Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei indicated that he still believes Iran must respond to Israeli operations targeting senior Axis of Resistance leaders in recent weeks, despite back-channel threats from the United States emphasizing that Israel would respond forcefully to an attack that kills Israeli civilians or causes significant damage..[i] eting senior Axis of Resistance leaders in recent weeks, despite back-channel threats from the United States emphasizing that Israel would respond forcefully to an attac
Khamenei said on August 14 at a meeting with the National Congress of Martyrs of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province that “according to [his interpretation of] the Quran” any non-tactical retreat, whether in military, political or economic affairs, leads to the wrath of God.[ii] Khamenei also said that the United States and Israel are waging ”psychological warfare” by exaggerating their ability to harm Iran in response to an Iranian strike.[iii] This argument suggests that US and Israeli attempts to discourage a direct strike on Israel have failed to convince the supreme leader and his inner circle. Back-channel messages from the United States have emphasized to both Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah that Israel would respond forcefully to an attack that kills Israeli civilians or causes significant damage.[iv]
These most recent statements are consistent with Khamenei’s belief that Iran has a ”duty” to respond to Israel’s targeted killing of Haniyeh on July 31.[v] Khamenei will have the final say on how and when Iran's retaliatory attack on Israel is conducted, and his repeated comments highlighting the necessity of a retaliation suggests that the Iranian regime will likely mount a retaliatory strike on Israel.[vi] Khamenei’s statements do not, however, indicate his chosen form of response and so his statements do not independently verify CTP-ISW’s running assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel.
Official Hamas statements suggest that a ceasefire during the August 15 Doha talks is unlikely.[vii] Unspecified Hamas officials have suggested that Hamas could attend the talks, however.[viii] The United States, Qatar, and Egypt said on August 8 that they would present a “final bridging proposal” at these talks that resolves outstanding points of disagreement in a manner that can ideally meet both Israeli and Hamas expectations.[ix] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office confirmed on August 14 that Israel would send a high-level delegation with a mandate to negotiate to Doha.[x]
At least five named Hamas officials and an unknown number of unnamed Hamas sources spoke to Western media outlets about these talks on August 13 and 14.[xi] The named Hamas officials have maintained consistently that Hamas will not attend ceasefire talks, claiming that talks allow Israel to introduce new conditions and to use the talks as “cover to continue aggression” against the Palestinian people.[xii] These statements are consistent with Hamas’ public August 11 demand that international mediators “oblige” Israel to accept “a plan to implement” a previous ceasefire proposal that Hamas submitted in July 2024 instead of conducting further negotiations.[xiii] Unspecified Hamas statements given to international media have claimed there is a chance Hamas will attend the August 15 talks, however.[xiv] An unnamed Hamas source told CNN that the group had adopted a strategy of “intentional ambiguity” over its participation in ceasefire and hostage talks.[xv] Two unspecified officials referencing knowledge of Hamas thinking said that Hamas would consider a “serious response” put forth by Israel that responds to Hamas’ July 2 proposal.[xvi] Israel responded to Hamas’ July 2 proposal on July 27 and issued ”essential clarifications” to past clauses and did not introduce new clauses, according to Israel.[xvii] Israel said those ”clarifications” included how to assure that only unarmed Palestinians cross into the northern Gaza Strip and the number of living hostages to be released.[xviii] Hamas official Osama Hamdan claims that Hamas never received the document.[xix]
US President Biden “expect[s]” that a successful ceasefire in the Gaza Strip achieved in the next few days would make Iranian leaders hold off on a retaliatory strike targeting Israel.[xx] It remains unclear if ”hold off” means Iranian leaders would decline to mount any retaliatory strike on Israel, or just that Iran would delay its strike. Reuters first reported the suggestion that Iran would ”hold back” from a strike on August 13, citing three unspecified senior Iranian officials.[xxi] CTP-ISW assesses that Iran is likely trying to expand divisions within Israel and between Israel and the United States ahead of a possible Iranian drone and missile attack by circulating this rumor.[xxii] Iran likely calculates that conditioning its attack on Israel on whether Israel and Hamas reach a ceasefire-hostage deal could force Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to choose between two bad options that could either cause him to lose the support of his political coalition or be blamed by Israeli society and allies for the ensuing Iranian-led attack on Israel.
The Iranian Parliament will vote to approve four ministerial nominees during the week of August 18 who articulated policies largely consistent with the regime’s current foreign policy.[xxiii] The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission approved the qualifications and plans of four cabinet minister nominees on August 14.[xxiv] The nominees for Foreign Minister, Intelligence Minister, Defense Minister and Interior Minister presented proposals for their ministries to the Iranian Parliament between August 12-14. The proposals are largely consistent with current regime foreign policy, though the nominee for foreign affairs minister continued to signal the Pezeshkian Administration’s willingness to pursue nuclear negotiations. The nominee for intelligence minister—who also served under former President Ebrahim Raisi—emphasized confronting Israel. Both the nominated foreign affairs minister and defense minister emphasized the importance of supporting Iran’s Axis of Resistance. The full proposals are as follows:
- Abbas Araghchi (Foreign Minister): Araghchi emphasized the need to both neutralize the effect of western sanctions on Iran and pursue the removal of sanctions entirely “with honorable means.”[i] Neutralizing sanctions suggests that Iran will attempt to reduce its economic dependency on other, pro-West states, while removing sanctions is a reference to pursuing negotiations. Pezeshkian’s appointment of Araghchi signals his serious intent to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West, given that Aragchi previously played a prominent role in nuclear negotiations with the West under former President Hassan Rouhani.[ii] Araghchi also said that he is committed to “all-around support” for the Axis of Resistance.[iii] Araghchi added that he will continue the “neighborhood policy” of former President Ebrahim Raisi by pursuing relations with other regional countries. Araghchi noted that he intends to increase Iranian exports through active economic diplomacy.
- Esmail Khatib (Intelligence Minister): Khatib stated that his top priority as Intelligence Minister would be to “confront” Israel.[iv] Khatib further stated that Iran must confront Israel in the “field of influence” by producing informational content. Khatib stated his other priorities included fighting terrorist groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province. Khatib stated that Iranian cooperation with Iraq has increased the security of northwestern Iran. Khatib claimed that 53 foreign intelligence services are ”structurally” working against Iran. Khatib also served in former President Ebrahim Raisi’s administration.
- Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh (Defense Minister): Nasir Zadeh proposed improving Iran’s airpower should he be approved as Defense Minister.[v] Nasir Zadeh proposed constructing vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft and airborne early warning and control aircraft. Nasir Zadeh stated that the Defense Ministry must continue to provide “effective and stable” support for the Axis of Resistance in all cultural, political, and economic fields. Nasir Zadeh also emphasized increased defense diplomacy to increase defense exports to neighboring countries and countries in Latin America and Africa.
- Eskander Momeni (Interior Minister): Momeni identified strengthening social and cultural capital, managing natural crises and environmental challenges, and increasing the political participation of citizens as the most important programs of the Interior Ministry.[vi] Momeni proposed promoting social capital by promoting public satisfaction and trust with the regime. Momeni is likely referring to promoting positive relations between the people and the regime to increase public participation in politics when he discusses social capital. Momeni stated that the government could prevent the feeling of social isolation by improving interaction between the government and the people.
Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said on August 12 that Iran is cooperating with Hamas in Lebanon to smuggle weapons and funds into Jordan to destabilize the Jordanian government.[xxxi] Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi denied Katz’s statement.[xxxii] CTP-ISW has observed previous Iranian attempts to undermine security in Jordan.[xxxiii] Jordanian police located two separate caches of explosives in Amman in June 2024 and linked these incidents to Iranian efforts to recruit agents in Jordan to destabilize the country.[xxxiv] Iranian-backed groups in Iraq have also shown an interest in developing networks in Jordan, including by threatening to equip thousands of “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with weapons in April 2024.[xxxv] A destabilized Jordan could provide Iran with more opportunities to transport weapons to Palestinian fighters in the West Bank.
Iran’s smuggling attempts through Jordan are part of a likely Iranian effort to increase its influence in the West Bank. Katz said that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is working with Hamas to transport weapons and funds through Jordan to Palestinian fighters in the West Bank.[xxxvi] Jordan's western border with the West Bank offers multiple routes through which Iran can move weapons into the West Bank.
Katz also said that Iran effectively controls Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank and that the Palestinian Authority is “powerless to act.”[xxxvii] Katz highlighted the Jenin refugee camp as a hub of Palestinian militia activity and said that Israel must take action to dismantle militia networks in the camp. Katz‘s comments come amid an uptick in Palestinian militia attacks in Jenin in August.
Unspecified Iranian backed militia launched unspecified projectiles targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province on August 13.[xxxviii] The projectiles landed near the base and no damage or injuries were reported, according to two unnamed US officials cited by Reuters.[xxxix] Local Syrian sources reported that US aircraft launched three retaliatory airstrikes targeting the rocket launch sites in al Hussainiya and al Junaina in Deir ez Zor Province.[xl] Local sources did not report any casualties. US official sources have not confirmed the attack on Conoco Mission Support Site or US retaliatory strikes in Deir ez Zor.
Israeli media reported that the IDF has deployed Israeli security forces along the northern border to protect against October 7-like attacks from Lebanon.[xli] Israeli newspaper Maariv reported on August 13 that the IDF bolstered security forces’ preparedness amid fears of a potential Hezbollah ground attack into northern Israel.[xlii] The IDF deployed security forces to unspecified northern Israeli towns on an unspecified date to form an “intervention force” to respond quickly to October 7-like infiltration threats.[xliii] Maariv reported that the IDF pre-positioned this force in northern Israel after learning lessons from October 7. Israeli security forces reportedly began training local police to respond to infiltration-type attacks following October 7.[xliv] Israeli media did not say whether the deployment of security forces along the northern border was triggered by a specific threat.
Surprise ground attacks are becoming a central idea in Iranian planning to destroy the Israeli state. Hezbollah pioneered the idea of ground attacks into Israel, and it developed the Radwan Force to this end.[xlv] The IDF discovered one Hezbollah plan developed in the early 2010s that involved a major assault by the Radwan Force in which the unit would infiltrate northern Israeli towns, strong point them, and then use Israeli citizens as hostages and human shields to protect against the IDF’s response.[xlvi] Senior Iranian leaders publicly expressed interest in involving Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Palestinian militias to launch ground campaigns from multiple fronts to destabilize the Israeli political and social order.[xlvii] A senior Iranian leader argued in May 2024 that the Axis of Resistance could destroy Israel by launching surprise attacks from Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank simultaneously, for instance.[xlviii]
The IDF has previously conducted operations to protect against this threat, and the more recent deployments are drawing on the lessons the IDF learned on October 7 to better protect northern Israelis. The IDF launched an operation in 2018 to identify and destroy cross-border tunnels that would enable such infiltrations.[xlix] The mayor of the northern Israeli town Shlomi told Maariv that locals remain concerned about the existence of Hezbollah tunnels leading into northern Israel, however.[l]
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