BETWEEN ISRAEL AND TURKEY, IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEW SYRIA (PART 1)
Policy Forum Report
April 10, 2025
A regional media bureau chief explains how continued Israeli military incursions in Syria are complicating efforts to stabilize the country, and why multilateral foreign assistance is a must.
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On April 9, The Washington Institute held a two-part virtual Policy Forum. The first session included Maya Gebeily, the Reuters bureau chief for Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, based in Beirut. The following is a rapporteur’s summary of her remarks; a summary of the second session will be published separately.
Israel and Turkey’s postures and objectives in Syria are
increasingly coming up against each other. Turkey wants to
see a stable, centralized Syria and is interested in the success
of the new political project under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
(HTS), the group that led the campaign to topple the Assad
regime. As Ankara pursues deeper political, economic, and
military cooperation with Damascus, Israeli military
incursions across the border are on the rise, with authorities
stating that they want to establish a demilitarized zone in
Syria.
Interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa has tried to signal Israel
that Syria does not pose a security threat, in part by asking
allies to convey this message. He has also tried to leverage
international law, calling on Israel to respect Syrian
boundaries under the 1974 disengagement agreement and
asking Qatar to mediate. Israeli strikes and incursions have
continued, however, leaving the Syrian public angry and
fearful about what they perceive as unjustified military action.
Israel insists that its moves are primarily defensive, pointing
out that in the post-October 7 environment, it needs buffer
zones to protect against cross-border attacks. Yet Syrians are
trying to prioritize actions that keep their country together
rather than threaten its territorial integrity.
Indeed, Sharaa has numerous challenges to address before he
can fully stabilize Syria, and Israel’s continued military
presence further complicates these thorny issues. For one, he
is still trying to consolidate authority over various actors
throughout the country. His current inability to fully control
Syria’s many armed factions was recently on display during
the widespread retaliatory killing of Alawites in the coastal
region. Sharaa is aware of the stakes involved in his plan—
although negotiations are ongoing, previous attempts to create
a unified national movement to replace the Assad regime all
failed.
As such, many Syrians believe that other countries must be
involved in stabilizing the country, emphasizing the need for
unified Gulf support. In their view, rebuilding Syria is not
workable if just one country—whether Turkey, Qatar, or
another state—has to deal with all of the post-Assad
challenges. Instead, different countries can take on various
security and economic roles.
Outside the region, military relations between Syria and
Russia are progressing. Moscow will apparently retain its
bases there, though figuring out the details of this defense
relationship will be complicated.
Assessing U.S. policy toward Syria is more difficult. President
Trump’s statement that his administration is willing to
mediate between Turkey and Israel has given Syrians the
sense that the United States can play a larger role in their
country going forward. Yet Washington is currently divided
between those who believe Sharaa should be treated as a
former jihadist and those who believe he is worth engaging in
the interest of promoting regional security. The State
Department has published a list of criteria that Damascus
needs to meet before Washington can lift its Assad-era
sanctions on the country; until then, U.S. sanctions remain a
significant obstacle to rebuilding the economy.
This summary was prepared by Rena Gabber.
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
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