The Jamestown Foundation
Eurasıa Daily Monitor
Armenia Reaches ‘Point of No Return’ in Withdrawal From CSTO
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 118
By: Vali Kaleji
August 5, 2024 05:20 PM Age: 2 days
(Source: Sputnik Armenia)
Executive Summary:
On July 12, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia plans to withdraw from the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization. This confirmation follows agreements for Russian border guards to leave Armenia, further moving Yerevan away from Russian influence.
For now, Yerevan has only frozen participation in the CSTO, with the intention to officially leave the body in the near future. When Armenia does, the organization will lose its influence over the South Caucasus, and Russia will no longer have as strong of a foothold in the region.
Armenia’s strategic shift away from Russia signifies a transformation in its geopolitical stance, seeking greater autonomy, alignment, and cooperation with Western and regional powers.
On July 31, Russian border guards completed their withdrawal from Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport, where they had been stationed since Armenia gained independence in 1991 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 31). Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan announced the withdrawal in March, stating that Yerevan had informed Moscow that the border guards should leave the airport (Civilnet.am, March 6; OC Media, March 7). Earlier, Yerevan and Moscow had agreed on the withdrawal of Russian forces and border guards from various parts of Armenia (see EDM, April 22; OC Media, May 9). The Russian border guards stationed between Azerbaijan and Armenia are currently in the process of withdrawing from the Tavush border area but “will continue to carry out service on Armenia’s borders with Türkiye and Iran” (Public Radio of Armenia, May 14). The withdrawal is the most recent example of Armenia distancing itself from Russia, especially after Azerbaijan’s retaking of Karabakh last year. Yerevan had appealed to Moscow for help, including a CSTO contingent similar to what was sent to Kazakhstan in January 2022, but never received any assistance (see EDM, January 19, 2022).
The troop withdrawals come as Yerevan has been reconsidering its regional posturing. In March, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenia will withdraw from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-dominated security alliance comprised of several post-Soviet states (see EDM, March 5). In parliament, Pashinyan stated, “We will leave [the CSTO], are you scaring me with this? Everything is fine. … We will decide when we leave” (Anadolu Agency, June 12). These developments are a continuation of the growing discontent and distance between Armenia and Russia since Pashinyan came to power in May 2018 (see EDM, February 9, 2023). Armenia’s strategic shift away from Russia toward Western and regional alliances, such as the European Union, marks a significant realignment that could reshape power dynamics in the South Caucasus and challenge long-standing economic and security dependencies.
In many ways, Armenia, under Pashinyan’s leadership, has reached a “point of no return” regarding the CSTO. In the past, Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Alen Simonyan has branded the alliance a “gun that does not shoot” (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, September 26, 2022; The National News, October 13, 2022). Armenia is now following the path Azerbaijan and Georgia were on two decades ago when they left the CSTO in 1999. If Yerevan follows through with this decision, the number of members will be reduced to five—Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. The decision to freeze Armenian participation will leed to the closure and withdrawal of Russian forces from the two military bases in Yerevan and Gyumri (see EDM, May 2). When Armenia officially leaves, the CSTO will lose control over the South Caucasus, and Russia will not have any other military bases in the region outside of the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Yerevan’s next step after leaving the CSTO remains unclear. Armenia is the only South Caucasus country that is a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). If Armenia wants to separate completely from Russia, it will have numerous obstacles concerning economic independence. Important sectors of the Armenian economy, such as electricity, gas, telecommunications, and railway transport, were handed over to Russia in 2003 in payment for Yerevan’s accumulated $100 million debt to Moscow (Eurasianet, May 7, 2003). In the years since, Armenia grew increasingly dependent on Russia for its economic needs, which gave Moscow increased political influence. For example, in September 2013, due to Russian pressure, including threats to cancel security guarantees and an increase in gas prices, then-Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan decided to join the EAEU instead of signing an Association Agreement with the European Union. Grigoryan described the event as “joining under the Gun” (Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents, 2014). Based on this precedent, Russia may try to force Armenia to remain in the CSTO with the gas pressure lever.
The Pashinyan government also seems to be trying to end Armenia’s geopolitical and economic isolation by normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye (see EDM, May 6). From the point of view of the Pashinyan government, this normalization could allow Armenia to further reduce its economic dependence on Russia by creating routes for transit and energy transfer with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, as well as open up opportunities for joint economic projects with both countries. In these circumstances, gas imported from Azerbaijan and Iran could replace a portion of the gas exported from Russia to Armenia (Azatutyun, April 25).
Pashinyan still needs to overcome internal political challenges in officially leaving the CSTO. However, if successful, it is unclear which partners Yerevan would go to as alternatives to Russia. The current options arrange from France and the United States to Iran and India. France seems to be the most willing to play such a role, which has support in the United States. Recent defense and military agreements between Armenia and France could be a sign of Yerevan reorienting the country’s foreign policy to the West (see EDM, November 6, 2023, July 17).
Iran can be a reliable and stable alternative for Armenia. Although Tehran finds the weakening of Armenia’s relations with Russia and possible departure from the CSTO undesirable, as such acts may serve to weaken the unwritten alliance between Iran, Armenia, and Russia and increase the influence of the West and NATO in the South Caucasus. These changes will drastically alter the balance of power in the South Caucasus, to the detriment of Iran and Russia and to the benefit of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and the West (see EDM, June 17).
In these circumstances, if Armenia withdraws from the CSTO, Iran will try to maintain close relations with its only Christian neighbor. Maintaining the 40 kilometer (25 miles) border with Armenia is a strategic priority for Iran, which clear opposition to the Zangezur corridor is a clear example in recent years (see EDM, September 23, 2022, October 11, 2023). During the last three decades, the Russian border guards were responsible for the security of this border. If these forces are withdrawn from Armenia, Iran would prefer they not be replaced by another foreign force and that Armenian border guard were stationed this border.
India and Armenia have expanded military and defense cooperation in recent years. India, however, is unlikely to be a suitable alternative for Russia, as New Delhi maintains close relations with Moscow (Armenpress, May 20). India also participates in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia, and New Delhi hopes to take a relatively more balanced approach to the South Caucasus. Furthermore, the tripartite cooperation between Armenia, Iran, and India focuses efforts on “soft balancing” (economic transit) instead of “hard balancing” (military-security) against the tripartite ties of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Pakistan in the region (see EDM, August 16, 2021, July 25; The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, March 28).
Armenia’s strategic shift away from Russia signifies a transformation in its geopolitical stance, seeking greater autonomy, alignment, and cooperation with regional powers and the West. Yerevan’s decision to withdraw from the CSTO, if implemented, is a paradigm shift not only for the country but also for the wider South Caucasus. It could fundamentally change the arrangement of political forces and the balance of power in the region, potentially diminishing Russian influence while enhancing the roles of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and the West.
05:20 PM Age: 2 days
(Source: Sputnik Armenia)
Executive Summary:
On July 12, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that Armenia plans to withdraw from the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization. This confirmation follows agreements for Russian border guards to leave Armenia, further moving Yerevan away from Russian influence.
For now, Yerevan has only frozen participation in the CSTO, with the intention to officially leave the body in the near future. When Armenia does, the organization will lose its influence over the South Caucasus, and Russia will no longer have as strong of a foothold in the region.
Armenia’s strategic shift away from Russia signifies a transformation in its geopolitical stance, seeking greater autonomy, alignment, and cooperation with Western and regional powers.
On July 31, Russian border guards completed their withdrawal from Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport, where they had been stationed since Armenia gained independence in 1991 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 31). Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan announced the withdrawal in March, stating that Yerevan had informed Moscow that the border guards should leave the airport (Civilnet.am, March 6; OC Media, March 7). Earlier, Yerevan and Moscow had agreed on the withdrawal of Russian forces and border guards from various parts of Armenia (see EDM, April 22; OC Media, May 9). The Russian border guards stationed between Azerbaijan and Armenia are currently in the process of withdrawing from the Tavush border area but “will continue to carry out service on Armenia’s borders with Türkiye and Iran” (Public Radio of Armenia, May 14). The withdrawal is the most recent example of Armenia distancing itself from Russia, especially after Azerbaijan’s retaking of Karabakh last year. Yerevan had appealed to Moscow for help, including a CSTO contingent similar to what was sent to Kazakhstan in January 2022, but never received any assistance (see EDM, January 19, 2022).
The troop withdrawals come as Yerevan has been reconsidering its regional posturing. In March, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenia will withdraw from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-dominated security alliance comprised of several post-Soviet states (see EDM, March 5). In parliament, Pashinyan stated, “We will leave [the CSTO], are you scaring me with this? Everything is fine. … We will decide when we leave” (Anadolu Agency, June 12). These developments are a continuation of the growing discontent and distance between Armenia and Russia since Pashinyan came to power in May 2018 (see EDM, February 9, 2023). Armenia’s strategic shift away from Russia toward Western and regional alliances, such as the European Union, marks a significant realignment that could reshape power dynamics in the South Caucasus and challenge long-standing economic and security dependencies.
In many ways, Armenia, under Pashinyan’s leadership, has reached a “point of no return” regarding the CSTO. In the past, Speaker of the Armenian Parliament Alen Simonyan has branded the alliance a “gun that does not shoot” (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, September 26, 2022; The National News, October 13, 2022). Armenia is now following the path Azerbaijan and Georgia were on two decades ago when they left the CSTO in 1999. If Yerevan follows through with this decision, the number of members will be reduced to five—Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. The decision to freeze Armenian participation will leed to the closure and withdrawal of Russian forces from the two military bases in Yerevan and Gyumri (see EDM, May 2). When Armenia officially leaves, the CSTO will lose control over the South Caucasus, and Russia will not have any other military bases in the region outside of the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Yerevan’s next step after leaving the CSTO remains unclear. Armenia is the only South Caucasus country that is a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). If Armenia wants to separate completely from Russia, it will have numerous obstacles concerning economic independence. Important sectors of the Armenian economy, such as electricity, gas, telecommunications, and railway transport, were handed over to Russia in 2003 in payment for Yerevan’s accumulated $100 million debt to Moscow (Eurasianet, May 7, 2003). In the years since, Armenia grew increasingly dependent on Russia for its economic needs, which gave Moscow increased political influence. For example, in September 2013, due to Russian pressure, including threats to cancel security guarantees and an increase in gas prices, then-Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan decided to join the EAEU instead of signing an Association Agreement with the European Union. Grigoryan described the event as “joining under the Gun” (Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents, 2014). Based on this precedent, Russia may try to force Armenia to remain in the CSTO with the gas pressure lever.
The Pashinyan government also seems to be trying to end Armenia’s geopolitical and economic isolation by normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye (see EDM, May 6). From the point of view of the Pashinyan government, this normalization could allow Armenia to further reduce its economic dependence on Russia by creating routes for transit and energy transfer with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, as well as open up opportunities for joint economic projects with both countries. In these circumstances, gas imported from Azerbaijan and Iran could replace a portion of the gas exported from Russia to Armenia (Azatutyun, April 25).
Pashinyan still needs to overcome internal political challenges in officially leaving the CSTO. However, if successful, it is unclear which partners Yerevan would go to as alternatives to Russia. The current options arrange from France and the United States to Iran and India. France seems to be the most willing to play such a role, which has support in the United States. Recent defense and military agreements between Armenia and France could be a sign of Yerevan reorienting the country’s foreign policy to the West (see EDM, November 6, 2023, July 17).
Iran can be a reliable and stable alternative for Armenia. Although Tehran finds the weakening of Armenia’s relations with Russia and possible departure from the CSTO undesirable, as such acts may serve to weaken the unwritten alliance between Iran, Armenia, and Russia and increase the influence of the West and NATO in the South Caucasus. These changes will drastically alter the balance of power in the South Caucasus, to the detriment of Iran and Russia and to the benefit of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and the West (see EDM, June 17).
In these circumstances, if Armenia withdraws from the CSTO, Iran will try to maintain close relations with its only Christian neighbor. Maintaining the 40 kilometer (25 miles) border with Armenia is a strategic priority for Iran, which clear opposition to the Zangezur corridor is a clear example in recent years (see EDM, September 23, 2022, October 11, 2023). During the last three decades, the Russian border guards were responsible for the security of this border. If these forces are withdrawn from Armenia, Iran would prefer they not be replaced by another foreign force and that Armenian border guard were stationed this border.
India and Armenia have expanded military and defense cooperation in recent years. India, however, is unlikely to be a suitable alternative for Russia, as New Delhi maintains close relations with Moscow (Armenpress, May 20). India also participates in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia, and New Delhi hopes to take a relatively more balanced approach to the South Caucasus. Furthermore, the tripartite cooperation between Armenia, Iran, and India focuses efforts on “soft balancing” (economic transit) instead of “hard balancing” (military-security) against the tripartite ties of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Pakistan in the region (see EDM, August 16, 2021, July 25; The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, March 28).
Armenia’s strategic shift away from Russia signifies a transformation in its geopolitical stance, seeking greater autonomy, alignment, and cooperation with regional powers and the West. Yerevan’s decision to withdraw from the CSTO, if implemented, is a paradigm shift not only for the country but also for the wider South Caucasus. It could fundamentally change the arrangement of political forces and the balance of power in the region, potentially diminishing Russian influence while enhancing the roles of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and the West.
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