NATO’s 75th Anniversary
July 3, 2024
As the NATO Heads of State meetings start in Washington next week, many will look at the past and evaluate the Alliance’s performance in the past 75 years. In my view, such an assessment must have two principal chapters: One on NATO’s performance in providing security for the territory of its members, and a second on the consequences of its members’ individual and collective actions, and their impact on the global perception of NATO and the West. In my view, the first is a success story, the second an entirely different one as I will elaborate at the end.
Since its signing on April 4, 1949, “Article 5” has remained the core of the North Atlantic Treaty. It says:
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”
Thus, Article 5 is the key to assessing NATO’s past 75 years. And since a Warsaw Pact attack on the US territory was hardly in the cards, such an assessment must focus essentially on European developments.
As World War II ended, it became clear that the Western Allies and the USSR would soon find themselves engaged in global competition, if not conflict.
Between November 1945 and December 1946, a number of the coalition governments established in the Eastern European countries occupied by Soviet troops during World War II were transformed into Communist “People’s Republics” with strong ties to the Soviet Union.
On February 22, 1946, George Kennan, the Chargé d’Affaires at the Moscow Embassy, sent a long telegram to the Department of State detailing his concerns about Soviet expansionism. Kennan argued that the United States would never be able to cooperate successfully with the Soviets because they saw the West as an enemy and would engage in a protracted battle to limit Western power and increase Soviet domination. Kennan argued that the United States should lead the West in “containing” the Soviets by exerting counterforce at various geographical and political points of conflict. Kennan published a public version of this argument in the July 1947 Foreign Affairs issue.[i] Kennan’s articulations of the policy of containment had a major influence on American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union.
During a speech at Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946, visiting Prime Minister Churchill proclaimed that Europe was divided by an “Iron Curtain” as the nations of Eastern Europe fell increasingly under Soviet control. Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia had all fallen under Communist control by early 1948.[ii]
On June 5, 1947, in a speech at Harvard University, Secretary of State George Marshall called for a comprehensive program to rebuild Europe. The “Marshall Plan” approved by the Congress in March 1948 generated a resurgence of European industrialization and brought extensive investment into the region.
On April 4, 1949, twelve nations, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington.
On May 6, 1955, West Germany joined NATO.
A week later, on May 14,1955, eight Soviet bloc states signed the Warsaw Treaty. The signatories—Albania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union—were joined by China, North Korea and North Vietnam as observers. The next day, the Soviet Union and the Western powers signed the Austrian State Treaty providing for Austrian neutrality.
For my young readers, below are some important developments in East-West/NATO-Warsaw Pact relations:
On February 25, 1956, at the CPSU’s 20th Congress, Khrushchev denounced Stalin and his crimes.
On November 4, 1956, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary to stop the revolution.
On March 25, 1957, the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community opening the path toward the European Union.
In 1958, Prime Minister Imre Nagy, the leader of the Hungarian uprising, was executed for treason.
On January 31, 1967, Romania established diplomatic relations with West Germany without consulting East Germany, thus marking the beginning of its more independent policy within the Eastern bloc.
On August 20, 1968, in response to anti-regime, pro-reform protests, Czechoslovakia was invaded by Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian armies.
On September 13, 1968, Albania formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Tirana’s new major partner was to become China.
On October 22, 1969, Willy Brandt became West Germany’s Chancellor.
On March 19, 1970, the first high-level meeting between West German and East German leaders, Chancellor Brandt and Premier Willi Stoph, took place in Erfurt, East Germany, where there was huge popular support for Ostpolitik.
After becoming Foreign Minister in a grand coalition of coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in 1966, Mr. Brandt had felt that he could reach out to the East without creating a backlash among West Germans. So, it would be small steps, not big leaps. But now, as Chancellor, it was time for him to move forward with his Ostpolitik defined as “change through rapprochement”. His policy envisaged building trust among governments in Eastern and Western Europe that could eventually lead to German unification, and the removal of Europe’s Cold War divides.[iii]
Mr. Brandt knew that the road to Berlin went through Moscow. On August 12, 1970, the Soviet–West German treaty and declaration of intentions, signed in Moscow, ruled out the use or threat of force and proclaimed the inviolability of existing borders while leaving open the possibility of their peaceful change. It also opened the way to agreements on the normalization of relations between West Germany and Poland as well as between the two German states. Despite expressions of doubt among some Warsaw Pact countries, General Secretary Brezhnev stood firmly behind the agreements.[iv]
Had it not been for the Nixon administration itself engaging in renewed efforts at détente with the Soviets, Brandt’s policy would have run into difficulties with its Western partners.
On February 21–27, 1972, President Nixon made a historic first visit to China.
After becoming the first US president to visit China since it came under communist rule, Nixon compelled the Soviet Union to be more open to political overtures from Washington. In May 1972, some three months after he visited China, he traveled to Moscow, where he met with Premier Kosygin and General Secretary Brezhnev. They discussed matters such as arms limitation, prevention of nuclear war, and increased trade between the United States and the Soviet Union. The most important immediate outcome of the summit meeting was the signing of SALT I. Thus, the word “détente” came to define the relaxation of East-West tensions.
On July 3, 1973, the CSCE opened in Helsinki to discuss aspects of security, human relations, and economic and scientific affairs. At the end of the month, at a Crimea meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders, Mr. Brezhnev gave an upbeat assessment of Soviet global ascendancy and a lasting, rather than temporary, American interest in détente. He sounded confident of the West’s acceptance of the CSCE on Soviet terms, and anticipated mutual force reductions, starting in Central Europe.
On August 1, 1975, the Final Act of the CSCE was signed in Helsinki by 35 countries. They pledged to resolve conflicts peacefully and agreed to respect human rights and basic freedoms.
On December 25, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and installed a new government.
In August 1980, workers’ strikes broke out at the Lenin Shipyards in Gdańsk, Poland, leading to the creation of the “Solidarity” trade union and a prolonged political crisis. On January 15, 1981, at a closed meeting of the Warsaw Pact Supreme Command, it was decided that the Polish crisis must be resolved by the Polish communists themselves.
On November 10, Mr. Brezhnev died and was replaced by Yuri Andropov. Looking at the past, one may say that Mr. Brezhnev, under understandable constraints, was a supporter of the détente policy. His mistake was to approve the invasion of Afghanistan.
In August 1983, President Reagan branded the Soviet Union an “evil empire”.
After Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party on March 11, 1985.
During President Reagan’s two terms as president, from January 20, 1981, to January 20, 1989, he and General Secretary Gorbachev met at five summit meetings. These years were a unique opportunity for the West to engage Russia, and help it democratize but, unfortunately, this did not happen.
On October 3, 1990, Germany was reunified after 45 years. East Germany left the Warsaw Pact and was incorporated into NATO. In 1991, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. The Cold War ended.
On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned as leader of the USSR. The Soviet Union ceased to exist on December 31.
On February 7,1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed, officially creating the European Union.
During the Yeltsin years (1991-1997) Russia implemented a radical privatization program encouraged by the West. The fall in oil prices added to Russia’s economic difficulties. GNP fell by 43%. Inflation reached record levels leading to social problems. In brief, Russia’s new leaders failed to ensure a smooth transition from a troubled past to a promising future. And the West failed to put the Cold War mentality behind and engage Russia. This paved the way for President Putin to emerge as Russia’s new leader.
In 2008, in Bucharest, NATO countries welcomed Ukraine and Georgia’s aspirations to join the alliance, angering Russia.
In December 2021, two months before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia demanded that NATO members not deploy forces in the territories of NATO members who joined post-1997 and that NATO refrain from further enlargement. NATO countries rejected Moscow’s proposals.
On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Thus, two decades after the end of the Cold War, Europe is now engaged in a hot war.
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed between 12 nations. By 1999, 4 other nations, namely Greece, Türkiye, West Germany, and Spain had joined the Alliance. From 1999 to the present, the number of NATO members has gone up from 16 to 32, reminding me of my days at the NATO Headquarters, first as a member of the international staff and later of the Turkish delegation during the Cold War days, of the title of a bi-monthly NATO publication titled, “NATO’s Sixteen Nations”. I also remember that, at the time, the discussions in the Defense Planning Committee were about meeting the target of not 2%, but 3% of the GDP defense spending. Since then, NATO has expanded, and the Warsaw Pact has become history.
The Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community (EEC) was signed between 6 nations: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Today, the EU has 27 members.
After years of Soviet domination, East European countries’ desire to solidify their independence through NATO membership was perfectly understandable. Nonetheless, one may ask, at least, if the history of Ukraine could have been written differently. On June 27, 2024, the European Council reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to providing continued political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military, and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes and as intensely as needed.[v] Yet we do not know about the conversations behind the scenes in European capitals, in Brussels, and for how long European peoples are prepared to continue with this policy.
To sum up, NATO has been a success story under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. For 75 years allied territories were not attacked, Germany was reunified, and member states, with their numbers doubling after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, enjoyed unprecedented levels of economic prosperity. But today, NATO and Russia are at war in Ukraine, after seven decades of peace, despite occasional flare-ups of tensions.
However, if one were to take a broad look at world developments since the end of World War II, beyond NATO territories, it is a different story characterized by Europe’s initial resistance to recognizing the independence of its colonies, the West’s regime change projects, and military interventions.
The ouster of the “democratically elected Iranian government” headed by Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953, in a coup d’état orchestrated by the US and the UK; the French-British-Israeli intervention in Egypt in July 1956, against the wishes of the US, causing a rift in NATO; the murder of Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on January 17, 1961; the fall of South Vietnamese capital of Saigon to the North Vietnamese Army, on April 30, 1975, effectively ending the Vietnam War; the September 11 attacks, commonly known as 9/11; the invasion of and the withdrawal from Afghanistan; the invasion of Iraq; failed Arap Spring interventions in Libya and Syria are a few examples from a long list of failures across the world. And NATO’s involvement in bringing “peace and stability” to conflict areas beyond NATO territories has not been a success story.
In brief, NATO has proved a success story in providing for its members’ security until the war in Ukraine. However, its member states’ individual or collective policies and actions have not always served the interests of the Alliance as a whole. Moreover, these have undermined the West’s public discourse on democracy and the so-called “rules-based international order” leading to the emergence of the increasingly neutral, more often than not critical, Global South.
In a recent NATO Review article, Congressman Michael Turner, the head of the US Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly said, “ The next front for NATO evolution will be in the battle between democracy and authoritarianism.”[vi] For NATO to win this battle, Alliance members must review the past and refrain from repeating the same mistakes because promoting democracy goes far beyond a public discourse, no matter how appealing it may be. And, Washington would have to put its democracy back on track. A Biden-Trump rematch inspires neither the Americans nor the people aspiring for democracy, it only disappoints them. When elected leaders in quasi-democracies, even in democracies, go for perpetuating their power matter what, democracy suffers. A statement on his withdrawal from the presidential race, at the end of the NATO summit, could be President Biden’s last opportunity for a graceful exit.
As for Türkiye, Ankara remained a steadfast member of the Alliance throughout the Cold War. NATO became the cornerstone of Türkiye’s relationship with the West. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, Ankara’s relations with Russia which had started to improve in the days of détente continued to expand. The end of Ankara’s EU accession process and relations with Washington taking “a less than an alliedly path” put a growing distance between Türkiye and the West. Some in the West started reminding Ankara of the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty which says, “They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”. Others started questioning Türkiye’s place in NATO.
What has recently come up on Ankara’s agenda is Türkiye’s membership in BRICS, which now brings together not only the five founding members of the group, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, but also Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, and the UAE. In the past, such a possibility could worry the West as a development creating a gap between Ankara and its NATO allies. Today, if not all, at least a good number of the European members of the Alliance would only be thrilled if Ankara were to turn its back on Brussels.
[i] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/george-kennan-sources-soviet-conduct
[ii] https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85895.htm#eastern_european_people
[iii] Odd Arne Westad, “The cold War, A World History”, (Penguin Books, 2017), 385.
[iv] Ibid. 386
[v] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf
[vi] https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2024/06/26/nato-in-the-democratic-arena/index.html?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NATO%20Review%20NATO%20in%20the%20democratic%20arena&utm_content=NATO%20
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