CHATHAM HOUSE - Research paper - Competing visions of international order 11 French global status rests on averting bloc geopolitics Dr Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer Director, Paris Office, German Marshall Fund of the United States Martin Quencez Fellow and Deputy Director, Paris Office, GMF

CHATHAM  HOUSE - Research paper - Competing visions of international order 

11 French global status rests on averting bloc geopolitics

Dr Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer

Director, Paris Office, German Marshall Fund of the United States

Martin Quencez

Fellow and Deputy Director, Paris Office, GMF

The French view of the changing international order is marked by pessimism – especially at France’s own declining influence – and pragmatism over how best to preserve the country’s interests.

France’s current domestic political turmoil reflects deep insecurities about its role and place on the world stage. The perception of decline, applied to the country as well as to Europe in the context of US–China competition, is shared by a large majority of the population and fosters an appetite for change. Some policymakers, such as President Emmanuel Macron, have argued that the evolution of the international order requires France to lead the emergence of a geopolitical Europe in order to promote and defend French interests. Others, notably among the far-right National Rally, favour a return to a more nationalist approach of foreign policy and reject the constraints of any form of supranational rule or organization.

The European security landscape has undergone a significant transformation in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Combined with the United States’ strategic focus on China and questions surrounding the reliability of US leadership, the evolution of France’s strategic environment has accelerated the debate about the country’s role in the international system. The direction of French foreign policy will be influenced by shifting power dynamics in the deeply divided domestic political arena, as well as by the changing role of the US in European affairs.

France aims to preserve the existing multilateral organizations which have bestowed on Paris a strong international influence. Support for targeted reforms is meant to consolidate these organizations and help the international order to overcome current geopolitical crises. This strategy, however, does not fully address the issue of France’s relative power decline at the international level, and the costly implications of US–China competition.

A guarantor of the liberal international order

France’s power depends on stability of the order

France was one of the principal beneficiaries of the creation of the post-Second World War international order, joining a select group of nations tasked with shaping and leading new global institutions. Its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and its special role within the International Monetary Fund are testament to this position. France’s attachment to a rules-based order pre-dates 1945, as illustrated by its involvement in the creation of the League of Nations. Its foreign policy culture has long valued the country’s contribution to international law.243

France was one of the principal beneficiaries of the creation of the post-Second World War international order, joining a select group of nations tasked with shaping and leading new global institutions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs encourages French citizens to join international organizations and sees this as a form of leverage for the country’s international influence. As of 2023, France was a member of 190 such organizations and approximately 20,000 French citizens worked for one of these, making up almost 9 per cent of their staff.244

The attributes of France’s power in the world today explain its attachment to the post-1945 international order. Its foreign, economic and defence policies rely on institutions and capabilities that depend on the stability of this order. The country’s position as a founding member of the European Union and of NATO provides the main leverage for its action in Europe. It is also one of the five acknowledged nuclear powers, an active defender of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a major contributor to the budget of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Decolonization has also left a legacy of diplomatic ties with powers in the Global South as well as a far-reaching territorial presence and stewardship of the world’s most extensive exclusive economic zone, as defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Reforming to preserve the order

The defence of France’s interests is inherently linked to the preservation of the liberal international order, particularly its multilateral institutions. Despite facing relative economic, demographic and military decline, Paris has managed to leverage its position to strengthen its industrial and trade assets. The use of diplomatic influence to maximize economic interests, illustrated by growing trade prerogatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is visible in the multiple arms deals that France has signed over the past decade. These contracts, often linked to a strategic partnership with the purchasing country, made France the second largest arms exporter in the world between 2019 and 2023.245 Such commercial successes depend on the stability of the system of institutions, norms and values on which France’s international influence is founded. The 2022 National Strategic Review on Defence and Security emphasized the need to ‘promote a stable international order’ and underlined the risks for France’s security and interests in the event of a fragmentation of international rules.246 The unravelling of the arms control agreements concerning Europe is one of the most striking illustrations of these risks.

In light of this, France’s political leaders have tried to find the right balance between preserving the status quo and supporting reforms to the international order to guarantee its survival. The reform of the UN Security Council is emblematic of this endeavour. France officially supports the efforts of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan to become permanent members, and it recognizes the need to have an ‘increased presence’ of African countries. This stance is meant to reinforce the legitimacy of the Security Council and to increase its peacekeeping responsibilities.

In this context, France wants to position itself as a moderate voice in the competition among great powers. French policymakers oppose the more radical changes promoted by China or Russia, but they are also inclined to hold the US accountable when it appears to disregard international norms and regulations. In the recent debates around the International Criminal Court’s decision on Israel and Hamas, France clearly expressed its support for the court’s independence.247 However, while this position was generally shared by the figures who dominated the French political landscape until the 2010s, the rise of the far-right National Rally may change that broad consensus. The National Rally is opposed to any form of supranational constraints on France’s national sovereignty and, should it win the presidency in 2027 or form a government, it is likely to seek to invest less in the reform and survival of the liberal international order.

A pessimistic vision of the international order and US politics

A more violent and competitive world

France’s political leaders have a profoundly cautious perspective on the current shifts in the global landscape. This reflects their concern over the rapid and complex changes that are reshaping international relations and the potential implications for their country’s strategic interests. Their vigilance is indicative of a broader apprehension about the stability and predictability of the evolving world order.

France’s political leaders have a profoundly cautious perspective on the current shifts in the global landscape. Their vigilance is indicative of a broader apprehension about the stability and predictability of the evolving world order.

There is widespread agreement that the global environment is set to become more hostile, with increased power competition likely to undermine the principles of the liberal international order and cooperation. The ‘return of geopolitics’ is seen as inevitable and underpins France’s focus on the necessity for Europe to defend its interests more assertively through competition rather than through cooperation. This was highlighted in all of the recent strategic documents produced by the governments of presidents Nicolas Sarkozy,248 François Hollande249 and Macron,250 displaying the broad consensus within the French strategic and political community.

This sentiment also reflects the French public’s deeper concerns. Since 2014, the share of French adults who say in polls that France is in decline has fluctuated between 69 per cent and 86 per cent, with 34 per cent saying in September 2023 that its decline had become irreversible.251 The French are also likelier than other Europeans to expect a shift in the global balance of power to the benefit of China. In the 2023 edition of Transatlantic Trends, 60 per cent of French respondents said that the US was the most influential actor in the world while 18 per cent said China was; but asked which would be the most influential actor in five years, 42 per cent said China, compared to 25 per cent for the US.252

The transformation of the international order is therefore broadly viewed as negative from a French standpoint, as it is likely to result in two main trends: the return of a logic of blocs among great powers, and an increase in violent competition in areas that are relevant to French interests.

Macron has repeatedly decried the return to a logic of blocs that pits a US-centric world against a China-centric one. For example, in 2022 he said: ‘Geopolitics is increasingly structured around the competition between the United States and China. And this competition is problematic to us for different reasons.’253 This reflects a commitment to a multipolar world order and a rejection of a simplistic bifurcation of global power structures. While French leaders have consistently affirmed a closer alignment with the US than with China, Paris stands against a strict decoupling from Beijing, and even de-risking policies trigger fierce debates. The US–China competition is seen as one of the main drivers of the erosion of multilateralism at the global level. The deadlock of UN institutions and the impossibility of any form of international cooperation on common challenges like climate change or terrorism are viewed as very costly consequences of this competition.

French economic and military interests are also directly affected by the growing competition among great and middle powers. Over the past decade, France has been challenged by Russia’s presence in Central and West Africa as well as by the competing actions of actors such as China and Turkey in North Africa. France’s disengagement from Mali and Niger, although driven primarily by local dynamics, was accelerated due to the actions of these external rivals. They have widely used disinformation campaigns and hybrid warfare in French overseas territories across the world, as seen in the recent actions by Azerbaijan and Russia to stoke the violent riots in New Caledonia.254 In this regard, France expects more frequent and violent contestation of its influence in the coming years, with its relations with Russia expected to stay at a new low and China likely to become increasingly active in undermining French strategic ambitions beyond Europe.

US disengagement, regardless of Trump

The trajectory of politics in the US is pivotal to France’s vision of the international order. A significant number of foreign policy experts have traditionally been sceptical of US leadership, and the relationship between the two countries has experienced significant strains over the last two decades, including disagreements over the Iraq war, President Barack Obama’s policy on Syria, President Donald Trump’s stance on Iran and climate issues, and the AUKUS alliance between Australia, the UK and the US. Since the Obama years, however, France’s chief concerns have been over potential US disengagement from European affairs. The diplomatic corps and strategic community consider the episode of the Obama administration’s ‘red line’ over Syria in 2013 as the embodiment of a new era in transatlantic relations, one characterized by a narrower definition of US interests and a decoupling of US and European strategic thinking.

This perspective was reinforced during both the first Trump administration 

(2017–21) and the Biden administration (2021–25), with the perception among French policymakers of two parallel developments: a shift in US strategic emphasis towards the Indo-Pacific region with the definition of China-focused foreign, trade, technological and defence priorities; and the US political class becoming more inward-looking and stuck in domestic disputes. The return of Trump to the presidency is being viewed as a major challenge, especially if it means the active deconstruction of the liberal international order.255 The French strategic community anticipates an incremental disengagement by the US from European affairs in the long run, regardless of the political party in power in Washington, as well as US protectionist decisions that will weaken international trade.

Redefining France’s role in the international order

Europe and national sovereignty as pillars of French power

France’s role in global affairs has led to a paradox among its foreign policy decision-makers. They find themselves facing the country’s waning influence on the world stage, while holding on to the belief that France must maintain its influence as a major power to preserve the status quo of the international system. This tension has sparked varied perspectives on the best approach for France to protect its interests in the evolving global landscape.

Since becoming president in 2017, Macron has consistently championed a perspective that is widely shared by political figures from the centre-right to the centre-left. This advocates France strategically using its role within the EU to maintain and enhance its position among the world’s leading powers. The EU is perceived as a bulwark against US hegemony and China’s economic coercion, and as the indispensable vehicle to prevent the ‘vassalization’ of France and Europe by either of those powers. This requires the EU to develop all the tools of a great power (economic and industrial strength, technological innovation and military capabilities) and to articulate its interests outside the transatlantic relationship whenever necessary. This approach also posits that the EU must be prepared to engage on an equal footing with its competitors, even at the cost of straying from certain tenets of the liberal international order. Specifically, in trade relations Macron has urged the EU to adopt a more pragmatic stance and to pursue an ‘EU sovereignty’ strategy aimed at reducing its strategic and economic dependencies while adopting protective measures in response to US and Chinese protectionism. He has also shown willingness to apply similar thinking to EU foreign and defence policy.

In the short term, this assertive vision requires France to take a leadership role in supporting Ukraine256 and to increase its contribution to defence and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank. It also explains Macron’s recent decisions and declarations on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as he perceives the war as a turning point for the EU as a geopolitical actor.

Another perspective on France’s global role highlights its distinct stance towards the US–China rivalry. It seeks to maintain its specificity within the Western alliances to which it is committed. This approach is deeply ingrained in the Gaullist tradition of French diplomacy and can take different forms – from the puissance d’équilibre [balancing power] concept introduced during Macron’s presidency to the aspiration for a ‘third way’ that presents an option for countries reluctant to side with either Beijing or Washington. This underlying concept in the French foreign policy debate either could suggest a pro-European outlook where the EU embodies this ‘third way’ – or it could point to a more nationally driven foreign policy that emphasizes the preservation of France’s sovereignty and ability to navigate great power competition.

Two points of consensus in the foreign policy debate

In terms of reinventing French foreign policy, both the alternatives above – the pro-European outlook and the more nationally driven approach – largely share two ideas: the rejection of a binary division of the world between the West and the ‘rest’, and a pragmatic attitude towards new formats of cooperation.

Since 2022 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, France’s political elites as well as its private sector and civil servants have expressed concern regarding the widening perception gap between the West and the Global South over various ongoing conflicts and crises. The country’s traditional role in the international arena, coupled with its colonial past and its economic interests spread across the globe, has shaped its approach to foreign policy. The global tensions stemming from the war in Ukraine and the Israel–Hamas war have raised alarm in Paris. Similarly, France has rejected any binary division of the world, notably promoted by the former Biden administration’s narrative – and also used by the European Commission’s president, Ursula von der Leyen – of a competition between autocracies and democracies. In France, this rejection can be found among the proponents of a strong geopolitical Europe, as they promote a multipolar order that is not structured around an ‘us versus them’ divide, and among the proponents of national sovereignty, who favour partnerships with India or the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Although its public discourse often highlights values, France’s foreign policy is primarily driven by pragmatism and a commitment to engage with all countries.

The same pragmatism can be found regarding formats of cooperation. While France regrets the slow unravelling of global institutions and continues to aim to ‘reinvent multilateralism’,257 it is ready to engage in minilateralism as well as bilateral strategic partnerships. The French vision for European cooperation – typically involving smaller, capable and willing coalitions within the EU – is reflected at the global level. Such groupings and agreements as the European Intervention Initiative, the Weimar Triangle with Germany and Poland, the Lancaster House Treaty with the United Kingdom and the Elysée Treaty with Germany have gained prominence in recent years. During Macron’s presidency, France has signed or reaffirmed bilateral partnerships with countries in Europe (Greece and Italy) as well as globally (India and the UAE). France even views the trilateral initiative with India and the UAE as a potential cornerstone for its strategy in the Indian Ocean.

While France regrets the slow unravelling of global institutions and continues to aim to ‘reinvent multilateralism’, it is ready to engage in minilateralism as well as bilateral strategic partnerships.

To sum up, France’s ability to meet current and future global challenges will probably come from a mix of the different approaches outlined above. Regardless of how domestic politics unfold, policymakers will aim to forge alliances with European partners, extending beyond the Franco-German axis, and to reshape partnerships with countries beyond the transatlantic sphere, including in areas of crisis management and diplomatic negotiations. Deepening cooperation with leading powers of the Global South, such as Brazil and India, will be an important priority in the coming years. The situations in Ukraine and Gaza will require the engagement of pivotal regional and international stakeholders: France can play an important mediating role in this by asserting its strategic complementarity with the US.