Ankara’s Horn of Africa Ambitions: - The Geopolitics of Turkey, Sudan, and the Red Sea - James M. Dorsey - 7 hours ago (October 6, 2026)

 

Ankara’s Horn of Africa Ambitions: The Geopolitics of Turkey, Sudan, and the Red Sea

James M. Dorsey

7 hours ago

(October 6, 2026)

The Iran and Yemen wars are fuelling competition in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa with Turkey as a key player. Turkey has long recognised the importance of the region as central to its growing influence in Africa.

Even so, the wars and competition have persuaded Turkey that relying on humanitarian diplomacy, development assistance and middle-power strength is no longer enough.

As a result, Turkey has rejiggered its approach to take into account a multitude of conflicts across a swath of geography ranging from the Red Sea to the Gulf, the Eastern Mediterranean to Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia, Somali, Somaliland dispute and footprints of Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Creating a mutual defence arrangement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was a first step with Turkey expected to send troops to the kingdom in support of its offensive against Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

Increased support for the Sudanese Armed Forces in the country’s civil war is another.

James discusses Turkey’s more assertive approach on Modern Diplomacy’s podcast.

Transcript

[Host Sana Khan] Hello Dr. Dorsey, hello and welcome. I am Sana Khan and today we are looking at Turkey’s evolving strategic role in Sudan and wider Red Sea region. Turkey and Sudan have maintained long-standing relations but Ankara’s engagement with Sudan took on a more strategic dimension following President Erdogan’s 2017 visit and the agreements surrounding Suakin Island.

Since then, Sudan has gone through a political transition, a military coup, and since 2023, a devastating war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Force. At the same time, the Red Sea has become increasingly important to regional and international security. So, what exactly is Turkey seeking in Sudan?

Is Ankara primarily interested in diplomacy and economic ties or does Sudan form part of a broader Turkish strategy in the Red Sea? Joining me today is Dr. James M. Dorsey, an award-winning journalist, author and geopolitical analyst and an adjunct senior fellow at the S.

Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Dr. Dorsey has spent decades covering and analysing political and security developments across the Middle East and the wider Muslim world and has written extensively on regional geopolitics, power competition, and the changing dynamics of the Middle East and Africa. Dr. Dorsey, thank you for joining me today.

[James M. Dorsey] Sana, thank you for having me. It’s a pleasure.

[Host Sana Khan] Yes, sir. So, my first question for you is, Dr. Dorsey, perhaps we can start with the bigger picture. Why has Sudan been strategically important to Turkey in the first place, particularly given its location on the Red Sea?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, Sudan has a long-standing relationship with Turkey and it’s been a long-standing strategic relationship. There was a very close relationship when Omar al-Bashir was still president before he was overthrown in a popular revolt. And in fact, until today, prominent figures, including a former head of Sudanese intelligence, who were part of the regime of Omar al-Bashir, are still resident in Turkey, or at least frequent Turkey very often.

But over and beyond that, the relationship with Sudan, certainly the current relationship, is part of a far broader strategy. There are Turkish advisors in Sudan advising the Sudanese Armed Forces of General Burhan. Turkey has a military presence in Somalia, which is its largest overseas military base.

It has a military presence in Qatar. And of course, over the last decade, Turkey has planted its flag, if you wish, across Africa. Africa has been a focus, or one focus, of its foreign policy.

Given the relationships that Turkey, of course, has with Middle Eastern states, particularly in the Gulf, and now with the crisis in Yemen and in the Red Sea, and the recent formation of the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani Defence Pact that has declared an attack on one as an attack on all, it should not come as a significant interest in Sudan.

[Host Sana Khan] When we talk about Turkey’s strategic interest there, are we primarily talking about economic interest, maritime access, security, or a combination of all three?

[James M. Dorsey] It’s a combination of everything. There’s a strategic geopolitical interest. There’s a commercial economic interest.

Think of reconstruction of Sudan, something that Turkey certainly wants to be involved in. And there’s the interest of military sales. You’ve had a deal of some $120 million, not very long ago, for the supply of munitions and of Bayraktar drones, these very successful Turkish drones being developed by a company that is run by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s son-in-law.

[Host Sana Khan] All right. So, basically, President Erdogan’s 2017 visit to Sudan marked a significant turning point in Turkey’s engagement with the country. What was Ankara actually seeking to achieve through the SWACIN project, and how important was the island to Turkey’s broader Red Sea strategy?

[James M. Dorsey]

Well, as a matter of principle, it was a 99-year lease of the island and it was officially to restore what was an Ottoman-era port. There’s been significant speculation that the ultimate intent was to establish a military base there, but we don’t know that actually for a fact. It makes sense for Turkey to want to restore an Ottoman-era entity, but at the same time, it also makes perfect sense that Turkey potentially would like a military presence or a base in Sudan.

It is, of course, not the only one that has sought a military presence in Sudan. Take, for example, Russia, which is a long-eyed port in Sudan.

[Host Sana Khan] Was the significance of Suakin primarily about establishing a military foothold, or was the strategic value broader than that?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, a military presence, if that’s the purpose of the exercise, is significant in and of itself. That is a geopolitical move. And again, I think Turkey wants to be a major player in Africa and certainly in the horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

Now, keep in mind also that Turkey is a powerful economy. Whether or not it’s going through a difficult period at the moment is neither here nor there. Turkey is slated to be one of the world’s top 20 economies.

So, the fact that it sees itself as a significant regional, if not global player, should come as no surprise to anyone.

[Host Sana Khan] All right. Basically, we will look at it from a different angle now. My question is, what changed after Bashir and the outbreak of war?

Does Turkey have a clear preference regarding the balance between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF, or is Ankara’s primary concern preserving the Sudanese state and its own strategic interests?

[James M. Dorsey] Those are not necessarily contradictory goals. Turkey, in the recent, over the last several years, the civil war that is wracking Sudan, Turkey has been a strong backer of the Sudanese Armed Forces and General Burhan. Now, there are those who claim that that is, well, there are those who view General Burhan essentially as aligned with the Islamists, which is, in my mind, an overstatement at the very least.

That is not to say that there are Islamist elements within the Sudanese Armed Forces inherited from the days of Omar al-Bashir, but nonetheless, Turkey wants to see a strong central state. I mean, contradiction to, for example, the United Arab Emirates’ preferences, or Israel’s preferences, for that matter, who prefer weak states rather than strong central states. Turkey wants to see a unified Sudan with a strong central government.

[Host Sana Khan] Sir, there is a bit of voice distortion.

[James M. Dorsey] Ah, okay. Do you want me to say that again?

[Host Sana Khan] Let’s talk, yes, yes, let’s talk about Turkey and the wider regional competition. Turkey is also balancing its relationship with Sudan against its broader ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. How is Ankara navigating these competing regional interests, particularly when different countries have different positions on the Sudanese conflict?

[James M. Dorsey] I don’t know that Egypt and Turkey have necessarily a fundamentally different view of Sudan. Egypt is certainly not a supporter of the rebel supreme forces. Egypt sees Sudan in a broader context in terms of Ethiopia and the Great Dam, which Egypt sees as an existential threat because it could affect the waters of the Nile.

For all practical matters, Turkey’s differences in Sudan are not with Egypt, certainly not with Saudi Arabia. To some degree, they are with the United Arab Emirates, which has been repeatedly accused, even though the UAE has denied those allegations, of supporting militarily the Rapid Support Forces, the RSF, of General Hemetdi. So, in many ways, Turkey’s policy towards Sudan is aligned with major powers in the Middle East, and those are powers with which it has very close relations.

[Host Sana Khan] So, in practical terms, does Turkey’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and Egypt place any limits on what Ankara can do in Sudan?

[James M. Dorsey] Not necessarily. I would think on the contrary. Saudi Arabia, like Egypt, is a strong supporter of the Sudanese armed forces and of General Burhan.

So, those interests are clearly aligned.

[Host Sana Khan] Sir, I am unable to comprehend you completely because of the voice distortion. Is there a possibility for you to change your location a bit, or check the internet connection?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, I am in a hotel. It’s all right.

[Host Sana Khan] It’s all right.

[James M. Dorsey] You want me to reconnect?

[Host Sana Khan] No, it’s all right. I think I can hear you now. You are audible to me now.

So, we are almost done with the interview. Basically, Port Sudan and Turkey’s long-term Red Sea strategy. Given Sudan’s Red Sea coastline and the importance of Port Sudan, how significant is the conflict for Turkey’s maritime, economic, and security interests?

Could Sudan become an important component of Ankara’s long-term Red Sea strategy?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, I’m sorry. It’s important. It’s also important in the context of Somalia or Somaliland, first and foremost, where the United Arab Emirates is a very strong player.

It’s facilitated recognition of Somaliland, which is a breakaway republic. The UAE has facilitated recognition of Somaliland by Israel, the first country in the United Nations to recognise Somaliland since the country broke away from Somalia 31 years ago. There’s, of course, great concern that Somaliland would be willing or may have already granted Israeli access to the country in military terms as well as in intelligence terms.

Of course, it’s important with the crisis that you’re seeing in Yemen, in which the region is such the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa are being affected. Just look at the influx of refugees you’re seeing from Yemen into Djibouti.

[Host Sana Khan] My final question to you is, what does Turkey ultimately want? Looking ahead, if the war eventually produces a political settlement, what role could Turkey realistically play in Sudan’s reconstruction and political future? Ultimately, is Ankara seeking to be a mediator, a strategic partner, or a regional power pursuing its own geopolitical interests?

Can Turkey realistically be all three at the same time?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, Turkey has offered to be a mediator, particularly between the United Arab Emirates and Sudan. Despite the offer being accepted by all parties, nothing has happened. Part of the problem, of course, is that engaging in that kind of a mediation on the part of the United Arab Emirates would counter its denial that it is involved in the conflict and that it is supporting the rapid support forces.

Sudan’s a land of opportunity. Turkey has a very strong construction industry. Turkey’s a country that is, and Turkish companies are ones that are willing to invest and go places that others may be more reluctant to do so.

Just think back to the early 1990s when Central Asia was first opening up. It was Turkish construction companies that moved in. There’s also a lot of talk about access to Sudanese energy resources.

So for Turkey, this is an issue of geopolitics. It’s an issue of positioning Turkey as a key regional, if not key global player, but it’s also an issue of economic opportunity.

[Host Sana Khan] All right. Dr. Dorsey, thank you so much for joining us and for helping us understand Turkey’s evolving role in Sudan and the wider Red Sea region. Thank you for your time.

[James M. Dorsey] It’s my pleasure. Thank you for having me.