stability, and economic growth. China’s desire
to expand has, among other things, fueled numerous conflicts in the South China
Sea over the past decade, but the unilateral approach of the US during the
Trump presidency also ran counter to this interest. Although the Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) provides an established, joint platform, SouthEast
Asian countries are increasingly looking for country-specific solutions or
partnerships with countries outside the region in the struggle to respond to
great power rivalry. The focus is on Australia, India, Japan, and,
increasingly, on potential European partners.
US-Asia Policy: Quo Vadis?
The Trump presidency weakened American
influence in South-East Asia and the confidence of countries in US leadership.
The TPP free trade deal – abandoned by Trump in February 2017 – was the
centerpiece of the “Pivot to Asia”, which was the strategic US shift towards
the Asia-Pacific region that his predecessor, Barack Obama, had sought from
2011.
In contrast
to Obama, Trump largely stayed away from high-level ASEAN summits. He
threatened trade partners with a trade balance surplus such as Vietnam,
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia with punitive tariffs. In contrast to trade
policy, US relations with South-East Asia are marked by greater continuity in
the area of security and military cooperation. Since World War II, the US has
provided the security architecture in South-East and North-East Asia by means
of its bilateral partnerships. As American allies, the Philippines and Thailand
are a part of this architecture. However, their formal defense alliances with
the US, which were concluded in the early 1950s, are less comprehensive and
significant than those of Australia, Japan, and South Korea. The US has also
maintained a decades-old, in-depth security cooperation with Singapore, which
includes annual joint military exercises.
From now on,
Biden has the task of positioning the US in an international political
environment shaped by major geopolitical shifts and the disruptive behavior of
his predecessor, while responding to new priorities in the process. China is
seen as a strategic competitor across party lines and has been defined as such
in official US strategy documents since 2017. The trade conflict started by
Trump quickly evolved into a multidimensional strategic rivalry between the US
and China, with both major powers seeking to influence third countries. The new
protectionist stance also enjoys broad support and could hold Biden back with
regard to negotiating and concluding free trade agreements, which are of
increasing geopolitical importance – especially in South-East Asia.
The US under
Biden is expected to revert to the multilateral path and try to resume a
leadership role in international policy areas such as climate policy or global
health policy, including the coronavirus pandemic – a role that was also
vacated in SouthEast Asia under Trump. Biden’s government will again seek
increased cooperation with allies, old and new partners in all world regions in
all policy areas, especially with regard to China.
China
Cements Its Power
China has
achieved a coup by concluding the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) free trade agreement at the end of 2020. The creation of the world’s
largest free trade area to date includes all ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan,
and South Korea. China was already ASEAN’s most important trading partner
before this and vice versa. Chinese direct investment in the ASEAN area nearly
tripled between 2010 and 2017, but did not match investment from ASEAN
countries and Japan. China has also become an important creditor, especially for
the smaller countries in South-East Asia. Cambodia and Laos’ debt today amounts
to over 25 per cent of their economic output.
China’s
approach in South-East Asia is characterized by a mixture of expansionism and a
quest for security through stable partnerships. China’s 21st century approach
to geopolitics focuses heavily on the sea. There are security priorities in
addition to the economic aspects. Since 2012, Beijing has aimed to become a
great power at sea and now has the largest navy in the world when it comes to
fleets. China has historic territorial claims in the South China Sea. Although
these claims were rejected as unlawful by the Court of Arbitration in the Hague
in the case of the Philippines against China in 2016, China is still pursuing
its objectives de facto through naval maneuvers, artificial islands and
administrative arrangements and taking the resulting conflict with Brunei,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam in its stride. China sees the
South China Sea as its sphere of influence and brazenly rejects the US-led call
for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
China’s
original reasons for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013 also
included its geostrategic calculation to try and avoid conflicts in South-East
Asia, and especially the rivalry with the US, and to expand westwards. In the
meantime, however, the BRI has become a global investment and infrastructure
program. With BRI and other cooperation initiatives that China has increasingly
initiated since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, it is intensifying its
economic and political relations both globally and in the region. These
cooperation formats, which are so important for SouthEast Asia, include the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation. (see
CSS Analysis 272)
Increasing Pressure
Although
Trump did not give
South-East Asia the same attention as Obama, he did attempt to consider the
growing strategic importance of South-East Asia in the USChina conflict and
rolled out a number of initiatives. The US is reaffirming its regional
commitment with the American version of the Free Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP),
which has been promoted since 2017. The US strengthened its efforts in security
cooperation as part of the FOIP policy. In practical terms, this involved
reviving the multilateral security dialogue started in 2007 with Australia,
India and Japan, as well as intensifying freedom of navigation operations in
the South China Sea. The US is also trying to counter China’s influence with
initiatives in development cooperation, infrastructure financing and technology
development.
The
countries of South-East Asia increasingly find themselves in a predicament.
China’s expansion in the South China Sea is leading to an escalation of territorial
conflicts. South-East Asia’s increasing economic dependence on China is fueling
fears that China will also try to use its economic weight to reshape the
region’s security order. However, the confrontational stance by the US towards
China and attempts to draw South-East Asian allies and partners to its side –
for example with the 5G Clean Network Initiative directed against Huawei – do
not help the interests of those countries either. Moreover, the US FOIP policy
has only partially addressed the real needs of the respective states in
South-East Asia to date.
Weaker “Hedgers”
South-East Asian countries are adopting
different strategies as they try to walk a line between the two great powers.
Chinese influence is obvious in the South-East Asian mainland states of Laos,
Cambodia, and Myanmar. However, while these countries depend heavily on Chinese
investment, aid, and diplomatic support, they should not be seen as satellite
states of Beijing. They also employ hedging strategies against China. In 2011,
for example, the then President of Myanmar, Thein Sein, bowed to huge social
pressure and suspended work on the Myitsone Dam championed by China. Even
though they have less geopolitical muscle, Cambodia and Laos should therefore
also be able to avoid difficult decisions in a similar way in future, for
example, with regard to China’s muchcriticized Mekong dam projects.
Two US
allies, Thailand and the Philippines, have recently adopted stronger stances
towards China. Thailand was an important partner of Washington in the region
after the Cold War. After the military coup in 2014, relations with the US
deteriorated and Thailand concluded several arms deals with China, including
purchasing three submarines. The military junta sees China as a reliable
partner and cooperates with China on numerous BRI projects. Even though the US
and Thailand still conduct regular military exercises, the structures of the
respective armed forces are well coordinated, and the U-Tapao Airfield is an
important US hub in the region, Thailand no longer seems to be a model ally for
the US. At the same time, there is growing mistrust of China in Thailand due to
delayed BRI projects.
Stronger “Hedgers”
The
President of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte suspended visitation rights for US
troops last year and has previously stressed that he wants to seek closer
military cooperation with China. Experts assume, however, that this is unlikely
to be a long-term trend and that the country will have a less China-friendly
attitude after the end of Duterte’s tenure in 2022, meaning the disputes over
border demarcations in the South China Sea are also likely to occur again.
Indonesia,
Singapore, Vietnam, and sometimes Malaysia too are trying to find the most
independent positions possible between the US and China, and this means
accepting certain conflicts. Despite strong trade and investment ties with
China, these countries are increasingly seeking diplomatic and military
cooperation with the US and other external actors, such as Australia, India, or
Japan, as they are very concerned about China’s increasingly assertive behavior
in the South China Sea and its growing economic influence. Malaysia’s long-time
former prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, even ran a successful election
campaign in 2018 based on criticizing Chinese influence. He also subsequently
cancelled a USD 20 billion BRI rail project which was seen as too expensive,
and the costs for Malaysia were reduced by a third after renewed negotiations.
Indonesia is also becoming ever more skillful in its dealings with China.
Indonesia,
Vietnam, and Malaysia have also begun to develop their navies and coast guards
and strengthen their deterrence capabilities. Rearming naval forces has been a
cornerstone of the Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo’s plan, which aims to
preserve maritime sovereignty. Vietnam and, to a certain extent, Singapore are
expanding their strategic relations with India, Japan, and France. For this
reason, Vietnamese submarine troops are being trained by the Indian Navy, which
uses the same submarines. In addition, Australian and French warships regularly
dock in Vietnam for refueling or maintenance.
ASEAN, Tested To the Limit?
Founded in 1967, the regional organization
still stands for the preservation of a rulebased order and the strengthening of
multilateral cooperation. ASEAN is also an intermediary for building trust
between non-member states. This inclusive approach leads to a multi-layered
regional security architecture. In the ASEAN Regional Forum, 27 countries
exchange views on security-related issues. In ASEAN+3, the ten ASEAN countries
are joined by China, Japan and South Korea, and by Australia, India, and New
Zealand in ASEAN+6. China’s resurgence has proved a major challenge to ASEAN
unity despite numerous diplomatic forums, changing not only ASEAN’s
relationship with China, but also ASEAN states’ relationships with each other.
China is a
natural partner in important areas of ASEAN cooperation. According to the G20
Global Infrastructure Outlook, there will be a USD 600 billion infrastructure
financing gap in South-East Asia by 2040. BRI projects are expected to improve
networking in the region and serve as a basis for further economic growth.
China is active in education and public health in the Mekong countries and it
also wants to help in the areas of digitalization and urbanization and supports
the ASEAN countries with its digital BRI Initiative and the construction of
so-called “Smart Cities”. However, these pledges are also tarnished by the fear
that the region will become increasingly China-centric and ASEAN will lose its
central position. At the same time, the ASEAN countries do not want to be used
by the US to contain China either and they do not want to be obliged to commit
to the FOIP, for example.
As ever, the
ASEAN countries see China as their most important economic partner and the US
as an important security guarantor. In addition, Japan is an important source
of investment and India has a promising sales market. The best-case scenario
would be to see the continued commitment of all actors, as the region has done
well out of this equidistance strategy in recent years. Likewise, increased
European involvement could prove to be of interest (see info box). However, the
question is whether ASEAN has already reached the limits of regional
cooperation. In the past, ASEAN showed a certain appetite for further
integration. This was long considered a strength of the organization, because
it meant that conflicts could be avoided. However, China’s growing influence
seems to be increasingly paralyzing ASEAN.
Overcoming the Dilemma
South-East Asian countries are trying to
protect their interests individually and as a region with different strategies
– in the complex context of American-Chinese rivalry. Lower labor costs and an
advantageous age distribution are allowing ASEAN countries to reduce their
economic dependence on China, while cooperating with other countries. China’s
sometimes confrontational behavior also offers the US the opportunity to engage
more and substantially deepen partnerships. Europe can also play a part in
this, while ASEAN countries would benefit from having a united front and
coherent communication of their joint interests. A dialogue on how to deal with
rivals China and the US would be key in the first instance. This way, the
various South-East Asian interests can be weighed up and prioritized and any
misleading perceptions of supposed threats can be allayed with the aim of
strengthening cooperation among the states.
Linda Maduz is Senior Researcher at he Center
for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich
Simon Stocker is a master’s student at the
Graduate Institute of International and Devrlopmrn Studies (IHEİD) in Geneva
The Role of the EU
The EU has not yet decided on a strategy for
South-East Asia. Given the mutual economic dependence, as well as the common
interest in a rule-based international order, European engagement seems
increasingly necessary. France was the first EU member state to put forward its
own strategy in 2019 and as
Paris has territories in the region, direct national interests are also at the
forefront here. In this context, France stresses strategic partnerships with
local actors and arms exports. Last Fall, Germany and the Netherlands also
submitted their own policy paper for the region. Both underlined the fact that
a mere spectator role would be a disadvantage for the EU. The term
“Indo-Pacific” does not have a clear definition and this could be an
opportunity for the EU to emerge as a shaping force with its own approach. As
the US FOIP policy is mainly aimed at containing China, it was never an option
for the EU to follow the American course. However, given the increasingly
significant differences between Brussels and Beijing, a strategy of
equidistance does not seem to be an option for the EU either. The EU might thus
develop its own approach. One focus here could be areas that are not seen as
priorities by other actors, such as climate policy. France will probably put
the issue on the agenda during its EU Council Presidency in 2022, at the latest.
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