Wednesday, February 3, 2021

Joe Biden's Surprises by Elizabeth Drew

 

Joe Biden’s Surprises

Jan 29, 2021ELIZABETH DREW

 

Notwithstanding a few head-scratchers among his cabinet and staffing picks, Joe Biden is being hailed as a paragon of conventionality after years of chaos and discord. But given his initial momentum out of the gate, Biden is already on track to effect radical change – and his team is actually competent enough to do it.

WASHINGTON, DC – Joe Biden knows enough about the US presidency to understand that the first few weeks are the easiest and most pleasant. There inevitably will be setbacks and crises, particularly for a president who took office amidst a raging pandemic, economic collapse, and a climate crisis near to a tipping point.  

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We should not be afraid of a post-pandemic world that will not be the same as the status quo ante. We should embrace it and use all appropriate fora and available opportunities to make it a better world by advancing the cause of international cooperation.

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In the early weeks a new president can accomplish a lot through executive orders, reversing previous administration policies and signaling a commitment to certain values without interference from Congress. Biden can use the powers of his office unilaterally to push his first priority: controlling the pandemic.

The new president also has a pretty free hand in naming his cabinet. When he first announced his choices to fill many top advisory and cabinet positions, many observers worried that Biden was turning to yesterday’s names to handle today’s most demanding jobs. Biden is gambling on experience as his key to success.

In any case, the Biden team’s hyper-emphasis on cabinet diversity has sometimes made it seem that it was more important to be able to say that a nominee was “the first” of something, rather than that he or she was the best for the job. Nonetheless, Biden selected a competent cabinet overall; only after the usual shaking-out period will we really know which picks succeed.

The nomination of US Federal Appeals Court judge Merrick Garland to be attorney general seemed at first to be primarily an “up-yours” to Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell, who refused even to allow hearings for Garland when Barack Obama tapped him to fill a Supreme Court vacancy. To those who know Garland, however, he is an excellent choice: brilliant, calm, and fair – just the person to restore integrity and morale to a Justice Department battered by Donald Trump.

Similarly, Biden’s chief-of-staff, Ron Klain, is almost as experienced as his boss, having served as chief-of-staff to Biden during his vice presidency and to Vice President Al Gore before that. This comfortable working relationship has helped Biden not put a foot wrong thus far.

The historical truth is that fresh faces in the Oval Office might be exciting, but they come with risks. Within three months of taking office, the relatively inexperienced John F. Kennedy, widely adored for his looks, charm, and eloquence, landed up in the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

George W. Bush, the son of a president and two-term governor of Texas, was probably the most experienced of recent incoming White House occupants. Nonetheless, he presided over two avoidable calamities early on: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (numerous warnings and clues went unheeded), and the invasion of Iraq (which, like Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam War, was based publicly on a lie).

Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, both former southern governors, were smart men with limited Washington experience. They, too, stumbled early on. And Obama had served for only three years in the US Senate before being elected; he neither enjoyed dealing with Congress nor had much of a feel for it.

Biden’s relationship with Obama and his legacy are more complicated than appearances suggest. Whereas Obama frustrated many Capitol Hill Democrats with his innate caution and readiness to compromise with Republicans (liberal Democrats referred to him privately as “Mr. 50-yard line”), Biden deliberately describes his own proposals as “bold.” His immigration proposals contradict Obama’s policy of pursuing substantial deportations of illegal immigrants. The message seems to be that Biden will no longer dwell in Obama’s shadow.

After serving four decades in the Senate before becoming vice president, Biden has a feel for Congress unmatched since Johnson. Still, it won’t be long before we know if all of his talk about working with the Republicans is based on nostalgic naivete or is a clever way of setting up Republicans for obloquy if they try to obstruct his proposals. 

And obstruction seems likely. McConnell may have seen eventually that Trump’s denial of losing the election wasn’t doing the Republican party any good, but that doesn’t mean he’s become a less fierce partisan.

Biden is also playing a sophisticated game with his party’s left. He managed to form a government without giving jobs to Senators Elizabeth Warren or Bernie Sanders, both of whom sought to join his cabinet. Sanders’s followers even threatened Biden if he didn’t give the Vermont senator the job he wanted. Biden has explained his actions away by noting – conveniently but not unreasonably – that the Democrats’ margins in Congress are too slim to risk a single open seat, although he did select three House members from relatively safe Democratic districts for top jobs.  

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Sanders didn’t take long before carping at Biden’s policy proposals. But that’s part of the show. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and her “squad” could also keep up pressure from the left, while Joe Manchin of West Virginia, a state which went heavily for Trump in 2020, poses a problem from Biden’s right. In a 50-50 Senate, with Vice President Kamala Harris breaking any tie, every vote counts. Still, Biden has adopted much of the left’s agenda, and will try to sell these policies from the center, his political home.

One sign of this change is that, unlike all recent Democratic administrations, Biden’s hasn’t paid obeisance to Wall Street by giving bankers top jobs. The new Secretary of the Treasury, Janet Yellen, is a former Federal Reserve chair and academic who has made it clear that she understands the country’s pressing social needs. Moreover, Biden consulted Warren on her economic views, and has named a former Warren adviser as Yellen’s deputy. Yellen’s appointment demonstrates that Biden shares the insight that enabled Trump’s rise: that too many Americans feel that they cannot get a fair shake.

Following the Götterdämmerung of Trump’s presidency, it seemed a foregone conclusion that Biden’s term would be dull. But Biden is coming off tougher and more imaginative than people thought he would be. So far – and to be sure it is early – Biden’s presidency is turning out to be more interesting and surprising than expected.

ELIZABETH DREW

Writing for PS since 2015
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Elizabeth Drew is a Washington-based journalist and the author, most recently, of Washington Journal: Reporting Watergate and Richard Nixon's Downfall.

Tuesday, February 2, 2021

Taliban Risks Losing International Legitimacy

 

Taliban Risks Losing International Legitimacy

A high-level delegation led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the senior leader of the Taliban and its chief negotiator at the Doha talks, held consultations in Tehran and Moscow this week through January 26-29 amidst growing uncertainty over the Afghan peace process.

A commentary by the US government-funded RFERL said on Thursday that “the fate of the nearly year-old (US-Taliban) agreement is in the balance,” as the Afghan government led by President Ashraf Ghani is “eager to exploit the growing fractures between the Taliban and Washington and is pushing at the very least to disrupt the (Doha) agreement.”

The RFERL adds: “Sensing an opportunity to advance their interests, Afghan officials are now pushing to keep a U.S. counterterrorism force beyond the May deadline for complete withdrawal. (US President) Biden has long advocated keeping a counterterrorism force in Afghanistan as a deterrent against possible terrorist threats.”

Indeed, if an alibi is needed for extended US troop deployment to Afghanistan, the outgoing Trump administration might just have provided one, with the Treasury Department notifying the Pentagon vide a memo dated January 4 that:

  • “As of 2020, al-Qaeda is gaining strength in Afghanistan while continuing to operate with the Taliban under the Taliban’s protection”;
  • “Al-Qaeda capitalises on its relationship with the Taliban through its network of mentors and advisers who are embedded with the Taliban, providing advice, guidance, and financial support”;
  • “Senior Haqqani Network figures have discussed forming a new joint unit of armed fighters in cooperation with and funded by al-Qaeda.”

The Doha agreement of February last year had envisaged that the US troop would completely withdraw its troops by coming May but that would be conditional on the Taliban severing its links with al-Qaeda. In principle, that conditionality is now becoming a deal breaker. The Taliban feels cheated and has reacted in indignation, saying, “some circles are seeking the extension of this imposed war on the Afghan nation in pursuit of their interests and malicious objectives.” Taliban suspects — with good reasons — that the US is shifting the goal post on the basis of intelligence inputs by the Afghan intelligence.

Taliban delegation
A high-powered Taliban delegation led by Mullah Baradar arrived in Tehran for consultations on January 26, 2021

Indeed, the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken hinted at his first press conference in Washington after assuming office on January 27 that a policy review on Afghanistan may be on cards, since “one of the things that we need to understand is exactly what is in the agreements that were reached between the United States and the Taliban (in Doha) to make sure that we fully understand the commitments that the Taliban has made as well as any commitments that we’ve made.”

On January 28, Blinken called President Ashraf Ghani and “shared that the United States is reviewing the February 2020 US-Taliban agreement and whether the Taliban are living up to their commitments to cut ties with terrorist groups, to reduce violence in Afghanistan, and to engage in meaningful negotiations with the Afghan government and other stakeholders.”  

The Biden Administration is distancing itself from the explicit commitment on a total withdrawal of US troops by May, as per the Doha pact. Therefore, the timing of Mullah Baradar’s journey to Tehran can be put in perspective as a frantic attempt by the Taliban to shore up regional support. Interestingly, Baradar reportedly said at his meeting in Tehran on January 27 with the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani, “We do not trust the United States an inch, and will fight any party that serves as its mercenary.”

Baradar assured Shamkhani that Taliban is open to the participation of all ethnic groups in shaping the future of Afghanistan and that Taliban will maintain the security of the Afghan-Iran border. These are of course Tehran’s core concerns. However, Shamkhani’s remarks were non-committal — although he voiced criticism of the US intentions. Shamkhani underscored that Iran is totally opposed to a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. He also stressed the importance of power sharing and an inclusive peace settlement.

Despite the US-Iran tensions, Tehran attaches the highest importance to the stabilisation of Afghanistan and will not play the role of a spoiler vis-a-vis the efforts for a negotiated settlement. Fundamentally, Iran assesses that the US is a much diminished power today, and is no longer in a position to impose its will or act unilaterally in regional conflicts.

A prominent Iranian expert on Afghanistan and Pakistan issues Pir Mohammad Mollazehi, recently referred to a behind-the-scenes agreement between the Trump administration and the Taliban to mobilise local radical Islamic forces in Afghanistan who have fought in Iraq and Syria, to pit them against Russia, China and Iran.  But he assessed that the Biden team will not allow any such full-fledged takeover of power by the Taliban and may have plans to engage with Russia and China or even Iran.

As he put it, Biden will also try to distribute power in a future set-up in Kabul between the three main currents — Abdullah Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani and the Taliban — and if that happens, there will be a new government in which all factions will have a share in power. Curiously, Tehran is sanguine that Pakistan is also inclined to encourage the Taliban to share power in Kabul.

From Tehran, the Taliban delegation proceeded to Moscow and held talks with Russian officials on January 29. A Russian Foreign Ministry press release said, “The Russian side spoke out in favour of launching substantive and constructive intra-Afghan talks as soon as possible so as to put an end to the bloody civil war and create an effective national government in Afghanistan.”

Again, despite the tensions in Russian-American relations, Moscow has so far refrained from undermining the US diplomacy vis-a-vis the Taliban. At the weekly foreign ministry press briefing in Moscow on December 16, spokesperson Maria Zakharova specifically addressed this aspect, saying,

“In recent years the Russian Federation and the US have established a constructive dialogue on the peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. Our special envoys have stayed in touch, and since 2019, together with our Chinese and Pakistani partners, we have set up the format of expanded “troika” that has proven effective in promoting a peaceful settlement in the intra-Afghan conflict.”

“We hope that once the new US president takes office, the Russian-American contacts for achieving peace in Afghanistan will continue as soon as possible, along with the efforts to neutralise the threats of terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking emanating from that country.”

In principle, Russia remains supportive of the US’ insistence that Taliban should jettison its links with all terrorist groups (which include Chechen militants from Chechnya and Central Asia) and agree to a ceasefire so that peace talks can take place in a conducive atmosphere. China’s position also cannot be any different, given its concerns over the presence of Uighur militants on Afghan soil. And this will continue to be so despite the Biden administration’s adversarial mindset toward Russia and China.

All in all, if the Biden Administration keeps its word to forge “a collective strategy to support a stable, sovereign, democratic, and secure future for Afghanistan,” —  as Blinken promised Ghani on Thursday — its efforts to get the Taliban to the negotiating table “to engage in meaningful negotiations with the Afghan government and other stakeholders” will have international backing.

The point is, no one wants the present scale of violence to continue in Afghanistan. Put differently, the Taliban once again faces the spectre of international isolation, as had happened in the 1990s, although the Ghani government itself is extremely unpopular and is ill-reputed as a cabal of self-seeking corrupt people devoid of any political base or legitimacy.

Source: The Indian Punchline

Monday, February 1, 2021

Iran Nuclear Deal: A Tough Path Ahead by Ali Tuygan and Yusuf Buluc

 


Iran Nuclear Deal: A Tough Path Ahead

Co-authored with Yusuf Buluc (*)

February 1, 2021

From the very beginning of his presidency Mr. Trump’s principal foreign policy target was the Iran nuclear deal, described by many as his predecessor’s “signature achievement”.

Thus, the US announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018. A month later, on June 12, 2018 Mr. Trump met North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore. Following the summit, he held a press conference and said, “My meeting with Chairman Kim was honest, direct, and productive. We got to know each other well in a very confined period of time, under very strong, strong circumstance. We’re prepared to start a new history and we’re ready to write a new chapter between our nations.”

Targeting the JCPOA and cozying up to Kim Jong-un was a contradiction albeit a tolerable one under Trump administration’s broad Middle East policy which combined action on two fronts, the cornering of Iran and support to Israel. Mike Pompeo was in charge of the former and Jared Kushner of the latter.

On August 15, 2020, a US draft resolution seeking to extend the 13-year-old UN arms embargo on Iran beyond October 18, 2020 failed at the Security Council. Only the US and Dominican Republic voted for the draft. Russia and China voted against. France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Indonesia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, Tunisia, and Vietnam abstained.

Having failed at the Security Council, the US immediately attempted to trigger the sanctions “snapback” clause of the JCPOA against Iran under Resolution 2231.

On August 20, in response to Mr. Pompeo’s notification to the Security Council, Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, and the UK published a statement saying:

“France, Germany and the United Kingdom (“the E3”) note that the US ceased to be a participant to the JCPoA following their withdrawal from the deal on 8 May, 2018… We cannot therefore support this action which is incompatible with our current efforts to support the JCPoA…”

With a new administration in Washington, attention is once again focused on the JCPOA.

On January 22, 2021, in a Foreign Affairs article titled “Iran Wants the Nuclear Deal It Made, Don’t Ask Tehran to Meet New Demands” Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif explained his country’s position with clarity.[i]  He said:

“The new administration in Washington has a fundamental choice to make. U.S. President Joe Biden can choose a better path by ending Trump’s failed policy of ‘maximum pressure’ and returning to the deal his predecessor abandoned. If he does, Iran will likewise return to full implementation of our commitments under the nuclear deal. But if Washington instead insists on extracting concessions, then this opportunity will be lost”.

Mr. Zarif admitted that Iran has significantly increased its nuclear capabilities since May 2019—but it has done so in full conformity with paragraph 36 of the nuclear agreement, which allows Iran to “cease performing its commitments” under the deal should another signatory stop performing its own. He also said if the Biden administration were to begin unconditionally removing, with full effect, all sanctions imposed, reimposed, or relabeled since Trump took office, in turn, Iran would reverse all the remedial measures it has taken in the wake of Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal.

Five days later the response to the Zarif article came from Amos Yadlin and Ebtesam al-Ketbi, representing the Israeli-led anti-Iran bloc.[ii]

Again, in a Foreign Affairs article they said, “For the United States to simply return to the nuclear agreement would be a major strategic blunder.” If a future Iran policy is to avoid producing a similar outcome, they argued, it must counter Iran’s malign regional activities and resist the temptation to try to game Iran’s political dynamics. They said the new administration is likelier to achieve its objectives, while safeguarding the strategic interests of its regional partners, with a two-stage approach. The first stage would be to reach an interim agreement (JCPOA minus) that is more limited than the original nuclear deal, and the second would be to conclude an agreement that surpasses the original and closes its loopholes (JCPOA plus).

Moreover, former and present Israeli officials are threatening military action against Iran to prevent it from manufacturing a nuclear weapon in case the US rejoins the JCPOA.

Mr. Trump has been “the greatest friend that Israel has ever had in the White House” to use Prime Minister Netanyahu’s words. Thus, Israel secured the Abraham Accords. That was hailed as a positive development for Middle East peace. Moreover, Mr. Trump chose to withdraw from the JCPOA. But that was seen as a negative development for the Middle East and was supported by no one.

Iran’s regional influence referred daily as “Iran’s malign regional activities” by Mr. Trump’s sanctions lieutenant Mr. Pompeo, has indeed grown during the past two decades. What enabled Iran was the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the regime change project in Syria. Gulf countries also took part in the latter project and failed to match Iran. Without a shadow of doubt, another military conflict would bring unprecedented instability to the Middle East, already plagued by the wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen.

It seems that with the changing of the guard in Washington, the anti-Iran regional bloc is now trying secure itself a place among the P5+Germany, if not formally at the negotiation table, through an intensive consultation process with Washington. In other words, the Biden administration would now have to engage in two parallel negotiations, one with Iran the other with Israel. And which one would prove a more arduous task remains to be seen.

In response to a question at a press conference on January 27, Secretary Blinken said,

“With regard to Iran, President Biden has been very clear in saying that if Iran comes back into full compliance with its obligations under the JCPOA, the United States would do the same thing and then we would use that as a platform to build, with our allies and partners, what we called a longer and stronger agreement and to deal with a number of other issues that are deeply problematic in the relationship with Iran.

“But we are a long way from that point. Iran is out of compliance on a number of fronts. And it would take some time, should it make the decision to do so, for it to come back into compliance in time for us then to assess whether it was meeting its obligations. So we’re not – we’re not there yet to say the least…”

In addressing the possibility of Washington’s return to the JCPOA observers often refer to “US rejoining the Iran nuclear deal”. Tehran and Washington coming to an agreement is a huge challenge. But “rejoining the JCPOA” will not be a unilateral US decision like the withdrawal. It would require agreement not only of Iran but also the P4+Germany.

Under the heading “Dispute Resolution Mechanism”, paragraphs 36-37 of the JCPOA refer to a Joint Commission designed to take up issues of non-compliance. So, at some stage, Washington’s return to the nuclear deal would have to be taken up by this Commission. But getting there may not be the end of the story. One may assume that France, Germany, and the UK would likely be receptive to Washington’s return. But what Peking and Moscow would have to say may also depend on the direction their relations would take with the Biden administration.

In his afore-mentioned article, Mr. Zarif said the following on Washington rejoining the JCPOA:

“The administration should begin by unconditionally removing, with full effect, all sanctions imposed, reimposed, or relabeled since Trump took office. In turn, Iran would reverse all the remedial measures it has taken in the wake of Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal. The remaining signatories to the deal would then decide whether the United States should be allowed to reclaim the seat at the table that it abandoned in 2018. International agreements are not revolving doors, after all, and it is not an automatic right to return to a negotiated agreement—and enjoy its privileges—after one simply leaves on a whim.”

The foregoing would prompt the reader to question the stake, if any, Turkey might have in the resuscitation of JCPOA. The short answer is that Turkey as a regional country sharing a border and engaging with Iran in diverse fields of statecraft has vital interest in how the fate of this deal will pan out.

While the two countries take pride in not having engaged in military conflict for four centuries, there is no hiding that their relations would best be qualified as self-imposed mutual accommodation and restrained competition. If Iran were to add to its inventory a deliverable explosive nuclear device, that will fundamentally undermine the historical balance of interests underpinned by reasonable compromises.

It is no secret that Iran has already acquired nuclear weapon technology which cannot be unlearned, but were it to produce a nuclear bomb, the regional strategic landscape would be altered in ways that bear potential catastrophic consequences, including Turkey being compelled, like some others, to develop its matching nuclear capability. 

Iran’s declaratory policy professing that it neither intends nor finds morally permissible to acquire nuclear weapons does not and cannot go far enough to reassure its neighbors, the broader Middle East and beyond. The JCPOA is the singular political instrument on the market that has the promise that such an eventuality could be avoided. Its contractual commitments, verification measures and punitive clauses render JCPOA a keystone in preserving the delicate status quo and building on its foundation, as promised by its protagonists, a more comprehensive agreement that seeks to remedy some of its shortcomings and to bring Iran into the positive embrace of international community. That is where Turkey’s vital national interests lie. It is only to be hoped that the latest visit of Foreign Minister Zarif to Turkey would have occasioned the two states to confirm and consolidate their mutual goal to go the distance to preserve the JCPOA.

Returning to the JCPOA would be one of the many challenges facing the Biden administration and its traditional European allies. Prominently among the others are relations with Russia, China, and Turkey.

Last Friday a White House statement on National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s call with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s Head of Cabinet Bjoern Seibert said the former underscored President Biden’s commitment to the transatlantic alliance and his intention to repair and revitalize the U.S.-EU partnership, including trade and investment relationship. The statement then read, “They discussed the importance of close U.S.-EU cooperation on the COVID-19 pandemic and global health security, as well as the global economic recovery and climate change. They also agreed to work together on issues of mutual concern, including China and Turkey.”

Some in Turkey must have felt proud.

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[i] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2021-01-22/iran-wants-nuclear-deal-it-made

[ii] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-27/united-states-must-move-forward-not-back-iran

(*) Yusuf Buluc is a retired Turkish Ambassador and a former Head of NATO’s Department of Defense Plans and Policy

A Time to celebrate... or worry? by Branko Milanovic

 

A time to celebrate … or worry?

by Branko Milanovic on 1st February 2021 @BrankoMilan

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Branko Milanovic worries that in the new global constellation a second cold war—with China—could be in the offing.

Branko Milanovic

Most of the world with some political influence seemed to have breathed a sigh of relief: Donald Trump had finally left the White House. Four years of chaotic policies, interspersed with racist invective, had come to an end.

United States liberals had fended off another existential challenge—this time from within their own nation. The current mood might be subdued by the ravages of the pandemic but, when this is over, would they not go back to the celebratory triumphalism of the early 1990s? There are indeed strong similarities between then and now.

Democratic victory

The end of communism was a victory for democratic capitalism and, in the US, for the coalition of conservatives and liberals established in Harry Truman’s postwar presidency and lasting through that of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Around the late 60s, communism had ceased to be an internal threat, as communist parties in western countries became less important politically and step-by-step transformed themselves into social democrats. Eventually they mostly self-extinguished.

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But externally the power of the Soviet Union was formidable. It could destroy the US (and be in turn destroyed) within less than half an hour—as recently released documents about a 1983 US exercise precipitating Soviet preparation for nuclear attack show. The coalition of democratic states prevailed when the Soviets decided to jettison communism and join the richer western coalition.

The winning coalition of conservatives and liberals in the US then felt free to engage in the building of a ‘new world order’ and in quick succession launched a number of wars: on Panama, Iraq (twice), Serbia, Afghanistan and Libya. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization expanded into the former Soviet sphere in eastern Europe and US military outposts—now numbering around 800—were established around the world.

Ideological belief

What underpinned this extraordinary manifestation of power was the ideological belief that all challenges to liberalism had been shown to be politically and economically weak. Those who had yet failed to embrace the nostrums of Washington, the story went, had not done so only because they were not allowed to express their deeply-held desires—or were incurable ‘Islamo-fascists’, a term  coined specially for the second Iraq war. In March 2003 the neoconservatives dominant in the administration of George W Bush and the majority of liberals who supported the war claimed that the streets of Baghdad would be strewn with ‘garlands and flowers’ for the conquering ‘coalition’ armies and that a newly democratic Iraq would join democratic Israel in ensuring peace and prosperity in the middle east.

Reality in Iraq plus the global financial crisis, followed by domestic insurgencies in the international centres of liberalism, put paid to these views. As the liberal-conservative coalition had to deal with ‘internal enemies’ in most important countries—ranging from the gilets jaunes in France to Brexiters in the United Kingdom and Trump in the US—the last few years were quiescent in foreign affairs.

Now, with this latest threat successfully subdued, the danger is that the triumphalism which accompanied the end of the cold war may return. And that could precipitate another cold war, this time with China.

Hysterical behaviour

Trump already did all the preparatory work. However gratuitous was the trade conflict between China and the US, in principle at least it was soluble—the two sides were moving toward a compromise. But Covid-19 ended these hopes. Trump’s increasingly hysterical behaviour indicated that he saw the epidemic as a Chinese plot to oust him from power. His own and his administration’s attacks on China became increasingly strident and frequent.



 

By now, however, the anti-China attitude was shared by all influential segments of US politics. Many may not wish to admit that they are following in Trump’s footsteps, but they are—with an ominous escalation. What was a trade conflict has morphed into a conflict of values. Conflicts of values are by definition irresolvable, except by the victory of one side and defeat of the other.

The explanation for a new cold war proffered by Democratic leaders is that US engagement with China and acquiescence in its membership of the World Trade Organization were based on the idea that China would gradually liberalise its politics. It was a form of the modernisation theory the US establishment had believed in since the early 1960s, a belief reinforced by the fall of communism. In this reading of history, the conflict with China is inevitable because the Chinese leadership has not behaved according to the US establishment’s script and has failed to follow its economic prowess with multi-party democracy.

Losing supremacy

But a different reading of the roots of the conflict is possible too. It is based on Realpolitik, where US supremacy is seen as potentially endangered by the rise of China and creation of a bipolar world. Additionally, if a different type of capitalism is shown to be economically more efficient, would that not undermine liberals’ own view of the ‘end of history’? The conflict may be due to the fear of losing economic, and with it ideological, supremacy—not just the spurned hope of China emulating the west.

Thucydides, general in classical Athens and historian of its war with Sparta, wrote that people fight because of interests, honour or fear. The fear of loss of US mastery may push the resurgent coalition of liberals and conservatives to continue with Trump’s anti-China policy—and to elevate the tensions another notch by presenting the conflict as one between incompatible values. The idea of ‘regime change’ cannot be far behind.

Does the world need a second cold war? We were lucky to have escaped nuclear apocalypse with the first. No sane person could be in favour of having another brush with destruction, just because one part of the world wants to impose its system of values on another.

But the stars seem so aligned. Covid-19 may be seen by future historians (in the optimistic scenario that there are future historians) as the trigger that launched the world into an unnecessary and destructive political, and perhaps military, confrontation.

This article is a joint publication by Social Europe and IPS-Journal

About Branko Milanovic

Branko Milanovic is a Serbian-American economist. A development and inequality specialist, he is visiting presidential professor at the Graduate Center of City University of New York (CUNY) and an affiliated senior scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). He was formerly lead economist in the World Bank's research department.