THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
PolicyWatch 3755
June 28, 2023
For nationals on both sides of the fight, the Ukraine war has
transformed Turkey from a popular summer destination to a longer-
term safe haven or permanent home on the Mediterranean.
Since the 1990s, Turkey has become a major destination for
tourists and migrants from Ukraine, Russia, and other former
Soviet states. Yet Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine set into
motion an even greater wave of migrants from both countries.
Those fleeing the crisis have used myriad channels to enter
and remain in Turkey, from obtaining “golden visas” to
applying for protection. Going forward, their presence could
have a sizable effect on future socioeconomic ties between the
three countries.
Ukrainians and Russians in Turkey Before 2022
During the Cold War, Turkey and the USSR had little
interpersonal exchange—in 1964, for example, government
data shows that only 414 Soviet visitors came to Turkey. In
the decades following the Soviet collapse, however, Turkey
became a major destination due to its tourism infrastructure
and geographic proximity.
According to the Turkish Ministry of Interior and the Turkish
Statistical Institute (TUIK), the yearly influx of Russian
tourists rose steadily from 1.3 million in 1996 to 7 million in
2019, the highest number among all nationalities. Ukrainians
have similarly flocked to Turkey (especially in the summer),
from 93,794 visitors in 1996 to 1.5 million in 2019.
Over the past two decades, this growing influx has begun to
reshape the social fabric of Turkey’s destination cities.
Russian became a prevalent language in the key tourist city of
Antalya, leading many employees in the Turkish tourism
sector to attend language schools in Russia. The number of
marriages between Turks and individuals from Russia or
Ukraine increased as well. According to TUIK, the two
nationalities made up a combined 10.1% of foreign spouses
by citizenship as of 2016. Additionally, 10,117 Russians and
7,575 Ukrainians had been granted residence permits by 2012,
enabling longer stays for non-tourism purposes.
Ukrainian and Russian Influx During the War
Ankara’s policy toward the war can be summarized as “pro-
Ukraine but not anti-Russia.” In line with this approach, it has
allowed individuals from both countries to seek temporary or
permanent refuge within its borders since last year.
By September, Turkey was hosting at least 145,000 Ukrainian refugees. That number has since fallen to 46,000, with most
refugees located in big cities (e.g., Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara)
and coastal provinces (Antalya, Mugla). Around 7,130 have
applied for asylum. As seen in other host countries, most of
the former registered refugees likely returned to Ukraine or
left for other destinations, but a portion of them obtained
alternative status (e.g., short- or long-term residence permits)
or found other ways of staying in Turkey (see the “golden
visa” discussion below).
Ankara has simultaneously kept its doors open to a greater
influx of Russian migrants during the war, including
individuals seeking to avoid sanctions, escape Vladimir
Putin’s government, or move their lives and assets overseas.
Among them have been affluent Russians (e.g., the oligarchs
Roman Abramovich and Dmitry Kamenshchik) and various
dissidents, from renowned journalists to individuals
associated with Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s
Anti-Corruption Foundation.
Golden Visas and Passports
For Russians and Ukrainians alike, the most common path to
secure a longer or permanent stay in Turkey has seemingly
been the “golden visa” option, wherein the government grants residence permits or citizenship in exchange for large
investments. For example, to become eligible for a Turkish
passport via this path, applicants are required to store at least
$500,000 in Turkish banks or state funds, purchase the same
value in government bonds, or create at least fifty jobs in
Turkey. Alternatively, purchasing real estate worth at least
$400,000 enables an applicant to quickly secure Turkish
citizenship, in some cases within 120 days.
Foreigners can also take three other paths—purchasing real
estate at a lower value, setting up a business in Turkey, or
investing a lesser amount determined by the Council of
Ministers—to obtain short-term residence permits for up to
five years with the option to renew. Once short-term residents
(not asylum seekers) complete seven years of consecutive,
lawful presence in Turkey, they become eligible to pursue
citizenship.
Short-Term Residence Permits
According to the Turkish Presidency of Migration
Management (GIB), 40,872 Ukrainians currently hold short-
term residence permits there. This figure was 46,804 at the end of 2022, mirroring the drop in refugee numbers since
September. GIB did not release data on Ukrainian short-term
permits before the war, since Ukrainians were not one of the
top ten nationalities to hold that status until 2022. They are
now ranked tenth, down from ninth place last year.
Russians have moved even higher on that list. Before the
Ukraine invasion, Iraq sent by far the most short-term
residents to Turkey, while Russia came in fifth. In 2022,
however, Russians skyrocketed from about 4.8% of Turkey’s
total short-term residents to over 10%. Currently, 145,092
Russians hold that status, a slight decrease from 145,715 in
2022. This drop was likely caused by large numbers of
wealthy Russians acquiring Turkish passports and then either
relocating to third countries or returning home with the
ability to enter Turkey at will.
Real Estate Purchases
According to data from TUIK, Ukrainian home purchases in
Turkey experienced a dramatic spike of 106.4% between 2021
and 2022, increasing from 1,246 houses to 2,572. This growth
will likely continue in 2023, with 1,540 houses already sold to
Ukrainian buyers as of May.
Russian house purchases have likewise increased during the
war. Among foreign buyers, Russians purchased the third-
highest number of homes in 2019-2021, behind Iranians and
Iraqis. Yet they topped the list in 2022, making up almost 25%
of total foreign purchases (rising from 5,379 houses in 2021 to
16,582 in 2022, an increase of 208.3%). And as of last month,
they had bought another 5,723 houses, indicating that the
wartime spike will continue in 2023.
The growth in Russian and Ukrainian real estate purchases
has raised domestic demand dramatically, causing many
Turks to be priced out of the areas in question. For example,
in Antalya—the capital of Turkish beach tourism—rent prices
have increased by over 300% in some cases. According to the
Antalya Chamber of Commerce and Industry, roughly seven
out of every ten rental customers there are now Russian or
Ukrainian.
Conclusion
Historically, Turkey has been a destination for immigration
from parts of Europe, including former Ottoman territories in
the Balkans and around the Black Sea. Russian and Ukrainian
migration is a relatively new phenomenon there (apart from
the influx of “White Russians” after the 1917 revolution,
many of whom later moved on to the United States or
Western Europe). Now that both nationalities are visiting
Turkey in larger numbers and laying down socioeconomic
roots, they could build up sizable Slavic communities there
over time—a development that would add to Turkey’s
diversity while also building bridges between all three
countries.
Sude Akgundogdu and Collin Trissel are research assistants in The
Washington Institute’s Turkish Research Program.
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