LSE EUROPP Lena Schorlemer June 16th, 2023 Assessing Germany’s new national security strategy

 LSE EUROPP 

Lena Schorlemer

June 16th, 2023

Assessing Germany’s new national security strategy

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On 14 June, Germany unveiled its first national security strategy. Lena Schorlemer assesses what the new strategy could mean for Germany and the rest of Europe.

Germany’s long-awaited first national security strategy (NSS), which has been repeatedly delayed, was finally presented by Chancellor Olaf Scholz and four cabinet members on 14 June. The NSS outlines how the current coalition government intends to tackle internal and external security threats, based on a holistic understanding of security (or ‘integrated security’) that goes beyond military and terrorism concerns to include challenges posed by climate change, healthcare and democratic backsliding.

The strategy emphasises three pillars of German security: robust defence, including increased military spending and deterrence efforts; resilience, focusing on safeguarding Germany and its allies’ values and the rule of law; and sustainability, addressing the impact of climate change and the need to protect natural areas. But what implications – if any – will the new strategy have for Germany and the rest of Europe?

A lack of detail

The NSS has some notable shortcomings. First, the identified threats to Germany are rather vague, and important threats are overlooked. While Russia is recognised as ‘the greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area today,’ other threats listed, such as terrorism, extremism, organised crime, illicit financial flows, cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns, to name but a few, are unspecific.

There is also no mention of threats to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Threats from other geopolitical domains, such as the Arctic or outer space, are also neglected. China is still referred to as a ‘partner, competitor and systemic rival’, although the increasing trend of competition and rivalry is noted. This continued ‘strategic ambivalence’ may be problematic in conveying Germany’s strategic priorities to the international community and is likely to frustrate Germany’s transatlantic partners. In addition to the lack of detail on the threats identified, the strategy paper’s failure to prioritise their relative importance is also problematic.

Second, the value-based national security interests outlined also lack detail and clarity in light of geopolitical realities and competition for critical raw materials. Nine high-level strategic interests are outlined, relating to the protection of national sovereignty and the liberal democratic order, strengthening the EU’s ability to act, global peace and stability, and the preservation of prosperity and an open economic and financial system. However, the crucial issue of securing Germany’s economic strength through energy and resource security is only mentioned briefly at the end of the list of interests. This is particularly striking when compared to the latest US national security strategy, published in October 2022, which places much greater emphasis on expanding economic prosperity and opportunities.

Another concern is the lack of clarity in the proposed policy responses to the security threats identified. The NSS fails to establish a clear causal chain between the suggested solutions and the threats outlined. While some policy responses are clearly defined, such as Germany’s plan to increase support for application-oriented research to strengthen innovation ecosystems at regional and supra-regional levels, others are vague.

For instance, there is no clear explanation of how Germany intends to allocate two per cent of its GDP to military spending and expand its military capabilities, or how it plans to diversify its supply of raw materials. Also problematic, but partly explained by the timing of the presentation of the NSS one week before German-Chinese government consultations on 20 June, is the reference to strategies on China, countering disinformation, space security and climate foreign policy that are still being worked on, all of which are currently delaying key policy decisions due to the lack of strategic guidance.

Moving forward

Despite these shortcomings, the benefits of the NSS must be emphasised. The process of developing Germany’s first NSS involved holistic thinking about Germany’s security concerns and capabilities across the Federal Chancellery, various ministries, and civil society stakeholders. This process of initiating thinking about strategic security has enormous value in itself.

Moreover, the NSS expresses a new awareness of interrelated threats and a holistic view of security, which is an important basis for making necessary policy changes. With the NSS, Germany is sending a clear political message to its population and the international community that it intends to take a comprehensive or ‘integrated’ approach to security and that it recognises that its economic strength, diplomatic clout and history entail a responsibility to contribute more to European security.

All in all, the German NSS, although long overdue, is a significant political achievement. It demonstrates a new political awareness of the interrelated security threats and vulnerabilities facing Germany and a greater willingness to take action. Nevertheless, the lack of concrete details remains a notable shortcoming. The continuing strategic ambiguity regarding China as the second global superpower also poses a challenge.

The NSS serves as an initial basis for the development of related German strategies that are currently underway, such as those focused on China, space security and countering disinformation. It would be beneficial for the NSS to initiate a process and be treated as a dynamic and regularly updated document. The key will be to translate the principles and directions of the NSS into concrete policies that clarify how Germany intends to use its resources to achieve its goals. This will also clarify Germany’s position and priorities to its citizens and the international community.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European Union

Lena Schorlemer

Lena Schorlemer is a PhD candidate in Politics at the University of Oxford. Her dissertation focuses on the links between radical right parties and fringe groups in western democracies. Her research interests include European politics, political extremism and party-movement dynamics.