Gen. Pierre Schill on France’s Strategic Vision and Adapting Land Forces for High-Intensity Conflict
Past Event
Hudson Institute
February 10, 2026
Hudson welcomes French Army Chief of Staff General Pierre Schill, one of Europe’s most senior military leaders, for a discussion on the evolving strategic environment and the French Army’s transformation in a rapidly changing world.
General Schill will discuss:
How new dynamics are shaping France’s evolving strategic concept and defense posture
The French Army’s role as a global military force, deployed in support of national interests, allied commitments, and international security
How operational experience feeds directly into force adaptation and readiness
The ongoing transformation of land forces, including the integration of emerging technologies and artificial intelligence
The human dimensions of military effectiveness—recruitment, training, leadership development, and cohesion
Additionally, drawing on his most recent book Command : Insight from the French Army, General Schill will reflect on the future of land warfare and commanding by intent, with an emphasis on the importance of trust, initiative, and decentralized decision-making in modern warfare.
This event will conclude with a Q&A session, offering the audience an opportunity to engage with a European and French perspective on the strategic, operational, and human challenges shaping the future of land warfare.
Event Audi
Event Transcript
General Pierre Schill:
Thank you. Thank you very much for welcoming me here. I’m very, very happy to be able to give some words before having some question and answers. So I spent three days here in the States. One day, we have been in Norfolk in order to meet ACT about the innovation in NATO, one day today in Washington, DC in order to meet my counterpart General George and the Army, talking about innovation in US Army and how there is a link with the innovation in the French Army and a lot of similarity. Perhaps, I will come back about this in the questions and answers. And one day tomorrow in New York, in the United Nation organization, because mainly, we are now in Lebanon in the UNIFIL and there is a question of ending this mission and how will be the future of this organization.
So, I’m very happy to take time to give some words. Perhaps what will be my initial remarks, it’s about there is a moment. It’s obvious for everyone, for everybody. How do I see this moment? I see that there is a moment for the world and America, which is the main power of the world at this moment. It is a moment for this country too. This is a moment for Europe and, of course, for France, and I will explain a little bit how I see the so what for France in this perspective. And there is a moment for the French Army. And how do I manage here to be prepared for the future, including this question of the command and the mission command type style I want for the army. So there is a moment for the world. This is very obvious. I would have talked three years ago. I was in the position. I would have said the same and perhaps trying to pursue the people in front of me, but now it’s obvious.
But how deep is this moment? I really feel it is a moment that is, at least, a change as deep as the 9/11, at least as deep at the end of the Warsaw Pact. I think it is at least as deep at the end of the Second World War and the building of the international relation basement about sovereignty, United Nations and so on. And perhaps, it is at least as deep as the First World War when there was at the same time some kind of a strategic revolution, of a cultural revolution, and of a technological revolution. So we are at a moment when there is a strategic revolution. We know this is the fact that the France, the force has came back as a mean that is accepted by some countries to be a legitimate means to wait and to prepare the future. And I’m sure we will not be able to take this reality back in the box as we did at the end of the Second World War.
But at the same time, there is some kind of a cultural revolution because the world is shifting toward Pacific with so huge countries such as China, India, with more than billion people. And because those countries, even if at the moment they are not able to build a new alternative system, they are able to destroy the previous one, saying this is a Western temporary reality and they want to have an alternative one. But those two revolutions are not enough to understand and explain the current situation because there is also some kind of a technological revolution. And as this revolution called digital or information revolution is transforming very deeply the societies, opening some new spaces, information. Of course, information was a space in which the humanity has been acting for all the history. But because of the power of the tools in this new information world, this is becoming very a new space of social action, human action. And as soon as a space is open to the human action, it is open to war. It is the same for cyber. It is the same for the space.
So there is some kind of this new technological revolution that had began some decades ago and will go for the next decades, mixed with this question of strategy and culture, is making a huge change. And in this time, I think that your country, but I’m not the best to define this, is at a time when this country is defining its strategy for the future and changing deeply the way it is seeing the world. And it is the most important part for my speech today is to say that this country says, “We want to be strong in the world that is coming and there are a lot of applications.” So there is a moment for the world.
There is a moment for Europe because one way to see this coming world is to say this is the world of empires coming back. And in front of empires, you can be a vessel, I don‘t know if it‘s the right word, or an enemy. And so Europe, which is some kind of a weak space between big forces, big spaces, has to answer to the question, what do we want for the future? So an easy way to answer is to say, to criticize the big powers, but I think this is not the question. The question is, what can we do for our future? And this is a question of power of Europe for the future. Is it EU? Is it NATO? Is it part of those countries? I don’t know. This is to be built for the future, but this is the real question.
When it comes to France, what I know and what I want to tell you, it is France has a very strong, very ancient idea of its strategy and the future. And there is a question how to make it come. This idea is the mix of sovereignty and ability to wage on the allies. That means . . . The word used by our president, France, is [French]. That means a balancing power with the ability to [French], what would be the word? To lead. So a balancing and leading country in order to build. France is a building country. It was a builder of the United Nations system. It was a builder of the NATO system. It was a builder of the European Union. And so I think my country still has this idea of sovereignty and the ability to lead in order to build something.
So the question for France at the moment is how to do this in a world where there are so huge powers, and perhaps the answer has been for the years, the last years and is for the years coming - Europe. How Europe is a power in this global world in front of us with this part of sovereignty and with this part of ability to lead in order to be part of the establishment of some kind of a balanced power on the world and the coping with the international relations with the questions of sovereignty of the countries and the right or the laws leading the discussions and negotiations rather than force in order to achieve what is needed. And so this is the big idea of my country at a time when there are so many questions around the continent and the country with the threat of Russia, the increasing of China and so on and so on.
And when it comes to the military part, and this is my part, and the military as a whole and the army, so this question and what is my mission in this moment for Europe is to help France to be able to be the master of his destiny. And the president says, “In the world that is coming, in order to be free, you must be strong.” And this is, I think, my mission and the question of myself and with the others. So, my army, the French Army as a whole and the army as . . . Sorry, the French defense and the French Army, we have this mission to defend the sovereignty and to be able to be a framework nation in the question of the military domains and topics.
The sovereignty is a question of nuclear deterrence. We have a sovereign nuclear deterrence. It is a question of ability to have an autonomous assessment of the situation. It is a question to have at least basic ability to act by ourself. And this is paramount in order to protect our sovereignty in the Europe and French territory, but also in all the overseas territories we have in French Vienna, in the Caribbean islands, in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean. And because in those countries, if China comes, for example, through the fishing companies in French Polynesia, no one will help us. So this is a question of having the ability to do it alone. So the sovereignty is very important. And I think perhaps it will come during the questions.
This sovereignty can’t be only a military one. It must be some kind of a strategic autonomy or a sovereignty that is relying on the fact that we have our own industry. And so sovereignty for Europe, sovereignty for France, and how are we a framework nation in order to help the other countries to say, “Okay, let’s defend ourself in a world when the States, they have told us that they are okay to defend us, they have done it for years, but they are not okay to give their word that they will always be there.” So if there is a situation in which there is a threat and the States are not here to back us, how we are able to defend ourselves?
And the way to do it, I will stop here, is through NATO at this moment. We must be credible in NATO in order to be credible in front or in the mind of our allies, because part of my allies, for example, my counterparts in the eastern part of Europe, in Estonia, in Poland, they speak only NATO. They say, “NATO is the islands which is defending me.” So, if I come and I say, “Okay, let’s be sovereign and have some kind of a Coalition of the Willing,” say, “Okay, where is NATO?” So, I say, “Okay, I will speak NATO. I will be credible in NATO in order to defend the continent in all way and with the States, if possible, but I will have the ability to do something else.”
So there is a moment for the world. I have nothing to say so what on this. There is a moment for Europe and I say, “So what is sovereignty of this continent on the military way, but on the others?” And I have the ability and I have the need and the mission to be able to build this by the framework capability. And so what for the French Army, it is a question of transformation. I think that what I’ve heard in NATO yesterday in ACT, what I’ve heard this morning in the Pentagon with the US Army is all the modern armies have the same assessment. There will not be an innovated army in the future. There is not a point in which we are and we say, “Okay, let’s jump to a next step in which we will be innovated.” No, innovation will be a permanent process. And being innovating and the ability to innovate on the technological but also tactical and so on way, is paramount, is the base of the operational ability of the future of the forces.
So the French Army has to be innovating, has to innovate. Does it mean that I’m delaying everything that was before? No, because I think that the basement of the ability of the forces, of the armies, the services, the French Army in the future, will still be on the men and the women who are in the army, the number of them, the quality of them, the educational system, the cohesion of them, the background and the experience they had on soil, on the operations, and the fighting spirit of them. So I will transform the French Army. I want to transform the French Army.
I will transform the French army. I want to transform the French army, but not backing or making the basement of the fighting spirit to be improved because this will be paramount for the future. So this is some kind of a line of continuity. And on this line of continuity, I have to transform. I have to transform toward operational capabilities, and this includes . . . So I explained the question of being a Framework Nation and coalition leaders and so on. And so this is a question of Army Corps, division, and so on and so on. But it is also a question of innovation. How am I able to seize this spirit of innovation in order to transform my army? So the answer we gave is to create some kind of a command, which is called future combat command, in order to make the innovation come from the top, mainly with the big companies for big capabilities, some kind of top-down innovation. And we have wrote a book that was released in English two weeks ago, which is called Future . . . No, no, not this one. It is another one. [Audience responds] This one is . . . Sorry?
[Audience Engages with General Pierre Schill]
General Pierre Schill:
No. No, I was mentioning what will be the combat in 2040 in order to think on a top-down topics. But having this future combat command, leading the innovation in the French army is not enough. We must have the pioneer spirit, and the pioneer spirit is a mention to your country. How the people who were going toward the West had this pioneer spirit that the ability to help themselves in front of the threat. And this pioneer spirit must feed the innovation in the units, not waiting for the big equipment coming from the top. And this pioneer spirit goes with some kind of a special for spirit. It comes with this question of link with small industries, small companies, startups, and so on.
And the tool and the aim is the UAVs, the drones. The drones will be paramount in the future of the fight, but it is also a way, a tool in order to have innovation in all the units from the bottom. So a bottom-up action. And as times goes, I will stop there in order to say, “Okay, transformation of the army is paramount in order to be in a permanent transformation way.” So there is a question of fighting spirit as a base, the question of innovation coming on operate. And I really think that the question of the style of command, the way leaders will act is paramount. And so it is why I wrote another book. It is cheaper than the other one. In order to say, “Okay, the mission common style, but in the French perspective, is paramount in the daily life of my army, as it is paramount in the future of the fight.” And it is not because the new systems will be very, very efficient.
The C2 system of the new generation could give the illusion that at a time the chief will know everything and will be able to give orders to everybody in a very precise manner. Now, in the future of the fight, the power will be in the initiative and the ability to take the initiative in order to succeed on the mission, so this question of mission command for the future is paramount. So there is a moment for France, I know what is the idea for the French army. I know what is the idea. It is a question of transformation in order to be a Framework Nation capability in order to be able to be an actor in the future of my country, of my continent, and of our common islands. And so this is my too long initial words. Sorry.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
It wasn’t too long. That was wonderful. Thank you for being with us, General. My name is Rebecca Heinrichs. I’m a senior fellow here at Hudson Institute, so it’s my privilege to have a short conversation here with you, General, and then hopefully just spare a few minutes of time for those of you in the audience to have a couple of questions.
I’m intrigued by the theme of transformation. And I want to start with what’s driving that transformation. You laid out some of those things, but I want to begin with the threat, because to me, we can talk about how we need to transform, but really our adversaries are the ones from my perspective that are driving transformation. So can you talk to us about how you view the threat from Russia and then specifically in terms of its war of aggression against Ukraine, but how that affects NATO and Europe in general?
General Pierre Schill:
I think there is a two-level for the answer. The first one is the reality of the threat of Russia. I think that when there is a potentiality, at the end, there is an effect. In 2022, Europe and France, we are known to be unable to see that Russia will attack, but the potentiality of the attack was there. But we said, “No, he’s silly. He won’t win, so he will not.” But he had the potentiality to attack. So, Putin, he did. And I think that on the coming years, now the Russian army is stronger than it was in 2022. Now, the Russian army is growing, is improving its forces faster than it loses forces on the frontline in Ukraine.
So Russian army is a huge army in the border of NATO, and there is this imperialist idea, and there is this plan for 2030 Russian army. So for the next coming years, for the next coming decades, we will have a very strong, very powerful, very imperialist power on the East of Europe. And as we are allies, NATO, we say that an attack against one of them, one of us, will be an attack against all of us. So I’m really sure that there will be the potentiality of this threat will occur. So the question is how we prepare and for when. And so for when, if I listen to my Estonian colleague, he will say in six months. If I am listening to my German colleagues, he will say in two years. And if I’m listening to us, I don’t know, we say three, four, five years. Okay, let’s see. But it will happen. I don’t know if it will be a frontal attack or it will be some kind of hybrid, but it will happen. So this is the first point.
The second point is how do we defend against this? And it comes to the transformation. What do we learn in Ukraine? We learn first that the nation is defending the country. You know the famous word? The armies are leading the battles or are doing the battles, but the nation are winning the war. This means there is a question of how the people is taking the idea of the defense of the country. And this leads to the question of the amount of resources and so on that are given to the army. The second lessons is that the new domains, the new tools, the new tactics, the new equipments, are not replacing the former one, but it is an addition of the very old-fashioned capabilities and the trenches body-to-body fights, and at the same time, the LEO capabilities, digital capabilities, drones and so on.
And when it comes to a more technical question of what are the main elements needed for the future, the very first one is the C2. So I need to transform my army through the C2. And in the US army, it’s a question of new generation C2. It is a question of transparency of the battlefield. Your country is very far in this question of having the transparency, but we need to gain it through electronic warfare, through analysis of the images, and so on and so on. When you have the C2 and the transparency, you have to kill. So the question of lethality is paramount. When you have the three of them, the enemy has the same, so the question of protection against all the air threats is paramount. And as we are leading very big battles and in the future, the question of logistic is paramount.
So those are the lessons learned. And because of those lessons learned, I think, and I know that my army needs to transform against this specific threat, even if at the same time it is to be prepared for other, what we call 360 degrees involvement, because we are a country which is not only focused on this major threat in the Eastern part of Europe.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
And you bring up a really good point about how, and correct me if I’m restating what you said incorrectly, but that the Russian army has been able to generate forces and reconstitute some of their weapons capability at a faster rate than Ukraine has been able to defend itself and destroy the Russian army.
General Pierre Schill:
Yes.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
And so my question to you though is, isn’t it still possible though, feasible, militarily possible for NATO to be able to change that equation, to surge forces into Ukraine so that Ukraine can destroy the Russian army and their forces at a faster rate? Because I will often hear that that should be the goal if we wanted to change the battlefield reality.
General Pierre Schill:
There are two levels in your question and one of a level is very difficult to answer. The first level is, could we be able as European countries, NATO countries, to add on enough forces in Ukraine that Ukraine can win? This leads to the question, what is winning? Retaking the territory? I don’t know if I’m speaking officially or not, but this is a very difficult question. And I think this is a question that is discussed now between the States, the Russia, and Ukraine. So very difficult question to answer because one of the country is also a nuclear power. So how will they accept that there is some kind of a retake of the territory?
Another level of the answer is, okay, do we assess that there will be a settlement in one way or the other on the coming days? And this is something America is trying to enforce and to push at the moment. And so what is the need for the next fight? That means what do we need to improve the deterrence that if we come back to on the 21st of February 2022, President Putin says, “No, I don’t go.” So I think this is something we can work on, and we have to work on, how to be deterrent enough. And this is question of NATO and the DDA, deterrence and defense of the allies, but it is also a question of the increasing of the forces of all those European countries as part of NATO. And it is a question of determination.
How many soldiers are killed every day in Russia now? There are a lot of figures. Let’s say 1,500 are missing in action, killed, or wounded every day. How are we able to express our determination in front of a country, which has at this moment 1,500 soldiers out of work every day and not succeeding in gaining a lot of territory? So this is a very difficult question for countries such as Europeans want and the US, and perhaps it is a question to express a determination and to have the ability and the technology and the tactics in order to deter even if we have at the end, the nuclear deterrence, and France is a nuclear power and that could be a last-line defense, but it is a question of facing some smaller threats or hybrid actions coming from the Russian part.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
And what I meant, it’s a fine answer. My question though was just changing that dynamic so that Ukraine can destroy Russian forces faster they can generate. That to me is different than retaking territory. And it’s actually just a capacity question for Europeans, but for the United States as well, even if we’re not the ones directly providing weapons to Ukraine as a seller to our European allies.
My other question though is what else are we learning? What else is the French army learning from how Ukraine has been able to adapt and fight? Because it seems to me that one of the . . . able to adapt and fight because it seems to me that one of the lessons that has been underappreciated, at least in the American electorate, is that we are learning a lot as a Western alliance. Ukraine is doing the work, but we are benefiting a lot by learning about how modern warfare is fought against Russia. Can you give us some examples of some things, adaptability, technology, those sorts of things?
General Pierre Schill:
First, I will say that looking and taking lessons from what is happening in Ukraine is paramount, of course, because it is one of the modern fights we have under our eyes and it is very interesting and it is useful and we need to study it, but we need to also study what are the elements that are specific to this war and what are elements that are for the future of the war. And mainly when it comes to the question for the States or for France, we are countries that we want to be able to act defending Europe, but also facing some other threats. And that’s obvious for the States, but this is also the question for France.
So I mentioned the question of the national support. I mentioned the question of the extension of the complexity of the war because of the opening of new spaces and the mix of those spaces with the old tactics and the new ones. I explained that the question of C2, lethality, transparency, protection, and logistic. But I think a very important point you mentioned, it’s the ability to transform and to adapt. And this is the question of tactics and so this is the question of the leadership and it is a question of technology and the procurement in order to find the new technologies, but it may be also, and what we learn, it is also a mix or a link, a strong link, a shorter link between the industry and the army.
And the fact that at the end, the power for the future may be the ability to link and to adapt at a speed when you are able to be faster than the enemy in order to overtake it and at best to deter it by being obviously more agile. And so it’s why the link between the industry and the armies is so important. So it’s a question of amount of resources, but it is also a question of linking the engineers and the soldiers in order to make the evolution of the capacities and the capabilities and the tactics going faster. And this is what we learned from the Ukrainians. They have, all along those four years, they have adapted their tactics and found some new ways of using the technologies in order to go faster than the Russians that are learning from the Ukrainians.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
Great. Another one, NATO’s language on China has gotten tougher as an alliance. And I believe it was in 2024 that NATO had determined that China is a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine. And in your opening remarks, you talked about sort of an era of imperialism and you talked about China. And France has interests in the Pacific, it’s not just Europe, but an outward looking country that has key vital interests in the Pacific. So how are you thinking about the China threat or how do you characterize it? How’s the army preparing to—
General Pierre Schill:
I’m thinking that China is one billion and 500,000 or 300,000 strong people and they have some kind of a strong power. So strong power is weak in certain part, but in other parts have the ability to have some kind of a long-term commitment toward its aim. And so, China has some power as a power strategy, and this power strategy will at least . . . China will try to be a prominent power. So as a power, as powers, we have to face this question of the rising of this, China’s power.
Does it mean that there is no way, no issue either than fighting? I don’t think so. I think that we have the ability to limit the expression of such a power by defending some kind of international laws, such as freedom of movement in the spaces that are not under the state control and so on. And so this is very important that as allies, we are able to defend those positions in front of China. And of course, you mentioned that France is quite interested because China is a global power. So even in Europe, and you mentioned the support from China to Russia, but also we are a Pacific country, France. We have French Polynesia, we have New Caledonia, we are in the Indian Ocean with La Réunion, Mayotte and some other territories. So, this pushing of the Chinese power through the fisheries, through the commercial means, and through the military means, it’s very important to make an opposition toward this development by the islands with the other countries.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
So, it seems to me that France, it has shared adversaries as the United States. We talked about Russia, talked about the challenge of China. The Islamic radicalism remains a problem as well, North Korea, Iran, and part of the solution is closer collaboration with allies, whether it’s Pacific allies or allies in NATO, but we’re back on this theme of transformation. So the threats are getting more prominent, harder to deal with. Another transformation is technology, which we can talk about the adaptability on the battlefield. And the third one is the nature of alliances. And so, I would love to hear your views on the US, you don’t have to grade it, but respond to the American national defense strategy. And the United States still very committed to NATO. We’ve heard that over and over again today, even. Our ambassador made that very clear, but it seems to me that the complexity of the threat to all of us, even as we focus on sovereignty, and may have differences in some regards, that the alliances are critical.
General Pierre Schill:
I’ll begin by the end of your question; I really think that the alliances are critical for the future. And I mentioned that France had this permanent strategy for the last decade, the question of balance and leadership, that means the islands are an answer in front of the complexity of the world and the increasing of the alternative or contesting powers. And so, I’m really sure of this, but of course these alliances, this is not . . . I would say it is not because we are allied, that we are aligned, and there is a question of . . . Coming back to the question of strategy, I think that the United States at the moment, it’s very clear, they have a strong strategy and they defend their strategy, including the link between their military capabilities, diplomatic capabilities, cultural wants, and industrial wants.
And so having a strong ally in Europe, with the European countries, I think my assessment is paramount for the statement, it is to the state to answer, but the question is for Europe. Europe, we must have the ability to wait in our future and to be able to decide about our destiny. And that in front of such powers, such as you mentioned Russia, China, North Korea, and so on, this is a question of developing a strategy that will include the economic industrial one parts.
But when it comes to economy and industry as allies, we can become some kind of competitors. And so how do we cope those domains when we are aligned and we have the same aims at the upper level, how do we discuss and negotiate on the lower level questions in which perhaps we are not opposed, but we are in a competition. And I think this is because of the speed of the change of the world, the states, they are developing a domestic answer that is very strong, but the question is, how fast are we able to discuss or to cope with the questions of economy, industry, which are part of these big questions of the future.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
And in my last question, before we turn to questions from the audience, you wrote a book while serving as chief of the army, which I hear is very unusual. I don’t know, Americans write books all the time, I don’t know, whether they’re in office or not. Why did you think that this was on . . .leadership, you talk about leadership, transformation of the French army at this time. Tell us why you felt motivated to write this book.
General Pierre Schill:
First, I felt motivated to write something for the soldiers of the French army about the need to have this initiative and the ability to deconcentrate the power in order to be able to face the complexity of the new world in their daily life, but also in the fight.
And why was it important to write something for the soldiers? It is because a lot of things, but I will stress only on the new world and the world is giving the illusion that something that could be more concentrated, more centralized will be better than decentralization. It is also because it is mainly because of the question of C2. I mentioned that because of the power of the C2 systems, you can have the illusion that at a time the big chief will be able to see everything and to give orders very precise to all the soldiers, such as the Star Wars to say to the robots, “Go left, go right, kill, come back,” and so on. But it is an illusion, because of the complexity of the world, we need to have this ability to seize the initiative in order to adapt.
So this was my aim in order to tell this to the soldiers, but making this work in order to tell something to the soldiers, I met some people coming from the civilian, from companies, from sports, from everywhere and said, “But this is very interesting,” because this is a question that has some implication or some equivalent in other domains. So, let’s write a book rather than a booklet for the soldiers. So those are the reasons why I wrote something, even being in duty, because it is when I’m in duty that I can say something to the soldiers and they do what I say because when I’m retired, they will say, “Okay, that was a good book.”
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
So, you wrote a book to command them to read it, so they learn to think for themselves and take the initiative.
General Pierre Schill:
Yes.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
Yes. Okay. That’s wonderful. I actually, that is so fascinating to me because normally right now in an era where everybody’s talking about AI and delegating a lot of things that we do to AI, I’ve been worried that we are underappreciating the importance, I think, and our advantage in the West of having free thinkers who can take initiative and seize different moments and adapt even as we control these technologies. So just wonderfully insightful themes there and I look forward to reading it.
Okay. Let’s take some questions from the audience. If you could please just state your name and your affiliation before you ask a brief question for the general, that would be great. Just raise your hand. Right here.
Audience member Sam Skove:
Hey. Thank you. Sam Skove, Foreign Policy Magazine. So on the NATO theme, the US has signaled that it is at least reducing rotational forces in Europe. I think there’s a lot of anxiety that maybe there’ll be greater reductions. What does that mean for you in terms of the French army? There’s a lot of things that could be under that topic in terms of France sending rotational forces, greater burden on the French army. I was just wondering what your thoughts were. Thanks.
General Pierre Schill:
First, the . . . Sorry. Very often, this is a very important question for us in Europe, very often when there is such a question, part of the speakers will say, “Okay, America should not do this.” “Okay, no, I say America ...”
General Pierre Schill:
. . . Africa should not do this. Okay. No, I say America, they have their policy. America has its policy and in this policy there is an assessment of the threats and the needs to allocate the forces. And this is a purely sovereign decision. So I take further the question as for me, for me as a European, what do I need to do? And I mentioned that the French position and the position we are defending is that when it comes to defense of Europe and under the threat we have mentioned, there are two lines.
The first line is that we are with the States, within a very strong alliance, which is NATO. And the second line is that the Europeans are taking part into taking part of the burden. And so on the first line, we are not the one who decide in Europe. So, we can’t say, okay, we can’t say stay. They can say, okay, they have their own policy and they will do whatever they want. So as a military, let’s build a bridge or that make the links that allow us if they want to stay, to stay. And it will be better if they stay for the defense of Europe.
There are a lot of capabilities and huge capabilities that the US have, that the Europeans, they don’t have for the moment. So, let’s say, okay, you are able to do whatever you want. And I understand that you say, okay, I don’t want to die for you if you don’t pay or die for yourself, but let’s build the leagues. And this is what I’ve done today, going to the Pentagon to say to General George, “You do whatever you want.” But I’m very interested in that we are able to keep the links between our two armies because if our leaders, they say we fight together, we will be able to fight together.
And the other leg is the question of the ability and the power of European countries. And in this domain, we have the leverage, we have the means. So, let’s build something strong. And the French assessment is that the two are supporting one each other. That means it is not because we are building something strong in Europe that we push the US away. We even say that if we are strong, the US, we say, “Okay, let’s support them because they are helping themselves.” So, this is our basic assessment and I’m really defending this position.
But when it comes to industry, this can put some difficulty on this because when it comes to industry, perhaps some people in the States, we say, “Okay, let’s buy American.” And we say, we assess that having a strategy and being strong relies on the fact that we have a strong industry. And some other people even in Europe would say, “Okay, I agree.” But when? In six months, the Russians will attack me, so I need now the equipment. So no, I’m not sorry. I will buy American for the moment and so on.
So it’s very clear on the strategic domain, but once again, it is a question of industry now and I’m taking back or giving the words of my president. He said, “Okay, we need to have a strong industry in Europe in order to build some equipment and so on because perhaps at a time, the US will have to face another threat and they will need all their equipment and the power of the industry.” And so having some kind of an extra source of equipment could be also for them a good solution. And it is a question of having strong allies, is it better than having weak allies? Of course, I think this is the good way.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
And I’ll just say, I think there’s, you can check in on this, there’s 85,000 American troops in Europe right now, Congress included in the last bill that was passed that there couldn’t be withdrawals lower than 76,000. So, Congress I think also has a say and that’s the foreseeable future. And other than the rotational brigade in Romania, that’s all that is planned for now. Is there another question over here?
Audience Member Carly Welch:
Hi, there. Carly Welch from Breaking Defense. So you mentioned that the French Army is standing up future combat commands to kind of drive innovation. Can you expand on what those commands will do and how they’ll kind of push forward innovation in the French army? Thank you.
General Pierre Schill:
Four years ago, I came here in a visit in the States and I went in Austin, Texas in order to see an army future command. And I was very impressed by this idea, this intuition from the US Army to say, “Okay, let’s create something, a command that will lead the transformation and the innovation.” And so I went back to France and said, “Okay, the idea is good, but I will do another way because we are another army,” and created the future combat command that could be roughly halfway between army future command and T2COM.
I think I was a step forward and now I’m a step backward because of T2COM. The idea was, okay, how create a command that will not be the only innovation part responsible for the army, but we’ll be in charge of innovation for the coming two years or three years, and not only for a long term in order to say, “Okay, how this command is able to bring the abilities and the capabilities in the army in two years as a fighting units.” And that was the idea of this future combat command, including the procurement part of the army mixed with the lessons learned capability and so on.
But at the same time, I was convinced that the question, and I mentioned it, the innovation in all the units was paramount because of this need not to wait, not to be a buyer, not to wait for the equipment coming from the top, but to be in this, including this question of the leadership and how do I manage to take my responsibility with what I’m able to do and the draws are a very good tool in order to do this. And what we have created, and so this is very good, but this leads to some kind of a movement of innovation that is all over the army and difficult to make a coherent movement.
So what we have created this year is some kind of an intermediate command. It is exploratory polls in each brigade, brigade in French Army, the equivalent of division, no, not as a . . . But we have quite the same numbers of brigade, 25, as there are divisions in the US Army. So very often we focus on the brigade level. So each brigade will be in charge of transforming this innovation, pioneer spirit into some kind of real capability. And for example, we have created last year, three years ago, there was the innovation, one of my cavalry regimens said, “Okay, let’s have some kind of a drone squadron.”
I said, “Okay, let’s do it.” And at the beginning, we gave some money to each of the regimens in order to give them the ability to buy by themselves some kits and make this innovation. So three years ago, it was an idea. Two years ago, they created this squadron and they began to train it. Last year, I was convinced that it’s good. So we are now buying six of those drone squadrons in order to put them in our brigades and this became some kind of a fighting capability.
And so making this process being more easy, it is what we are doing by creating those quite of intermediate capability in order to link the innovation coming from the top, mainly with the big companies and this innovation coming from the bottom. And what I’ve seen this afternoon have been explained for the US Army, it’s transforming in contact and continuous transformation, there are really a lot of common elements on this need to transform the innovation in real capacity.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
We have time for a very quick one. Very quick one.
General Pierre Schill:
Very quick answer?
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
And a quick answer. You are the boss. You can make it as quick as you want, but we’ll turn it over here.
Audience member Christine Ramin:
Thanks. Christine Ramin, former Belgian military. You explained the role of France and Europe. When you speak to your counterparts in the UK or in Germany or other military powers in Europe, do you feel more like tension or do you have a shared vision?
General Pierre Schill:
Both. Okay. When I say, “Okay, guys, I’m the leader in Europe,” there is tension. When I say, “Okay, we need to do something,” they all say yes. The smaller country . . . They’re not small. Yes. Some of the countries, they tell me, “Let’s do something, France, with the other big countries in Europe. Because if you give an idea, if you begin a movement, we will support because you are known to have some kind of one of the three big armies, four big, six, seven, 10 big armies in Europe with Poland, Great Britain, Germany. And so, when you begin . . . and Italy—
[Audience member mentions Belgium]
General Pierre Schill:
And Belgium. “And as soon as you begin the move, we will follow,” and so on. And it is a question because we can say, “Okay, we were right. We have been right for the last years. So, the Europeans, you didn’t listen to us when we were talking about sovereignty. Now, see how we are right. So, say big France and bravo to France and follow . . . “ No, as soon, we must cooperate. And I think because of the threat, because of the emergency, because of the movements, there is a global comprehension that there is something to do.
But we are in a competition when it comes to industry with Germany for the moment, for example, with Great Britain. So the question that is the one with Europe and the States is the same in a smaller domain within Europe, even if there are some very good success. And this is one of it is with Belgium because we are developing the same equipment and we have an interoperability very, very strong.
And we see that this ability in the technical and tactical domains creates some opportunity in the strategical domain because when it comes to the coalition of the willing that could be guaranteed security for Ukraine, we know that perhaps the Belgium could send a battalion in one of the French brigade or a brigade in one of the French, in the French division. So this is a good example of a common project that is built now here.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs:
Well, we here at Hudson certainly have been very busy working on how to deter further conflict and war with this axis of authoritarian powers that we see as growing and becoming more acute. And we believe that our primary way of deterring war, and of compelling war to cease is through collaboration with strong like-minded allies.
France, of course, is top among them, one of the many on top for those other allies who are watching this. And then NATO is the most successful political military alliance, and so we must endeavor to adapt it and make it stronger to meet the moment. And so thank you for your leadership, sir. And please join me in thanking General Schill.
General Pierre Schill:
Thank you. Thank you.
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