CHATHAM HOUSE - Research paper - Competing visions of international order 08 Continuity and non-alignment shape Indonesia’s worldview Dr Ralf Emmers Professor in International Politics of East Asia and Co-Chair of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS University of London

 

CHATHAM HOUSE - Research paper - Competing visions of international order 

08 Continuity and non-alignment shape Indonesia’s worldview

Dr Ralf Emmers

Professor in International Politics of East Asia and Co-Chair of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS University of London

The world’s third largest democracy has a long-held commitment to strategic autonomy and multilateralism – yet growing China–US rivalry will increasingly put Indonesia’s non-alignment to the test.

Continuity characterizes the vision of the international order that is held by Indonesian foreign policy elites. Indonesia openly proclaims a non-aligned policy and favours an autonomous regional order. It emphasizes that national resilience and stability can only be obtained through national sovereignty that is free from external interference and domination.

Given the prominence of continuity in Indonesian foreign policy, it is important to situate the country’s vision for international order within a historical context. The concept of non-alignment remains central to the Indonesian perception of the international order.176 Non-alignment spread rapidly during the Cold War period, especially after the April 1955 Bandung Conference organized by the Indonesian president, Sukarno. Over the years, Indonesia has repeatedly committed itself to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and has called for regional solutions to regional problems, free from outside interference.177 For example, Jakarta has continued to support the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declaration and the 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ). ZOPFAN seeks to achieve regional autonomy by limiting outside interference in Southeast Asia,178 and the declaration expresses a belief in not having to choose between Washington, Moscow or Beijing.179 While ZOPFAN has not been realized, it remains an ambition of Indonesia to achieve autonomy vis-à-vis the great powers.

Indonesian foreign policy elites perceive their country as a rising Asian power and a middle power in the international order.180 Indonesia’s middle-power behaviour emerged in the mid-2000s during the presidency of the retired three-star general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The period preceding his presidency had been politically and economically unstable, with Indonesia greatly affected by the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. The country faced serious socio-economic problems, which for a time diminished its international influence and diplomatic position in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Over the last 20 years, Indonesia has benefited from a new status, driven by sustained economic growth and political stability.181 This has generally strengthened Indonesia’s reputation both regionally and internationally, as illustrated by it becoming the only Southeast Asian nation to be a full member of the G20.182 The country’s new status is also linked to political change which started in 1998 after the downfall of President Suharto and which transformed the country into the third largest democracy worldwide. Indonesia’s national identity now includes respect for democracy and human rights.

Indonesia’s political transformation has been extended to its foreign policy through a normative agenda implemented in Southeast Asia and beyond.183 Jakarta has, for example, promoted democracy and human rights in Southeast Asia through ASEAN and other bodies like the Bali Democracy Forum.184 Yet these efforts have had limited success.

Furthermore, foreign policy elites in Indonesia share a vision of the international order structured around the importance of international law and multilateralism. The country has acted as a normative power in various regional and international institutions. Its attempt at exercising influence in the international order through multilateralism is best illustrated in the context of ASEAN. Indonesia co-founded the regional organization in 1967 together with Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and it has since then been viewed by all the other Southeast Asian members as ASEAN’s natural or de facto leader due to the country’s territorial size and large population.185 Indonesia has also continued to reaffirm its commitment to multilateralism in Asia through the establishment of other regional platforms like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS).

Indonesia has also engaged in global multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations and the G20. It has been on four occasions a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and is a contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. Still, Indonesia is often viewed domestically and by the wider international community as punching below its weight in global institutions due to a lack of capacity and strategic vision.

Perceptions of power, foreign policy objectives and the role of Indonesia in the international order are not a source of great debate in Jakarta, as broad agreement generally prevails on such questions among the few involved in making foreign policy.

In short, there is consensus among foreign policy elites in Indonesia about the role and status of the country in the international order, and about its ongoing commitment to the concept of non-alignment and autonomy, to international law, and to the use of multilateralism. Perceptions of power, foreign policy objectives and the role of Indonesia in the international order are not a source of great debate in Jakarta, as broad agreement generally prevails on such questions among the few involved in making foreign policy. It is interesting to note that Indonesia is a majority Muslim state but that Islam has not directly influenced the country’s view on the liberal international order and how it interacts with the US and China. Hence, while religious values certainly matter in Indonesia, its foreign policy has remained rather secular in its approach to the liberal international order in comparison to other majority Muslim states like Turkey.

While Indonesia accepts the liberal international order and its core principles, its foreign policy elites do not view the country as a shaper of that order. Instead, they wish to pursue some form of strategic autonomy and to support continuity in the national vision of the international order. Moreover, Jakarta does not reject or seek to undermine the international order, as it benefits directly from the public goods it provides. Indonesia is also aware that the international order and the global multilateral system that sustains it are currently failing. This is viewed with concern in a country committed, in particular, to the UN system.

Indonesia’s perceptions of US power

Indonesia established diplomatic relations with the US in 1949 and the two countries deepened their ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2015. Yet, Jakarta and Washington often regard their relationship as underdeveloped and as having the potential for more cooperation.186

Indonesia has historically favoured a regional order determined by the Southeast Asian states and free from external intervention. However, other states in the region have long relied on the US to guarantee their defence and national security. The Philippines and Thailand are treaty allies of the US, and most other states in the region have signed security and economic partnerships with Washington. Moreover, most Southeast Asian states have never perceived ASEAN as a long-term alternative to bilateral links with the US. Indonesia has gradually accepted this reality and it has generally endorsed the role that Washington plays in upholding the existing regional and international order.

The relationship with the US is also strategic for Indonesia, whose armed forces are dependent on US military equipment and training. The country benefits from a rather benign security environment. Yet it is concerned about Chinese military expansion and rising assertiveness in the South China Sea. Indonesia exploits fisheries and hydrocarbon reserves around the Natuna Islands, a maritime zone that might overlap with Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Hence, Jakarta unofficially supports the presence of the US Navy in Southeast Asia to counterbalance Chinese activities, and its armed forces have held annual joint military exercises with US forces under the Garuda Shield programme since 2004.

US–Indonesian relations deepened during President Barack Obama’s administration. A comprehensive partnership was signed in 2010 that provided a framework for closer economic and security links; in 2015 this was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership, at an equivalent level to the China–Indonesia strategic partnership of 2013.187 Obama’s personal history in and connection to Indonesia contributed to closer relations and were influential on Indonesian public opinion.

The transactional nature of President Donald Trump’s first term in office (2017–21) and his shift away from free trade influenced the foreign policy of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Jokowi introduced a greater domestic orientation into his foreign policy by emphasizing the importance of economic growth.188 His priorities included ties with great and middle powers to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and support domestic infrastructure projects. This made China a key partner of President Jokowi while the Trump administration and its absence of economic initiatives were viewed as less significant in Jakarta. The Jokowi administration was also apprehensive about the geopolitical rivalry between Beijing and Washington and its effect on Indonesia.

During the administration of President Joe Biden, there was renewed collaboration in the security and economic sphere. Indonesia supported two US-led initiatives: the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and the Just Energy Transition Partnership.189 It acquired US military equipment and, since 2022, held upgraded Super Garuda Shield military exercises. Yet Jakarta has not supported or joined US-led minilateral security arrangements like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (‘Quad’ – of Australia, India, Japan and the US) or the AUKUS security partnership, announced in 2021, which ties Australia, the UK and the US.190

In Indonesia, the perception of US democracy and foreign policy priorities has been affected by the war in Gaza. The scale of the loss of lives and the destruction in Gaza have been a source of concern for Indonesian public opinion. In the annual survey of foreign policy elites by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, the level of support for the US in Southeast Asia dropped by 11 points in 2024 compared to the previous year. In the same survey, only 27 per cent of Indonesian respondents said they viewed the US favourably, in contrast to 73 per cent doing so for China.191 Most analysts believe that this significant drop in US popularity was linked to the Biden administration’s pro-Israel position.192 It is too soon to predict the longer-term consequences of the US response to the Gaza war on Indonesia and its view of the international order.

It is also difficult to predict what Trump’s return to the presidency could mean for Indonesia and its relationship with the US. This is due to the unpredictability and transactional nature of Trump and the people likely to advise him at the start of his second administration. That said, foreign policy elites in Jakarta appear to have already priced in some likely aspects of a second Trump administration and its possible consequences for Southeast Asia. These expectations are mostly based on Trump’s first presidency. Such indications include a use of trade tariffs as a negotiation tool, a US foreign and defence policy in Asia structured around China and its rising power in the region, and a focus on bilateralism at the expense of multilateral institutions like ASEAN.

Foreign policy: a reliance on multilateralism

Indonesia has always refused to commit itself to a collective defence arrangement, arguing that military alliances threaten international security as they have a common external enemy in mind. Instead of joining an alliance to balance an external threat, regional diplomacy and autonomy from great power politics have historically been at the core of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Jakarta prefers to find regional solutions to regional problems to limit external interventions. Hence, the search for strategic autonomy pre-dates the current pressure to choose sides between Beijing and Washington, as it is linked to Jakarta’s long-term ambition to preserve its agency and room for manoeuvre in regional affairs.

Indonesia’s strategic outlook aims for a ‘free and active’ foreign policy (bebas dan aktif), a concept first articulated by Vice-President Mohammad Hatta in 1948.193 ‘Free and active’ has been central to Indonesia’s foreign policy from Sukarno to the present day.194

Another constant has been the attention given to ASEAN, which is regularly described as the main pillar of Indonesia’s foreign policy.195 Indonesia relies on ASEAN and its related institutions like the ARF and the EAS to exercise and amplify its own regional influence. In addition to multilateralism, Indonesia has enhanced its status by focusing on network diplomacy. Jakarta has established strategic partnerships with China and the US as well as with Australia, India, Japan and other states. These cover a broad range of issues and enhance Indonesia’s role in international affairs.

Indonesia relies on ASEAN and its related institutions to exercise and amplify its own regional influence.

Indonesia has had some success in mediation with its diplomatic efforts – for example, in a dispute on the border between Cambodia and Thailand in 2011, the maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and the conflict in Myanmar over the rights of the Rohingya minority group. However, Indonesia has been unable to mediate the recurrence of clashes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea or regarding the ongoing civil war in Myanmar. Jakarta has also supported regional and global initiatives to promote democracy and human rights. It has attempted to enhance functional cooperation to tackle forms of transnational crime, like human smuggling and trafficking, but with limited success.

Nevertheless, limited domestic resources and a lack of strategic vision have restricted Indonesian foreign policy, which partly explains why Indonesia often punches below its weight in international affairs.

The country’s foreign policy elites aspire to maintain the status quo in the international order by sustaining the rule of law, the role of international institutions and the promotion of democracy and human rights. In addition, Jakarta aspires to address the material limitations that have prevented it so far from achieving its desired international status and objectives. It wants to position itself as a rising Asian power in the international order. It will continue its commitment to non-alignment and its reliance on ASEAN to amplify its international voice and influence. Indonesia’s foreign policy elites see this as achievable as long as the country continues to be stable and peaceful domestically and its economic development remains sustainable.

Concern at the China–US rivalry

Indonesia observes with concern the rise of great power competition in Asia. Jakarta wants to stick to non-alignment and strategic autonomy, and does not want to be forced to choose between Beijing and Washington.196 Yet the growing rivalry between the two powers has narrowed Indonesia’s policy options. This has made it harder for the country to promote bilateral and multilateral initiatives in its foreign policy.

Since the 1990s, Indonesia has contributed to building a regional security architecture that covers most states in the Asia-Pacific. Consisting of overlapping multilateral bodies – such as the EAS, the ARF, the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and South Korea) and others – this architecture is based on the notion of inclusiveness. It focuses on dialogue and confidence-building measures to improve the climate of regional relations. But achieving these cooperative goals is much harder in a period of rising geopolitical tensions.197 Indonesia continues to resort to ASEAN and to preserve the organization’s centrality to regional security.198

However, Indonesia is concerned by the increase in minilateral arrangements that may offer an alternative to ASEAN and its various regional platforms. Arrangements such as the Quad and AUKUS are excluding China in a bid to constrain rising Chinese influence in the region. By adopting an exclusive approach to cooperation, such arrangements undermine ASEAN’s centrality and preference for inclusiveness.199 China and the US have so far not undermined ASEAN’s role in regional cooperation, but they have invested more time and resources in pushing their own diplomatic initiatives.

Indonesia realizes that it will become increasingly difficult to stay neutral and manage China–US competition. For Jakarta, a worst-case scenario involves losing its autonomy and having to choose between the two powers.

Indonesia realizes that it will become increasingly difficult to stay neutral and manage China–US competition. For Jakarta, a worst-case scenario involves losing its autonomy and having to choose between the two powers. Indonesia sticks to its ‘free and active’ foreign policy, avoiding taking sides and refraining from joining collective defence arrangements. Yet not choosing sides is difficult, for example, in the context of the overlapping disputes in the South China Sea. Jakarta is committed to international law and the law of the sea convention. It also supports the negotiation of a code of conduct for the South China Sea that would include China and the 10 ASEAN members. However, the increasing China–US competition would make such a negotiation even more challenging. In short, Indonesia’s non-aligned position is being tested by unfolding events.

There have been some shifts already in Indonesia’s approach, especially in trade and investments. President Jokowi prioritized domestic economic development, and Indonesia has in recent years become more dependent on Chinese FDI.200 China is now the country’s main trading partner and source of investments. The Jokowi administration developed large infrastructure projects, funded mostly through Chinese and Japanese joint ventures, to unlock economic growth. Beijing has also supported Jokowi’s plan to turn the city of Nusantara in Borneo into the new capital of Indonesia and has provided some necessary investment. In contrast, there was an absence of ambitious US trade and investment policies towards Indonesia under the previous Trump and Biden administrations.201

Notwithstanding these developments, Chinese FDI has become a domestic political issue. Chinese companies operating in Indonesia rely on Chinese migrant workers rather than local ones. China’s rising influence in the mining sector is also viewed negatively and large Chinese-led projects have often been marred by extra costs.202

Managing the China–US rivalry will be a significant challenge for President Prabowo Subianto, who took office in October 2024. Like his predecessors, he can be expected to seek a balance in Indonesia’s relationships with Beijing and Washington. He travelled to China as president-elect in April 2024, which provoked speculation about his foreign policy priorities.203 Yet, in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, Prabowo hinted that Jakarta would maintain its non-aligned position despite the China–US strategic competition. This is likely to remain the case under the second Trump administration.

Prabowo must now establish a good working relationship with Donald Trump and the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and preserve some form of diplomatic equidistance between the two – even as both powers gradually increase pressure on Indonesia to budge from its non-aligned position.