CEPA (Center for European Policy Analysis)
Europe's Edge
Trump or Not, NATO Must Change
By James H. Armstead
August 13, 2024
The alliance faces numerous challenges. To cope, European members should shoulder more of the collective burden.
Photo: Passers-by walk past the Eisenhower Building with the US and NATO flags in the early morning. The NATO summit begins in the capital with celebrations to mark the 75th anniversary of the defense alliance. Credit: Kay Nietfeld/dpa via Reuters Connect
In 1952 General Hastings Lionel Ismay, the first NATO Secretary General, was asked why the North Atlantic alliance was necessary and responded with an acerbic quip oft repeated in the intervening years. “To keep the Soviets out, the Germans down and the Americans in,” Churchill’s former military secretary wryly explained.
That original formula, with a few modifications and a lot of diplomacy, has essentially remained unchanged and been successful throughout the remainder of the 20th Century and into our current era.
The Atlantic alliance has forestalled a land war in Continental Europe between major powers for eight decades and has also provided the strategic space for the development of the European Community into the European Union (EU), the world’s most successful international federated economic union.
It should also be noted that while once there was a desire to “keep the Germans down,” there’s now pressure for Berlin to be much more militarily robust. That’s an acknowledgment that Europe has changed in profound ways, not least its extensive wealth and its mostly mature democracies. So, while many Europeans discuss the (as yet undefined) threat to the alliance from a second Trump presidency, this is, in fact, a great time to be talking about shifting the balance.
There are profound questions to ask but also important symbolic issues. Why, as Henry Kissinger asked in the 1970s, is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) always a US officer and why is the Secretary General always a European? It might be more equitable and provide for a better integration of NATO if the roles were reversed.
The initial conditions giving rise to NATO in 1949 have changed considerably in 80 years. The immediate post-war poverty, massive political disruption, growing military tensions, and fear of renewed conflict led the Western allies to renew their wartime military alliance and solidify their political ties in an unprecedented peacetime arrangement of interlocking global alliances, with the Atlantic community as the geopolitical lynchpin of Western cooperation. A permanent military structure, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), was (re)created with over 350,000 US troops stationed in Europe for over 40 years to bolster European defense needs.
The Soviet Union, along with its Warsaw Pact military alliance, dissolved in the early 1990s as a (supposedly) less aggressive Russia emerged, with many strategic planners believing there was a significant reduction in the threat to European security.
The EU had become the largest economic bloc on the globe with its political integration having achieved unprecedented growth and prosperity including legislative, juridical, and economic interconnections. Its major trading partner was the US, which also put its money where its mouth is — it now has around $5 trillion in EU and UK investments. A sunlit era of democratic expansion, increasing wealth, and a low-risk geopolitical environment seemed upon us.
This clearly begged the question, especially before Russia illegally seized Crimea and invaded Ukraine in 2014: Could Europe take care of itself now that the Soviet threat had disappeared? Did it really even face a security threat? In the event, Europe pocketed the peace dividend without properly considering the first question. The US would always be there after all. Much like fourth-century Britons, it seemed unthinkable that Rome’s legions would ever leave.
Now, in 2024, it is very odd indeed to look back at this recent period, but the early years of the 21st century left many people (including President Macron) wondering whether NATO was obsolete. Russia had been defanged and was our friend. The alliance seemed to be in search of a mission.
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Now that its purpose has been reestablished and once-neutral countries have raced to join the fold, another question is being asked — does America want to provide so much of European defense and can it?
The need to face an expansionist and heavily armed China in the Asia-Pacific region is now widely seen by American strategists as the primary threat. And while it spends around 3.5% of GDP on defense (down by almost half since the Cold War), many European allies struggle to meet the 2% NATO spending target. You don’t have to be an isolationist to question whether the balance is right.
The Trump administration expressed a willingness before losing office to consider leaving the Atlantic alliance altogether if its European partners did not contribute more. Trump has repeated that Europe’s contribution is very far from adequate.
Our European partners have recently become somewhat wary of a continued American resolve and are beginning to consider how the alliance might cope with a sudden change of approach from Washington.
A new command structure has been created to coordinate NATO support towards Ukraine’s defense and discussions are underway on even more fundamental changes. Europeans seem to be seeking a more interdependent defense posture in light of the recent Russian aggression. They clearly see a possible need to rethink their eastern flank security. They are now examining a more robust defense posture within or without a NATO structure.
I think this is a good thing.
A stronger European defense provided by Europeans means a more interdependent continent and provides more military muscle for NATO.
There are serious issues to consider, of course. European states are heavily indebted and EU rules restrict additional borrowing; Europe’s defense plants and shipyards were massively scaled back from their Cold War peaks and are now struggling to expand; and like the US, the European members struggle to recruit defense industry workers and military personnel. It would take Europe at least a decade to reestablish its military to a suitable level.
But needs must. Russia is not going to end its imperial aggression, and China will not lightly surrender its dependent ally that so satisfyingly ties up Western resources and energy.
The Kremlin and its allies directly threaten our Eastern and Central European allies. It’s time to sit down with our friends and find new ways. We need a stronger, more robust Europe to reinvigorate NATO so that it can take more of the load.
Perhaps the alliance will re-cast itself to keep the Russians out, the Germans up and the Americans involved. That would be a good outcome.
James Holmes Armstead is a retired professor of Strategy and International law from the US Naval War College. He is a former RAND analyst and Department of Defense team member who assisted in negotiating 13 new member states’ entry into NATO and has taught international law, strategy, and national security policy for over 40 years both in the US and abroad.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
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