BROOKINGS BRİEF The death of Sinwar and the moment of opportunity - October 19, 2024

 BROOKINGS BRİEF

The death of Sinwar and the moment of opportunity

October 19, 2024 

War in Israel and Gaza

The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Rafah is potentially a watershed moment in the year-long and extremely bloody war he sparked on October 7, 2023. It is unlike the deaths of any other Hamas leader in the past year. While Ismail Haniyeh was the official political head of Hamas, living a lavish life in Doha, it was Sinwar who was in charge on the ground in the Gaza Strip, where the organization’s governing and military power was concentrated. It was Sinwar who decided to launch the war, only informing Haniyeh shortly before the attack. When Haniyeh negotiated over cease-fires, he would wait for a final word from Sinwar, in his shelters beneath the Gaza Strip. While Mohammed al Masri (“Deif”) and Marwan Issa were the commanders of Hamas’s military wing, they worked in close coordination with Sinwar.

Regionally, the death of Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, is far more consequential, but Sinwar’s death has the potential to change the course of the devastating war in Gaza. For Israelis, Sinwar’s death is a symbol of justice served to the arch-terrorist most responsible for the atrocities of October 7. It is an important psychological and political milestone for them, in order to turn the page on a horrific year since that day.

In policy terms, Sinwar’s death improves—somewhat—chances of a cease-fire deal in two important ways, even while complicating it in a third. Hopes for such a deal should be tempered. It remains a long shot, but any opening needs to be explored.

Sinwar himself is removed

First, most directly, Sinwar himself was a major obstacle to reaching a deal. He was the final arbiter of Hamas’s position and remained apparently uninterested in the horrific plight of those he governed. His reluctance for a permanent cease-fire was likely rooted in his strategic goal of a wide and long war surrounding Israel from multiple fronts. A cease-fire for him also risked a reckoning for the historic gamble he took, and a much weaker position in practical terms in Gaza than he had before he launched the war.

There is some chance that a change in Hamas leadership could open the door for others to lead a different path on negotiations. The remaining leaders abroad, for example, may be more open to pressure from Arab countries to accept a deal. There is no guarantee this would be the case, of course, but a moment of change can open policy options unavailable at other times.

Netanyahu’s calculations are changed

Second, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his coalition have been very difficult partners in the negotiations as well. Several ministers, including Netanyahu, prioritized defeating Hamas over the release of the Israeli hostages. Now, with the Israeli sense of justice served, this moment offers a glimmer of hope for reviving the cease-fire and hostage-release talks and ending the war in Gaza. The main Israeli maneuvering in the Gaza Strip ended months ago, even while Israeli operations and the abject misery of Gazans continue to this day. Yet even with Israel concluding its main military goals, the much-vaunted “day after” has not arrived, in part because Netanyahu has refused to plan for any alternative to Hamas. The remnants of the organization’s fighting force are still poised to continue a guerilla war indefinitely, and Israelis are intent to continue fighting any resurgence of Hamas in the coming years.

Shortly after October 7, 2023, as the scope of the horror of that day was coming to light, the emergency Israeli cabinet set two overriding goals for its military campaign in the Gaza Strip: Destroying Hamas’s capacity to govern Gaza or pose another military threat from it toward Israeli towns, and the return of Israel’s hostages from Hamas’s hands. These goals were in tension from the start. The hostages were the Hamas leadership’s main asset to securing their own survival and Hamas would not return the hostages home without assurances they could maintain their position of power. Freeing the hostages necessitated dealing with and compromising with the same Hamas Israel aimed to bring down. 

Now that Hamas, to its very top, has been severely damaged, there is more room, politically, for Netanyahu to compromise. He is still committed to his political survival and is politically constrained, though less than in the past, and major declarations on a diplomatic horizon with the Palestinians are not in the cards, but his ability to claim victory may make him somewhat more flexible on a cease-fire.

Netanyahu has already claimed that only his insistence on entering Rafah, despite severe pressure from the United States not to, allowed Israel to get to Sinwar’s whereabouts. Israel did not know where Sinwar was precisely, but Israelis believe that their continued pressure in the area where he was believed to be hiding allowed for his discovery during routine operations. Netanyahu can now argue that his insistence on continuing the war has led to a victory of sorts, easing the pressure from the right to continue the fight, and allowing him to turn more toward the Israeli center, which is very much in favor of a hostage deal.

In a broader sense, so long as Sinwar evaded capture, his supposed “resistance” remained a symbol in Israeli eyes of the trauma of October 7—its horrendous cost in lives, but also their astounding failure to defend themselves. Sinwar’s demise and the dramatic degrading of Hamas’s capacity are still insufficient for Israelis to turn the page—the unresolved fate of the hostages looms very large in Israeli minds—but they are major steps in that direction. His death is a tangible manifestation of the hits Hamas has suffered. A deal for a return of the hostages, both the bodies of those deceased and any living hostages, is now even more of a political imperative inside Israel and could ease the reluctance of Netanyahu and his coalition to conclude a deal.

While a cease-fire was a nonstarter for Netanyahu’s current coalition until now, and remains a difficult proposition, it may be more possible in the post-Sinwar world, where Israel can declare victory in Gaza, something it has been reluctant to do so far. Netanyahu is still politically risk-averse, and could easily squander the opportunity, but the chances have improved somewhat.

Hamas’s next leaders’ constraints

A third consideration is more complicated: Hamas will continue to exist as an organization, and new leadership will emerge. One candidate on the ground appears to be Sinwar’s younger brother, Mohammed Sinwar. Any successor might find it hard to compromise where the late leader stood firm and may seek to establish their leadership through fire and more “martyrdom” of ordinary Gazans. Like Hezbollah, whose leadership is in disarray after recent assassinations, Hamas will regroup to a degree. But such blows are not always easy to recover from, especially for a group under extreme military pressure like Hamas. And whereas Hezbollah has a state within which to operate freely, and with the backing of outside actors, Hamas is under extreme military pressure that will likely not subside. This could push it in either direction—toward a compromise, in order to save what it can of its structure, or toward a more hardline approach worthy of what it sees as its sacrifices to date. It will depend, in the end, on the internal dynamics within Hamas itself.

A formal cease-fire now would not end all fighting between Hamas and Israel in Gaza in the future. But it could allow for an alternative governing structure in Gaza to begin to take shape and for the huge task of Gaza relief and reconstruction to begin, allowing Gazans and Israelis to begin the long journey of a return to a normalcy of sorts.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, for example, is now discussing such a plan with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel. Such a deal would see a secular Palestinian leadership take a major role in Gaza, backed by funding and political cover from the Gulf. It would be, according to this outline, accepted or at least tolerated by the Palestinian Authority (PA), but not subservient to the PA’s current leadership, a point of insistence for both Israel and the UAE, for different reasons.

However, PA acquiescence would be key, and there is no guarantee its current leadership would budge and allow anyone else a role in Gaza, regardless of the dire need there for relief and reconstruction. And any such Gulf involvement would require at least some Israeli commitment to a return to a two-state policy, something this Israeli coalition would not do in its current form. It remains, in other words, a long shot, but one that is actively promoted by those closest to Netanyahu and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Sinwar’s death does not solve these issues, even if it makes the path slightly easier.

Sinwar’s death is not the end of the war, but it may be the beginning of the end, and a sign of the start of the long, difficult road out of the current morass.

Author

Natan Sachs

Director - Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy

@natansachs