AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF TAIWAN IN US-CHINA RELATIONS - RYAN HASS

AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF TAIWAN 

IN US-CHINA RELATIONS

RYAN HASS

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS  

1

Executive summary

Tensions in the Taiwan Strait are spiraling and have 

been since before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Communication channels for managing tensions 

have collapsed. Each of the main players — China, 

Taiwan, and the United States — believe it is acting 

prudently to protect its interests in the face of 

escalatory actions from the other side of the Strait. 

Officials and analysts increasingly are competing to 

forecast when conflict could break out, not whether 

it will occur. 

Taiwan is one of a small number of issues that has 

the potential to spark conflict between the United 

States and China. Given the stakes, it is essential for 

American policymakers to return to first principles 

for evaluating events, understanding America’s vital 

interests, and identifying the center of gravity for 

developments in the Taiwan Strait. 

One should expect Beijing to remain bloody-minded 

in its determination to unify Taiwan with the mainland. 

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 

sought to achieve unification since its establishment 

of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. 

There are no signs that Beijing will waver from this 

goal in the foreseeable future. Cross-Strait tensions 

likely will intensify in the coming years. This will 

reduce the margin of error for U.S. policy actions on 

Taiwan. 

This paper argues that the future of Taiwan will 

turn on whether the people of Taiwan can maintain 

confidence in their future. Confidence is the essential 

ingredient to gird the Taiwan people to resist fatalistic 

conclusions that resistance is futile and 

instead protect their autonomy and democratic 

way of life until such time as peaceful, uncoerced 

solutions emerge to resolve cross-Strait differences. 

Since 2016, the PRC has intensified its campaign of 

coercion to undermine the Taiwan people’s confidence 

in Taiwan’s future autonomy and democratic way of life. 

For the United States to preserve its 

abiding interest in upholding peace and stability 

in the Taiwan Strait, it will need to visibly support 

efforts to enable Taiwan to enjoy dignity, security, 

and prosperity, even as it also maintains a credible 

military presence around Taiwan. 

AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF TAIWAN IN US-CHINA RELATIONS  2

U.S. policymakers also will need to restore coherence to 

policy decisions and public messaging 

relating to Taiwan. It will be important for American 

policy to be guided by consistent precepts, including 

the principle that the United States supports Taiwan 

for its own sake and not as a tool for harming China. 

Washington can play an important role in managing 

tensions, but ultimately it will be up to Taipei and 

Beijing to resolve cross-Strait differences. 

The path to the present

Taiwan’s role in America’s foreign policy and in U.S.-

China relations has oscillated considerably over the 

past century.1

 Before World War II, Taiwan was not 

a focus of American policymakers. In the wake of 

World War II, President Harry S. Truman and his advisors 

expected that Chinese Communist Party forces 

would annex Taiwan and they did not plan to intervene to 

prevent that outcome. Following the onset of 

the Korean War, the Truman administration revised 

its posture to actively deter forces from the mainland 

from moving on Taiwan. This decision effectively 

froze in place the military dimension of the Chinese 

civil war between Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang 

(KMT) and Mao Zedong’s CCP, causing the contest 

to shift to other domains. During the 1950s and 

1960s, the United States maintained a formal mutual 

defense pact with Taiwan. U.S. military planners saw 

Taiwan as a strategic node for projecting force in 

East Asia. 

Driven by pursuit of strategic advantage in Cold War 

competition with the Soviet Union, President Richard 

M. Nixon and then-national security adviser Henry 

Kissinger shifted America’s focus in 1972 toward 

establishing relations with the People’s Republic of 

China. Seven years later, Washington broke diplomatic 

relations with the Republic of China in Taipei and 

established a formal relationship with Beijing. 

During this period, Washington supported deepening 

cross-Strait economic integration, which it viewed as 

contributing to a relaxation of tensions in the Taiwan 

Strait. Washington was focused on challenges 

from the Soviet Union and welcomed the reduction 

of tensions elsewhere that could distract from its 

foremost strategic concern. 

As China began to replicate Taiwan’s economic 

reforms in the late 1980s, Taiwan’s leader, Chiang 

Ching-kuo, decided to set Taiwan on a path to 

democratization, in part as a way of differentiating 

Taiwan from the PRC in the eyes of U.S. policymakers 

and the U.S. public. Taiwan’s political transition to a 

democracy provided a basis for the United 

States to strengthen its ties with Taiwan. 

Cross-Strait security tensions sharpened in 1995-96 

during the run-up to Taiwan’s first democratic 

election. During this period, Beijing perceived that 

Taiwan’s leader, Lee Teng-hui, was pursuing independence 

and the United States was not restraining 

him. Beijing sought to intimidate Taiwan’s voters 

through coercive diplomacy, ostensibly to protect 

its bottom line of deterring Taiwan independence. 

Washington responded by sending two carrier strike 

groups toward Taiwan. Although China’s leaders 

backed down in that instance, they shortly thereafter 

determined to pour significant national resources 

into developing military capabilities so that they 

would not be pushed around by the United States 

on Taiwan matters in the future. The fruits of those 

investments are now on display in China’s military 

force arrayed across the Taiwan Strait. 

During the Chen Shui-bian presidency in Taiwan 

(2000-2008), Washington and Beijing each 

concluded that their vital interests were threatened, 

but for different reasons. Both sides sought to 

dissuade President Chen from precipitating steps 

toward Taiwan independence that could trigger 

conflict that might lead to a war between the United 

States and China. Even though Washington and 

Beijing did not coordinate their respective policy 

actions, they both sought in their own ways to urge 

Chen to exercise restraint and avoid provoking a 

conflict. 

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS  3

Taiwan voters next elected Ma Ying-jeou as president. 

In terms of temperament and orientation toward 

cross-Strait relations, Ma (2008-2016) was close to 

the opposite of his predecessor. During 

the Ma years, Beijing and Taipei made considerable 

progress in expanding cross-Strait links. Washington 

welcomed constructive dialogue and cross-Strait 

stability. During this period, Taiwan was an everpresent 

element of the U.S.-China relationship, but it was not a 

dominant issue that impeded U.S.-China 

cooperation on other issues or that dampened 

the overall trend of rising competition between 

Washington and Beijing. 

In 2016, Taiwan voters chose Tsai Ing-wen as their 

next president. In a departure from her predecessor, 

Tsai did not recognize the “1992 Consensus,” an 

agreement between Beijing and Taipei in 1992 stipulating

 that each side upheld the “One China” principle and would 

strive for eventual unification.2

 Tsai 

presented herself as a steady, stable, predictable 

leader who would work to maintain the cross-Strait 

status quo. Beijing insisted that Tsai accept the 

“1992 Consensus” as a precondition for engaging 

with her or her administration. Tsai held firm and in 

response, Beijing froze direct communication with 

Taiwan’s leaders. 

In the absence of anything more than sporadic communication between 

U.S. and Chinese officials on issues relating to Taiwan, Washington and 

Beijing relied upon public messaging and military signaling to register their 

views on developments in the Taiwan Strait.

During this same period, channels of communication between Washington and Beijing atrophied and became non-functioning. In the absence of anything more than sporadic communication between U.S. and Chinese officials on issues relating to Taiwan, Washington and Beijing relied upon public messaging and military signaling to register their views on developments in the Taiwan Strait. Such tools send blunt messages that often err on the side of strength and resolve over nuance and precision. 

This brief survey of developments in the U.S.- China Taiwantriangle over recent decades exposes three main takeaways:

First, this triangular relationship has not traveled on a linear trajectory. 

Just in the past three decades, the balance has shifted from Washington

using military presence to push Beijing to stand down in 

its pressuring of Taiwan, to Washington and Beijing 

acting in a parallel fashion to deter Taiwan from 

pursuing independence, to deepening integration 

between Taipei and Beijing, to growing concerns in 

Washington and Taipei about China accelerating 

preparations to seize Taiwan by force. 

Second, Taiwan voters have proven pragmatic. They 

have alternated between “blue” (Kuomintang) and 

“green” (Democratic Progressive Party) leaders over 

the past four presidencies, seeming to correct for 

the perceived excesses of one party by voting into 

power the other. This pattern is reflective of — and 

consistent with — public opinion polls in Taiwan, 

which show a strong and enduring preference for 

sustaining the status quo.3

 Support for unification or independence exists on the margins, 

but the significant plurality of voters favor maintenance of 

Taiwan’s autonomy and democratic way of life. 

Third, cross-Strait relations operate according to their 

own logic and must be managed according to each 

side’s view of its long-term interests. Cross-Strait relations are not 

derivative of U.S.-China relations. Trend lines of cross-Strait tensions 

do not automatically follow trend lines of U.S.-China tensions. 

Conversely, stable cross-Strait relations are not the magic key 

to unlocking improvements in U.S.-China relations. 

Nor would it be proper for Washington to sacrifice 

Taiwan’s interests in the hope of improving ties with 

Beijing. During the 2008-2016 period, cross-Strait 

relations improved markedly, but U.S.-China relations 

grew more tensely competitive. 

AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF TAIWAN IN US-CHINA RELATIONS  4

At the same time, the U.S., China, and Taiwan each 

have their own respective interests and priorities. 

While there presently appears to be significantly 

more overlap in interests, values, and affection 

between Washington and Taipei than between Taipei 

and Beijing or Washington and Beijing, there is not 

perfect alignment of interests in any of these three 

dyads. At present, the only natural overlap between 

all three sides is that none of the parties describe 

conflict as their preferred means for achieving their 

desired ends. 

In present circumstances, Beijing’s declared objective is 

to achieve unification of Taiwan with the PRC. 

Taiwan’s declared policy is that the Republic of China 

already is a sovereign country and that its elected 

leaders have a responsibility to preserve Taiwan’s 

autonomy and democratic way of life. The United 

States’ declared objective is to preserve peace 

and stability in the Taiwan Strait until such time as 

leaders on both sides of the Strait can arrive at a 

peaceful solution to tensions that accords with “the 

wishes and best interests of Taiwan’s people.”4

Evaluating the current moment

Cross-Strait tensions currently are at elevated levels. 

The triangular dynamic is stuck in an escalatory 

spiral in addition to a long-term security dilemma. 

The emergence of the spiral has coincided with the 

breakdown in all direct channels of communication 

between Beijing and Taipei as well as Beijing and 

Washington. This predates Russia’s February 2022 

full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If anything, the Ukraine 

war has clarified the real risks of conflict in the 

Taiwan Strait.

It likely is too soon to determine what lessons Beijing 

will draw from Russia’s attack on Ukraine. At the time 

of this writing in July 2022, Russian and Ukrainian 

forces are engaged in intense combat operations 

and the outcome of the war is uncertain. It is not 

too soon, though, to conclude that Russia’s nuclear 

arsenal has induced caution on the part of the United 

States in intervening directly in combat operations in 

Ukraine. This fact has not escaped notice in Beijing 

and likely has fortified China’s decision to advance 

its current nuclear build-up.5

The unfolding conflict in Ukraine also has laid bare 

the importance of prepositioning munitions, food, 

and fuel reserves in Taiwan. Allied options for 

sustaining a regular resupply to Ukraine may not be 

available in the event of a cross-Strait conflict, given 

Taiwan’s island geography and Beijing’s anti-access 

and area-denial capabilities. The Ukraine war also 

has highlighted the critical role that reserve and territorial 

defense forces can play in defending territory from attack.6

At the same time, while Russia’s barbarism in 

Ukraine is reprehensible, it is not a foreshadowing of 

events in Taiwan. There is no automaticity between 

war in Ukraine and war in the Taiwan Strait. Tensions 

in the Taiwan Strait operate according to their own logic. 

Many in the Washington policy community attribute 

elevated levels of cross-Strait tensions primarily 

to Beijing’s growing assertiveness toward Taiwan. 

In this telling, President Tsai has been steady and 

predictable in her approach to cross-Strait relations. 

Even though she has not endorsed the “1992 

Consensus” like her predecessor, she has pledged to 

handle cross-Strait affairs according to the Republic 

of China constitution, which reflects the principle 

that there is one China. She has not taken steps 

toward de jure independence, instead proposing to 

handle cross-Strait relations according to the principles 

of “peace, parity, democracy, and dialogue.”7

 

Similarly, U.S. policymakers routinely assert that 

United States policy toward Taiwan remains longstanding and

 consistent. The United States upholds its “One China” policy, 

which is guided by the three U.S.-China joint communiques, 

the Taiwan Relations Act, and the six assurances that President 

Ronald Reagan offered to Taiwan in 1982.8

To the extent that there have been adjustments in America’s 

overall approach and posture toward Taiwan in recent 

years, American policymakers assert, it has been

 

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS  5

in response to visible Chinese efforts to ratchet 

up pressure on Taiwan. In other words, U.S. policy 

decisions have been reactive to Chinese actions. 

Examples of Chinese actions that American policy makers

 often point to as justifying adjustments in America’s visible 

support to Taiwan include:

● China’s poaching of seven of Taiwan’s diplomatic 

allies during Tsai’s presidency;9

● China’s persistent efforts to exclude Taiwan from 

participating in multilateral fora, including events 

that do not require statehood as a prerequisite 

for membership;

● China’s obstruction of Taiwan public health officials 

from receiving information about COVID-19 

and other public health concerns from the World 

Health Organization;10

● China’s obstruction of Taiwan public security officials 

from receiving information from INTERPOL;

● China’s obstruction of Taiwan civil aviation 

officials from receiving information from the 

International Civil Aviation Organization about 

safety issues relating to air transportation;

● China’s use of fighter jets to deliberately cross the 

Taiwan Strait center line for the first time in 20 

years in March 2019, and multiple times since;11

● China’s growing military presence around the 

south, east, west, and north sides of Taiwan and 

its public announcements of its rehearsals of 

simulated attacks on targets in Taiwan;12

● Chinese military incursions into Taiwan’s air 

defense identification zone to protest visits by 

American officials to Taiwan, and other U.S.-

Taiwan activities;13

● Growing Chinese economic pressure on Taiwan, 

including by obstructing Taiwan’s ability to enter 

into trade agreements with other countries, 

working to induce a brain drain of top talent from 

Taiwan to China, and using targeted measures – 

such as bans on group travel to Taiwan – to place 

pressure on specific constituencies and localities 

in Taiwan; 

● Expanded use of cyber operations and disinformation 

campaigns to attempt to accentuate divisions within Taiwan. 

● Public declarations by Chinese officials that the 

Taiwan Strait is not an international waterway.14

Many of these efforts appear designed to punish 

Taiwan and expose the limits of American capacity 

to protect Taiwan’s security and prosperity. Given 

the public nature of these Chinese punitive actions, 

Washington has felt a need to push back visibly, in 

effect working to offset Chinese pressure through 

shows of public support for Taiwan. 

Conversely, from Beijing’s perspective, Washington 

has grown more active in its support for Taiwan. In 

Beijing’s telling, this has forced China to ratchet up 

its responses, lest the United States conclude that it 

can establish more official relations with Taiwan with 

impunity and set an example for other countries to 

follow. Chinese officials and analysts often complain 

that the United States is weaponizing its support for 

Taiwan to counter China.15 During the Trump years, 

the U.S. government occasionally acknowledged that 

it was demonstrating support for Taiwan to register 

opposition to China, for example when Secretary 

of State Mike Pompeo linked American support 

for Taiwan to Washington’s objection to Beijing’s 

dismantling of Hong Kong’s special status.16

Beijing evaluates elevated tensions as a function 

of Washington’s and Taipei’s efforts to erode the 

unofficial nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations, encourage 

Taiwan’s greater autonomy from China, and promote 

Taiwan as an independent actor on the world stage. 

Specific examples of American actions to support 

Taiwan that Chinese officials have pointed to as 

triggering action-reaction dynamics include:

AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF TAIWAN IN US-CHINA RELATIONS  6

● Publicizing routine naval transits of the Taiwan 

Strait;17

● Publicizing the visit of Taiwan’s national security 

adviser to Washington;18

● Referring to Taiwan as a country in an official 

Defense Department report;19

● Secretary Pompeo sending a public congratulatory 

message for use at President Tsai’s 2020 inauguration;20

● Inviting Taiwan’s Representative to the United 

States as an official guest at President Joe 

Biden’s inauguration;21

● Secretary of State Antony Blinken referring in public comments

 to Taiwan as a country on multiple occasions;22

● President Biden referring to Taiwan as an ally and 

vowing publicly that the United States will defend Taiwan;23

● Inviting Taiwan officials to participate in the 

Summit for Democracy;24

● Including Taiwan in official readouts of G-7, Quad, 

and U.S.-EU senior official and leaders meetings;25

● Disclosing publicly that U.S. military personnel 

are in Taiwan to train Taiwan forces;26

● Sending U.S. military aircraft to Taiwan on three 

occasions in 2021;

● Sending high-level executive branch officials, 

including from the State Department, to visit Taiwan;

● Hosting Taiwan officials for meetings in the State 

Department and publicizing the meetings;27

● Authorizing the sale of Standoff Land Attack 

Missile Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) and 

expanding the scope of sales beyond military 

capabilities that are clearly defensive or within 

a grey zone that plausibly could be described as 

defensive.28

● Growing congressional activism to signal support 

for Taiwan, including through legislation and 

visits by members of Congress to Taiwan.29

In other words, both Washington and Beijing accuse 

the other of saying one thing and doing another. 

Washington accuses Beijing of saying it is striving 

for peaceful unification but acting in ways that are 

coercive and aggressive toward Taiwan. Beijing 

accuses Washington of paying lip service to its “One 

China” policy, even as it hollows out the substance of 

the policy in practice. 

Looking ahead

There are a range of perspectives on the proper 

weighting of risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 

Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, The Economist 

ran a cover story in May 2021 describing Taiwan as 

“the most dangerous place on earth.”30 Former U.S. 

national security officials piled on, making various 

predictions about the timeline of a Chinese military 

assault on Taiwan. Former INDOPACOM Commander 

Phil Davidson made headlines, for example, when 

he predicted in congressional testimony in 2021 

that the threat of a PRC invasion of Taiwan could be 

“manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six 

years.”31 These views were later tempered by, among 

others, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, 

who publicly observed that while Beijing remains 

focused on achieving unification, “there are not 

indications that [Xi Jinping] is currently intending to 

take Taiwan by military force even as he is planning 

for the potential.”32

 

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS  7

To date, though, this heightened alertness to 

the risks has not induced any visible steps by 

Washington, Taipei, or Beijing to take steps to break 

the escalatory cycle or build risk management mechanisms. 

Such inaction has caused observers such as former 

Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd to warn 

of the potential risk of “sleepwalking into war.”33

I am less alarmed than others about the imminence 

of conflict. I note, for example, that in its annual 

report to Congress on China’s military power, the 

Department of Defense observes that the People’s 

Liberation Army is prioritizing developing capabilities 

for global and regional expeditionary capabilities 

and is not investing substantially in landing craft that 

would be needed for a Taiwan invasion scenario.34

I nevertheless acknowledge the real risk of conflict 

and believe that the risk should induce corrective 

actions by all parties to guard against war. 

The current tensions in the Taiwan Strait are a product of

 a strategic dilemma with a military component, 

and not a military dilemma with a military solution.

The current tensions in the Taiwan Strait are a 

product of a strategic dilemma with a military 

component, and not a military dilemma with a military 

solution. If war arrives in the Taiwan Strait and involves PRC, 

Taiwan, and U.S. forces, it is difficult to image a scenario 

whereby any party could prevail and come out strengthened 

by conflict. More likely, all three sides would be devastated 

by a sprawling and violent conflict that produced no clear absolute 

victor.

There is no public enthusiasm in the United States 

or Taiwan for a military conflict. The Taiwan public 

recognizes any pursuit of independence would lead 

to war.35 Beijing also has its own reasons for wanting 

to “win without fighting,” in other words, for compelling 

unification without resort to force. Chinese planners must 

assume that any use of military force to occupy Taiwan 

would trigger a U.S. military response that would be difficult 

to limit from escalating or spreading beyond the Taiwan Strait. 

It would be irresponsiblefor Chinese planners to prepare for 

anything short of such a U.S. response. 

In a full-spectrum conflict with the United States, 

China’s energy and food security vulnerabilities likely 

would be exposed, as would its dependence on 

foreign technology and know-how for its innovation 

agenda. China does not have domestic production 

capacity to feed its appetite for semiconductors and 

other components that run China’s industrial and 

military complex. 

There has been some speculation that China could 

seek to occupy Taiwan for purpose of securing 

Taiwan’s semiconductor production capacity. Taiwan 

produces over 80% of the world’s highest-end 

chips.36 This scenario is unlikely. Even if China were 

to gain control of Taiwan by force, China does not 

have its own capacity to operate Taiwan’s semiconductor 

fabrication plants and it would have difficulty 

forcing Taiwan engineers to produce chips for an 

invading force. Given the exquisite precision required 

for production, semiconductors are a difficult item to 

produce from the tip of a bayonet.

Perhaps recognizing these realities, China has been 

using a broad range of coercive tools below the 

threshold of military force to deter Taiwan’s permanent

 separation and gradually weaken the will of 

the people of Taiwan to resist integration with the 

mainland. On one hand, China’s leaders have sought 

to talk up the shared ethnic, social, and historical 

linkages between peoples on both sides of the 

Strait. On the other hand, China also has targeted 

Taiwan economically, sought to induce a brain drain 

to the mainland, isolated Taiwan on the world stage, 

fomented social divisions inside Taiwan, launched 

cyberattacks, and undertaken displays of military 

force in waters and airspace around Taiwan. 

These efforts seek to constantly remind Taiwan’s 

people of China’s growing power, induce pessimism 

about Taiwan’s future, deepen splits within the 

AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE 

OF TAIWAN IN US-CHINA RELATIONS  8

island’s political system, and show that outside 

powers are impotent to counter Beijing’s steady 

ratcheting of pressure. Chinese scholars invoke the 

aphorism, “once ripe, the melon will drop from its 

stem” to explain the logic of their approach. They 

acknowledge that the strategy may require more 

time and patience but believe it would come at less 

cost and risk to Beijing.37 

Seen through this vantage, the will of Taiwan’s 

people is the center of gravity of China’s campaign 

of coercion without violence against Taiwan.38 It 

likely will remain so unless Chinese forces conclude 

that they can seize Taiwan by force at manageable 

cost and risk, or that they have no other alternative 

for obstructing Taiwan’s permanent separation or 

independence than through use of force. 

This conclusion about the center of gravity for 

Taiwan carries several implications for U.S. policy

makers as they work to protect America’s abiding 

interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

First, Washington and Taipei must ensure credible 

deterrence, but do so in a manner that limits risk of 

precipitating attack on Taiwan. This requires steadily 

and discreetly strengthening defensive capabilities, 

as opposed to flashily and publicly attempting to 

integrate Taiwan into a U.S. defense perimeter 

against the PRC. Any public declaration of a shift 

in American policy to offer “strategic clarity” about 

American military intervention in a cross-Strait 

conflict irrespective of the circumstances could 

invite the very outcome that America’s strategy is 

designed to prevent.39 Similarly, invoking support 

for Taiwan in the name of a global struggle between 

democracies and autocracies adds kindling to 

the fire without offering any offsetting benefits to 

American capacity to manage cross-Strait tensions. 

Rather than take steps that have the effect of 

accelerating the current escalatory spiral, the United 

States should seek to dampen tensions and slow the 

spiral. Even if such a goal proves unattainable, then 

at least policymakers in the rest of the world would 

be able to more readily identify the source of the 

problem. 

The security objective of America’s military engagement

 with Taiwan is to enhance Taiwan’s capacity 

to defend itself by investing in capabilities that build 

upon Taiwan’s geographic advantages. It is not to 

present Taiwan as a strategic asset or power projection 

platform for preserving American dominance in Asia. 

Friends do not treat friends as tools or proxies, 

especially when Taiwan will bear the brunt of any 

Chinese response to such efforts. 

Second, Washington and Taipei will need to settle 

upon a mutually agreed posture for responding to 

PRC military provocations. Washington and Taipei 

will benefit by comparison to Beijing if they are able 

to maintain a principled, steady, and reliable military 

posture around Taiwan, as opposed to a perpetually 

reactive military posture. Not every PRC air incursion 

into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone requires 

a Taiwan response, for example. Not every Chinese 

naval movement around Taiwan requires the U.S. 

Navy to publicize a routine transit of the Taiwan 

Strait. Both Washington and Taipei would benefit 

by playing their own games well, i.e., operating in a 

manner that lends confidence to the Taiwan public 

that Washington and Taipei have a shared theory 

of the case for defending Taiwan and are regularly 

exercising and improving capabilities in support of 

that approach. 

Third, U.S. policymakers will need to restore coherence 

and discipline to policy and rhetoric on Taiwan. The 

U.S. harms its own interests and those of its friends 

in Taiwan when it treats Taiwan as a strategic tool to 

weaken China. The objective of American strategy 

since the 1950s has been to preserve peace and 

stability in the Taiwan Strait. Every American action 

or statement relating to Taiwan must be reinforcing 

of this objective. So, in instances when it is in the U.S. 

interest to enhance America’s level of engagement 

with Taiwan, such changes should be made in ways 

that achieve that objective, and not in ways that are 

designed to create a public challenge to Beijing. 

Perhaps nowhere in the world do words carry more 

weight than in American official statements over 

Taiwan. Senior officials in the Trump administration, 

and occasionally also in the Biden administration, 

have failed to offer a consistent articulation of 

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS  9

American policy toward Taiwan. They need to get it 

right going forward. This means abiding by America’s 

“One China” policy, not taking a position on formulas 

for resolving cross-Strait disputes, not prejudging 

peacefully agreed outcomes that are acceptable to 

the people of Taiwan, and continuing to urge Beijing 

and Taipei to conduct cross-Strait relations with flexibility, 

patience, creativity, and restraint.40 Rhetorical 

precision and consistency offers reassurance about 

America’s intentions. 

Fourth, bipartisan political leadership will be needed 

to forge an understanding in both the executive and 

legislative branches that Taiwan will not become a 

profitable issue for point-scoring, either domestically 

or in relation to China. This will require political 

leaders to enforce an expectation in both parties 

that Taiwan will not become a vehicle for officials to 

seek to burnish their strength or demonstrate their 

toughness on China. Given the war and peace stakes 

involved, political leaders will need to exercise their 

leverage to impose discipline against opportunistic 

expressions of support for Taiwan in pursuit of 

partisan advantage. 

Presidential leadership also will be necessary to 

reinforce that the United States is invested in the 

process for managing and resolving cross-Strait 

differences, not the outcome. The United States 

must be prepared to welcome any evolution in 

relations between Taipei and Beijing that is mutually 

agreed upon and peacefully reached by both sides. 

Of course, from America’s perspective, Beijing’s 

actions are more troubling and threatening to 

crossStrait stability than American officials’ words. 

As an American, I am sympathetic to this perspective. 

At the same time, I acknowledge that there is a relationship 

between America’s policy drift and China’s rising 

assertiveness. I would like to see the United States 

do more and say less in its efforts to preserve peace 

and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This would help 

focus global attention on where the sources of rising 

cross-Strait tensions originate. At present, many 

countries in Asia and elsewhere do not embrace 

America’s argument that China is the principle driver 

of spiraling tensions. 

Fifth, it would serve America’s interests to reestablish 

reliable channels with Beijing for addressing differences 

over Taiwan. From the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait 

crisis through the end of the Obama administration 

in 2016, there were active diplomatic channels for 

each side privately to register concerns about the 

other’s actions and request clarification of the intentions 

underlying specific actions. In the period since, 

such channels have largely gone into disuse. 

In the coming years, there very likely will be further 

intensification of cross-Strait tensions. This could 

partly be a function of Beijing’s confidence that its 

growing economic leverage and military superiority 

vis-à-vis Taiwan should compel Taipei to become 

more attentive to Beijing’s top concerns and priorities. 

It could result from a change of identity among Taiwan 

people, who increasingly have less attachment to China. 

It also could be informed by the latent security dilemma 

and resulting efforts by each side to bolster deterrence 

against perceived military advances by the other.

Beijing will not be immediately 

receptive to efforts that it perceives 

as emboldening Washington to 

assume greater involvement and 

acceptance of risk in operating near 

Taiwan, just as Washington will 

be resistant to any efforts that it 

perceives as limiting American forces’ 

freedom of navigation and overflight 

in international waters and airspace.

In addition to managing day-to-day differences, such 

channels between Washington and Beijing could be 

used to explore whether there is any possibility of 

establishing risk management mechanisms. These 

could include updating deconfliction protocols for 

surface and air encounters, updating protocols for 

notifications of major military activities, and exercising-

AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE 

OF TAIWAN IN US-CHINA RELATIONS  10

real-time crisis management hotlines. For such 

efforts to achieve progress, officials in Washington 

and Beijing will need to employ creativity and flexibility. 

Beijing will not be immediately receptive to 

efforts that it perceives as emboldening Washington 

to assume greater involvement and acceptance of 

risk in operating near Taiwan, just as Washington will 

be resistant to any efforts that it perceives as limiting 

American forces’ freedom of navigation and overflight 

in international waters and airspace. 

Conclusion

Ultimately, Taiwan is one of a small number of 

issues that has the potential to serve as a catalyst 

for conflict between the United States and China. To 

forestall such a scenario, American policymakers will 

need to be clear on their role in the Taiwan Strait. The 

United States is not capable of mediating differences 

between Taiwan and China, which are vestiges of 

the unresolved civil war between the Republic of 

China and the People’s Republic of China. The best 

America can do is to foster enabling conditions for 

peaceful solutions to be found. The more the United 

States becomes partisan in favor of any specific 

outcome, the less influence it will wield over cross

Strait developments.

Even as a reliable American military presence near 

Taiwan remains vital, it is the minimum necessary 

ingredient for sustaining stability, not the essential 

variable for doing so. As important, if not more 

so, will be American efforts in the coming years to 

support Taiwan’s ability to enjoy dignity and respect 

by contributing meaningfully on the world stage, to 

deepen trade and economic integration with Taiwan, 

and to strengthen Taiwan’s capacity to safeguard the 

health of its people. The more that American officials 

can advance such efforts, the better they will be able 

to protect America’s objectives — preserving peace 

and stability in the Taiwan Strait and keeping open a 

path for an eventual peaceful solution to cross-Strait 

tensions.

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS  11

References

1  For additional background, see Alan D. 

Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: 

American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC 

Relations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. 

Stimson Center, 2003) and Richard C. Bush, At 

Cross-Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 

1942 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). 

2  Stacy Hsu, “No ‘consensus’ in Tsai speech: 

report,” Taipei Times, May 12, 2016, www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/05/12/2

003646058. 

3  “Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the 

Mainland (1994/12~2022/06),” Election Study 

Center, National Chengchi University, July 

12, 2022, https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/

Detail?fid=7801&id=6963.

4  “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 

(Washington, DC: The White House, February 

2022), 13, www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/

uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf. 

5  “Global nuclear arsenals are expected to grow 

as states continue to modernize–New SIPRI 

Yearbook out now,” Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute, June 13, 2022, www.

sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/global-nuclear-arsenals-are-expected-grow-states-continue-modernize-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now. 

6  Andrew S. Bowen, “Ukrainian Military 

Performance and Outlook,” (Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, June 29, 

2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/

pdf/IF/IF12150. 

7  Tsai Ing-wen, “Inaugural address of ROC 15thterm President Tsai Ing-wen,” (speech, Taipei, 

May 20, 2020), https://english.president.gov.tw/

News/6004. 

8  Richard C. Bush, “A One-China policy primer,” 

(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 

March 2017), www.brookings.edu/research/aone-china-policy-primer/. 

9 Steven Lee Myers, “Taiwan Loses Nicaragua 

as Ally as Tensions With China Rise,” The New 

York Times, December 9, 2021, www.nytimes.

com/2021/12/10/world/asia/taiwan-nicaragua-china.html. 

10 “Taiwan says WHO ignored its coronavirus questions at start of outbreak,” Reuters, March 24, 

2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-taiwan/taiwan-says-who-ignored-itscoronavirus-questions-at-start-of-outbreakidUSKBN21B160. 

11 “Taiwan condemns Beijing after Chinese jets 

cross maritime line,” Reuters, March 31, 2019, 

www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china/

taiwan-condemns-beijing-after-chinese-jetscross-maritime-line-idUSKCN1RC0ID; “Taiwan 

says Chinese fighters crossed median line of 

Taiwan Strait,” Reuters, July 8, 2022, https://

www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwansays-chinese-fighters-crossed-median-line-taiwan-strait-2022-07-08/. 

12 Paul Mozur and John Liu, “China is organizing 

military drills near Taiwan in a warning to the 

U.S.,” The New York Times, May 25, 2022, www.

nytimes.com/2022/05/25/world/asia/china-taiwan-military-drills.html. 

13 Agence France-Presse, “China makes second 

largest Taiwan defence zone incursion this year,” 

France 24, May 31, 2022, www.france24.com/

en/live-news/20220531-china-makes-secondlargest-taiwan-defence-zone-incursion-this-year. 

14 “U.S. rebuffs China by calling Taiwan Strait an 

international waterway,” Reuters, June 14, 2022, 

www.reuters.com/world/china/us-rebuffs-china-by-calling-taiwan-strait-an-international-waterway-2022-06-15/. 

15 For example, PRC State Councilor and Minister of 

National Defense Wei Fenghe told an audience 

of policy experts at the International Institute for 

Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue in June 

AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF TAIWAN IN US-CHINA RELATIONS  12

that the United States “keeps playing the Taiwan 

card against China.” See Wei Fenghe, “China’s 

Vision for Regional Order,” (speech, Singapore, 

June 12, 2022), www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2022. 

16 Michael R. Pompeo, “On the Mass Arrests 

of Democracy Advocates in Hong Kong,” 

U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong & Macau, 

January 6, 2021, https://hk.usconsulate.gov/n2021010601/. 

17 See, for example, Heather Mongilio, “U.S. 

Cruiser Transits Taiwan Strait Days After 

Chinese Naval, Air Exercises,” USNI News, May 

10, 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/05/10/us-cruiser-transits-taiwan-strait-days-afterchinese-naval-air-exercises. 

18 Keoni Everington, “China rankled by rare 

Taiwan-US security official meeting,” Taiwan 

News, May 28, 2019, www.taiwannews.com.tw/

en/news/3712100. 

19 See “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: 

Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting 

a Networked Region,” (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Defense, June 1, 2019), 

30, https://media.defense.gov/2019/

Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENTOF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGYREPORT-2019.PDF. 

20 Sophia Yang, “Mike Pompeo congratulates 

‘Taiwan’s President’ Tsai Ing-wen on inauguration,” Taiwan News, May 20, 2020, www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3937139. 

21 Keoni Everington, “Taiwan represented at US 

presidential inauguration for 1st time since 

1979,” Taiwan News, January 21, 2021, www.

taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4107807. 

22 Keoni Everington, “US secretary of state 

calls Taiwan ‘country’ again,” Taiwan News, 

September 16, 2021, www.taiwannews.com.tw/

en/news/4288972. 

23 See, for example, Joe Biden and Kishida 

Fumio, “Remarks by President Biden and 

Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint 

Press Conference,” May 23, 2022, https://www.

whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/23/remarks-by-president-bidenand-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-of-japan-injoint-press-conference/. 

24 Richard C. Bush and Ryan Hass, “The Biden 

administration is right to include Taiwan in 

the Summit for Democracy,” The Brookings 

Institution, December 1, 2021, https://

www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2021/12/01/the-biden-administrationis-right-to-include-taiwan-in-the-summit-for-democracy/. 

25 See “Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communique,” 

The White House, June 13, 2021, www.

whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/13/carbis-bay-g7-

summit-communique/; “Quad opposes any 

‘change by forcec,’” Taipei Times, May 25, 

2022, www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/

archives/2022/05/25/2003778767; “U.S.-EU 

Summit Statement,” The White House, June 

15, 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/

statements-releases/2021/06/15/u-s-eu-summit-statement/. 

26 “Taiwan president confirms U.S. troops training 

soldiers on island - CNN,” Reuters, October 28, 

2021, www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/

taiwan-president-confirms-us-troops-trainingsoldiers-island-cnn-2021-10-28/. 

27 Lawrence Chung, “Taiwan envoy’s meeting with 

Biden official a sign of how US regards Taipei 

and disregards Beijing’s warning,” South China 

Morning Post, February 11, 2021, www.scmp.

com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3121488/

taiwan-envoys-meeting-biden-official-sign-howus-regards. 

28 “US arms sale to lift long-range striking capabilities: analysts,” Taipei Times, October 24, 2020, 

www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2

020/10/24/2003745709. 

29 “Bill to help Taiwan regain WHO status 

passes Congress, sent to Biden for signature,” 

Reuters, April 27, 2022, https://www.reuters.

com/world/bill-help-taiwan-regain-who-

FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS  13

status-passes-congress-sent-biden-signature-2022-04-27/; “Six U.S. lawmakers arrive 

in Taiwan on unannounced trip,” Reuters, April 

14, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/

asia-pacific/six-us-lawmakers-arrive-taiwan-unannounced-trip-2022-04-14/; Wayne Chang, 

Eric Cheung, and Clare Foran, “US congressional delegation makes surprise visit to 

Taiwan,” CNN, May 30, 2022, https://www.cnn.

com/2022/05/30/politics/us-congressional-delegation-visit-taiwan/index.html; “U.S. House 

Speaker Nancy Pelosi to visit Taiwan in August 

– FT,” Reuters, July 19, 2022, https://www.

reuters.com/world/us/us-house-speaker-nancy-pelosi-visit-taiwan-august-ft-2022-07-19/.

30 Editorial, “The most dangerous place on Earth,” 

The Economist, May 1, 2021, www.economist.

com/leaders/2021/05/01/the-most-dangerousplace-on-earth. 

31 Mallory Shelbourne, “Davidson: China Could Try 

to Take Control of Taiwan In ‘Next Six Years,’” 

USNI News, March 9, 2021, https://news.usni.

org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-totake-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years. 

32 Jeff Seldin, “US Believes China Still Hoping to 

Take Taiwan Without Force,” Voice of America, 

June 30, 2022, www.voanews.com/a/us-believes-china-still-hoping-to-take-taiwan-withoutforce-/6639239.html. 

33 Kevin Rudd, “The Dangers of a Catastrophic 

Conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping’s 

China,” (speech, Washington, DC, March 28, 

2022), https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/

dangers-catastrophic-conflict-between-us-andxi-jinpings-china. 

34 “Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2021: Annual 

Report to Congress,” (Washington, DC: Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, 2021), https://media.

defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-

1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. 

35 Shelley Rigger, Lev Nachman, Chit Wai John 

Mok, and Nathan Kar Ming Chan, “How are 

people feeling in the ‘most dangerous place on 

Earth’?” The Brookings Institution, October 13, 

2021, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2021/10/13/how-are-people-feeling-inthe-most-dangerous-place-on-earth/. 

36 Yimou Lee, Norihiko Shirouzu, and David 

Lague, “T-DAY: The Battle for Taiwan,” Reuters, 

December 27, 2021, www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-chips/. 

37 Richard C. Bush, “From persuasion to coercion: 

Beijing’s approach to Taiwan and Taiwan’s 

response,” (Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution, November 2019), www.brookings.

edu/research/from-persuasion-to-coercionbeijings-approach-to-taiwan-and-taiwans-response/. 

38 Ibid. 

39 Richard Haass and David Sacks, “American 

Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous,” 

Foreign Affairs, September 2, 2020, www.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous. 

40 Richard C. Bush, “A One-China policy primer.” 

AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF TAIWAN IN US-CHINA RELATIONS  14

About the author

Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Michael H. Armacost Chair in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. He is also a nonresident affiliated fellow in the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. Hass focuses his research and analysis on enhancing policy development on the pressing political, economic, and security challenges facing the United States in East Asia.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the Security in Asia program at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies for research support for this paper. 

The author also expresses appreciation to Adrien Chorn for assistant with research, Ted Reinert for editing the paper, and Rachel Slattery for providing layout.

Disclaimer

The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. 

Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars