Facing Off—China and Taiwan in the Contexts of the Swords of Iron War
Assaf Orion, Roy Ben Tzur, Ofir Dayan | June 16, 2024
The conduct of China and Taiwan since the October 7 massacre in the contextof the Swords of Iron war reflects differences in their interests, objectives, and strategic positions with respect to Israel, the Middle East, and the international arena. While China is opposed to Israel and sympathetic to Hamas, Taiwan shows sympathy and support for Israel. In spite of the emerging clarity, Israel should not at this stage change its fundamental policy on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
—Background China and the Palestinians
China has traditionally expressed political support for the Palestinians, promoted the two-states solution, recognized the Palestinian state, and consistently criticized Israeli actions that it has described as provocative. The source of China’s ongoing support for the Palestinians lies in its historical perception of itself as the leader of the developing world and a supporter of national liberation movements against what it describes as Western imperialism. China’s support is largely expressed rhetorically with statements backing Palestinian rights, including self determination, while China’s
economic aid to the Palestinians remains limited. In the ranking of UNRWA donors by donation size, over the past decade China has never been ranked above 30th place,with donations ranging from $200,000 to three million dollars. In 2023 China was in 41st place with a donation of only two million dollars, while countries such as Indonesia, India, and Japan donated higher sums ($2.6 million, $5 million, and $48.5million respectively). For comparison purposes, the United States is ranked as the largest donor with about $422 million. At the same time, China’s relations with Israel have developed into a “comprehensive partnership in innovation,” including considerable activity in the fields of economy, trade, infrastructure, and more. In recent years, China’s position on the Palestinian issue has become more prominent and vociferous, made clear by its contributions to discussions in the UN Security Council,
the UN Human Rights Council, and its public statements on the issue. During the
of Iron war, China’s conduct has become more hostile toward Israel.
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What Has China Done Since October 7?
China’s immediate response to the October 7 massacre was weak, calling on both
sides to remain “calm” and resolve the dispute through “implementing a two-state
solution and establishing an independent Palestinian state”—without mentioning the
hostages held by Hamas or condemning its barbaric crimes. Since then, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry has expressed growing support for the Palestinians, along with
condemning Israel, calling to investigate Israel’s “crimes,” supporting ceasefire
proposals with unfavorable terms for Israel, and using its veto power against American
proposals for a ceasefire—all this in debates in the UN Security Council. Chinese
rhetoric has become harsher as the war continues. In October, the Chinese
ambassador to the UN claimed that Israel was occupying Palestine, whereas in the
past its references to “occupation” focused mainly on the building of settlements. In
February, the legal counsel of the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared in the
International Court of Justice in The Hague that the Palestinians had the “right” to
armed struggle against Israel, as part of their right to self-determination. Since the
outbreak of the war, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and President Xi Jinping have
frequently mentioned the “right of return” as one of the basic rights of the Palestinians.
Not only have President Xi and other official spokespersons defined Israeli policy as
“collective punishment,” but China has not even officially condemned the murder and
wounding of Chinese citizens by Hamas terrorists. Instead, China maintains direct
contacts with Hamas, which it does not see as a terrorist organization. In March the
head of the Hamas political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, and Chinese envoy Wang Kejian
met in Qatar, and before that, Ismail Haniyeh met the Chinese Ambassador in Doha.
According to a Hamas announcement after the meeting, Wang said that unlike
Western countries, China recognizes Hamas as part of the Palestinian national fabric.
In a vote at the UN Security Council, China expressed full support for granting the
Palestinian state membership in the UN. China continued to issue harsh statements
regarding the direct escalation between Israel and Iran and condemned the Israeli
attack on senior Al Quds personnel in Damascus and the damage caused to the
sovereignty of Syria and Iran. However, China did not condemn Iran’s launch of over
300 rockets and drones against Israel, and the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi,
even told his Iranian counterpart that “the action taken was limited and was an act of
self-defense,” without reference to Iran’s infringement on the sovereignty of Iraq,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia whose airspace was violated by Iranian weaponry, let alone
a reference to Israel’s sovereignty. The strong rhetoric against Israel did not end with
official announcements from the government, as a wave of antisemitism swept over its
social media, which is, of course, subject to strict government censorship that could
have prevented this if it desired.
At the end of October, Israel’s then foreign minister Eli Cohen spoke with his Chinese
counterpart, Wang Yi, expressing his concerns about the spread of antisemitism on
Chinese social media and asking him to raise the demand for the return of the hostages
in international forums. Israel also lodged an official protest with China for not clearly
condemning the massacre, and there was even a discussion between the Deputy
Director General for Asia and the Pacific in the Foreign Ministry and the Chinese
Middle Eastern envoy in which the former “expressed Israel’s deep disappointment
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with Chinese announcements and statements about the recent events in the south,
where there was no clear and unequivocal condemnation of the terrible massacre
committed by the terrorist organization Hamas against innocent civilians and the
abduction of dozens of them to Gaza.”
But since October 7, China’s embassy in Israel has been silent. The Chinese
ambassador, Cai Run, only spoke for the first time in February, in an article in Israel
Today marking the Chinese Year of the Dragon, with no mention of the massacre and
the war. The article focused on China’s prosperity and contribution to strengthening
the global economy and innovation and ended by describing the relations between
Israel and China as important and fruitful. At the same time, the ambassador did not
ignore matters affecting China and Taiwan, and after the swearing-in of the Taiwanese
president on May 20, the Chinese ambassador to Israel held talks with Israelis “from
all walks of life” in which he stressed the importance of the “One China” principle.
Against the backdrop of Beijing’s statements against Israel, its support for Hamas and
Iran, and the silence of the embassy in Tel Aviv, the Chinese government has refused
to send additional workers from China to Israel. However, Chinese workers who are
already in Israel continue to work on building the light railway system in Tel Aviv and
other construction sites. Chinese companies operating in Israel also continue, and
some have even initiated activities in support of soldiers, the Gaza border
communities, and the hostages. For example, the Haifa Bay Port, which is operated
by SIPG Israel and owned by a company from Shanghai, temporarily hosted a Home
Front Command company, purchased agricultural produce from farms along the Gaza
border, and even donated protective containers to the IDF.
China’s foreign policy, as expressed in a joint statement by the presidents of China
and France on May 7, referring to the dispute between Israel and Hamas, reflects
China’s diplomatic maneuvers. In the declaration, President Xi condemned Israel,
expressed opposition to the operation in Rafah, and avoided mentioning Hamas or
Iranian involvement. However, the statement also demonstrated a more balanced and
comprehensive approach to the dispute. For the first time, President Xi called the
events of October 7 an “attack,” criticized “violent terror,” and called for the immediate
release of the hostages—using the term “hostages” instead of “detained civilians,” as
Chinese officials had previously referred to them, echoing Hamas rhetoric. It is possible
that this more balanced approach to Israel was influenced by France’s diplomatic
efforts and by China’s desire to lead a broad international consensus and be perceived
as moderate by its Western partners.
On May 16–18, President Xi hosted Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and at their
meeting, they discussed the situation in the Middle East. Contrary to the public
messages heard in Paris, the only information published was that the leaders had
agreed that UN decisions must be complied with and that the Palestinian issue must
be resolved through the two-state solution.
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Meanwhile, in Taiwan
In contrast to China’s blatant avoidance of addressing Hamas’s terrorist atrocities and
its victims in Israel, Taiwan has clearly and openly supported Israel since the start of
the war, by expressing solidarity and by offering concrete assistance. Even on the day
of the massacre, the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry was among the first in the world to
condemn Hamas. The support continued with symbolic gestures, including illuminating
the Taipei 101 Tower—the highest in Taiwan—with the colors of the Israeli flag, days
after the slaughter, and holding a concert organized by the Taiwan-Israel Friends
Alliance in mid-May, more than seven months after the war started. A survey held in
Taiwan just a few days after October 7 showed that the Taiwanese public identified
more with Israel (35%) than with the Palestinians (15%)—similar to the public in most
Western countries at that time. However, there have also been limited demonstrations
on the island in support of the Palestinians.
Unlike China, Taiwan condemned the Iranian attack on Israel, and the Taiwanese
Foreign Minister Joseph Wu said that the island joins “other democratic countries in
condemning Iran’s attack on Israel,” and illustrated the link that Taipei sees between
identifying with and supporting Israel and its association with the global west. In
response, Knesset Member Boaz Toporovsky and chairperson of the Israel–Taiwan
Friendship Group, who at the time of the Iranian attack was leading a delegation of
four Knesset members to Taiwan, thanked the outgoing president and the foreign
minister for their support of Israel. He also linked the attack to Israel’s association with
the west, said that it was “an attack against the democratic world” and compared
Taiwan to Israel by saying that both were small democracies situated in a difficult
environment. During the meeting with the outgoing president, Tsai Ing-Wen,
Toporovsky called Taiwan “a true friend” and said that Israel “noted and would always
remember Taiwan’s support for Israel after the October 7 attack.”
Taiwan’s representative office in Israel, headed by Ya-Ping (Abby) Lee, has been very
active since the tragedy. Its employees visited Gaza border communities and medical
facilities, volunteered in agricultural businesses in the south, and organized events and
activities for evacuated families. The mission worked hard to provide donations and
aid to evacuated Israelis and the Israeli hinterland. It “adopted” Kibbutz Kfar Aza and
promised to help with its rehabilitation by constructing a resilience center and
temporary housing for its residents. It donated $70,000 to the Pitchon Lev Association
for families from the Gaza border communities and wounded Israeli soldiers and about
half a million dollars to the Federation of Local Authorities to set up a satellite
communication system for security and protection needs in local authorities. These
activities, which were mostly publicized in the media and on social media, are intended
to express Taiwan’s commitment and solidarity with Israel and its citizens, its
unambiguous stance against terror, and, of course, to improve Taiwan’s public image
in Israel. As part of the Israeli Knesset delegation’s visit to Taiwan, its members heard
from their Taiwanese colleagues that they were happy about the aid they had granted
Israel, but they had also been subjected to domestic criticism as a result and were
forced to clarify that the donations were granted to civilian rather than military
organizations. It should be noted that at the beginning of May, Taiwan donated half a
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million dollars for humanitarian aid in Gaza through the Mercy Corps organization to
provide food, water, clothing, and tents.
Taiwan’s involvement in unofficial civilian social initiatives in Israel has occasionally
led to criticism and anger from the Chinese Embassy in Israel. Last year, the Yad Ezer
leChaver Association signed a memorandum of understanding for humanitarian
cooperation with the Taiwanese mission in Israel. The mission donated to the
association’s motorcycle unit and also provided assistance during the Swords of Iron
war. Representatives of the Chinese Embassy were invited to the association’s
Holocaust Day Ceremony in Haifa, but when they understood that Taiwan’s envoy
Abby Lee had also been invited and was planning to speak at the event, they told the
chairperson of the association that “there is no such country as Taiwan” and asked
that “she should go.” When the chairperson said that he “did not want to engage in
politics” and did not ask the envoy to leave, the Chinese representatives left the event
in protest and envoy Lee addressed the audience as planned.
China and Taiwan in the Middle East
Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East focuses on economic and diplomatic activity,
as well as symbolic military presence. In economic terms, China sees the Middle East
as an important source of energy, capital, and a significant market for its goods,
infrastructure, and investments. China claims that it maintains a principle of nonintervention, by avoiding direct involvement in the region’s conflicts and presenting
itself as a neutral broker. For example, China hosted symbolic meetings between
Palestinians and Israelis, and last year, it hosted the signing of the treaty between Iran
and Saudi Arabia, positioning itself as the source of regional reconciliation and calm.
Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, China’s diplomatic activity has included
conferences of international organizations at the UN; visits to the region by senior
officials, Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Special Envoy Zhai Jun, to key countries in the
Middle East, including a visit to the Gaza Strip by China’s Ambassador to the UN
Zhang Jun. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has held numerous telephone discussions with
his Middle Eastern counterparts, including Minister Eli Cohen in October. China has
also published joint statements, such as the one made by China and the Arab League
on the future of the Israeli–Palestinian dispute. At the end of April, China hosted
“reconciliation” meetings between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas—as part of its
perception that Palestinian unity is a condition for stability—and called for a “united
Palestinian front” and invited them to another reconciliation meeting in June.
The United States has called on China to use its influence to prevent escalation by
Iran and Yemen, but it is hard to determine whether China has taken action on this
matter. However, in terms of results, the aggression from Tehran and Sana’a continues
to escalate. Beijing’s inability to restrain the axis of resistance, which threatens the
interests of China and its regional partners, particularly in regards to freedom of
shipping, energy security, activity in the Suez Canal, as well as the attacks on Gulf
States and Israel, underlines the limits of its influence and also perhaps its
unwillingness to become involved by exerting actual influence on security matters in
the region.
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Like Israel, all countries in the Middle East recognize the “One China” policy, and
Taiwan operates in those countries through Economic and Cultural Offices, below the
threshold of official diplomatic relations. Taiwan’s policy in the region is characterized
by non-involvement in political matters, with the focus on economic collaborations,
particularly in the energy sector, with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Oman, which
supply over half of Taiwan’s oil imports. Although Taiwan imported oil from Iran (about
4% of its imports) until 2021, Taiwan rejected Tehran’s proposal to establish a
commercial office in Taiwan due to extensive pressure, including from Israel, and it
severed economic relations with Iran following American pressure. Taiwan’s focus on
economic cooperation with “moderate” countries in the Gulf and on civil initiatives in
other countries of the region enables it to deal with any potential tensions with Arab
countries that could arise from its broad collaboration with Israel, since these countries
are themselves cooperating with Israel.
China Versus Taiwan: Why the Differences in Approach?
The difference between China’s and Taiwan’s approaches to the war in Gaza stems
from a broader context that goes beyond the war itself or the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict. China’s opposition to Israel and support for Iran, the Palestinians, and even
Hamas expresses a strategic choice that reflects its view of the current war as another
episode in the ongoing struggle between the powers, regionally and globally, in which
China sees another opportunity to position itself against the United States and the
West. In the UN Security Council, for example, China uses its veto, together with
Russia, to block US resolutions favorable to Israel; it demonstrates commitment to the
Palestinian issue and presents itself as the leader of the global south, thus challenging
the American influence. Beijing also presents an alternative vision for resolving
conflicts, signaling its ambitions to reshape the geopolitical order. In the Middle East,
China’s position toward Israel echoes reservations that are common among large
swathes of the public in the region and the declared positions of their regimes, thus
“going with the (popular) flow.” China’s policy aims to continue maneuvering through
the Middle Eastern maze while preserving its many interests in the region—trade and
collaboration with Arab countries, significant trade with Israel, in addition to
strengthening its image as the leader of the developing world, while undermining the
status of the United States both regionally and globally.
However, China’s position since the outbreak of the war, a position that purports to be
neutral but in fact stands alongside Iran and Hamas, is not without cost. While the
United States has concretely illustrated its commitment to the defense of its ally, Israel,
and demonstrated operational, technological, and strategic capabilities to recruit
Western and Arab partners—a message that resounds throughout the Middle East,
Europe, and Asia—China has been revealed as an irrelevant power for the security
needs of countries in the region, and even put itself alongside those that are most
threatening to them, Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, as for the Houthi
attacks on shipping and communication cables in the Red Sea, whose security is also
an obvious interest for China, it is hard to distinguish a relevant response from Beijing,
whose ships in the area even ignored distress calls from civilian vessels. This is in
spite of the damage caused by the Houthis to China’s strategic partners such as Egypt
and the cost to Chinese trade, as Chinese shipping companies have also diverted their
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shipping to the longer route round Africa. In its statements, China has frequently called
on “relevant countries” to use their influence to calm the situation, but this choice of
words actually reveals its own lack of relevance.
Meanwhile here in Israel, trade relations continue, although at a considerably slower
pace—trade between Israel and China fell by 16% in 2023, and the number of Chinese
citizens entering Israel has been continuously low since the COVID-19 pandemic.
Moreover, according to a survey conducted by the Data Analytics Desk at INSS (see
Figure 1), China’s image in Israel continues to decline, at least among the Jewish
population: 35% of those surveyed said their attitude toward China had changed for
the worse since the outbreak of the war, approximately 42% see it as a country that is
unfriendly to Israel, and 15% see it as a hostile country. It is hard to imagine that these
sentiments will not be reflected in the willingness to establish partnerships with China
or relations with it at various levels—from people-to-people connections to
relationships between towns and academic institutions, and even to decisions on
matters of regulation, projects, infrastructure, and technology.
Figure 1. How would you describe Israel’s relationship with China?
Source: Roy Ben Tzur, “What Does the Israeli Public Think about Israel–China
Relations?” (May 2024), https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-china-relationspublic/
In contrast to China, which in effect has stood alongside Iran, Taiwan identifies with
Israel, as it is facing an existential threat and is backed by the United States. Taiwan’s
determined stance is in keeping with its wider strategic interests and with its democratic
values, and it strives to reinforce alliances with like-minded countries—liberal
democracies. Although Israel recognizes the “One China” policy (like most countries
worldwide), Taiwan continues to support Israel and strengthen cooperation with it. By
openly backing Israel and explicitly condemning terrorism, Taiwan aims to position
itself as a player in the international arena, identifying with Western countries and thus
seeking broad recognition and support for its ambitions to participate more actively in
international organizations and in the global discourse. In the absence of official
diplomatic relations, Taiwan actively promotes people-to-people ties, not only to
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intensify bilateral relations, but also in order to leverage the potential for collaboration
in various fields, including culture, technology, innovation, health, and education. In
this way, Taiwan deepens its ties with Israel, reinforces its diplomatic presence, and
improves its international status.
The responses of China and Taiwan to the Swords of Iron war provide a glimpse into
the complex dynamics of the trilateral Israel–China–Taiwan relationship. While China’s
realpolitik approach gives precedence to economic interests and regional influence,
Taiwan’s support for Israel, despite promoting its own interests, also stresses its
commitment to democratic principles and to strategic partnerships. Nonetheless, there
are also clear differences in their courses of action since the outbreak of the war—in
both words and deeds. While China is mainly engaged in declarations and traditional
diplomacy, Taiwan is very active on the ground, providing active and direct help to
Israelis in distress following the massacre, while leveraging these efforts on social
media, to amplify its influence. In spite of these efforts, the findings of the survey
conducted by INSS show that Israeli familiarity with Taiwan is limited: 56% of
respondents were unable to assess relations between Israel and Taiwan. Apart from
strategic explanations, the comparison also reflects gaps in style and ability between
the representative offices of China and Taiwan in Israel, as well as the degree of
initiative, activity, and connection to the local reality, which stem from differences in
the national and organizational culture and from the character of their officials in the
field.
Significance for Israel
The mirror image of Chinese and Taiwanese policies since the outbreak of the war is
characterized by a high degree of clarity and contrast. On one side is China, calling—
with apparent balance—for all sides to show restraint and end the fighting, while
actually standing with Hamas and Iran and adopting anti-Israeli positions on several
aspects and on international platforms. On the other side is Taiwan, which has clearly
stood with Israel and against Iranian aggression and Hamas terrorism, both in words
and deeds. It is clear that Israeli policy strives for fruitful relations with China, subject
to national security considerations, as well as for productive, although unofficial,
relations with Taiwan. Should Israel now change its policy toward China and Taiwan
as a result of the situation? It should definitely not move from one extreme to another.
China regards Taiwan as part of China, and its unification as a core national interest
of the first rank. In spite of China’s conduct toward Israel and its core interests—
national security and international status—Israel must not turn China into an enemy,
damaging its own core interests.
China is Israel’s third-largest trading partner (after the European Union and the United
States), and trade with it (including Hong Kong) in 2023 amounted to 17.5 billion dollars
(see Figure 2), while trade with Taiwan amounted to 1.989 billion dollars. In terms of
quality, economic relations with Taiwan—the global capital of chip manufacture—have
important potential benefits for Israel’s economy, which has relative advantages in the
field of chip programming and design. In the current situation of diplomatic relations
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with China and unofficial relations with Taiwan, Israel benefits from fruitful trade
relations with both of them, and maintaining this situation is obviously in its interests.
Figure 2. Israel–China (including Hong Kong) trade in commodities (excluding
diamonds), 2012–2023
Source: INSS, The Glazer Israel-China Policy Center.
China’s conduct over the last eight months has clearly demonstrated that it is not a
good friend of Israel as its spokespersons repeatedly claim. However, it is also not an
enemy of Israel, as some of its critics claim, and it is essential for Israel to avoid turning
it into one. It is clear that China takes positions that make Israel uncomfortable
whenever it serves its purposes in competition with the United States or for its global
and regional positioning; Jerusalem’s growing dependence on Washington due to the
war only intensifies this situation. Therefore, in its relations with China, Israel must
continue to balance its economic interests with its national security considerations; it
should give increasing weight to the latter in view of emerging trends, just as China
itself does on a range of issues.
At the same time, Taiwan offers Israel an additional potential space for developing
unofficial cooperation within the framework of existing policy, which could include
matters of civilian resilience and civil defense in emergency situations and natural
disasters such as earthquakes, as well as in the fields of economy, academia, science
and technology, cybersecurity, environmental quality, water resources, and food
security. Israel and Taiwan share a common ally, the United States, which represents
additional potential for cooperation beyond the bilateral level.
It is often claimed that Israeli policy tends toward realpolitik at the expense of
expressing ethical positions, and rightly so. Israel has faced a lot of criticism for its
“weak” stance on the war between Russia and Ukraine, while Russia is giving support
to and strengthening ties with Iran. But wars sharpen the lines between friends and
enemies and reduce the room for smaller players to maneuver between the major
powers. The Swords of Iron war has provided a foundation for China to emphasize its
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oppositional stance toward Israel, for its own reasons and considerations, but it also
has shed light on those that support Israel—the United States, the Western powers,
and democracies, including Taiwan. In the current state of affairs, Israel can maintain
the main aspects of its policy with certain adjustments, but if the war in the Middle East
escalates, and certainly if war breaks out around Taiwan, Israel’s room to maneuver
between the powers will be severely restricted, and then it will be forced to align with
its friends.
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