RACHED GHANNOUCHI is a co-founder of the Ennahda Party.
Ennahda, one of the most influential political parties in the Arab world and a major force in Tunisia’s[1] emergence as a democracy, recently announced[2] a historic transition. Ennahda[3] has moved beyond its origins as an Islamist party and has fully embraced a new identity as a party of Muslim democrats. The organization, which I co-founded in the 1980s, is no longer both a political party and a social movement. It has ended all of its cultural and religious activities and now focuses only on politics.
Ennahda’s evolution mirrors Tunisia’s broader social and political trajectory. The party first emerged as an Islamist movement in response to repression at the hands of a secularist, authoritarian regime that denied citizens religious freedom and the rights of free expression and association. For decades, Tunisian dictators shut down all political discourse in the country, forcing movements with political aims to operate exclusively as social and cultural organizations. But the revolution of 2010–11[4] brought an end to authoritarian rule and opened up space for open, free, and fair political competition[5]. Tunisia’s new constitution[6], which Ennahda members of parliament helped draft and which was ratified in 2014, enshrines democracy and protects political and religious freedoms. Under the new constitution, the rights of Tunisians to worship freely, express their convictions and beliefs, and embrace an Arab Muslim identity are guaranteed, and so Ennahda no longer needs to focus its energies on fighting for such protections. Therefore, the party no longer accepts the label of “Islamism”—a concept that has been disfigured in recent years by radical extremists—as a description of its approach. In this new democratic stage of Tunisian history, the question is no longer one of secularism versus religion: the state no longer imposes secularism through repression, and so there is no longer a need for Ennahda or any other actor to defend or protect religion as a core part of its political activity.
Of course, as Muslims, the values of Islam still guide our actions. However, we no longer consider the old ideological debates about the Islamization or secularization of society to be necessary or even relevant. Today, Tunisians are less concerned about the role of religion than about building a governance system that is democratic and inclusive and that meets their aspirations for a better life. As the junior partner in Tunisia’s coalition government, Ennahda aims to find solutions to matters of concern to all of the country’s citizens and residents.
Ennahda’s evolution is a result of 35 years of constant self-evaluation and more than two years of intense introspection and discussion at the grass-roots level. At an Ennahda Party congress held in May, more than 80 percent of the delegates voted in favor of this formal shift, which represents not so much a sea change as a ratification of long-held beliefs. Our values were already aligned with democratic ideals, and our core convictions have not changed. What has changed, rather, is the environment in which we operate. Tunisia is finally a democracy rather than a dictatorship[7]; that means that Ennahda can finally be a political party focusing on its practical agenda and economic vision rather than a social movement fighting against repression and dictatorship. As the entire Middle East[8] grapples with instability and violence—often complicated by conflicts over the proper relationship between religion and politics—Ennahda’s evolution should serve as evidence that Islam is indeed compatible with democracy and that Islamic movements can play a vital, constructive role in fostering successful democratic transitions.
RESISTANCE AND RENAISSANCE
Abdelfattah Mourou and I established the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), which later became Ennahda, in the 1970s. We were both graduates of Ez-Zitouna, the first Islamic university in the world, which was founded in 737 and has long fostered a vision of Islam as dynamic and responsive to the changing needs of society. Our approach was shaped by our contact with a variety of reformist Islamic thinkers. Early on, we were influenced by thinkers in Egypt and Syria linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, such as the movement’s Egyptian founder, Hasan al-Banna, and Mustafa al-Sibai, the leader of its Syrian branch. But as the MTI developed, we increasingly drew inspiration from thinkers in the Maghreb region, such as the Algerian philosopher Malek Bennabi and Ez-Zitouna University’s own Mohamed Tahar Ben Achour, one of the fathers of the rationalistic approach to Koranic exegesis, which emphasizes the importance of maqasid al-sharia: the objectives, or ends, of Islamic law.
At the time, Tunisia was experiencing increasing social and political unrest due to widespread dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime of President Habib Bourguiba and its crackdown on civil and political liberties, as well as with the slow pace of economic growth, the spread of corruption, and the persistence of social inequality. Discontent boiled over in a series of strikes between 1976 and 1978 that culminated in a general strike on January 26, 1978—a day that came to be known in Tunisia as Black Thursday, when the regime killed dozens of protesters, wounded hundreds more, and arrested more than 1,000 people on charges of sedition.
In light of a growing consensus about the need for democratic reforms, the MTI brought together Tunisians who opposed the Bourguiba regime and felt excluded from the political system, especially owing to the state’s repression of any expression of religiosity, whether in public or private. MTI members set up discussion groups, published journals, and organized students on university campuses.
In April 1981, the Bourguiba regime consented to the registration of other political parties. The MTI submitted a request to form a party committed to democracy, political pluralism, the peaceful sharing and alternation of power, free and fair elections as the sole source of political legitimacy, the protection of moderate religious scholarship, and the promotion of a form of modernization that would be in harmony with Tunisia’s values and cultural heritage. But the application was ignored by authorities.
Faced with rising calls for reform, the regime instead expanded its crackdown, arresting around 500 MTI members, myself included. Between 1981 and 1984, I was imprisoned along with many of my colleagues. Shortly after our release, many of us were rearrested, accused of inciting violence and “seeking to change the nature of the state.” Many Ennahda members were sentenced to life in prison after sham trials, as the regime deepened its descent into repression and despotism.
The rise to power of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali[9], who deposed Bourguiba in a 1987 coup d’état, seemed to signal a potential political opening. The following year, Ben Ali granted an amnesty to all political prisoners and announced the beginning of a new era of multiparty democracy. The MTI again applied for recognition as a political party, changing its name to Hizb Ennahda (the Renaissance Party). However, the application was again ignored, and the hoped-for opening soon proved to be a mirage, as the Ben Ali regime reverted to the repressive tactics of the Bourguiba era. After the 1989 national elections, in which independent candidates linked to Ennahda won 13 percent of the overall vote and, according to some sources, as much as 30 percent in some major urban areas, the regime moved to crush the party. Tens of thousands of members were arrested, imprisoned, tortured, blacklisted from employment and educational opportunities, and subjected to police harassment. Many others, including me, were forced into exile.
For the next two decades, Tunisia languished under repression, and Ennahda struggled to survive as a banned underground movement. A turning point finally came in December 2010, when a young Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in front of a local government office to protest the harassment he had suffered at the hands of officials. Bouazizi’s action captured the public imagination, and in less than a month, massive protests around the country had forced Ben Ali to flee and had sparked a series of revolts across the Arab world. Ennahda members participated in the protests alongside other Tunisians, but not under the party banner, partly to avoid giving the regime an excuse to paint the demonstrations as the work of an opposition group seeking to take power.
In the country’s first free and fair elections, in October 2011, Ennahda’s grass-roots networks and track record of opposing the dictatorship helped it win the largest share of the vote, by a wide margin. Seeking a national unity government, Ennahda entered into a pioneering coalition with two secular parties, setting an important precedent in contemporary Arab politics.
In Tunisia’s postrevolutionary era, when tensions have threatened to overwhelm the country’s fragile democratic structures, Ennahda has pushed for compromise and reconciliation rather than exclusion or revenge. During negotiations over a new constitution, Ennahda’s parliamentarians made a series of crucial concessions, consenting to a mixed presidential-parliamentary system (Ennahda had originally called for an exclusively parliamentary system) and agreeing that the constitution would not cite sharia as one of the sources of legislation. As a result of Ennahda’s willingness to compromise and work within the system, the new constitution enshrines democratic mechanisms, the rule of law, and a full range of religious, civil, political, social, economic, cultural, and environmental rights.
In 2013, violent Salafi extremists carried out a series of attacks and political assassinations, setting off a period of instability and protest. Seeking to tar Ennahda by falsely associating the party with these crimes, a number of parliamentarians suspended their participation in the drafting of the constitution. In response, Ennahda and its coalition partners sought to forge a compromise rather than force the document through in the midst of turmoil. To preserve the legitimacy of the process, the Ennahda-led government did something never before seen in the region: it willingly stepped down and handed over power to a neutral, technocratic government. Our priority was not to remain in control but to ensure that the National Constituent Assembly, the supreme representative body, could complete the work of drafting a constitution that would establish the political foundations of a democratic Tunisia. The Ennahda-led government did something never before seen in the region: it willingly stepped down.
Following elections in 2014[10], Ennahda gracefully conceded its loss—even before the official results were announced—to Nidaa Tounes, a center-right party founded in 2012. Ever since, Ennahda has worked with Nidaa Tounes as the junior partner in a coalition government. Although the two parties do not see eye to eye on every issue, the coalition has held steady, and the combination of a well-constructed constitution and political cooperation has produced the right conditions for Ennahda to take the next step in its journey toward Muslim democracy.
THE SEPARATION OF MOSQUE AND STATE
At its tenth party congress, in May, Ennahda announced a series of changes that formalized its decision to focus exclusively on politics and to leave behind social, educational, cultural, and religious activities. In recent years, the party has gradually abandoned those pursuits, recognizing that they should be the purview of independent civil society organizations and not of the party or any entity related to it. The motion to enact this change stipulated, among other things, that the party’s cadres can no longer preach in mosques and cannot take leadership positions in civil society groups, such as religious or charitable associations.
Our objective is to separate the political and religious fields. We believe that no political party can or should claim to represent religion and that the religious sphere should be managed by independent and neutral institutions. Put simply, religion should be nonpartisan. We want the mosque to be a space for people to come together, not a site of division. Imams should not hold positions in any political party and should be trained as specialists in their field in order to gain the skills and credibility required of religious leaders; currently, only seven percent of Tunisian imams have undergone such training.
The party congress also approved a comprehensive strategy to overcome the major challenges Tunisia faces, focusing on consolidating constitutional procedures, pursuing transitional justice, reforming state institutions, enacting economic reforms to spur growth, creating a multidimensional approach to the fight against terrorism, and promoting good governance in religious institutions.
Ennahda is now best understood not as an Islamist movement but as a party of Muslim democrats. We seek to create solutions to the day-to-day problems that Tunisians face rather than preach about the hereafter. To be clear, the principles of Islam have always inspired Ennahda, and our values will continue to guide us. But it is no longer necessary for Ennahda (or any other party) to struggle for religious freedoms: under the new constitution, all Tunisians enjoy the same rights, whether they are believers, agnostics, or atheists. The separation of religion and politics will prevent officials from using faith-based appeals to manipulate the public. It will also restore the independence of religious institutions: religion will no longer be hostage to politics, as it was before the revolution, when the state interfered in and repressed religious activities.
This separation will also help better equip Tunisia to combat extremism. When religion was repressed and religious institutions forcefully closed and restricted for decades, Tunisian youth were left with no reference point for mainstream, moderate Islamic thought; many succumbed to distorted interpretations of Islam that they encountered on the Internet. Confronting violent extremism requires an understanding of the true teachings of Islam, which reject black-and-white views and allow for interpretations that accommodate the needs of modern life. The genuine separation of mosque and state and the effective governance of religious institutions will facilitate better religious education and reintroduce moderate Islamic thinking to Tunisia.
The Zitouna mosque in Tunis, April 2012.
A REBUKE TO TYRANTS AND EXTREMISTS
Tunisia has made significant political progress[11] over the last five years. To consolidate these gains, the government must prioritize social and economic development. It must go beyond democratic institution building and carry out economic reforms that will meet the urgent need for jobs and growth. To this end, Ennahda has called for a comprehensive national economic dialogue and a participatory approach to reforms based on a vision of “compassionate capitalism”—an approach that balances the freedom of enterprise with the ideals of social justice and equal opportunity.
To boost growth, the government needs to pave the way for the resumption of production in several strategic sectors, such as the phosphate industry, which has slowed down since the revolution due to disagreements between labor unions and producers over pay and working conditions. Ennahda also strongly supports reforms to the banking sector that will make it easier for firms and individuals to get access to financing. These reforms will bring much of the informal economy into the mainstream. The party has also successfully pushed for increases in government assistance to small businesses and farmers. In addition, the government must diversify Tunisia’s trading relations and increase Tunisia’s exports to neighboring countries by opening up new opportunities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and advancing the ongoing negotiations over a free-trade agreement with the EU.
Creating a culture of entrepreneurship is particularly critical for Tunisia’s success. Tunisians have grown accustomed to thinking of the state as the country’s main employer, and corruption under the former regime placed many barriers in the way of would-be entrepreneurs. Ennahda wants to encourage a shift away from this dependence, which has historically allowed the state to monopolize resources and distribute them in an opaque and clientelistic manner. Ennahda supports the government’s ongoing efforts to encourage entrepreneurship among the younger generations; the minister of vocational training and employment, the Ennahda member Zied Ladhari, has introduced ambitious and much-needed reforms, launching a new program to train more than 600,000 unemployed Tunisians, renovating job-training centers, and creating a national authority for career guidance.
Ennahda also backs reforms that will make it easier to establish public-private partnerships and to start new businesses. The Ennahda-led government of 2011–14 introduced a new law governing such partnerships, which has recently been adopted. And a new program proposed by Ladhari would promote new businesses by creating mentoring programs for start-ups and by supporting entrepreneurs through training, flexible funding systems, and a one-stop shop for administrative procedures, to reduce bureaucracy.
Economic development cannot progress, however, without significant changes in the educational system, which has become divorced from the realities of the labor market in Tunisia, where the overall unemployment rate currently hovers around 15 percent. Education must be a path to work, not a bridge to joblessness. Ennahda is pushing for reforms that will help educational institutions meet the needs of the market, including by focusing more on soft skills, providing a larger range of technical training schemes, and connecting students to opportunities and internships in the public and private sectors.
Consolidating Tunisia’s dramatic political transformation and making progress on economic development will also require social change, especially when it comes to the role of women in government and business. The participation and leadership of Tunisian women—in politics, the judiciary, and civil society—were crucial to the country’s democratic transition. Today, 60 percent of all Tunisian university graduates are female, yet women still face higher unemployment than men (21.5 percent compared with 12.7 percent in 2014). The country’s democratic development depends on removing the obstacles that women face in all fields, promoting equal participation, and protecting women’s rights. To that end, Ennahda supports mandating equal gender representation on all party lists in the local elections that will be held in March 2017. Ennahda members of parliament have also proposed stronger maternity-leave rights to protect women against discrimination and to give them greater career flexibility.
Overshadowing all these issues, of course, is the question of security. The challenge of keeping Tunisians safe in an unstable region is testing the resilience of the country’s new democratic system. The state must protect citizens while ensuring respect for individual rights and the rule of law. Ennahda has successfully pushed for amendments to counterterrorism laws that ensure suspects’ access to legal advice. We have also called for a comprehensive national security strategy that addresses the complex causes of extremism. Smart counterterrorism avoids counterproductive reactions and will require a cultural shift on the part of Tunisia’s security institutions, toward respecting the supremacy of the law and protecting the freedoms of individuals, civil society groups, and the media. Newly enacted provisions to protect the rights of detainees, as well as the establishment of the National Anti-Torture Commission, represent a step in the right direction.
The only way to conclusively defeat extremist groups such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State (also known as ISIS) is to offer a hopeful alternative to millions of young Muslims around the world. In the Arab world, people have faced increasing social exclusion, fewer opportunities, and repression at the hands of autocrats. Their frustration has been exploited by extremist groups such as ISIS, which aim to sow chaos and disorder and impose their own form of tyranny on the region. By showing that Muslim democracy can respect individual rights, promote social and economic opportunities, and protect Arab Islamic values and identities, the successful consolidation of democracy in Tunisia will serve as a rebuke to secular tyrants and violent extremists alike.
Ennahda’s recent transition will make that kind of success more likely. We hope it will also inspire more debate in the Muslim world about the compatibility of Islam and democracy, what it means to be an inclusive political party, and how to build democratic systems that promote pluralism and respect the right to difference. Of course, Tunisia’s political environment is different from that in the rest of the region. Other Arab countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, are still suffering under dictatorship and military rule or remain mired in ethnic and sectarian conflicts. The more complicated a country’s internal situation, the higher the price of change will be and the longer it will take. But change is coming, whether as a result of civil war, peaceful revolution, or gradual reform. And when it comes, Tunisia—and Ennahda—will hopefully serve as a valuable model.
It was a few months before the 2008 US Presidential election. I was talking to my American colleague at UNESCO. I said to her that since American presidents’ decisions have global implications, democratic countries should also have the opportunity vote in those elections within a reasonable quota to be shared among them. She responded, “an interesting idea…”. We both laughed. It was a joke but the premise was not entirely without logic.
Now that we are only months away from the end of President Obama’s second term in office, pundits have started to express opinions regarding his legacy. I feel that without voices from the Middle East the portrayal President Obama’s legacy would be incomplete.
To start with, one needs to remember what the broad Middle East looked like when he took office. The war in Afghanistan wasn’t leading anywhere. But the invasion of Iraq undertaken on distorted evidence and carried out in total disregard of Iraq’s realities had been a failure with regional implications. It wasn’t “mission accomplished”. Furthermore, it had caused great damage to Washington’s claim to world’s moral leadership. Americans may have forgotten about Abu Ghraib but Iraqis haven’t.
West’s only hope for democratizing Middle East was Turkey’s moderately Islamic government which had engaged in political reform and had even launched accession negotiations with the EU. Thus, President Obama arrived in Turkey after attending a G20 summit in London, a NATO summit in Strasbourg and an EU summit in Prague. In other words, this was his first bilateral visit abroad.
The following paragraph from the speech he delivered before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on April 6, 2009 reflected the purpose of the visit: “This morning I had the great privilege of visiting the tomb of your extraordinary founder of your republic. And I was deeply impressed by this beautiful memorial to a man who did so much to shape the course of history. But it is also clear that the greatest monument to Ataturk’s life is not something that can be cast in stone and marble. His greatest legacy is Turkey’s strong, vibrant, secular democracy, and that is the work this assembly carries on today…”
The message was clear: Turkey, with its secular democracy, has set an example for the Islamic world. Turkey should continue this path and others should follow.
Two months after his visit to Ankara, President Obama addressed the Islamic world from Cairo. He said:“The United States is not and will never be, at war with Islam… I have come to seek here a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world… I do so recognizing that change cannot happen overnight… There must be a sustained effort… I also believe that events in Iraq have reminded America of the need to use diplomacy and build international consensus to resolve our problems whenever possible… America’s strong bonds with Israel are well known… the Palestinian people – Muslims and Christians – have suffered in pursuit of a homeland… the only solution is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace and security…”
Then came the Arab Spring. Widespread discontent among the peoples of the region was known. Nonetheless, the pace of developments was a surprise for most. On 14 January 2011, following a month of protests against his rule, Tunisian President Ben Ali was forced to flee to Saudi Arabia. Revelations about his close relations caused embarrassment to some European politicians. When protests started to threaten Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Washington vacillated but eventually gave protestors cautious support. There was no other option. On February 11, 2011 Hosni Mubarak stepped down.
Expecting other dominoes to fall, President Sarkozy and PM Cameron then led the military intervention in Libya which the US joined, again after some hesitation. Country’s dictator Qaddafi whom European leaders had not failed on occasion to pamper went to his tragic end. President Obama eventually admitted that without adequate preparation for the “day after”, the intervention became a failure. Nobody else has shown the courage to say that.
With three leaders gone, some of America’s NATO and Middle East allies and partners started calling for a US military intervention to oust President Assad but President Obama resisted them.
Domestic critics of his last-minute decision not to bomb Syria have focused on the question of “credibility”, particularly the sort of credibility purchased with force.
His Middle East critics were unhappy because they believed that a military intervention, no matter its scope, would accelerate Assad’s fall. The prospect of another front with Russia was the least of their concerns. All they wanted was and remains Assad’s ouster. But that was as far as their interests overlapped. The moment Assad was gone, they would have engaged, in all likelihood, in another round of struggle, this time to determine his successor. And if they were unhappy with post-Assad developments they would not have hesitated to blame “foreign powers from outside the region” for meddling. Washington is already confronted with a web of conflicting Middle East interests for which its allies are as much to blame as Russia and Iran. “Boots on the ground” would have made the challenge even more complicated, frustrating and costly.
The “redline” President Obama chose not to enforce, despite a huge setback in US-Russia relations over Ukraine, created a window of opportunity for “focused cooperation” with Moscow and led to the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons. Under the circumstances that was a substantial achievement.
Some members of the “Sunni bloc” have been as critical of the Iran nuclear deal as Israel. Yet, none of the deal’s critics, including those in the US, have been able to put forward a viable alternative. Some of those critics may have entertained dreams of bombing Iran into submission. Had this been the case, those dreams would have turned into a nightmare of violence and war to last for decades and decades. One only needs to remember the scar PM Mohammed Mosaddeq’s overthrow has left on the Iranian psyche. The nuclear deal has been a remarkable achievement in Iran’s relations with the West. Moreover, it represents a multilateral effort which enjoys international legitimacy.
President Obama’s determination to refrain from another military intervention in the Middle East, his emphasis on multilateralism, diplomacy and international legitimacy constitute a principled stand and will be appreciated more and more by the peoples of the region in the years to come. Besides, interventionists tend to ignore the fact that Afghanistan and Iraq still remain decades away from stability. The President promised to withdraw forces from Afghanistan but the Taliban does not allow that. The beginnings of ISIL’s rise go back to the invasion Iraq. ISIL was able to emerge as force, but despite years of investment and training the Iraqi armed forces were only able to flee before its assault.
All of this unmistakably shows that while external military interventions can bring about regime change, their capacity for nation-building is strictly limited, let alone promoting democracy. This is just as true for supporting regimes which have lost popular support. Democratic change requires higher levels of enlightened education and energy from within. Sadly, the Middle East is yet to produce such energy and leaders who can channel it towards something positive. In the absence of both, the current turmoil will last for decades. Partitioning of Iraq and Syria is often mentioned as a possibility because of the regional inability to put the good the nation above sectarian, regional and personal interests. One may now add to that the barely camouflaged desires of some for territorial expansion. If that turns out to be the case, because of a history of interventions in the Middle East since the First World War, regional leaders will conveniently be absolved of all responsibility because the West, and only the West would be held accountable.
European countries have for some time been worried about what they call the “threat of radical Islam”. President Obama has taken a different approach. The interview he gave the Atlantic magazine reflects the essence of his outlook for and his frustration with Middle East. When Jeffrey Goldberg asked him what he had hoped to accomplish with his Cairo reset speech, he said that he had been trying—unsuccessfully, he acknowledged—to persuade Muslims to more closely examine the roots of their unhappiness.“My argument was this: Let’s all stop pretending that the cause of the Middle East’s problems is Israel,”he told Mr. Goldberg.“We want to work to help achieve statehood and dignity for the Palestinians, but I was hoping that my speech could trigger a discussion, could create space for Muslims to address the real problems they are confronting—problems of governance, and the fact that some currents of Islam have not gone through a reformation that would help people adapt their religious doctrines to modernity. My thought was, I would communicate that the U.S. is not standing in the way of this progress, that we would help, in whatever way possible, to advance the goals of a practical, successful Arab agenda that provided a better life for ordinary people.”
President Obama also told Jeffrey Goldberg that he had demanded that Muslim leaders do more to eliminate the threat of violent fundamentalism.“It is very clear what I mean,” he said, “which is that there is a violent, radical, fanatical, nihilistic interpretation of Islam by a faction—a tiny faction—within the Muslim community that is our enemy, and that has to be defeated… There is also the need for Islam as a whole to challenge that interpretation of Islam, to isolate it, and to undergo a vigorous discussion within their community about how Islam works as part of a peaceful, modern society.”
This is the right approach. In the absence of regional partners with progressive agendas it may be of little or no consequence for now, but it is a good US investment in the future. And, if European countries are unhappy with current Middle East developments and the influx of refugees, they would need to find new methods of engaging the region beyond conventional political, military or politico/military interventions reflecting their selfish interests. President Obama has made a genuine effort. The ideas he has put forward constitute a platform for Western countries to act upon for a more substantial dialogue among cultures.
President Obama says that the combat against ISIL is making progress and the terrorist organization is losing ground. I do hope so. But the price for this long-drawn-out struggle has been costly. ISIL’s gaining an aura of invincibility has expanded its reach and drawn more people to its ranks. In Turkey we have seen ISIL undertake acts of terror and we worry about reports on its sleeper cells. There, more could have been done. But again, I admit that ISIL is essentially the problem of Islamic countries.
In brief, if the Middle East is no better today than it was when he was elected to the White house in 2008, but this is not President Obama’s fault. This is the destiny of the broad Middle East with its polarized masses and bygone leaders. The contrast the President drew between the lethargy which characterizes the Middle East and the dynamism Southeast Asia is the sad truth. Unfortunately for the peoples of the Middle East, leaders like Ataturk are the exception.
As for Turkey, I am really sorry that we have been a great disappointment for President Obama, maybe his biggest in the Middle East. He probably gave us more credit than any of his predecessors in the White House; he praised our secular democracy as Ataturk’s legacy; perhaps, he even saw in us a nation to promote respect for human rights, freedom of expression and good governance in the region. All of this made me proud. Today, however, I feel disappointed and angry because of the ungrateful campaign waged to destroy that very legacy. Only recently, the current Speaker of the Parliament he addressed in 2009 said that secularism should be eliminated in the new constitution. This, however, like many others, is our problem and only for us to solve.
At the end of the day, as a Middle Easterner, I would not have hesitated to vote President Obama for a third term into office had it not been for the 22nd Amendment.
