CHATHAM HOUSE - Research paper - Competing visions of international order 06 Brazil sees opportunity in a multipolar order Professor Oliver Della Costa Stuenkel Associate Professor, School of International Relations, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), São Paulo; Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), Washington, DC

 

CHATHAM  HOUSE  - Research paper - Competing visions of international order 

06 Brazil sees opportunity in a multipolar order

Professor Oliver Della Costa Stuenkel

Associate Professor, School of International Relations, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), São Paulo; Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), Washington, DC

Multipolarity may suit Brazil’s preference for strategic flexibility and its claim to a greater global role – but the country faces difficult choices ahead when navigating great power competition.

Brazil’s strategic outlook is profoundly shaped by the confluence of the country’s size – it is the world’s fifth-largest country by area and boasts the seventh-largest population – and sense of vulnerability, the latter symbolized by its relatively limited military power, its proximity to the United States and its difficulties in controlling its 16,800 km-long borders, the world’s third-longest. This combination of factors explains both Brazil’s ambition to play a global role and its deep-seated concern about sovereignty and foreign interference – themes which have shaped Brazil’s worldview and foreign policy strategy since independence.

This vast territory and population, along with Brazil’s dominant position in South America and a profound awareness of its unique cultural identity – which encompasses Western, African and Indigenous influences, as well as large diasporas from the Middle East and Japan – all contribute to the belief among foreign policy elites that Brazil has a distinctive role to play on the international stage. This belief, often overlooked by foreign observers, is a shared trait between Brazil and the other BRICS127 founding members, who see themselves as natural contenders for a leading role in global affairs.

Brazil has tended to see international law, rules and norms, and multilateral institutions, as the best means to protect its interests. Its diplomatic corps has long prided itself on its capacity to ‘punch above its weight’ at multilateral forums such as the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This tradition goes back to the early 20th century, when Brazil advocated for treaty-based multilateralism at the Second Hague Conference in 1907, standing against the imperial ambitions of European powers. As Marcos Tourinho writes, at the time major powers of the day aimed to create a system resembling the classic European model, with differentiated privileges based on military might. Conversely, a coalition of Latin American countries, spearheaded by Ruy Barbosa, a Brazilian politician and writer, argued that international governance must be grounded in the principle of sovereign equality among all states.128 One may dismiss the relevance of such traditions, given that countries’ foreign policy strategies are often based on aspirations, leading states to couch their goals in a language based on idealism and altruism. Yet this historical background remains crucial to comprehending how Brazil perceives itself on the global stage.

Brazil’s diplomatic corps has long prided itself on its capacity to ‘punch above its weight’ at multilateral forums such as the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organization.

This long history of actively defending rules and norms explains why Brazil feels authorship and co-ownership of today’s multilateral system.129 It does not regard the current order as a US or European invention but as the product of complex and multidirectional negotiations between Western and non-Western countries. Brazil was a founding member of the United Nations and was present at its inception in San Francisco in 1945. The fact that the country came relatively close to being granted a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (US president Franklin D. Roosevelt had lobbied on Brazil’s behalf, but the Soviet Union was opposed) is regularly invoked to show that Brazil’s claim to greater responsibility is far from recent.130 This explains why Brazil’s foreign policy elites tend to believe that the rise of non-Western powers does not inherently weaken multilateral structures but reflects their evolution in response to shifting global dynamics. They thus fundamentally disagree with many Western scholars who associate the emergence of multipolarity and the West’s declining influence with growing instability – and who tend to agree with the neorealist scholar Kenneth Waltz, who argued that multipolarity is unstable.131

Western interlocutors often seem surprised to hear that Brazilian elites view the shift to multipolarity as both unavoidable and beneficial.132 While this might seem counterintuitive – given that a multipolar world is likely to be more turbulent, unpredictable and potentially dangerous for a militarily weak country such as Brazil – Brasília still views it as an opportunity and believes that multipolarity offers greater strategic autonomy and the ability to navigate between competing powers. Brazil’s historical goal of constraining US influence is central to this perspective, which has long been a source of concern, particularly regarding US interference in Latin American countries’ domestic affairs.

This apprehension vis-à-vis the US is not entirely unfounded. Some fears – such as conspiracy theories about foreign plans to seize control of the Amazon – are exaggerated. But they stem from a genuine distrust rooted in history, symbolized by the continued relevance of the Monroe Doctrine.133 Recent threats by US president Donald Trump against Panama, as well as the prospect of US military intervention in neighbouring Venezuela in 2019, during Trump’s first presidency, for instance, caused concern within Brazil’s military establishment. It also explains why the then Brazilian president, Jair Bolsonaro, despite being firmly pro-Trump, was unwilling to support the US president’s strategy of refusing to rule out the use of force to unseat Nicolás Maduro as Venezuela’s president. After all, such an action would have set a troubling precedent for the region.

The 2013 revelations of US National Security Agency espionage on Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, also complicated the bilateral relationship. This scandal abruptly ended a carefully nurtured rapprochement between Brazil and the US under Rousseff and Barack Obama, who refused to issue a public apology. For Brazilian policymakers, these episodes exemplify the dangers of a unipolar world dominated by a single power that cannot be held accountable, strengthening their preference for a multipolar order that promises more balance and reduced dominance by any one state.

This historical context explains why Brazil’s policymaking elites responded to the Soviet Union’s collapse with hesitation and unease rather than relief and celebration, as was common across the West.134 Yet Brazil’s cautious reaction in the early 1990s had little to do with nostalgia for the Soviet Union or any advantages gained from bipolarity. Instead, its leaders were focused on maintaining strategic autonomy and limiting the reach of US influence in Latin America – a region where Brazil aspired to lead but where Washington had long played a far more relevant role than Brasília.

A sceptical approach to globalization and democracy promotion

Brazil has never fully embraced the Western-centric global liberal narrative, whether inspired by Kantian ideals of democratic peace or Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis. While the cultural influence of the West remains deeply ingrained – particularly that of the US and, to a lesser extent, Europe, as critical cultural reference points for Brazilian society – alternative perspectives have consistently shaped Brazil’s worldview. For instance, concerns that globalization could undermine national sovereignty and economic independence have long been present in Brazil’s debates and have shaped policy, even during the heyday of globalization in the 1990s, when other nations, such as Mexico, embraced economic liberalization. Similarly, the notion that the state should retain a significant role in regulating the economy continues to enjoy ample support. Numerous attempts in the past to industrialize Brazil through state-led policies produced mixed results at best, yet there is no sign that Brazilian governments will abandon them – quite the contrary in fact.

Concerns that globalization could undermine national sovereignty and economic independence have long been present in Brazil’s debates and have shaped policy.

These factors contributed to Brazil’s relatively cautious approach to economic liberalization in the 1990s and explain why, until this day, politicians who defend it are often accused of being ‘entreguistas’ (which loosely translates as ‘sellouts’), a pejorative label used to describe policymakers perceived as being overly submissive or willing to ‘surrender’ national resources, sovereignty or interests to the US.

Unlike countries such as Argentina and Chile, where many policymakers (often trained in US universities) at times enthusiastically implemented Washington Consensus reforms, Brazil was far more reluctant and concerned about the harmful effects of globalization on its domestic industries. This made Brazil’s experience with market reforms less disruptive and politically contentious than that of its regional neighbours, but it also contributed to less economic dynamism and to protectionism, which generally benefited national economic elites, facilitating crony capitalism.135

Consequently, the political elite in Brazil never fully embraced the optimistic Western belief in the irreversible transformation of the global order and the spread of liberal democracy following the Cold War. In Brazil, that belief was largely limited to pockets of the business and academic elites with little influence. The Bolsonaro government defended liberalizing the economy to some extent. Yet growing protectionism around the world and the growing risk of a renewed trade war between the US and China limit Brazil’s capacity to sign large trade deals, even though the two most recent administrations (of Bolsonaro and that of the current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva) have made an effort to sign more trade agreements. The ratification of the Mercosur–EU trade deal, which would be unprecedented in size for both sides, remains uncertain and still faces significant resistance in Europe.

In the same way, despite its strong democratic tradition, Brazil remained sceptical of democracy promotion as a foreign policy priority, mainly because it was seen to stand in inevitable tension with national sovereignty.136 Unlike Western powers, Brazil has historically avoided embedding its foreign policy within a liberal ideological framework. It neither sought to promote its democratic model globally nor did it develop a ‘civilizing mission’ rooted in a belief in its own superiority, akin to the approaches pursued by other states. US-led initiatives such as the Summit for Democracy under Joe Biden (and similar ones by Bill Clinton in the 1990s) have often been met with indifference or even resistance in Brasília, reflecting Brazil’s wariness of initiatives that prioritize ideological alignment over pragmatic cooperation.

Brazil’s outlook, however, is far from pessimistic. While it did not share the West’s enthusiasm during the so-called ‘end of history’, after the end of the Cold War, it does not embrace the West’s current disillusionment or despair. Brazil views these shifts pragmatically as the global order transitions towards multipolarity, recognizing opportunities in a world where Western dominance is less pronounced. At the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro in November 2024, for example, Brazil sought to take a leading role in the fight against poverty and inequality. Given its role as a critical exporter of numerous agricultural commodities, the Brazilian government argues that it can contribute.137

Brazil’s perceptions of US power

In Brazilian policy circles, the US is recognized as a key player in maintaining international order but paradoxically is also perceived as the greatest threat to global stability. It often surprises Western observers that Brazilian officials, regardless of political orientation, often identify the US – rather than China, Iran or North Korea – as the primary destabilizing force in global affairs.

This perspective explains why countries like Cuba and Venezuela, despite their weak economies, poor human rights records and large-scale emigration, are still able to garner significant support in Brazil and other parts of Latin America for standing up to US hegemony. Brazilian diplomats often question the credibility of global rules and norms when the US proclaims itself the indispensable nation, free to disregard the rules when that suits its interests. Such scepticism helps to explain why Western anxieties about issues like ‘Chinese sharp power’ resonate less in Brazil and why US warnings about the subject often sound disingenuous or paternalistic to Brazilians.138 After all, for much of the 20th century, what Latin Americans experienced from the US felt anything but benign. At the same time, China adroitly uses a discourse of South–South solidarity and emphasizes ‘win-win’ relationships and respect for sovereignty (which, of course, is facilitated by the significant geographic distance between China and Latin America). In addition, given the profound asymmetry in Brazil’s relationship with Washington, maintaining strong ties with other powers, such as China and Russia, remains a strategic priority.139

Foreign policy: a difficult balancing act

For decades, Brazil’s primary foreign policy objective has been to safeguard its sovereignty and strategic autonomy to advance its socio-economic development. To achieve this, the prevailing foreign policy approach emphasizes avoiding fixed alliances in favour of adaptable partnerships. By maintaining strategic flexibility, Brazil seeks to maximize its bargaining power with major powers like the US and China by preserving various options. This approach – variously described as non-alignment, multi-alignment, strategic equidistance or strategic neutrality – stands out as one of the rare points of agreement across Brazil’s political spectrum, uniting both the left and the right.

For decades, Brazil’s primary foreign policy objective has been to safeguard its sovereignty and strategic autonomy to advance its socio-economic development.

Whenever Brazilian presidents have leaned too heavily into either anti-America or anti-China rhetoric, Congress has intervened to promote a more balanced approach, safeguarding the interests of the country’s economic elites. This dynamic was evident during Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019–22) when his first foreign minister, Ernesto Araújo – a vocal supporter of Trump and a proponent of conspiracy theories – was removed after Congress grew concerned that his harsh criticism of China could jeopardize relations with Brazil’s largest trading partner since 2009. Similarly, Brazil’s economic and political elites and its military have consistently prioritized maintaining strong ties with the US, which remains the single-largest source of foreign direct investment in Brazil. For example, when Bolsonaro and his allies considered orchestrating a coup after his 2022 electoral defeat, significant parts of the military ultimately rejected the idea, largely because they feared it would severely damage relations with Washington.140 This scenario suggests that Brazil, regardless of who wins the presidential elections in 2026, will seek to preserve its current strategy of maintaining ties to all major players despite growing tensions among them.

Brazil’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine clearly illustrates its broader foreign policy approach. This stance likely would have remained unchanged even if Bolsonaro, a right-winger, had secured re-election in 2022. Like most other developing nations, Brazil condemned Russia’s aggression and backed several United Nations General Assembly resolutions, including one early in the war that called for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine.141 However, Brazil refrained from endorsing Western sanctions against Russia, aligning instead with the position of numerous developing countries that viewed such measures as disproportionately harmful to economies still recovering from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.142 Lula has also been careful not to antagonize the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. He has made numerous comments about the war that can be described as pro-Russian and in 2024 presented, along with China, a ‘peace plan’ that the Kremlin regarded as friendly, and that was rejected by Ukraine.143

Some Western analysts interpret Brazil’s neutral stance on the war in Ukraine as either weakening the liberal international order or exposing its fragility. From Brasília’s perspective, however, Western insistence on the moral imperative to denounce Russia’s invasion is often seen as hypocritical. Brazilian officials frequently highlight examples of Western double standards, such as the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, its support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, and NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, which shifted from protecting civilians in Benghazi to a broader regime-change operation. While the West has been vocal about Russia’s violation of international law in Ukraine, many in Brazil note the West’s reluctance to condemn Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestinian territories and its insufficient efforts to prevent mass civilian casualties in Gaza. In the same way, the US decision not to become part of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and to threaten its judges with sanctions is seen across the Global South as a sign that Washington is only willing to defend international law when doing so is aligned with its national interest. Seen from Brasília, this selective application of international norms underscores the West’s tendency to prioritize geopolitical interests over universal principles. This issue is often aggravated by what is perceived in the Global South as the West’s hectoring rhetoric.

This critique of Western policies, of course, does not exempt Brazil’s foreign policy from scrutiny, and the West is certainly not alone in applying rules and norms selectively. Lula’s rhetoric on the Ukraine war has faced domestic criticism for appearing overly sympathetic to Russia. Some argue that his position may be shaped by pragmatic calculations, long-standing anti-American sentiment, and tacit admiration for Russia’s defiance of US hegemony. Lula’s remarks suggesting that the US bears responsibility for the continuation of the war and that Ukraine should consider territorial concessions have drawn a particular backlash both at home and abroad, with critics warning that such a stance could undermine Brazil’s credibility when it seeks international support to uphold the rules-based order. In the same way, Lula’s criticism of the ICC’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Russia’s president – and his initial comments that he would assure Putin could come to the G20 Summit in Brazil without fearing arrest – undermine the image that Brazilian diplomats have long sought to project. This often-uncomfortable balancing act reflects broader tensions in Brazil’s foreign policy, where its desire for strategic autonomy sometimes conflicts with the expectations of a principled stance in global affairs based on the public narrative of Brazil as a staunch defender of international law.

Brazil and the liberal international order

Brazil frequently argues for the reform of the global order, contending that institutions such as the UN Security Council no longer reflect contemporary power dynamics, which thereby undermines their legitimacy and, ultimately, global stability. It also challenges entrenched practices like the unwritten rule that a European must lead the International Monetary Fund while the US controls the appointment of the World Bank president. The country’s participation in the BRICS grouping stems significantly from dissatisfaction among its foreign policy elites with the limited progress of institutional reform efforts during the 2000s.

Brazil frequently argues for the reform of the global order, contending that institutions such as the UN Security Council no longer reflect contemporary power dynamics.

However, Brazil does not seek to overturn the global system. Unlike revisionist powers such as Iran, Venezuela, Nicaragua, North Korea or Russia, it is neither fundamentally anti-Western nor anti-American. Critics may point out that while Brazil frames its quest for reform as a noble pursuit, it is ultimately interested in joining a small number of countries with institutionalized privileges (e.g., as a permanent member of the UN Security Council) rather than genuinely seeking to make global order fully democratic.

Still, Brazil has worked with India to moderate BRICS summit declarations, ensuring the final version of the texts avoids overtly anti-Western tones. Brasília’s stance has often countered Russia’s policy preferences, frequently leading to tensions between Brasília and Moscow at intra-BRICS meetings. This dynamic has been visible since 2014, when Russia invaded the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. For example, while Putin often describes BRICS as a counterweight to the G7, Lula likes to point out that BRICS is ‘against no one’.144 Despite opposing BRICS expansion, Brazil and India failed to prevent the inclusion of new members like Iran in 2024, which is set to alter the group’s dynamics in the future. This reflects Brazil’s more nuanced approach: it criticizes the current order but does not advocate overthrowing it.

Brazil’s critique of the liberal international order is not rooted in opposition to its values but to the selective and, according to Brazilian policymakers, hegemonic ways they have frequently been implemented. Government officials frequently point to structural inequities, such as the in-built privileges for Western powers and the inconsistent enforcement of norms. From Brazil’s perspective, the liberal order is often neither liberal nor orderly but is shaped by explicit and implicit hierarchies. For example, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 without UN Security Council authorization, NATO’s reinterpretation of Resolution 1973 to justify regime change in Libya in 2011, and the use of the SWIFT financial system as a tool to isolate Russia exemplify how rules have been, according to many Brazilian observers, distorted for hegemonic purposes.

Brazilian policymakers generally do not fault the liberal rules and norms themselves but rather the actors who manipulate or disregard them. In this regard, there are significant differences between Brazil and countries such as Russia and Iran. The unifying thread among BRICS countries is thus not a criticism of the principles that underpin global rules and norms but a shared desire to counterbalance the US. Naturally, BRICS members also diverge on numerous issues. For example, while Brazil largely seeks to constrain Washington’s ability to act unilaterally – without the ‘permission slip’ of global consensus – China aims to secure privileges similar to those the US enjoys.

This rhetoric seems to reflect Brazil’s aspiration for a rules-based order that is genuinely equitable and universally upheld, reflecting its broader push for systemic reform rather than radical upheaval. Yet, of course, Brazil cannot hide the fact that it too may often defend rules and norms inconsistently – for example, when Lula suggested he would welcome Putin in Brazil, despite the active ICC arrest warrant against the Russian president. In the same way, Lula’s rhetoric on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine essentially embraces the Kremlin’s narrative, for example, when he accused the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, of not being willing to negotiate a peace agreement.

China–US rivalry: opportunity and risk for Brazil

For two reasons, Brazilian foreign policy elites perceive China’s rise as largely positive. From an economic point of view, that ascent has brought substantial benefits, with China becoming Brazil’s biggest trading partner in 2009. Secondly, China’s emergence as a global power contributes to the development of a multipolar world, enhancing Brazil’s leverage and flexibility when dealing with Washington. While this shift may result in a more volatile and conflict-prone international system compared to US-led unipolarity, Brazilian policymakers see the opportunities it creates as outweighing the downsides. Brazil’s preferred multi-aligned strategy may become more challenging and costly with the emergence of a ‘digital iron curtain’ in the context of the intensifying ‘tech war’ between the US and China, which may create two mutually exclusive and incompatible spheres of technological influence.145

Non-alignment remains a cornerstone of Brazil’s foreign policy, and there is little domestic debate over its merits, given that all alternatives seem unnecessary and excessively disruptive from an economic point of view. This strategy is reinforced by the uncertainty surrounding the trajectory of the US–China rivalry. Despite certain parallels between Brazil and the US – both are large, vibrant democracies grappling with socio-economic inequality and polarization – Brasília does not regard cultural and political similarities as a decisive factor in crafting its foreign policy strategy. With US domestic politics becoming increasingly unstable and with bipartisan consensus on foreign policy waning, fence-sitting is seen as the preferential strategy by both the left and right in Brazil, especially after Trump’s election victory in November 2024.

However, the growing tensions of a new cold war present significant challenges to Brazil’s neutral stance. Washington’s pressure on Brasília and other Latin American governments to curtail the use of 5G technology from China’s Huawei has largely backfired, being perceived as unwelcome interference. Yet, as economic decoupling between China and the US spreads – encompassing areas like biotechnology and electric vehicles – the costs of non-alignment may rise. Both Beijing and Washington are expected to intensify efforts to compel countries like Brazil to take sides on critical economic and geopolitical issues.

This dynamic is causing unease among Brazilian policymakers, particularly as many expect the second Trump administration to adopt a more aggressive stance towards curbing Chinese influence in Latin America. Remarks in the memoirs of Trump’s former National Security Advisor, John Bolton, have amplified these concerns, particularly Trump’s claim that Venezuela is ‘really part of the United States’ and his insistence on exploring military options for the country.146 Such rhetoric underscores the challenges that Brazil could face in navigating great power competition.

The US–China rivalry thus represents both an opportunity and a risk for Brazil. China’s rise seems to have strengthened Brazil’s strategic autonomy. However, the increasing polarization of the global order may limit its room for manoeuvre, forcing difficult choices in the years ahead – especially if the US increases pressure on countries to move away from China.