MATTHEW LEVITT
©2024 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. All rights reserved.
INTRODUCING
THE IRANIAN EXTERNAL OPERATIONS
INTERACTIVE MAP AND TIMELINE
2 | THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
MATTHEW LEVITT
Over the past forty-five years, agents and proxies of the Islamic Republic of Iran have targeted Iranian dissidents and journalists, diplomats from countries opposed to Iranian policies, as well as Israelis and Jews inassassination plots, attempted abductions, intimidation campaigns, andsurveillance operations.
Iran has carried out these operations around the world,in countries with both strong and weak law enforcement, intelligence, and border control agencies. And it has done so consistently, including incircumstances when taking such actions could undermine Iranian diplomatic efforts, such as negotiations over the country’s nuclear program. In recent years, Iranian reliance onthese external operations as tools of intimidation, revenge, and deterrence has spiked, leading governments from the United States,1 Britain,2 and Sweden,3 among others, to decry the regime’s aggressive plots on foreign soil.
Iran has pursued such plots since the earliest days
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. One of the first
such cases on U.S. soil occurred in July 1980, when
Iranian agents recruited David Belfield, aka Dawud
Salahuddin, an American convert to Shia Islam,
to assassinate former Iranian diplomat Ali Akbar
Tabatabai in Bethesda, Maryland.4 Later, in a 1997
briefing, Ambassador Philip Wilcox, the U.S. State
Department’s coordinator for counterterorrism,
stated that “since 1990, we estimate—and indeed,
we have solid information—that Iran is responsible
for over 50 murders of political dissidents and
others overseas.”5
The current map tool shines a bright spotlight on
activities Iran goes to great lengths to obfuscate,
using cutouts such as proxy groups and criminals
to complement its own stable of operatives and
diplomats to engage in murder, abduction, intimidation,
and surveillance around the world. The
map is not a comprehensive compilation of Iranian
external operations, however, since many of these
remain classified. For example, the map does not
include the more than fifty murder plots between
1990 and 1997 referenced by Ambassador Wilcox.
But it does represent the first open-source repository
of Iranian external operations of its kind, and
officials who cover these matters and have access
to classified sources—from the United States to
Europe to the Middle East—have confirmed that
the findings here parallel their own.6
This is an interactive project to which entries will
be added on an ongoing basis, both to keep up
with current events and to backfill past entries as
information and source material become public.
ORIGIN STORY
In July 2018, an Iranian diplomat partnered with
three Iranian operatives in a plot to bomb the
annual convention, near Paris, of the National
Council of Resistance of Iran, the political wing of
the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) opposition group.
The plot was thwarted, and all four conspirators
were arrested, tried, and sentenced for their roles
in an attack that could have killed many people,
including several senior current and former U.S.
officials who attended.7 The plotters, who engaged
iin operational activities in at least five European
countries, were undeterred from carrying out a
potentially spectacular strike in Western Europe.8
In the wake of this plot, U.S. officials sought to
mobilize partners to counter Iran’s support for
terrorism around the world. A senior State
Department official—after noting the role of an
Austria-based Iranian diplomat in the Paris bomb
plot—summarized Washington’s concerns in a
press briefing:
[The] United States is urging all nations to
carefully examine diplomats in Iranian
embassies to ensure their countries’ own
security. If Iran can plot bomb attacks in
Paris, they can plot attacks anywhere in the
world, and we urge all nations to be vigilant
about Iran using embassies as diplomatic
cover to plot terrorist attacks.9
The Paris plot was a turning point for many U.S.
and European officials, in part because it was not
a standalone event. The previous month, in June
2018, the Dutch government expelled two Iranian
diplomats following an intelligence investigation
into an attack on an Iranian Arab activist in
Amsterdam.10 And in March 2018, Albanian
authorities charged two Iranian operatives with
terrorism following a German raid two months
earlier on several residences tied to suspected
Iranian agents.11 Within weeks of the thwarted
Paris plot, an article by this author in CTC Sentinel,
“Iran’s Deadly Diplomats,” documented Iran’s long
history of carrying out such attacks and the roles
played by Iranian diplomats, intelligence operatives
under diplomatic cover, and the Iranian Foreign
Ministry.12 At the time, before the Paris plotters
were tried and convicted, the article concluded that
“as authorities in Austria, Belgium, France, and
Germany dig deeper into the Assadi affair [a
reference to Vienna-based Iranian diplomat/
operative Assadollah Assadi], they are likely to
determine fairly quickly, as investigators invariably
did in previous Iranian plots, that these are not
rogue actions, but the actions of a rogue regime.”13
Shortly thereafter, several U.S. and European
governments reached out asking for more
information on the history of Iranian external
operations. Eager for informed analysis, they had
been frustrated by the lack of unclassified data
about past Iranian plots. Policymakers were looking
for ways to deter Iran from continuing to carry out
such plots, while intelligence and law enforcement
agencies sought trend analysis to understand where,
when, and why Iran conducts such operations along
with details on operatives and targets.
What followed was a five-year research project
that resulted in a unique, unclassified data set
encompassing Iran’s external operations. Entries
were based on available open-source data, but also
relied on consultation with government experts
in cases of insufficient clarity or sourcing. Many
cases have yet to be included for lack of sufficient
sourcing.
The first research product based on the data set,
“Trends in Iranian External Assassination,
Surveillance, and Abdduction Plots," was published
in CTC Sentinel in February 2022.14 Additional
articles followed,15 as well as requests from
journalists to leverage the data set for stories on
Iranian external operations.16 Now, even as more
analytical pieces remain to be published, the
public is welcome to dig in to this open-access
resource as well.
THE MAP
Before exploring the analytical potential of the
Iranian External Operations Map and Timeline, one
must note its primary limitation—that of a publicly
available, open-source information repository
documenting the covert activities of a state actor
(Iran) as well as a designated terrorist organization
(the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps). This
collection of court records, interviews, video
documentation, and other unclassified primary
material about Iran’s external operations is one
of the largest of its kind, but it is by definition
incomplete; therefore, users should be careful not
to draw conclusions from the map or timeline as
to what operations Iran did or did not carry out at
a particular time or in a given place. Several of the
older entries, particularly those that took place
in Europe in the years immediately following the
Islamic Revolution, may list only a victim or target’s
name and the location of an assassination or
kidnapping plot, but that does not make them any
less significant than more current operations with
a wealth of publicly available unclassified details.
Limitations aside, this project represents a major
contribution to the understanding of Iran’s external
plots against those it considers enemies—political
dissidents, journalists, Israelis, Jews, former Iranian
officials, Americans, and others. Its analytic potential
lies not only in its collection of much of the publicly
documented information available on Iranian
assassinations, kidnappings, surveillance, and
intimidation operations, but also in its constant
evolution as more sources are added, plots
uncovered, and entries updated. The information
contained in this interactive resource allows users
to understand the geographic and temporal range
of Iranian external operations, in addition to the
types of perpetrators conducting these plots and
the victims they most frequently target..
Consider a few key themes:
• Two major spikes in Iranian external
operational activity. Patterns in the data reveal
two events that led to a significant increase in
external operations: the 1979 Islamic Revolution
and the January 2020 targeted killing of IRGC
Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani. In the
decade following the rise of the Islamic Republic,
the data reveals at least fourteen unique Iranian
external operations, largely targeting former
shah-era officials who fled Iran for Europe.
The Iranian external operations data set also
documents at least 116 unique operations since
Soleimani’s killing, meaning that more than half
of the documented operations have taken place in
the past four years.
• Reliance on hired criminals and locals to
conduct surveillance and execute plots. Iran
frequently turns to criminal groups, including
the Hells Angels biker gang—as well as hit men,
drug traffickers, and even private investigators—
to conduct surveillance operations, organize
kidnappings, and commit assassinations.
• Use of diplomats to provide official cover
for illicit activities. Since the mid-1980s,
Iran has been using government officials and
diplomats posted in embassies abroad to
provide diplomatic immunity to those carrying
out external operations. Take the cases of Kazem
Rajavi, who was assassinated in 1990, leading to
the attempted arrest of no fewer than thirteen
Iranians with diplomatic passports;17 Assadollah
Assadi, the diplomat/explosives smuggler who
was arrested in 2018;18 or Masoud Vardanjani,
who was assassinated in 2019.19
• Targeting of those who speak out against the
Iranian regime. Iranian external operations
largely target individuals and groups seen as
enemies or critics of the Islamic Republic,
including activists like Masih Alinejad, media
outlets like Iran International, and dissident
political organizations like MEK.
Besides highlighting broad trends over the past
four decades, the map provides insight into littleknown
Iranian links to criminal plots across the
globe, including an IRGC effort to build up a small
rebel group in the Central African Republic, a
German-Afghan national’s Iranian espionage
activities while working as a translator for the
German army in Afghanistan, and a plot by two
alleged Afghan nationals to assassinate three
Swedish Jews, among them a dual U.S. citizen.
This tool also reveals new details in more wellknown cases,
including links between known Iranian drug trafficker and
Ministry of Intelligenceoperative Naji Ibrahim Sharifi Zindashti and
atleast half a dozen assassination plots spanning
the globe; the involvement of a senior commander
in the IRGC’s Syria-based Unit 840 in a 2022 plot to
assassinate former U.S. secretary of state Mike
Pompeo and former national security advisor John
Bolton; and connections between three late-2022
attacks on Jewish targets in Germany and an Iranbased
Hells Angels member wanted in connection
with the reported murder of a fellow rock band
member in Tehran in April 2024.
Creating this tool required attention by many people
to a range of details, from the design of the user
interface and interactive feature set to even more
granular decisions about coding and the relationships
between entries and known actors. Here is
how some of these details were addressed:
1. Spellings. The Iranian External Operations Map
typically adopts the spelling of individuals and
entities used in government documents. Yet agencies
occasionally vary their transliterations of Arabic
or Persian names, and in these situations the text
adheres to the spelling used in the source document
(e.g., a criminal indictment or Treasury Department
designation). The map’s search feature takes into
account all known documented spellings of an
individual or organization’s name. For example,
if an individual’s first name is spelled “Mohammed,”
“Mohamed,” and “Muhammed” across three
different sources, all three spelling variations will
link to the same entry concerning that individual.
2. Document repository and attached primary
sources. Wherever possible, the entries include
primary sources, such as criminal complaints,
indictments, declassified CIA reports, trial
testimony, Rewards for Justice announcements,
Treasury Department designations, government reports
and press releases, and links to NGO reports. Some
entries include documents (e.g.,indictments from foreign countries)
that have been translated from their original languages;
these documents are intended for reference only
and users are encouraged to examine an entry’s
original sources, which are always included
alongside the translated copy when available.
Additionally, where relevant, key documents
such as an indictment or Treasury Department
designation are used as the header image for an
entry to highlight a main source. Entries with
multiple associated documents will have a blue
arrow indicating that users can click through
attached PDFs, as well as a “View document”
button that will enlarge an attached PDF or
photograph. For entries where photographs clearly
illustrate the contents, photos will be included as
the header, and PDFs—if applicable—can be viewed
in a “Documents” dropdown box at the bottom of
the entry. Additional sources, including news
articles and other secondary materials, are
available in the dropdown box labeled “Sources.”
3. Dates for incidents. Because this tool functions
as both a map and an interactive timeline, each
event is associated with a date and a set of geographic
coordinates. When a specific date is unavailable,
entries provide the greatest specificity possible:
e.g., November 2022, Fall 2022, or simply 2022 if
no further identifying information can be found.
In instances where sources provide no clues to the
date of illicit activity, the date of the source will be
used and noted in the entry description.
When the only information available is the year,
that entry will appear on the timeline at the earliest
possible date (e.g., January 1, 2022, for a listing of
2022), even as the date in the text box will reflect
solely known information (2022). Users can filter
for events during a specific period by adjusting the
sliding timeline on the bottom of the page, and can
view events during a specific year by clicking on
that year. Filtering entries by time period will open
up a sidebar listing all entries relevant to a user’s
filtered search.
4. Dates for judicial actions. Wherever possible,
entries will reference an individual’s first contact
with law enforcement. Ideally, judicial actions will
be categorized as arrests, but in instances where
the date of an individual’s initial arrest is unknown,
an entry will be tagged as an indictment. Details
concerning an individual’s trial, sentencing, or
deportation are included in this same entry, which
is periodically updated as new information becomes
publicly available.
In cases where an individual’s extradition occurs
shortly after their arrest, that information is
included in a single entry detailing both the arrest
and subsequent extradition to a third country.
For example, Rafat Amirov was arrested in a third
country, extradited to the United States on
January 26, 2023, and then charged in a New York
court the following day in connection with a 2022
plot to assassinate Masih Alinejad; all of this
information is included in one entry tagged as
both “arrest” and “indictment.” But Polad Omarov,
charged on the same day as Amirov, was not
extradited to the United States from the Czech
Republic until February 2024; this new information
warranted a separate entry due to the length of
time between Omarov’s indictment and arrest.
When multiple entries are associated with a single
plot, they will be listed in a dropdown box labeled
“See also” at the bottom of a given entry and sorted
by appropriate noun tags (e.g., individuals, organizations, businesses).
5. Cross-coding of entries and colored dots on
the map. The map’s category filters, shown in six
colored boxes atop the screen, allow users to filter
by type of external operations plot, counterterrorism
action, or operational finance and logistics action,
as well as by specific country, perpetrator, and
target. Selecting one or multiple filters will limit
the dots that appear on the map itself, as well as
the events listed in the collapsible sidebar. Users
may notice that selecting the “Assassination”
subcategory under “Plots and Attacks” still leaves
many blue and turquoise dots on the map; this is
not an error but instead reflects the cross-coding
of entries under multiple categories to enhance
searchability. For example, the entry “Manssor
Arbabsiar Transfers Money to Fund Saudi
Ambassador’s Assassination” is coded primarily as
a case of “Finance” under “Finance and Logistics”
(turquoise), but is listed secondarily as an
“Assassination” under “Plots and Attacks”
(orange) due to Arbabsiar’s role in funding an
attempted hit on the Saudi ambassador to the
United States, Adel al-Jubeir.
6. Searching by country and other filters. The
mapping tool includes several additional filters to
reflect the target and perpetrator set involved in
Iranian external operations globally and to give
users a fuller picture of how the Iranian regime
preys upon its perceived enemies using a diverse
operational toolkit. The “Country” filter allows
users to search for plots taking place in a specific
country and filter out entries that do not meet the
search criteria. Users may notice, however, that
when selecting “United Kingdom,” events still
appear in multiple countries, including Albania,
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates; remaining
dots represent cases linked to Britain by association
(explained below in point 9). Users should note that
the “Country” filter does not allow users to search
by region or autonomous administration—e.g.,
Kurdistan, Scotland, northeast Syria, the Middle East.
7. Combining of filters. This interactive tool is
particularly powerful when filters are combined to
produce targeted search queries. For example, users
can manipulate the timeline to display all events
taking place since the beginning of 2020, then select
the “Assassination” and “Kidnapping” filters under
the “Plots and Attacks” main category, and afterward
narrow results by activating the
“Iranian dissidents” filter under “Target.”
8. Approach to geolocation. Each event is
geolocated as precisely as possible given the
available information, and pinned to a country’s
capital when more specific geographical information is unknown.
While capital cities serve as both stand-ins and actual locations
for various entries,the most specific confirmed information is
denotedin the entry text (e.g., London, United Kingdom v.
United Kingdom). Additionally, the geolocation is
typically determined by the activity rather than
the site of a report or designation’s publication.
For example, “Treasury Department Designates
Mohammed Reza Ansari” is geolocated to Damascus,
Syria, where Ansari is accused of heading an IRGC
Qods Force unit, and linked to Washington DC,
where he allegedly helped orchestrate assassination
plots targeting John Bolton and Mike Pompeo.
A note on Iran: While this map includes only
external operations (i.e., those taking place outside
Iran), a number of entries are geolocated to Tehran
or other locations inside Iran. This is the case
when an individual within Iran helps orchestrate a
plot in another country (see, e.g., “IRGC Hires
Fugitive Biker Gang Leader to Organize Attacks
on Synagogues in Germany”), as well as when
individuals travel to or are recruited in Iran (see
“Majid Ghorbani Travels to Iran”), when Iran
releases statements pertaining to kidnapping or
assassination plots (see “Iran Executes SwedishIranian National Habib Chaab”), and when
counterterrorism operations take place on Iranian
soil (see “Gunmen Kill IRGC-QF Officer Hassan
Sayyad Khodaei in Tehran”).
9. Linked and associated locations. While all
entries are pinned to one “primary” location, some
cases are more complex and involve linked or associated locations.
Locations are connected linearly
in the presence of known travel routes or financial
flows, while spider lines demonstrate a radial connection.
These features allow users to understand
the geographic breadth of Iran’s external operations
and visualize the interconnectedness among many
of these plots. “Linked” locations are those with
direct geographical ties to an entry; spider lines
show the direction of travel (see “Majid Ghorbani
Travels to Iran”) or a direct link to a plot in a secondary
location (see “Damion Patrick John Ryan
Indicted for Plotting to Assassinate Two Maryland
Residents”). When used to indicate travel, spider
lines are often configured linearly, moving from one
location to another rather than radiating outward
from a central location. In cases of more complicated travel
patterns, multiple lines are used toindicate direction of travel
(see “Dawud Salahuddin Flees to Iran”).
“Associated” map locations are portrayed as gray
dots superimposed on colored dots, but are not
physically connected to an entry with spider lines—
these represent a looser connection to a secondary
location. For example, the 1989 assassination
attempt against Salman Rushdie took place in
London, with Cote d’Ivoire, Lebanon, and the
Netherlands listed as “associated” locations to
illustrate Mustafa Mahmoud Mazeh’s travel route
from West Africa to Britain. Associated locations
may also be used to highlight operatives’ or
victims’ nationalities or passport countries (see
“Ali Mansouri Arrested for Espionage”), locations
of operatives’ handlers (see “Thaer Shafut Indicted
for Developing Iranian Espionage Network in West
Bank”), or suspected links to separate plots (see
“Mohammad Mehdi Mozayyani Investigated for
Plotting Assassinations Against Iranian Dissidents
in Britain”). Users should note that entries may
have both linked and associated locations,
including multiple instances of each.
10. Decoupling dots from activity volume. A dot
is not necessarily indicative of the volume of
activity at one given set of coordinates. For example,
the map currently has twenty-nine entries whose
primary, linked, or associated location is tagged as
“Jerusalem, Israel”—those twenty-nine entries are
represented with a single dot. To view all the entries
associated with one particular location, users can
click on a city dot to activate a pop-up window that
displays the titles of all entries associated with a
location.
11. Recent developments. This resource is
continuously updated as news stories break,
reports are declassified, and insights into historical
plots emerge. The upper left-hand corner of the
map provides a running tally of entries included in
the map. Clicking “Last updated” will call up a list
of updated events sorted in reverse chronological
order.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many people contributed, in one way or another, to the creation of this interactive map and the data set onwhich it is based.
I had the benefit of meeting with a wide range of subject-matter experts for this project, from academics andjournalists to victims of Iranian external operations and the agents and policymakers working to disrupt suchplots. These meetings have taken place in Washington DC and cities across the United States where officialsare overseeing cases in which Iran and its agents have targeted people, as well as cities around the world where officials are doing the same.
This product is the fruit of many people’s labor, but the following individuals truly stand out. The designand technical teams at International Mapping have been fantastic partners, and I am very grateful to them forhelping me transform this idea into an actual product—special thanks to Kevin Danaher and Mikael Ems. Themap is attractive, user-friendly, and intuitive thanks to the vision of The Washington Institute’s publicationsdirector, Maria Radacsi. Jason Warshof and Miriam Himmelfarb provided expert editing of each map entry.
Scott Rogers, the Institute’s managing editor for online communications, made sure the map would workproperly on our website. And Jeff Rubin and the entire Institute communications team were great partnersin this project, including video work by Kori Francis and Katie Durkin and social media contributions by Carolina Krauskopf.
The Washington Institute is a fabulous intellectual community, and I thank all my colleagues for their patience and counsel over the past few years as we built our data set and then this interactive map, which is far better for their feedback. I am especially grateful to the Institute’s leadership, each of whom was supportive of this project and encouraging to the research team that made it possible. It is to this team that I am most grateful. Sarah Boches, Camille Jablonski, Ella Kinder, Ilana Krill, and Juliette Reyes all worked on the data set. Two exceptional research assistants, Lauren von Thaden and Delaney Soliday, carried this project on their shoulders and saw it through to fruition. Lauren and Delaney were effectively the projectmanagers, and it is due to their tremendous energy and dedication that the product came out as well as it has.
Finally, it is a tremendous honor to be named The Washington Institute’s Fromer-Wexler Senior Fellow,and to direct the Jeanette and Eli Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. Thank you tothe Fromer, Wexler, and Reinhard families for your support and friendship.
MATTHEW LEVITT
NOTES
1 U.S. Department of Justice, “Justice Department Announces Charges and New Arrest in Connection with
Assassination Plot Directed from Iran,” January 27, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/opa/gallery/justice-department-announces-charges-and-new-arrest-connection-assassination-plot.
2 Security Service/MI5, “Director General Ken McCallum Gives Annual Threat Update,” November 16, 2022,
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/director-general-ken-mccallum-gives-annual-threat-update.
3 Reuters, “Swedish Security Service Says Iran Uses Criminal Networks in Sweden,” May 30, 2024, https://www.reuters.
com/world/swedish-security-service-says-iran-uses-criminal-networks-sweden-2024-05-30/.
4 Ira Silverman, “An American Terrorist,” The New Yorker, July 28, 2002, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/08/05/an-american-terrorist.
5 U.S. Department of State, “Briefing by Ambassador Philip Wilcox on Release of Report Patterns of Global Terrorism
1996,” April 30, 1997, available at https://1997-2001.state.gov/policy_remarks/970430.wilcox.html.
6 While working on this project, the author has on multiple occasions provided briefings on it to policymakers, law
enforcement, and intelligence officials in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.
7 Samuel Petrequin, “Iranian Diplomat Convicted of Planning Attack on Opposition,” Associated Press, February 4,
2021, https://apnews.com/article/iran-trials-antwerp-france-belgium-6005db14421f60e003cfcf5a32145414.
8 Saeed Kamali Dehghan and Kim Willsher, “France Blames Iran for Foiled Bomb Attack near Paris,” Guardian, October 2,
2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/02/france-blames-iran-for-foiled-bomb-attack-near-paris.
9 U.S. Department of State, “Background Briefing on Meeting with Saudi Officials,” July 10, 2018, https://2017-2021.
state.gov/background-briefing-on-meeting-with-saudi-officials/.
10 Reuters, “Netherlands Expels Two Iranian Embassy Staff: Dutch Intelligence Service,” July 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/netherlands-expels-two-iranian-embassy-staff-dutch-intelligence-service-idUSKBN1JW27A/;
and Stephanie Van Den Berg, “Be Careful, Murdered Iranian Activist’s Daughter Tells European Exiles,” Reuters,
December 12, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/be-careful-murdered-iranian-activist-s-daughter-tells-european-exiles-idUSKBN1E61KB/.
11 Benet Koleka, “Albania Says It Foiled Iranian Plot to Attack Exiled Dissidents,” Reuters, October 23, 2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-albania-iran/albania-says-it-foiled-iranian-plot-to-attack-exiled-dissidents-idINKBN1X22CN/?edition-redirect=in.
12 Matthew Levitt, “Iran’s Deadly Diplomats,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 7 (August 2018), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-deadly-diplomats/.
13 Levitt, “Iran’s Deadly Diplomats,” https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-deadly-diplomats/.
14 Matthew Levitt, “Trends in Iranian External Assassination, Surveillance, and Abduction Plots,” CTC Sentinel 15,
no. 2 (February 2022), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/trends-in-iranian-external-assassination-surveillance-and-abduction-plots/.
15 Matthew Levitt, “The Backstory Behind the Killing of Qods Force Col. Khodaei,” Trends Research & Advisory,
June 20, 2022, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/the-backstory-behind-the-killing-of-qods-force-col-khodaei/; and
Matthew Levitt, “Contending with IRGC Plots,” Lawfare, August 16, 2022, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/contending-irgc-plots.
16 Loveday Morris and Souad Mekhennet, “Hells Angels, a Synagogue Shooting and Iran’s Shady Hand in Germany,”
Washington Post, March 6, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/06/iran-revolutionary-guard-attacks-germany/; and Shane Harris, Souad Mekhennet, and Yeganeh Torbati, “Rise in Iranian Assassination,
Kidnapping Plots Alarms Western Officials,” Washington Post, December 1, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/2022/12/01/iran-kidnapping-assassination-plots/.
17 Julia Crawford, “Why Switzerland Is Relaunching an Iranian Cold Case for ‘Genocide,’” JusticeInfo.net, October 26,
2021, https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/83702-switzerland-relaunching-iranian-cold-case-genocide.html.
18 Levitt, “Iran’s Deadly Diplomats,” https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-deadly-diplomats/.
19 Reuters, “Iranian Diplomats Instigated Killing in Istanbul, Turkish Officials Say,” March 27, 2020, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-turkey-iran-killing-exclusive/exclusive-iranian-diplomats-instigated-killing-of-dissident-in-istanbul-turkish-officials-say-idUSKBN21E3FU/
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