STATEMENT / EUROPE
& CENTRAL ASIA (ICG) 22 SEPTEMBER 2020
How to
Defuse Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean
Greece and Turkey have stepped back from the brink of military
confrontation over gas exploration in disputed waters in the Mediterranean Sea.
But trouble still looms. European leaders should welcome signs of conciliation
from Athens and Ankara and nudge them toward talks.
A simmering
dispute between Turkey and Greece over maritime rights in the eastern
Mediterranean Sea came nearly to boiling point in August, as the two countries
narrowly avoided a naval clash. A Turkish research vessel, the Oruç
Reis, was surveying the seabed for natural gas deposits in contested
waters near the Greek island of Kastellorizo offTurkey’s
southern coast. Greece dispatched its own ships to shadow the naval escort
of the Oruç Reis. Clumsy manoeuvres by the rival flotillas led to a
collision between Greek and Turkish frigates. In a show of solidarity with its
fellow EU member Greece, France deployed warships to conduct joint exercises
with the Greek navy and Rafael fighter jets to Crete. The United Arab Emirates
(UAE) sent four F-16s to Crete.
For the time being, European
leaders’ shuttle diplomacy has yielded welcome signs of
de-escalation: Turkey has recalled the Oruç Reis into
port, advisers to the Greek and Turkish leaders are in contact, and
military officials from both sides are meeting at NATO
headquarters. But the standoff could yet spin out of
control, and now is the time to ensure there is no more brinkmanship. The
priority is to find space for the resumption of exploratory talks between
Athens and Ankara, halted in 2016, on the demarcation of maritime zones.
Greece, along with France and the Republic of Cyprus, is pushing for EU
sanctions on Turkey over its prospecting for natural gas in waters claimed by
Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. But punitive measures risk having the
opposite effect, pushing Turkey to behave more aggressively in the eastern
Mediterranean. How this dispute is handled will be critical for restoring
neighbourly relations between Turkey and the EU, which is in the interests of
all sides, including Greece.
Instead of wielding sticks at this
stage, European leaders should urge the sides not to reverse the positive –
albeit modest – steps they have taken and offer incentives that could pave the
way back to the negotiating table. The two sides could themselves take a number
of additional steps to minimise risks of another incident and open space for
talks. For its part, Turkey should keep the Oruç Reis in
port. Ankara and Athens should continue with those contacts already in place,
including between officials engaged in technical military talks at NATO,
refrain from military exercises and avoid inflammatory rhetoric, particularly
at the UN General Assembly.
An Explosive Mix
Three ingredients make for a combustible
mix in the eastern Mediterranean. First are disputes between Turkey and Greece
over Cyprus and over Turkey’s maritime boundaries with the Greek islands
scattered off its Aegean and southern coasts. Cyprus itself has been divided
since 1974, when Ankara sent in troops following a coup on the island
backed by what was at the time a military dictatorship in
Athens. Four decades of talks under UN auspices have failed to reunify the
island. The Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus in the south became an EU
member in 2004, while only Turkey recognises the “Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus”. In the Aegean Sea, Greece and Turkey have flexed their muscles to
assert dominion over rocks, seas and skies. In 2002, they kicked off what would
become 60 rounds of exploratory talks over demarcation across the Aegean Sea’s
complex jigsaw puzzle of more than 2,400 islands, most of which are Greek, and
high seas shipping routes that are Turkey’s economic and security lifeline.
These talks broke down in 2016.
The discovery of gas off Cyprus is the
second element. Exploration by international firms ramped up from 2011 onward,
against the backdrop of the foundering UN-sponsored talks. Major finds promised
to turn the Cypriot economy around, enhance the island’s energy security and
lower energy prices – provided that the Republic of Cyprus could clinch
agreements with other littoral states to build gas export infrastructure. For
its part, Ankara harbours ambitions to act as an energy hub for Europe. It is
keen both to ensure Turkish Cypriots a share of future gas revenue and to wean
Turkey itself off its dependence on Russian gas supplies. Excluded from plans
by the Republic of Cyprus,Egypt, Israel and Greece to run a pipeline to Europe,
Ankara sent its own drill ships into contested waters both north east
and west of Cyprus, as well as south of Kastellorizo.
Although the Oruc Reis has, for now, been brought back to
port, other Turkish vessels, including the Yavuz and the Barbaros
Hayrettin Paşa, continue exploring off Cyprus. In September
2020, Ankara extended navigational advisories for both ships until
mid-October.
A third element, Turkey’s Middle
East policy, has helped draw other powers into the maritime skirmishes. With
the 2011 Arab uprisings, Ankara expanded its activism across the region and
backed attempts by the Muslim Brotherhood to gain power. In 2013, it
severed diplomatic ties with Cairo over the coup that deposed Egyptian
President Mohammed Morsi, a Brotherhood leader. Turkey’s support for the
Islamists angered not only the new Egyptian government but also the UAE, itself
implacably opposed to political Islam. Then, in December 2019, Turkey
signed a maritime delimitation deal with Libya’s UN-recognised government,
based in Tripoli and partly composed of figures linked to the Brotherhood. It
also sent military advisers to aid the Tripoli-based government in its fight
with adversaries in eastern Libya backed by Egypt and the UAE. The delimitation
agreement led Greece to conclude its own overlapping deal with Egypt; events in
Libya spurred the UAE to also side with Athens. Meanwhile, Israel – at
loggerheads with Turkey over a host of issues – has also lined up behind
Greece. Italy, whose energy major ENI has one of the largest stakes in the
region, is trying to balance support for fellow EU members Greek and Cyprus and
good relations with Cairo, with whom ENI has oil and gas exploration agreements
in Egyptian waters, with a position in Libya that is quite close to Turkey’s.
The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which aims to develop the region’s gas
market, includes the Republic of
Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan,
and Palestine, but excludes Turkey.
France, whose energy companies are also
interested in the region, is a late addition to the mix. Paris has asked to
join the forum. Relations between Paris and Ankara have soured over Libya and
French disquiet at Turkey’s policy in Syria and its arms purchases from Russia.
In June, a French warship attempted to inspect a Turkish
vessel as part of a UN arms embargo on Libya. Recent weeks have seen
French President Emmanuel Macron and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan exchange ever sharper barbs.
Turkey feels ganged up on and
increasingly hemmed in by the hundreds of Greek islands dotting the seas around
its coast. It fears being cut off from most of the Aegean and therefore
key maritime routes should Greece unilaterally extend its territorial waters
and establish new maritime jurisdiction zones. Erdoğan has responded by taking
a more assertive line and adopting more aggressive rhetoric linking all of Turkey’s regional
policies, which are broadly popular at home. Turkish diplomats tell Crisis
Group that their government wants “a fair share” of the eastern
Mediterranean gas riches. As long as the “exploratory talks” on their maritime
disputes remain on hold, and Greece and the Republic of Cyprus keep prospecting
or drilling, they say that Ankara will too. For their part, Greek officials
argue that Turkey’s new forward-leaning policy is what reignited the dispute
and soured Ankara’s relations with its neighbours. Greeks increasingly
worry about the safety of hundreds of islands that are much closer to Turkey
than to their mainland.
A role for Europe
The 2020 flare-up is taking place at a
time when American leadership is lacking. In the past, Washington has stepped
in to dampen Greek-Turkish tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. In 1996, the
United States refused to back either side in their dispute over a pair of
uninhabited islands, known as Imnia in Greek and Kardak in Turkish, and its
mediation led Turkey to withdraw its troops from the rocks. This time around,
Washington has appeared less concerned about neutrality. Drawing Ankara’s ire, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo travelled to
Cyprus on 12 September and U.S. President Donald Trump lifted a
three-decade embargo on arms sales to the Greek Cypriot government
on 15 September. Despite the timing, the Trump
administration insisted the move was months in the making and unrelated to the maritime quarrel.
Russia has tried to move in but without
success. Spotting an opportunity to exert influence where Washington’s is
waning, Russia’s foreign minister told the Republic of Cyprus president,
with whom Moscow has friendly ties, that it was ready to help mediate talks
with Turkey over energy exploration in the eastern Mediterranean. Ankara,
however, gently rebuffed the offer.
It is critical that European leaders get
their policy right. The European Council meeting on 24-25 September will
be a major test of the EU’s approach toward Turkey. Thus far, the bloc’s
struggles to find the right mix of carrots and stick could, as some EU
diplomats told Crisis Group, make or break relations with Ankara. The EU’s top
officials are personally invested in brokering a solution in the eastern
Mediterranean.
The Republic of Cyprus has been
pushing for months to add more Turkish companies and individuals to the list of those subject to asset freezes and travel bans over
Turkey’s hunt for hydrocarbons near the island. But such penalties have yet to
gain EU members states’ full support, with many holding out hope that diplomacy
can ease tensions with a strategically important partner. In turn, the Republic
of Cyprus has been blocking separate efforts to impose sanctions on Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka, unless other
European governments back its bid for tougher measures against
Turkey. France, Greece and Austria also want a stronger line against
Ankara and argue the split within the EU may embolden Erdoğan.
Germany, along with the so-called Visegrad group of Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia, favours giving dialogue with Ankara a chance
first. These countries worry in particular that Turkey could respond to
sanctions by allowing migrants to cross its borders with Europe – as it
did in late February – stretching Europe’s ability to cope
with a new influx. Italy, Malta and Spain, whose interests are more
closely aligned with Turkey in Libya, are also hesitant to back new sanctions.
Like the UK – now no longer part of the EU – they are wary of alienating a
NATO ally and a partner that, despite tensions, they wish to encourage in its
stuttering ambitions for closer integration with the bloc.
The EU has struggled to come up with new
incentives for Turkey. In one of the more promising initiatives, European
Council President Charles Michel has floated the idea of inviting Ankara to a multilateral
conference that could allow regional power brokers to thrash out their
disagreements in an environment of civility. According to several EU officials,
the conference would aim to tackle a broad range of issues from gas revenue sharing
arrangements to migration to maritime delimitation, culminating with a meeting
between leaders. In private, some EU diplomats suggest such a conference
could soothe Turkey’s irritation at being excluded from the regional energy
forum. That said, others contend that regional rivalries, some of which
spill into the Cyprus dispute, render such a format unworkable.
What Europe Should and Should Not
Do
At the European Council meeting,
European leaders should allow more time for dialogue instead of opting for
sanctions. Further punitive measures are unlikely to move Ankara
toward talks. Tougher options, such as banning Turkish firms from EU
ports, sectoral sanctions, cutting funds allocated to ease Turkey’s
putative EU accession or terminating Turkey’s EU candidacy outright, would
almost certainly empower hardliners in Ankara. The Republic of Cyprus and its
allies should stop linking Turkey policy to sanctions
against Lukashenka. Belarus and eastern Mediterranean geopolitics
are very different issues, each requiring its own approach.
At what the EU’s foreign policy chief
describes as a “watershed moment” in relations with Ankara, Germany
should push Ankara, on one hand, and Athens and its allies, on the other,
toward further de-escalatory steps and a return to “exploratory
talks”. Berlin, which holds the EU’s six-month rotating presidency through
December, is arguably best positioned to engage Turkey. Chancellor Angela
Merkel has constructive ties with Erdoğan and economic leverage. Germany is
Turkey’s number one trade partner and its largest foreign investor.
Ankara and Athens could take a series of
steps to reduce risks and improve prospects for dialogue. Both sides
should refrain from additional military exercises and combative rhetoric.
At the UN General Assembly, they should avoid fiery words. An aggressive tone
from the Turkish president in particular could backfire, helping unite EU
capitals behind stronger punitive measures. Nor should Ankara
overreact if the Council goes ahead with adding a few individuals to the
existing sanctions list.
No matter the fate of efforts at
dialogue, the two capitals should also publicly commit to technical talks
at NATO to establish a military-to-military deconfliction
mechanism. This would not address the heart of the dispute, but it could stop
incidents at sea from spiralling into open conflict.
At the same time, Ankara should
keep the Oruç Reis in port. Its withdrawal from waters claimed
by Greece was important, but Turkish officials have said the ship will
return after routine maintenance.
A moratorium on drilling in disputed
waters would also help. During the exploratory talks on delimitation between
2002 and 2016, Turkey and Greece respected such a moratorium and could restore
it. Diplomats from both sides tell Crisis Group they are open to this step if
progress is made in talks. It should be an easier one to take at a time when
the COVID-19 pandemic has crippled gas demand and energy companies around
the world are under increasing pressure to go green. The viability of extracting
gas from some seabed deposits was already in doubt, and Turkey has had more
luck with exploration in the Black Sea. If global energy markets pick up, and
tensions ease, the parties could look into the possibility of joint ventures,
gas revenue sharing on Cyprus, or legal arbitration to resolve their disputes.
Talks could also tackle issues beyond maritime zones to cover military
over-flights and the demilitarisation of Aegean islands.
Any conflict in the eastern
Mediterranean would come at a high cost: it would disrupt energy investment,
undermine transatlantic security and damage vital ties between Turkey and the
EU. If the parties do not find ways to manage them, the disputes over maritime
boundaries could have damaging consequences for all.
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