Clingendael (Hollanda Uluslararası İlişkiler Enstitüsü) With Lebanese Hezbollah in tatters, Iran may dash for the bomb Articles 4 October 2024

 Clingendael (Hollanda Uluslararası İlişkiler Enstitüsü) 

With Lebanese Hezbollah in tatters, Iran may dash for the bomb

Articles

4 October 2024

With Lebanese Hezbollah in tatters, Iran may dash for the bomb

Rockets fired from Iran to Israel are seen over Jerusalem on October 01, 2024 ©Reuters

Israel seeks a full-scale regional war with Iran, leveraging the harsh blows it has dealt to Hezbollah.

Barring a US ground invasion, Iran will absorb the punishment Israel metes out, along with a potential protracted US bombing campaign, and develop nuclear weapons while repressing any domestic opposition.

The result will be a nuclear capable Iran that is more militarized, poorer, more paranoid and more fractured.

 

Editor’s introduction

In September 2022, the death of Mahsa Jina Amini marked a major turning point for Iran. The event sparked nationwide protests that rapidly evolved from calls to discard controversial hijab regulations to calls to overthrow the Islamic Republic. The Iranian government responded with repression, killing over 400 protesters in late 2022 and early 2023, according to human rights groups. 

The Clingendael blog series ‘Iran in transition‘ explores power dynamics in four critical dimensions that have shaped the country’s transformation since: state-society relations, intra-elite dynamics, the economy, and foreign relations. This blog post analyzes the relation between Iran’s Sunni Baluch and the state, focusing on its socio-political elements.

By Ali Alfoneh

Debacle in Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah, a pillar in Iran’s defense doctrine and the primary deterrent against Israel and, indirectly, the United States, is in tatters: Israel’s systematic bombing of the Lebanese militia’s positions since October 8, 2023, followed by a series of spectacular targeted attacks decapitating the military and political leadership of the organization, have severely degraded Hezbollah’s power. Unrestrained by the militarily and politically weakened Hezbollah, and largely capable of shielding itself against missiles launched from Iran, Israel may take advantage of the propitious circumstances of Iran’s October 1 retaliatory missile volley to target critical components of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, oil production facilities, ports or any other target. Israel’s decimation of Hezbollah and potential destruction of critical components of Iran’s nuclear or oil infrastructure, could cost Iran decades of nuclear and economic investment and even spark a new round of popular protests against the Islamic Republic.

As surrendering the nuclear program and relinquishing power to an undefined domestic opposition are out of the question, the regime may run the risk of developing nuclear weapons, emulate Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s survival strategy in the 1990’s by absorbing prolonged Israeli and possibly United States bombardments of Iran and severely suppressing domestic dissent, and have perhaps two nuclear bombs in hand by the end of 2025 despite inevitable damage to its nuclear infrastructure. Absent a United States ground invasion of Iran, the regime may achieve its objectives and survive.

This scenario was unthinkable just a year ago, when the Islamic Republic’s military doctrine appeared effective: Iran’s non-state allies and proxies kept adversaries in check, allowing Iran to further develop its nuclear program without risking direct attacks on its homeland and infrastructure.

Iran seemed to be on top

The October 7, 2023, Hamas incursion into Israel exemplified the efficacy of Iran’s approach. The Islamic Republic provided material support to Hamas, its adversary in the Syrian civil war but a tactical ally against Israel, enabling the organization to deliver the most significant blow to Israel since the October 1973 war. In one swift move, the Islamic Republic achieved several objectives: derailing diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, humiliating Israel’s military and security establishment, shattering the myth of Israeli invulnerability, and provoking civilian losses in Gaza that created public relations challenges for both Israel and the US. As a sign of the efficacy of the proxy war logic, neither Israeli nor U.S. leadership accused Iran of orchestrating the October 7 attack directly, despite Tehran having armed and advised Hamas and other factions for years, often through Hezbollah. This obviated the need for direct conflict with Iran. It seemed Iran's military doctrine was working.

But then it was not

However, Iran’s fortune was short-lived. Hezbollah’s shelling of northern Israel provided Israel with a strong incentive to target the organization’s positions in southern Lebanon. Still later, Israel shifted its focus to Lebanon as a whole, Iranian positions in Syria and operations within Iran. On April 1, Israel targeted the Iranian embassy complex in Damascus, Syria, killing eight Revolutionary Guard officers, including Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Zahedi, Quds Force chief in Lebanon, and Major General Mohammad-Hadi Haji Rahimi, senior adviser to the Quds Force chief commander. Although Israel did not claim responsibility for this attack, Tehran publicly vowed retaliation, launching drone, cruise, and ballistic missiles against Israel on April 13—a significant escalation that Tehran considered proportional to Israel's preceding targeted assassinations. While most of these projectiles were intercepted by Israeli and allied air defense systems, the action demonstrated Iran's resolve and capability to defend itself. Israel's limited response on April 19, which targeted an air defense facility in Isfahan, was interpreted by the Islamic Republic leadership as a sign of the efficacy of Iran's deterrence.

This turned out to be an incorrect assessment. Israel continued its attacks, including the July 31 assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, who was attending President Masoud Pezeshkian’s inauguration ceremony in Tehran, and a series of targeted strikes against Hezbollah, culminating in the September 27 assassination of Hezbollah General Secretary Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.

These targeted assassinations provoked a debate among the ruling elites of the Islamic Republic: President Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and senior adviser to the president Mohammad-Javad Zarif perceived Israel’s provocations as a trap to ensnare the regime in a devastating war against Israel, and potentially with the United States. They preferred to re-start negotiations with the United States, and offer to freeze Iran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions relief to improve Iran’s economy. The Revolutionary Guard, on the other hand, likely argued that Iran’s lack of response to the Haniyeh assassination in Tehran emboldened Israel to assassinate Nasrallah, and there will be no end to Israel’s provocations absent an effective deterrent. The Revolutionary Guard appears to have won the debate, as Iran on October 1 launched its second direct ballistic missile attack against Israel. Once again, Israeli and allied air defense systems managed to intercept most of the 200 ballistic missiles launched by Iran, but some appear to have reached their objective and generally performed better than the April 13 attack.

Rien ne va plus

At the time of writing this article, Israel contemplates how to strike Iran. Assured of American backing in protecting Israel against Iranian missiles, unrestrained by Hezbollah, and facing ineffective Iranian air defense systems, Israel can either opt for a limited punishment of Iran, or opt for an all-out war by obliterating critical components of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, oil production facilities, ports, or any other target, regardless of Washington’s advice and preferences with regards to the targets. Exacerbating the situation for the regime, a limited Israeli punishment of Iran, as well as an all-out war, may also embolden oppositional-minded Iranians, who perceive Israel, the enemy of their enemy, as a friend, to initiate a new wave of anti-regime protests.

Under present circumstances, neither surrender of the nuclear program to the United States, nor relinquishing power to an undefined domestic opposition are viable options: If the fate of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi serves as a warning, the Islamic Republic's surrender of its nuclear capabilities to the United States does not guarantee survival. Iran’s nuclear capitulation may be interpreted by the oppositional public as weakness of the regime and instead incite domestic rebellion. In Libya in 2011, the United States provided air support to the armed rebellion. This time around, Israel could provide a similar support to separatist movements aiming at partition of Iran.

It is therefore likely that the regime will develop nuclear weapons and simply suffers through prolonged Israeli and possibly United States bombardments. Facing domestic dissent, and possibly armed uprisings in the periphery regions sponsored by Israel, the regime will take a page out of Saddam Hussein’s survival manual in the 1990’s and engage in merciless suppression of internal dissent. Absent a United States ground invasion of Iran, the regime may build two nuclear bombs by the end of 2025, establish the balance of terror with Israel and the United States, and survive. In the meantime, these dynamics will deepen problems that already plague the Iranian regime and society: Militarization, impoverishment, paranoia and fracturing.