Critical Threats and ISW - Iran Crisis Update, April 4, 2025 - ...US air campaign in Yemen has had only limited success in destroying Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen.

 

Critical  Threats and ISW

Iran Crisis Update, April 4, 2025

US Central Command (CENTCOM) is conducting a military operation in Yemen that aims to render the Houthis unable or unwilling to continue attacks that threaten US ships and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. This does not imply that CENTCOM must destroy all Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen. US President Donald Trump ordered the US military to restore the freedom of navigation and prevent attacks on US shipping in the Red Sea.[i] Western media reported on April 4 that Pentagon officials have told Congress and US allies that the US air campaign in Yemen has had only limited success in destroying Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen.[ii] There are likely multiple different operational concepts that would successfully render the Houthis unwilling or unable to continue attacks targeting international shipping. A focus solely on missiles, drones, and launchers would be very unlikely to make the Houthis unwilling or unable to target international shipping because it would be very difficult to destroy all Houthi weapons stockpiles and missile launchers. Such an operation would not seriously threaten Houthi control in Yemen. The Houthis’ top priority remains maintaining control over Houthi-controlled territory and ultimately defeating the internationally recognized government of Yemen.

CENTCOM can render the Houthis unwilling or unable to continue attacks without destroying all Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen . Yemeni media and officials and US officials have reported that CENTCOM has targeted Houthi communications, training centers, underground facilities, leaders, and other assets.[iii] CTP-ISW cannot currently assess the overall impact of these strikes on Houthi decision-making. These strikes could degrade the Houthi ability to target shipping by disrupting targeting cycles and command networks, however. Leadership strikes, particularly against mid-level leaders responsible for imposing local Houthi control, could disrupt Houthi internal security over time.[iv] US officials currently assess that the initial US strikes targeting Houthi assets have disrupted the Houthi command-and-control network and limited the Houthi ability to target international shipping. This would suggest that the air campaign has achieved some temporary military effects, though these effects are temporary without continued pressure on the Houthis.  

A US airstrike killed a Houthi Hudaydah Governorate Police supervisor on April 4.[v] Continued US airstrikes targeting Houthi supervisors could destabilize Houthi internal security over time. The Houthi regime uses a ”supervisory” system to maintain control over its governance structures. Supervisors fill a similar role to political commissars in the Soviet Union by ensuring that non-Houthi government leaders remain loyal to the Houthi movement.[vi] A sustained air campaign against these individuals could seriously disrupt Houthi internal security in certain areas.

CENTCOM has conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 3.[vii] CENTCOM conducted an unspecified number of airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in the Houthi stronghold of Saada Governorate, northern Yemen, including likely command and control sites in Saada City and eastern Saada Governorate.[viii] The Houthis conducted a combined cruise missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea on April 4.[ix] CENTCOM did not confirm the attack.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria, likely to both deter a US strike on Iran and to ensure the US forces withdraw from Iraq. Newly-formed militia Harakat al Ashtar said on April 3 that its fighters are “preparing major surprises” for US forces and swore to burn US vehicles.[x] The Popular Campaign to Expel the American Occupation, another likely pro-Iranian Iraqi militia formed in early February 2025, posted a video on April 3 threatening US forces and said that the United States has no choice but to withdraw ”humiliated, defeated, and broken.”[xi] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, a larger Iranian-backed Iraqi militia, implicitly warned on March 20 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria if US forces do not withdraw by the end of 2025.[xii] Other militias have implied that they would respond to a US or Israeli strike on Iran.[xiii] These militia threats mirror Iranian efforts to discourage a US or Israeli strike on Iran by threatening attacks on the United States in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously conducted attacks targeting US forces to both encourage a US withdrawal and to fulfill other strategic objectives.  The militias have continued to threaten to attack US forces since January 2024 but have claimed few attacks since that date.[xiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xv] The removal of US forces from Iraq and Syria is a long-standing Iranian objective, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias frequently conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024.[xvi]

Najaf-based Iraqi Shia cleric Sadr al Din al Qabanji separately threatened that US bases in Iraq are within the striking range of Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias during a sermon on April 4.[xvii] Qabanji urged US President Donald Trump not to start or threaten war, referring to Trump’s threat to bomb Iran if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[xviii] Qabanji is a member of an Iranian-aligned Iraqi Shia political party and has ties to Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr.[xix]

Senior Iranian officials appear increasingly concerned about a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and IRGC Aerospace Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh visited Iran's Southeastern Air Defense Zone based in Bandar-e Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 to conduct an operational assessment of military units and defense capabilities at the zone.[xx] The visit comes as Iran continues to pursue efforts to strengthen its air defense capabilities amid growing concerns about a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.[xxi]

The United States continues to pursue direct negotiations with Iran to secure a comprehensive deal that will fully dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, according to an unspecified senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal on April 4.[xxii] US President Donald Trump told reporters on April 3 that direct talks "go faster."[xxiii] Iranian officials have repeatedly rejected direct negotiations with the United States.[xxiv] An Iranian expert close to the regime told the Atlantic on April 3 that Iran seeks a ”secret,” two-step process that starts with indirect talks and “potentially” moves to direct negotiations.[xxv] US officials have previously warned that the United States will pursue military options if the Iranian regime does not engage in direct negotiations.[xxvi] Indirect talks likely allow Iran to buy time, avoid public pressure, and preserve its image while quietly weighing US demands it may eventually have to accept in some form.

Senior Iranian official Ali Akbar Velayati criticized the interim Syrian government’s handling of recent violence in coastal Syria and Israeli operations in Syria, likely as part of an Iranian effort to discredit and undermine the Syrian government.[xxvii] Velayati stated on April 4 that the Syrian government has ”no legitimacy” and has targeted ”innocent civilians“ in Latakia, likely referring to a period of violence in coastal Syria in early March.[xxviii] Velayati also criticized the government’s inaction against Israeli operations in Syria.[xxix]

Velayati’s statements and the Iranian efforts to discredit and undermine the Syrian government reinforce insurgent objectives to delegitimize the government with foreign audiences.[xxx] Anti-government actors, including Alawite social media accounts and Alawite insurgents, are driving sectarian narratives in the Syrian information space that support insurgent objectives.[xxxi] Both Iran and the insurgents likely calculate that highlighting the Syrian government’s sectarian tendencies will make it more difficult for the government to secure foreign aid and make it more likely that the government becomes increasingly unstable. This would provide an opportunity for Iran to reinsert itself into Syria, as it has expressed interest in doing.

Key Takeaways:

Yemen: The US Central Command (CENTCOM) is conducting a military operation in Yemen that aims to render the Houthis unable or unwilling to continue attacks that threaten US ships and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. This does not imply that CENTCOM must destroy all Houthi missiles, drones, and launchers in Yemen. The current air campaign could render the Houthis unable or unwilling to continue attacks in the Red Sea by disrupting Houthi targeting cycles and command-and-control networks.

Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria, likely to both deter a US strike on Iran and to ensure the US forces withdraw from Iraq.

Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: The United States continues to pursue direct negotiations with Iran to secure a comprehensive deal that fully dismantles Iran’s nuclear program, according to an unspecified senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal on April 4.

Iran and Syria’s Insurgency: Senior Iranian official Ali Akbar Velayati criticized the interim Syrian government’s handling of recent violence in coastal Syria and Israeli operations in Syria, likely as part of an Iranian effort to discredit and undermine the Syrian government. Velayati’s statements and the Iranian efforts to discredit and undermine the Syrian government reinforce insurgent objectives to delegitimize the government with foreign audiences.

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The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War will provide regular updates, including daily updates, as the crisis warrants.

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