September 04, 2024
Background Press Call on Efforts to Secure the Release of Hostages in Gaza
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4:04 P.M. EDT
MODERATOR: Good afternoon, everyone. Eduardo here. Thanks so much for joining today’s call. As a reminder, this call is on background, attributable to a senior administration official.
For your awareness, not for your reporting, on the call today we have [senior administration official].
The goal of this call is to provide an overview of our efforts to secure the release of the remaining hostages.
I’ll turn it over to [senior administration official] for a few words at the top, and then we’ll take your questions.
Over to you.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hey, everybody. Thanks. Thanks for joining.
We wanted to just, to the extent we can — and it’s always risky in the middle of a negotiation — but given that there’s just so much out there about this process, and after just the horrific events of the weekend which we’ve all been grappling with, just to provide the opportunity to bring you all a little bit more inside the actual negotiation and what’s actually on the table, what has been worked out, and what is still being discussed.
So, if you could just indulge me here for about five minutes, I thought it’d be useful for me and us to go through just where we are and try to help clarify, you know, any outstanding questions and what we’re trying to do.
So let me just — obviously, this has been a negotiation that’s been going on for many months. As I think we’ve said before, it is a complex arrangement.
There are three primary components. One is the humanitarian and the benefits for Gazans that are kind of woven throughout this deal. That’s one part. The second part is a prisoner exchange; that is the hostages for Palestinian prisoners. And the third part are the ceasefire arrangements for what those arrangements will look like and including some redeployment of Israeli forces and the phasing, which I think you’re familiar with. But those are basically the three components of the deal.
The deal has 18 total paragraphs. Fourteen of those paragraphs are finished and, I have to say, are identical. You’ll sometimes hear Hamas say they agreed to a deal on July 2nd. Let me just explain that. There’s 18 paragraphs; 14 paragraphs are identical. One paragraph has a very technical fix, and the other three paragraphs have to do with the exchange of prisoners to hostages, which even Hamas’s own text of July 2nd explicitly says it has to still be negotiated.
So, basically, 90 percent of this deal has been agreed, and it’s been agreed on terms that even Hamas had in their own proposal.
On the humanitarian benefits — and I just — I wanted to go through this, what is already in the agreement, because I think this is somewhat lost in the debate of, if this deal goes forward, if Hamas agrees to release hostages, just what happens in Gaza.
So what is in the deal? You might remember the November deal. There was a requirement of 200 trucks of aid a day getting into Gaza. Again, this can happen because a ceasefire enables the movement of humanitarian aid and humanitarian workers in a ceasefire condition. Obviously much different than
conditions that you have with an ongoing conflict.
So in the November deal, the target of 200 trucks a day. In this deal — and again, this is all explicit in the deal and ready to go, because we’ve done an extraordinary amount of work to get ready for this — 600 trucks of aid a day. That would include about 50 trucks of fuel. So just over the first 42 days of the deal in phase one, if you do the math, you’re talking 25,000 trucks of assistance and aid for Gazans.
Also in the deal:
The immediate entry of equipment to clear rubble, as well as rehabilitation of hospitals, medical centers, bakeries across the Gaza Strip.
The rehabilitation of infrastructure, electricity, water, sewage, communications, and roads in all areas of the Gaza Strip.
The entry of supplies to support the internally displaced. That includes no less than 60,000 temporary homes, 200,000 tents.
Freedom of movement for civilians internally displaced. Full access for U.N. and other humanitarian organizations in all areas of the Gaza Strip.
I go through that because I was struck by some news stories
today kind of interviewing Gazans about how they feel about the Philadelphi Corridor, without any context of what is actually, like, in this deal and immediate relief for Gazans. And I’ll get to the Philadelphi Corridor in a second.
But just the provisions in this deal, interwoven throughout — which have been agreed and are ready to go if, again, hostages will be released — and the relief for Gazans, who are undergoing this hell on Earth, as we’ve called it, which is very true, is extraordinary, it would be immediate, and it’s ready to go.
The second component of the deal, which is quite complicated, is the prisoner exchange. And we have now — we really spent most of last week on this issue in Doha. And the terms of the deal — you would have hundreds of Palestinian prisoners coming out in exchange for the hostages, give or take 800 or so, including some very significant prisoners, including some with life sentences. I won’t go into all the details of that.
But, basically, what Hamas has been demanding here, the Israelis have come forward to meet the terms as best they can. And Hamas, frankly, on this issue, we’ve had a pretty frustrating process. And until that is worked out, you’re not going to have a deal, because that is a component — central component of the deal.
And I have to say, as we were negotiating last week off a list of hostages, we now have fewer hostages because six hostages were executed. And I just think that is something that we have to take full account of and why we have always been focused on the accountability for Hamas. It’s something that is obviously urgent in all of our efforts but is even more so after what happened over this weekend. It’s totally outrageous the execution of hostages that we were negotiating to release
in a tunnel underneath Rafah.
But that is the prisoner exchange component of the deal, which is central to it, which has been under negotiation, and which, you know, there was some progress on last week, but is difficult and requires Hamas to engage on it. Otherwise, you just can’t move forward.
There’s also a provision for the exit of wounded, not only civilians, but the exit of wounded Hamas militants — that is a part of the deal — for treatment and aid. Can get out of Gaza for that. That is in the deal; something they demanded. And it’s in the deal.
Let’s talk about the ceasefire arrangements. The ceasefire arrangements I think you’re familiar with, if you follow this. It is a three-phase process. First phase is 42 days, but that can continue. As the President laid out in May, that is still very much in the deal. So long as after 42 days there are talks going on to set the conditions for phase two, all the ceasefire conditions, all the humanitarian conditions I just mentioned all remain in place.
So, as soon as this deal starts, you have a full and complete stop to the war. You have a commitment from the mediators to help support those indirect talks to get to phase two. And phase two is a permanent ceasefire and a full withdrawal of Israeli forces.
Now, in phase one, it is not a full withdrawal of Israeli forces and it never has been. It is a withdrawal of all Israeli forces out of densely populated areas. And you have — maps have been produced. There are really two maps, one of which is agreed, on the Wadi — what’s known as the Wadi Gaza corridor in the north; that is very much mapped out in the agreement.
Nothing in the agreement mentions the Philadelphi Corridor. What the agreement says is they withdraw from all densely populated areas. And a dispute emerged whether the Philadelphi Corridor, which is effectively a road on the border of Gaza and Egypt, is a densely populated area. So, based on that dispute, the Israelis, over the course of the last couple weeks, produced a proposal by which they would significantly reduce their presence on the corridor — and I think John Kirby addressed this a little bit yesterday — a fairly significant reduction, but outside densely populated areas, which is technically consistent with the deal. But, of course, you don’t have a deal until there’s an agreement.
So that’s an issue that has remained in dispute and then has become a bit of a political debate in Israel. So that is an issue that’s in dispute, and there’s the issue of the prisoner exchange that’s in dispute. Other than that, that’s about it.
So, that is basically where this negotiation stands.
Now, before the events of this weekend, we had been working together with Egypt and Qatar on, kind of, the — particularly the arrangements of the prisoner exchange and putting together a package by which you would basically have everything worked out, the nuts and bolts of the deal, as I think Jake called it very accurately last week. And we were working through that, and then, of course, we had the execution over the weekend, which has kind of changed the character of some of that discussion, to say the least.
But that is basically where we’ve been. It’s where we are. We still see this deal, this very complex but necessary arrangement, as really the most viable, perhaps the only viable option for saving the lives of the hostages, stopping the war, bringing immediate relief to Gazans, and also making sure we fully account for Israel’s security. We think this deal does all that. We are still committed to doing all we can to try to get it done. But again, I’m not going to make any predictions on this call.
And the execution of hostages over the weekend is something that, as I said, is basically coloring the discussions. I think that’s true. It has brought a sense of urgency to the process, but it’s also called into question Hamas’s readiness to do a deal of any kind.
So, with that, I will turn it over to questions.
But I just wanted to kind of take some time, given I know you’re all reporting on this in various ways and there’s so much out there, to just kind of go through a little bit more what is actually in this deal, what’s not in the deal, and what we’re trying to do.
So, I’ll turn it over to questions.
MODERATOR: Thanks, [senior administration official]. We’ve got time for a few questions.
First up, we’ll go to the line of Aamer. You should be able to unmute yourself.
Q Hi. Can you hear me all right? Hey. So, the —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah.
Q On — you mentioned before the events of the weekend. I just wanted to clarify: Is essentially the Israelis saying because there are just fewer hostages left, what Hamas will get in return has to be less?
And then secondly, I was hoping you could just address: Is capacity a concern on how the U.S. can help Israel in the long term on this if this just continues to go on and on? And has that been conveyed? You know, there’s other parts — there’s (inaudible) of hotspots, and you have two aircraft carrier battle groups now in the Mediterranean. How long can that go on? And has any of that, sort of, sense of “capacity won’t last forever” been conveyed to the Israelis? Thank you.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On your second question: No, we’re very much we can have a sustainable forward posture in the Middle East. We can shift to other parts of the world when we need to. We have a very dynamic — one thing our military does that is extraordinary: its ability to move fast, quickly, in a very dynamic way, together with partners. That’s something I think we’ve demonstrated throughout this crisis; we’ve demonstrated in other theaters.
And now we are — one of our primary aims at the beginning of this was to contain this conflict to Gaza. That remains the case. I have to say, many enemies of Israel, the Iranians and others, that was not their intent in the beginning and have still been looking for ways to potentially expand the conflict.
But I think we’ve done a pretty good job here through diplomacy, a lot of back-channel diplomacy and deterrence — because without the deterrence, the diplomacy is not going to work — to try to ensure that we — as we work for the ceasefire, which, you know, I think everyone wants to see, and the hostage release, we’re also maintaining a deterrent posture. That deterrent posture will adjust, then go up and down over time depending on events and also depending on other circumstances. But we are ready and able to sustain what we’re doing.
On the number of hostages, you know, it’s a good question. I mean, having been involved in these negotiations, there’s a list of hostages, and we all have it, and Hamas has had it, and all the parties have had it, and there’s now fewer names on the list. And, you know, it’s horrific. And Hamas is threatening to execute more hostages.
So, I just — this cannot be lost in what we’re dealing with here. We all knew who we’re dealing with; we’re dealing with a terrorist group. But, you know, it does mean, in terms of the exchange, obviously, I just mentioned there’s — you know, for each hostage, there’s a certain number of Palestinian prisoners that will come out, so you just have fewer hostages as part of the deal in phase one. It’s tragic and awful, and, you know, it’s affecting all of us.
MODERATOR: Next up, we’ll go to Julian Barnes.
Q Hi. Thanks for taking the question. When do you think Egypt, Qatar, and the U.S. will be able to submit a bridging proposal on the corridor and the prisoners?
And in the prisoner case, how much is the veto over people with life sentences an issue? Or do you have a way forward to resolve or find a place on the veto?
And with the Philadelphi Corridor, is it really just about phase one, because subsequent phases would have no presence? Or is this really both about the phase one drawdown and longer-term presence in phase two?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks, Julian. So, on the first, let me kind of put that into context. So you asked about the veto for life sentences. So there are, give or take,
500 life sentences in Palestinian and Israeli prisons. Obviously, the number that would come out in phase one will be a fraction of that. That number had more or less been agreed to many months ago, including in a part of an agreement that Hamas put out many months ago. And the Israelis, obviously, will have some say and will have — in determining who those prisoners will be in the first phase.
So they have what’s called a veto, for lack of a better word, just in terms of certain prisoners will not come out, particularly in this first phase. And also, you need — that’s important because in phase two — again, just to rewind this a little bit: Phase one we’re talking about all women hostages will come out — that includes a number of women soldiers; all men over 50; and all ill and wounded hostages.
And I don’t want to get into numbers, but there’s not a significant number of those hostages who are still alive and need to get out of Gaza. So there will be a subset of the total number of life sentences, and that has been part of the negotiation for some time. There’s not — the principle of the veto is not an issue. It’s kind of the numbers and how you categorize.
So I don’t see that as a major stumbling block. However, Hamas has been putting some things on the table. Obviously, there have been complete non-starters when it comes to the exchange, and they’re different than what has been agreed months ago.
So, on the Philadelphi Corridor, as I mentioned, phase one, what the agreement says is out of densely populated areas. Phase two is — over the course of phase two, a full Israeli withdrawal, and the conditions of that would be negotiated over phase one. So we’re really talking here about phase one, about what that configuration will look like. And the Israelis put an offer down on the table a couple weeks ago, and, you know, we’re still continuing to work through that.
I have to say, we’re not at the — it’s not like there’s basically an agreement to be had. It’s done but for that issue. I mean, sometimes I’ve seen it characterized that way. That’s not — that’s not where we are. That’d be an easier problem to have. That’s not where we are. Because the prisoner exchange issue is — also has to be worked out.
So there’s a couple things here that we still need to conclude to have a deal. But I just — the discussion of the configuration on the Philadelphi Corridor has been a phase one discussion.
MODERATOR: Next up, we’ll go to Trevor Hunnicutt.
Q Thanks for doing this. Could you talk a little bit about what kind of timing we’re looking at for new language being put on the table and what that new language will look like in terms of the Philadelphi Corridor?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So, the whole — the packet — the package deal is a text, which, as I mentioned up front, is basically done other than, really, down to two paragraphs; is a annex of the prisoner exchange; and two maps showing redeployment of forces over the course of phase one. That’s what the package is.
Our bridging proposal of August 16th basically tried to put this together in a way, particularly bridging the gaps on the prisoner exchange, and I think went pretty far in that direction and finally opened up the actual discussion of names and how that would go, including a list of hostages, which is fundamental here. We need agreement on who the hostages are and who’s coming out.
So that’s what we’ve been working on, and so that’s what the package will have. I don’t want to get in — just the timing and everything else, I’m not going to make a prediction here. We’re going to try to get this right. We all feel the urgency, but we also, and especially after what happened last weekend, you know, it just — as I mentioned it, it changed the character of the discussion.
But we do want to try to get something together and in consultation with our fellow mediators, who are still consulting with Hamas on a daily basis, and, of course, in our discussions with the Israelis.
MODERATOR: Next up, we’ll go to Alex Marquardt.
Q Thank you, guys. And thanks for all this detail — it really does help out — especially on the Philadelphi Corridor, which, of course, Netanyahu has really been focused on in the past few days. And, in turn, that had seemed like the major sticking point. As you’ve laid out, it’s not as much. Phase one is not a full withdrawal.
But generally speaking, do you think that the Prime Minister’s focus on this maximalist position of never leaving Philadelphi is getting in the way of getting at least phase one off the ground, getting at least some of the hostages out?
And then, if I could: When the mediators are speaking with Hamas and they submit their answers and responses, do you know to what extent those are coming from Sinwar himself? Can you characterize his involvement in the most recent negotiations? Thanks.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I’ll be careful with how I characterize the — I’ve never been involved in a negotiation where, basically, every day there’s a public statement about the details of the negotiation, because it makes it difficult, especially in a hostage negotiation.
You know, so in my view, the less is said about particular issues, the better, as we work through it. And, you know, staking out concrete positions in the middle of a negotiation isn’t always particularly helpful.
But I do want to clarify that — and as I think I’ve tried to do — that it’s not like that’s the only issue. And what the agreement says — there’s a legitimate debate about densely populated areas and what that looks like. Okay?
So — and I will also say: However this agreement comes out, and if we’re fortunate enough to get this done and see the hostages coming home, we, as the United States of America, are going to make sure and certain that Israel’s security is a primary interest in this deal. I have seen some Israeli ministers say this deal somehow would sacrifice Israel’s security. That is just fundamentally, totally untrue.
We have taken account of Israel’s security concerns in this negotiation. And, if anything, I would argue that not getting into this deal is more of a threat to Israel’s long-term security than actually concluding the deal. And, frankly, that includes on the issues of the Philadelphi Corridor and the border with Egypt and everything else.
So, I started going so long with it. I think it’s just important context.
Yeah, and you’ve raised another difficult issue. Sinwar is — you know, as we know, Hamas leaders are living deep underground, in tunnels, as the civilians in Gaza are not allowed in the tunnels. So they’re living in tunnels. Hostages are in tunnels. And I think just provides a context to this awful conflict and the nature of Hamas and also the nature of a negotiation like this, because, ultimately, the final decision-maker is Sinwar. That was true before Haniyeh; it’s true now.
So, that means things have to go in to him. It also means that you don’t want to go in issue by issue; that’d take forever. It’s kind of the package. So, you submit the package. So that’s what we’re trying to get to so you can get a final answer of whatever the — you know, we did that with the bridging proposal. Done that a couple other times. And we’ll probably do that here in the — as we kind of make some adjustments.
MODERATOR: Last question will go to Karen DeYoung.
Karen, you should be able to unmute yourself. All right, we’ll —
Q I’m sorry, (inaudible). I didn’t recognize he was picking my name.
Hi, [senior administration official]. Thank you. Did I understand you correctly where you said that the Philadelphi Corridor, or at least parts of it, are outside the densely populated areas, as they are described in the original framework? That’s first of all.
And has that — is what you’re saying is that you believe, therefore, that certain parts of the corridor could — Israeli troops could remain there? And has that always been the U.S. position, or is it just since late July when Israel specified that it wanted to stay there?
And also, does — that seems contrary to what other officials have said here, you know, that — the State Department, they said yesterday, all densely populated areas includes the Philadelphi Corridor. So I wonder if you could clarify that.
And also, if you could address the question of the possibility of a U.S.-trained Palestinian force or any other force with EU monitors, or any other way, being used to address some of Israel’s concerns along the border. Is that on the table?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, so the — it’s a road. There are areas in which the Rafah city kind of juts up against it. This has been an extensive part of the negotiation of what is densely populated and what’s not. And so, yeah, there are configurations. And, in fact, I think what the Israelis put on the table a couple weeks ago is a significant reduction in the force that’s there now. And we have a map that kind of lays that out. And I think it’s consistent with the agreement. However, actually, we’re, as the U.S. position, not going to — our position is we need a deal. And so, until you have a deal, you don’t have a deal.
So, you know, if Israel has to make some additional adjustments on whatever issue to try to get a deal, and it’s within reason and doesn’t jeopardize Israel’s security, I think they should get a deal. Same thing on the Hamas side. There are things Hamas needs to do to deliver a deal here, and it’s on Qatar and Egypt to work with them to do that.
So, you know, I just want to be very clear: The agreement says what it says. There is a proposal from Israel that was put on the table a couple weeks ago. It’s a significant reduction in forces along the corridor. Kind of maps it out where Israeli forces would be, would not be, in what I think anyone would consider a densely populated area. It’s got a significant reduction of forces.
At the same time, until you have an agreement, you don’t have an agreement. Until you have an agreement, the hostages are not coming home and the war doesn’t stop. So, you know, I think that’s the reality that we’re all grappling with, or we’re trying to find a formula that can ultimately work, which also gets to your second question.
We feel pretty confident about the security arrangements around the corridor. And, obviously, this is Egypt’s border as well. We have had deep discussions with the Egyptians on the security of their border. They want that border to be secure. They do not want any smuggling across that border. There are things, obviously, the United States can do to support Egypt as we support our other partners. So, we have done a lot of work here over the last four to five months, particularly on this question.
And so, we think we can fully account for Israel’s security needs on that corridor in ways that would be almost unprecedented, and that does not require some alternative security force just because of the nature of the border. Kind of west of the — west of the Rafah crossing, you have a very secure — pretty secure border. You have to have arrangements in place to detect against tunnels and other things, but you have a very secure border.
Again, at the Rafah crossing, we believe we have worked out arrangements at the Rafah crossing for phase one, arrangements that allow the effective operation of that crossing for purposes of the deal. And then east of the Rafah crossing is from Rafah to Kerem Shalom. It’s kind of a different situation, and there’s really not densely populated areas there.
So, in any case, that’s kind of where we are on the issue care.
MODERATOR: Thanks, everyone. That’s all the time we have for today. I know there are some remaining questions. Feel free to reach out to the team, and we’ll get back to you.
Thanks to [senior administration official] and everyone for joining. We’ll talk again soon.
4:33 P.M. EDT
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