THE HILL Iran’s elections could give rise to another military coup BY SHAHERZAD AHMADI, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 06/11/24 7:45 AM ET

 THE  HILL 

Iran’s elections could give rise to another military coup 

BY SHAHERZAD AHMADI, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 06/11/24 7:45 AM ET

The death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi last month has further opened the door to the possibility of a military coup in the country. An effort to replace Raisi has commenced, with elections scheduled for late June, but stability for the Islamic Republic is certainly in question. 

Despite the veneer of control, there has been an unexpected shuffle in the Islamic Republic as pro-establishment figures now compete for the role of president. Between the losses of Major General Qassem Soleymani, General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, his deputy general, Mohammad Hadi Haji-Rahimi and now Raisi, there is one remaining key figure who may be holding it all together for the time being: 85-year-old Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran.   

The death that the Islamic Republic is now bracing for is that of Khamenei. The now-deceased Raisi, whom many considered an appropriate successor, is no longer a contender. It is now more likely that Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, will rise to the most illustrious office in Iran. The 1979 Revolution, which overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy, challenged the concept of hereditary rule, which Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution’s leader, also eschewed by naming Ali Khamenei his successor. Many questioned whether Khamenei was qualified for the position, due to his limited theological credentials.  

Like Raisi, Khamenei was president (from 1981-1989) before his ascent to supreme leader. The target of an attempted assassination in 1981 that left his right arm paralyzed, his loyalty to Khomeini inspired a change in the Iranian constitution to allow him to serve as supreme leader (since Khamenei was not a grand ayatollah, he did not qualify for the role). For Khamenei’s son, another mid-rank cleric, to bid for the supreme leader would surely cause a crisis within the Republic, as the role of the supreme leader would become further delegitimized and politicized.

It’s also important to note, Mojtaba has not been favored for the leadership role by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

 

Developed in the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, the IRGC is distinct from the regular military, though their operations overlap. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the IRGC had achieved a status above public reproach as the most committed volunteers defending revolutionary values. In addition to ground, naval and air forces, the IRGC also operates the Basij, the unpopular morality police also responsible for disbanding and attacking dissident activists, as well as the relatively respected extraterritorial operations officers within the Quds Force. Following the war, the IRGC became major stakeholders in various industries, allowing them leverage to marginalize moderate figures in the Islamic Republic. 

The Quds Force, now led by Soleymani’s successor, Esmail Qaani, as well as the IRGC as a whole will have to decide whether to capitalize on public sentiments to achieve their own strategic aims, as Egypt’s military did toward the end of President Hosni Mubarak’s tenure in 2011. At the moment, they are committed to Khamenei — but the (potential) occupant of the position of the supreme leader might change their view of the utility of the position itself.    

Just as in Egypt, where the army did not approve of Hosni Mubarak grooming his son for the position of president, the IRGC could also reject Khamenei’s son as supreme leader. Since the demonstrations sparked by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini for protesting a mandatory hijab in the custody of police in 2023, the Islamic Republic can no longer pretend to enjoy public support. Surely the IRGC’s leadership noticed the muted response to the death of Raisi, a president associated with the brutal crackdown against protestors in 2022, compared to the grief expressed by Iranians following the 2020 death of Soleymani, whom many Iranians considered to be a military hero. 

In fact, Amini’s death represented the most sustained public expression of disenchantment with the very pillars on which the Islamic Republic stands. The demonstrators, agitating for women’s rights, called for a reassessment of Khomeini’s legacy and challenged Khamenei’s record as supreme leader. Raisi’s rejection of the protestors certainly endeared him to IRGC insiders, as Basijis arrested and abused activists. Understandably, the public identified Raisi’s presidency as especially brutal and the Basijis as an enemy of the people. 

However, Mojtaba Khamenei’s likely ascent will lead to accusations of nepotism. And Quds leader Qaani, whose importance will grow exponentially should the conflict between Israel and Hamas expand to Iran, may see an opening to transform Iran into a more naked military dictatorship akin to Egypt’s, though with outward commitments to the revolution’s Islamic roots. After all, the structure of the Islamic Republic, with a supreme leader at its head, was up for debate not only in its nascency but also in the aftermath of Khomeini’s death, in 1989.  

Surely, in the Islamic Republic’s highest echelons, questions are swirling once more about the supreme leader model, especially given the increasing pressure from military engagements abroad and economic sanctions at home.  

Shaherzad Ahmadi is an associate professor of history at the University of St. Thomas, with expertise in Iranian and Iraqi affairs.