CHATHAM HOUSE - Research paper - Competing visions of international order 07 Saudi Arabia’s goals rest on managing multipolarity Dr Sanam Vakil Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme

 

CHATHAM HOUSE  - Research paper - Competing visions of international order

07 Saudi Arabia’s goals rest on managing multipolarity

Dr Sanam Vakil

Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Email Sanam

X

Saudi Arabia faces a challenging juggling act – pursuing a bold domestic reform agenda, trying to balance US-backed security with China-led economic ties, and seeking to maximize its multi-aligned regional influence.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, like many US partners in the Middle East, has been adapting to perceived shifts and a gradual fracturing of the Western-led international order. These shifts have affected Riyadh’s worldview, security, economic relationships and international engagement. Actively and ambitiously, the kingdom is attempting to navigate these geopolitical dynamics, while implementing a major state-led social and economic transition known as Vision 2030. This requires the country to balance its preference for a US-focused security relationship with its more eastern-facing economic links. The prospect of an emergent multipolar world order, where power is distributed among many countries, is at the same time prompting Saudi Arabia to seek to maximize its influence – pursuing a greater multi-aligned multilateral role while engaging more directly over regional security challenges. The chapter will discuss these various strands within Saudi Arabia’s approach to international order.

A major driver of all this is Vision 2030 – an economic diversification and social transformation project begun in 2016 under the leadership of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman (known colloquially as MBS). Vision 2030 represents a bold state-led capitalist reform agenda for Saudi Arabia and aims to reshape the country’s economy, society and global standing. By diversifying its economic base and sources of income, reducing its dependence on oil revenues, enhancing public services and promoting sustainable development, the kingdom seeks to secure a prosperous and resilient future amid changes in the global order. As Vision 2030 seeks to attract significant foreign direct investment, a new global-facing Saudi Arabia is attempting to emerge – one that promotes stronger international linkages, greater regional stability and strategic autonomy.147

Saudi Arabia and the changing international order

Saudi Arabia holds a complex and multifaceted view of the liberal international order. The kingdom has historically been a close ally of the United States and has benefited from US security guarantees and the stability and economic opportunities provided by the liberal international order. However, Saudi internal politics and regional ambitions often diverge from the principles typically associated with that order. Saudi Arabia sees itself as a growing middle power with economic relevance, as the leader of the Islamic world and a regional convener in the Middle East.148

Alongside important economic reforms and diversification efforts, recent years have seen significant social changes, such as granting women the right to drive and opening up the entertainment sector. All these various reforms have been championed by the West and by Saudi youth who form the majority of the population. The reforms are partly influenced by the need to modernize the economy and society, temper religious radicalism, and make Saudi Arabia more attractive to international investors and tourists.149

Reflecting a desire for diversification in foreign policy, Saudi Arabia continues to balance its traditional alliances with the West with its emerging partnerships with other global powers. Riyadh’s long strategic partnership with the US developed in the aftermath of the Second World War, and was grounded in mutual interests: security guarantees and military support in exchange for stable oil supplies and cooperation in counterterrorism.150 Since 2019, the US’s hydrocarbon independence coupled with a more inward focus on domestic priorities has disrupted US ties with Saudi Arabia, leading to challenges in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, Riyadh continues to seek US security guarantees through a stable defence agreement that would anchor and better structure the relationship.

Saudi Arabia views the liberal international order through a pragmatic lens. It values the stability and economic opportunities provided by this order but diverges significantly over political governance and regional strategies.151 The kingdom’s political system – a closed absolute monarchy with limited room for dissent – is at odds with the democratic principles and human rights values of the liberal international order. Saudi Arabia’s human rights record – including the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, continued jailing of activists, the long-running war in Yemen since 2015, among other touchpoints – has strained relations with the US and European states. The use of capital punishment, which last year reached its highest level in decades, is sure to draw further criticism.152

While efforts to liberalize Saudi society – such as the announced curtailing of the religious police in 2016 – have earned praise from the West, dissent and political debate remain tightly controlled. A new Saudi nationalism and identity that shift away from religion to embrace national celebrations and citizen empowerment are being crafted. The aim is to support top-down changes, rally around the leadership and harness national energy to deliver Vision 2030.153 National discourse remains united around these themes; any citizens who have divergent or more critical views self-censor and are very cautious about making public statements. Civil society members, activists, journalists and members of the economic and political elite have been jailed, barred from international travel and targeted for their political criticism, partly due to an anti-corruption campaign under way since 2017.

The kingdom has long been frustrated by what it sees as Western double standards where principles of non-aggression and sovereignty are not fairly applied.

The kingdom has long been frustrated by what it sees as Western double standards where principles of non-aggression and sovereignty are not fairly applied. This tension has been acute since the start of the war in Gaza following Hamas’s attacks on 7 October 2023, and given what the Saudis see as the West’s unequivocal support for Israel. Accusations of hypocrisy are not new and date back over two decades to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 where Saudi Arabia saw the US try to bend international rules for its own purposes. It is worth noting that the kingdom was vehemently opposed to the US invasion, fearing that the removal of the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, whose regime had helped to contain Iranian regional influence, would lead to Iran’s empowerment across the region. Riyadh accused the US and Western partners of inconsistency during the 2011 Arab Spring protests, pointing repeatedly to Syria where in 2012 President Barack Obama rowed back on his famous ‘red line’ that US action would follow were the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, to use chemical weapons against his people. Further charges of double standards stem from the unilateral Western defence of Ukraine and sanctions against Russia while little support or action has been seen to protect Palestinian life.

Riyadh essentially sees a mismatch between Western actions and value-driven statements. In response, particularly when Riyadh’s interests appear to be harmed, Saudi leadership and policymakers have challenged Western policy more forcefully, pushing back against Western critiques of the kingdom. This occurred after the Russian invasion of Ukraine when Saudi Arabia did not immediately condemn Russia’s violation of international law and kept an open channel to Moscow. Riyadh will likely use future tension points and accusations of double standards to push back against interference in its domestic affairs and defend what it sees as its national interests.154

Saudi perceptions of US power

Like much of the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has been deeply impacted by what it views as increasing inconsistency in US politics and policy. During the Obama presidency (2009–17), the kingdom witnessed Washington pull away from the Middle East and prioritize geopolitical competition with China and Russia, alongside a US-centric domestic agenda. To the dismay of leaders in Riyadh, the subsequent Trump and Biden administrations continued the same theme. A list of divergences that have included Washington’s response to the 2011 Arab uprisings (seen as supportive of protests at the expense of traditional regional partners), the poorly planned US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and, above all, the uneven US approach to Middle East security have produced tensions between both capitals. Criticism by Congress of the kingdom’s human rights record and its war in Yemen also ruffled feathers in Riyadh.155

Saudi leaders have been frustrated by US policy fluctuations vis-à-vis Iran – notably from the negotiations that led to the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement to the US withdrawal from that agreement in 2018, and President Donald Trump’s imposition of ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions. The Iran-backed attack on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019 complicated things further. Trump initially responded with forceful rhetoric but then retreated from confrontation, making it clear that the US did not want a direct war with Iran. Trump was judged to be close to the Saudi political establishment, so his vacillation alarmed the kingdom’s leaders. In January 2020, the US eventually killed Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force. Despite this, Washington’s inconsistency alongside the lack of an effective plan to manage Iran’s nuclear and regional behaviour left an indelible mark on the US–Saudi relationship. Little was changed subsequently by President Joe Biden’s approach of incremental conflict management through side agreements to contain Iran’s regional activities and nuclear acceleration – an approach which Riyadh views to be neither durable nor effective.

Differences with the US administration persisted, fuelled by pointed criticism in the US of Khashoggi’s murder and Biden’s withdrawal of offensive support for the war in Yemen. Saudi Arabia responded with a new, cooler approach. It rebuffed US pressure to pick sides over the Ukraine invasion, and instead has maintained strategic relations with Moscow.156 The kingdom is seeking to broaden and diversify economic and political ties with other global players and middle powers. Nonetheless, the various shifts and strains within the US–Saudi relationship have resulted in an important, pragmatic mutual re-evaluation – one in which Riyadh continues to favour a security-based relationship with Washington.

Saudi Arabia seeks consistency above all in its relationship with the US. The kingdom engaged in negotiations with the former Biden administration to stabilize the relationship via a defence and security treaty that would provide some mutually binding defence commitments and expand cooperation to include energy and counterterrorism policy. Having seen how the Iranian nuclear deal was a non-binding US commitment instituted through an executive order, Riyadh was insisting on obtaining approval from the US Congress to secure the deal.157 The proposed security pact has also been linked to broader US efforts aimed at promoting Saudi–Israeli normalization.

On Israeli–Palestinian relations, Riyadh was disappointed that these issues were not at the forefront of the Biden agenda in the Middle East. However, Washington did embrace accelerated plans to enhance greater regional integration and normalization of ties between Israel and Arab states, building on the 2020 Abraham Accords. Prior to the 7 October Hamas attacks and war in Gaza, as part of an intended tripartite Saudi–Israeli normalization deal, Riyadh would have obtained important defence and security guarantees from Washington, while Israel would have revived a peace process with Palestine. That vision was also articulated at the 2023 G20 Summit in India where Biden unveiled plans for the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) that would build connectivity and infrastructure across geographies including Israel, Jordan and the Gulf states.158

Given the war in Gaza, the prospect of Israel normalizing ties with Saudi Arabia seems dim, and plans of regional integration that include a broader vision of economic connectivity have stalled. In November 2024, frustrated by Israel’s war aims and lack of engagement on a peace process, the Crown Prince accused Israel of genocide.159 The kingdom has led an international coalition of more than 90 countries to support the establishment of a Palestinian state – a move that Riyadh sees as critical to its broader vision of regional stability.160 While not advocating for Palestinian statehood, Trump in his second presidency will push American Arab partners like Saudi Arabia to share the burden of regional security crises, including in Gaza. Despite his wild statement calling for the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza so that the territory could be redeveloped into the ‘Riviera of the Middle East’, Trump is expected to promote Israeli–Saudi normalization in an effort to secure what is often referred to as ‘the deal of the century’.161 For Saudi Arabia, the broader aim of such a negotiation would be to achieve a permanent US-oriented security arrangement while also establishing a political horizon for Palestinian statehood which it now sees as necessary to achieve broader regional security.

Managing multipolarity: the best of all worlds

In an increasingly multipolar world beset with geopolitical tensions, Riyadh is primarily seeking strategic autonomy. It aims to maintain balance in its relationships with major powers like the US, China, Russia and to a lesser extent Europe. The Saudi minister of investment, Khalid al Falih, said: ‘I don’t see our relationship with the U.S. [and] with China as being mutually exclusive. I think, in fact, they complement each other.’162

In an increasingly multipolar world beset with geopolitical tensions, Riyadh is primarily seeking strategic autonomy. It aims to maintain balance in its relationships with major powers like the US, China, Russia and to a lesser extent Europe.

Notwithstanding its traditional security partnership with the US, Riyadh has pursued independent policies, especially in energy and regional politics. For example, in 2022, at the outset of the Ukraine invasion, Riyadh rebuffed US calls to increase energy production, insisting on production cuts with OPEC+ that led to higher prices that benefited Russia. Washington saw this move as politically motivated.

The kingdom has described its position as one of ‘active neutrality’ leading it to balance strategic decisions with diplomatic gestures. In 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted 40 countries for a two-day Jeddah peace summit and invited the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the Arab League summit. The kingdom, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), also helped to negotiate prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine, continues to put itself forward as a mediator between the US and Russia,163 and at the time of writing had already hosted separate sets of talks between, respectively, the US and Russia and the US and Ukraine.

In the same vein and despite US concerns, Sino-Saudi relations have continued to accelerate. They have moved from limited interactions to a comprehensive and strategic partnership that encompasses economic, political and cultural dimensions. China is Saudi Arabia’s top export destination. According to 2023 IMF figures,164 Saudi exports to China, the majority of which consist of crude oil, amounted to $54.3 billion, three times higher than exports to the US. The comprehensive strategic partnership has brought China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the kingdom’s Vision 2030 into ‘alignment’, notably via agreements over technology, hydrogen and infrastructure investment.165 Military cooperation has also increased, with China supporting the development of Saudi Arabia’s ballistic missile capability. In addition, Beijing played a key mediating role in bringing Riyadh and Tehran’s long-time estrangement to an end in March 2023. Like many autocratic Arab states, Saudi Arabia also appreciates China’s policy of non-interference in domestic affairs.166 As both nations continue to evolve economically and politically, their partnership is likely to deepen further. However, Beijing’s limited ability to manage or contain Middle East conflicts and its unwillingness to choose sides in regional contests reveal the limitations of this cooperation for Riyadh.

As mentioned above, Riyadh continues to see Washington as the primary security guarantor of the Middle East. With the second Trump administration, Riyadh will seek to obtain a long-term stable arrangement with Washington. As part of any agreement, Washington will impose limits on Saudi Arabia’s technical and military cooperation with China, while the kingdom may benefit from US technological and defence investments. Saudi Arabia also hopes to gain US support for its own civilian nuclear programme, although Washington is unlikely to provide Riyadh with sought-after nuclear fission processing technology.

Ultimately, Riyadh is seeking the best of both worlds – to advance its multipolar aims and to avoid having to pick sides. To advance its objectives, the kingdom is strategically cultivating a portfolio of diverse international relationships. With its security still anchored in the West and its economy in the East, multipolarity is seen as a better outcome for Riyadh.

Foreign policy and multilateralism

To more effectively counter geopolitical shifts and tensions, Riyadh is adopting a more assertive foreign policy aimed at showcasing its leadership in the Middle East and North Africa region and its relevance as a middle power on the international stage. This assertiveness is also tied to domestic shifts associated with Vision 2030.

The kingdom has also been playing a global mediation and multilateral role, requiring Saudi policymakers to invest in complex mediation and conflict stabilization efforts.167 With Saudi Arabia having once turned down the Arab seat at the United Nations Security Council, this shift towards greater multilateral involvement reflects a dramatic change in the kingdom’s posture. Riyadh’s G20 presidency, held during the COVID-19 pandemic, should be seen as the beginning of its outward-facing diplomatic presence. The kingdom also convened multilateral summits such as the extraordinary Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Arab League gatherings in December 2023 to press (albeit without success) for a ceasefire, humanitarian aid and a peace settlement to the war in Gaza. It also led on a 2023 regional initiative to invite Syria under its then president, Bashar al-Assad, back to the Arab League after a decade-long suspension.168

To more effectively counter geopolitical shifts and tensions, Riyadh is adopting a more assertive foreign policy aimed at showcasing its leadership in the Middle East and North Africa region and its relevance as a middle power on the international stage.

Riyadh has been simultaneously bolstering its international relationships and its participation in alternative minilateral and multilateral forums. It became a dialogue partner at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in March 2023 and has been considering joining the BRICS grouping to leverage greater economic cooperation with partner countries.169 However, Riyadh’s delay in accepting the invitation to the group is likely due to the unclear and conflicting objectives of the many countries involved that range from Iran to Ethiopia to India. Through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia has hosted summits with China, Central Asian states and the US. In 2020, Riyadh founded a council of countries from around the Red Sea basin. It is important to note that the council has not provided maritime support to contain Houthi action in the Red Sea since the war in Gaza.170

Saudi Arabia faces competition from its smaller, nimbler neighbour, the UAE. The two states have been on competing sides in a number of regional conflicts including in Sudan, Libya and Yemen. Economic competition between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh has also intensified. Should these dynamics continue without resolution or more direct management, they could undermine Riyadh’s bold Vision 2030-focused objectives.

Attention to regional security

The kingdom’s leadership has understood that Saudi security is predicated on regional security. This has led Riyadh to pursue direct diplomacy in often adversarial regional relationships and to embrace pragmatic outreach. Since the war in Gaza, and given that conflict’s impacts on the broader region, the kingdom has been more assertive in managing crises.

A direct approach in managing regional rivalries has led to some de-escalation and reconciliation with long-standing adversaries. As a result, Saudi Arabia has improved relations with Turkey and Iran, and has extended collaboration with Central Asian states, Brazil, India and South Korea, among others. This outreach is connected to the Vision 2030 goals of increasing foreign direct investment as well as investing in soft power to build long-term partnerships and increase security for the kingdom.171

Part of this foreign policy shift involves a political rehabilitation of the kingdom’s image, important both for broader economic and international objectives and for the Crown Prince. Saudi Arabia’s reputation has long been marred by criticism of human rights abuses and of its sponsorship of Islamic radicalism. However, its reputation hit new lows during the 2015–19 period. Reflecting the ambitions and the impatience of the new Saudi leadership, that period could be considered a ‘trial-and-error’ phase of foreign policy application. Riyadh was enmeshed in its long and brutal war in Yemen and was pursuing some clumsy diplomacy. Conflict with Lebanon led to the forced resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2017, with suggestions that he was held hostage in Riyadh. In 2018, trade and diplomatic ties with the Canadian government were suspended after it criticized Saudi Arabia’s detention of women activists on social media; the ties were only restored in 2023. Also in 2018 was the killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, drawing worldwide outrage and condemnation.172

The 2017 blockade of Qatar imposed by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt was another low point. This badly conceived attempt to intervene in a neighbouring state caused a rift which lasted until 2021. The action failed to garner broader support and led to Qatar’s strengthened ties with Iran, Turkey and even the US, all of which were moves that the blockading parties were seeking to avoid. The 2021 Al Ula agreement enabled Gulf states to resume diplomatic relations and helped Saudi leaders to make amends with Turkey, where ties had also been strained.173

Another important development has been the rapprochement with Iran negotiated over 18 months, and which resulted in the March 2023 agreement brokered by China. Current diplomatic efforts are now aimed at producing direct engagement to stem bilateral and regional conflict. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran has seen lengthy periods of rivalry, regional competition and antagonism. Through its sponsorship of regional proxies, Iran had developed deterrence capabilities, expanded its regional influence and threatened neighbours including Saudi Arabia. As part of the reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which has seen an uptick in diplomatic and military exchanges, Riyadh hopes to contain Iranian transgressions and gradually achieve a change in Tehran’s behaviour.174 Israeli efforts to degrade Iranian-backed groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, alongside the dramatic departure of Tehran’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, from Syria, have left Iran in a weaker regional position. Despite these key changes, Iran’s nuclear programme and drone and missile capabilities still pose challenges for Riyadh, which sees no alternative other than to engage in a direct approach. President Trump’s intention to reimpose maximum pressure sanctions on Tehran could prompt incidents similar to the 2019 Iran-backed attacks on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais. To manage such challenges and to prevent further regional instability, the kingdom will likely try to temper the Trump administration’s approach.

Ending the costly war in Yemen has become a focal point for Riyadh’s broader objective of achieving regional stability. Despite Saudi, UAE, UK and US military efforts, Houthi advancements in Yemen have not been curtailed. With Iran’s support and sponsorship, the Houthis have acquired the capacity and technology to direct missiles and drones over Saudi Arabia. These capabilities, which led to numerous strikes in Saudi Arabia and also hit the UAE in January 2022, have raised the long-term risk potential to damage infrastructure, disrupt tourism and deter investment in the Saudi Vision.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Saudi Arabia declared a unilateral ceasefire in 2020 to encourage the Houthis to engage in peace talks. Although this did not produce a lasting ceasefire, it was an attempt to reduce hostilities and create a conducive environment for negotiations. Saudi Arabia proposed a new peace initiative in March 2021, which included a nationwide ceasefire, the reopening of Sanaa airport, and the easing of restrictions on Hodeidah port. The initiative was supported by the UN and the US but faced resistance from the Houthis.175 Since then, diplomatic efforts have focused on a permanent peace agreement. However, those have been derailed by Houthi activities in the Red Sea related to the Gaza war, jeopardizing Riyadh’s immediate goals of ending the Yemen conflict. Containment of that conflict and delicate management of relations with the Houthis will be paramount to achieving the economic objectives of Vision 2030, and to improving security on the Arabian Peninsula and in the Red Sea.