LSE Brexit
LSE Comment
Buğra Süsler
May 29th, 2024
Interview with Buğra Süsler – “Turkey’s contestation of the West does not mean a lack of cooperation with the West”
On 12 June, LSE will be hosting an event on global middle powers and the changing world order. In an interview with EUROPP’s editor, Stuart Brown, Buğra Süsler discusses whether Turkey fits the description of a global middle power and assesses the impact of the 2024 Turkish local elections on the country’s politics.
LSE Festival banner
Buğra Süsler will be speaking at an LSE event on 12 June on Global middle powers and the changing world order as part of the LSE Festival 2024.
The event you’re speaking at on 12 June is about the role global middle powers play in a changing world order. The key idea is that the western-led global order is now facing increasingly robust challenges from middle powers that assert their influence within their respective regions and on the global stage. To what extent do you think Turkey fits this description?
The decline of the US-led liberal hegemonic order raises important questions about the future and the nature of power transition in the international system. There is now a lively debate taking place about the changing world order and what a post-western world order will look like.
There are different terms used to capture this transition, including the idea of a “multiplex world” where you don’t have a single hegemon and there is a proliferation of influential actors in world politics. An important part of this debate is the rise of emerging powers on the global scene.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine showed the return to prominence of great power politics with increasing contestation between a US-led western alliance and a Russia-China axis. There was a sense of unity among western democracies after the invasion, but their expectations of a global, unified condemnation of Russia were unmet.
Many states in the Global South did not endorse the western position and abstained or voted against resolutions that sought to condemn Russia. At the same time, we have seen a group of middle powers such as Turkey, Indonesia and South Africa respond in a similar manner. They have adopted what they term “balancing” or “bridging” policies between the West and Russia. They have also sought to take on mediatory roles, which has occasionally led to them being framed as “fence sitters” or “swing states”.
So what the war in Ukraine has shown is that while major powers seek to shape the structural context, they increasingly have to pay more attention to the policies and interests of those middle powers that lie in between. And I would argue that Turkey fits into that description of an emerging middle power.
What makes Turkey an “emerging” middle power?
Scholars writing about middle power theory often make a distinction between traditional and emerging middle powers. Traditional middle powers are described as wealthy, stable, egalitarian social democracies that promote the liberal international order. Classic examples are Canada and Australia.
In contrast, emerging middle powers are often understood to be states that have assumed internationalist postures in the post-Cold War era. They may face domestic problems to do with development or democratisation. They may hesitate to promote liberal internationalism. Emerging middle powers often exhibit policy behaviour that is based on systemic contestation. This arises from the pursuit of higher status in the international system.
Turkey is a middle power in the sense that it’s not a great power, nor a small power. It’s an important actor, especially in regional politics. It has global ambitions. Turkish policymakers have often emphasised that Turkey should emerge as a regional leader and then a global actor in the post-Cold War era.
It’s an emerging middle power most notably because it contests the power hierarchies of the western-led liberal international order, and it pursues status to increase its standing in the international system. Turkey’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows how it can diverge from western positions. But at the same time, it also shows how Turkey can pursue policies to increase its influence by, for example, seeking to play the mediator role in the conflict.
In your book, Turkey, the EU, and the Middle East: Foreign Policy Cooperation and the Arab Uprisings, you write that Turkey has often aligned itself with western actors throughout history while at the same time carrying a certain mistrust towards the West. Does this perspective still frame Turkish foreign policy today?
Turkish policymakers have often used historical references in their public discourses to highlight mistrust toward the West. In the context of Turkey’s relations with the European Union, the rhetoric of double standards has frequently been used by Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This is used to criticise how the EU has engaged with Turkey and the lack of consistent commitment to Turkey’s EU membership process, as well as the idea that the EU does not keep its promises.
This rhetoric of mistrust toward the West can be used instrumentally by policymakers to influence domestic audiences. The argument that foreign powers are trying to weaken Turkey is often used in the domestic arena. But it can also be directed at a foreign audience. Turkey has been an increasingly prominent actor in sub-Saharan Africa and when Turkish policymakers visit African states, they often use anti-colonial rhetoric to appeal to African populations while criticising Europe’s historical engagement with Africa.
At the same time, Turkey’s contestation of the West does not mean a lack of cooperation with the West. The 2016 migration deal with the EU is a clear example of this. In recent years, the idea of strategic autonomy has become a popular way to describe the pursuit of more influence in international and regional affairs and that applies to the case of Turkey as well. It does not necessarily mean Turkey is moving away from its western allies, but it means that Turkish foreign policy is formulated with a greater emphasis on pursuing a more autonomous, Turkey-centric approach.
We’ve mentioned that Turkey has a complex relationship with the EU, but it’s also a relationship that has changed significantly over time. How has the balance of power in EU-Turkey relations shifted over recent decades?
In the early years of Turkey’s EU candidacy, many scholars described the relationship as one of asymmetrical interdependence in favour of the EU. The EU was able to exercise political leverage through membership conditionality and the promise of membership provided accession countries such as Turkey with an incentive to cooperate with the EU.
Today, the relationship looks very different. Asymmetrical interdependence has shifted. Since Turkey is less keen on membership, while the EU is more reliant on Turkey regarding migration, conditionality is not as effective as before. I would argue that Turkey-EU relations in recent years have become largely transactional and I don’t think there is any genuine interest on either side to keep the kind of normative, ideational aspect of the accession process alive.
It is likely that we will continue to see a transactional working partnership. There is a degree of “conflictual cooperation”, which occurs when you may have tensions at the leadership level but there remains functional cooperation in areas of mutual concern. The migration deal is again a good example of how both contestation and cooperation can happen. Securing Turkey’s cooperation was politically crucial for the EU, even if it came at the expense of the EU’s retreat from membership conditionality.
Turkey’s local elections in March saw the main opposition party claim several important victories. What impact have the elections had on President Erdoğan’s hold on power?
The results were a major blow for Erdoğan. They marked the first time in two decades that his party had been defeated at the ballot box. The Mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, and the Mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavaş, are both important figures in the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party.
One major factor behind the result was the economic crisis in Turkey. Many voters who voted for the opposition had previously voted for Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party and wanted to signal their dissatisfaction with the government’s economic policies. Even though the government has taken some measures to keep inflation under control, such as formulating a public savings policy, they have not been successful so far.
At the same time, the Republican People’s Party has been trying to prove that it can lessen the economic burden on citizens through municipal initiatives, such as opening municipal restaurants that serve meals at a low price. The Republican People’s Party now seems to be stronger than ever in terms of electoral success. If they manage the municipalities they now control effectively and if they can raise their popularity, they will have a better chance of being successful in the next general election.
Global middle powers and the changing world order will take place on 12 June from 6.30pm – 7.30pm as part of the LSE Festival
Note: This article gives the views of the interviewee, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: idiltoffolo / Shutterstock.com
About the author
Buğra Süsler
Buğra Süsler is a Lecturer in the UCL Department of Political Science and the Head of the Turkey and the World Programme at LSE IDEAS. He is the author of Turkey, the EU, and the Middle East: Foreign Policy Cooperation and the Arab Uprisings (Routledge, 2020).
No comments:
Post a Comment