Throughout this year, American officials have been privately and publicly signaling to their Chinese counterparts that the United States is firmly committed to upholding its alliance commitments to the Philippines. The message is intended as a warning not to test the limits of American tolerance for Chinese attempts to obstruct access to Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef in the South China Sea where a grounded Philippines vessel, the Sierra Madre, serves as an outpost for Filipino soldiers. In May, Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., delivered a keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, warning that if a Filipino citizen is killed by a willful act, it would be “very, very close to what we define as an act of war,” which could compel the Philippines to invoke the 1951 mutual defense treaty with the United States.

Such rhetoric has not stopped Beijing from trying to prevent the Philippines from resupplying the Sierra Madre. The Philippines has successfully reinforced the outpost in recent months. But on June 17, the Chinese coast guard intentionally collided with a Philippine resupply boat. Chinese servicemen wielded axes, machetes, and improvised spears, and a Filipino sailor lost a finger in the ensuing skirmish. A video of the confrontation went viral. Chinese and Philippine vessels continue to operate close to one another. The risk remains high that an incident could result in the death of a Filipino soldier, potentially triggering the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty and bringing American and Chinese forces to the brink of conflict.

To manage through this current moment, Washington will need to operate with clarity on its goals. For Washington, success is upholding the credibility of its alliance commitments, avoiding conflict with China, and preventing Chinese occupation of Second Thomas Shoal. Achieving these results will require Washington to weigh every policy decision against whether it does more to prevent or provoke a crisis. Second Thomas Shoal is a strategic challenge with a military dimension. It is not a military problem with a military solution. Washington must resist pressure to frame this issue as a test of wills between the United States and China and instead leverage Beijing’s bullying at Second Thomas Shoal to strengthen its relationships in the region.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS

Second Thomas Shoal carries tremendous symbolic weight for the United States, China, and the Philippines. At present, there is little hope of compromise. Washington views the struggle over Second Thomas Shoal as threatening the credibility of its security commitments, which underpin the United States’ standing in Asia and around the world. If Washington fails to stand firm in defense of the Philippines, the thinking goes, then other allies and security partners will question the United States’ reliability and begin to hedge.

For Manila, Second Thomas Shoal has become a national symbol of the country’s determination to stand up to Chinese bullying and uphold international law. In 2016, a tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that China cannot claim sovereignty over Second Thomas Shoal and sovereign rights over it are vested in the Philippines. Second Thomas Shoal sits on the Philippine continental shelf and falls within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. Manila is determined to prevent the Chinese from building an artificial island at Second Thomas Shoal, as Beijing previously did at Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation with similar legal standing as Second Thomas Shoal.

Beijing believes it has exercised restraint by refraining from dislodging the Sierra Madre and from employing the Chinese navy to use force in obstructing Philippine resupply efforts. Beijing alleges that Manila has reneged on a gentlemen’s agreement with the administration of Rodrigo Duterte on limits to the resupply efforts, but the current government under Marcos has responded that no such agreement exists. Chinese officials further insist that the Philippines would not be so reckless in confronting China over Second Thomas Shoal were it not for the urging and military backing of the United States.

Given the conflicting imperatives of the three major participants, the United States will need to walk a tightrope. It cannot allow itself to be seen as passive in the face of Chinese pressure against its treaty ally. On the other hand, Washington must preserve its position as defender of the status quo, thereby sharpening the contrast with China’s revisionist attempts to alter the situation at Second Thomas Shoal.

THE MIDDLE WAY

U.S. policymakers must resist the urge to turn Second Thomas Shoal into a contest of wills between the United States and China and urge Beijing to do the same. The more the standoff becomes publicly framed as a showdown between great powers, the more likely that nuclear-armed rivals could find themselves in a nose-to-nose confrontation over a rusting boat.

Instead, Washington should use every available diplomatic channel with Beijing to clearly lay out its objective to uphold the status quo at Second Thomas Shoal and to insist that Beijing reciprocate in kind. Such mutual clarity of intentions will shrink space for miscalculation. At the same time, Washington should make clear that the more China pressures the Philippines, the more the United States will feel obliged to provide countervailing support for its ally. Washington’s immediate focus is on limiting risk that the current struggle could spiral into an armed conflict. Washington should press Beijing to reduce its public and physical pressure on Manila and instead engage directly with Philippine counterparts to manage tensions. A meeting held between Chinese and Philippine diplomats on July 2 was an encouraging step in this direction.

U.S. policymakers must also be publicly supportive and privately firm with their Philippine counterparts. Washington should privately counsel Manila against unilateral uncoordinated actions that could lead to escalation. It should make clear that it supports direct talks between Manila and Beijing to de-escalate tensions. Washington should also encourage Manila to refrain from publicizing every encounter between Philippine and Chinese forces near Second Thomas Shoal. China is not embarrassed by evidence of its heavy-handedness when it comes to its assertions of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The more international media highlight every cat-and-mouse encounter between Chinese and Philippine forces, the more public pressure there will be on leaders in Beijing, Manila, and Washington to demonstrate resolve. This heightened public scrutiny and accompanying nationalist fervor will make diplomacy more difficult.

Washington should enlist as many concerned countries as possible to privately counsel Beijing against further escalation. Greater engagement by more actors, especially the Southeast Asian states that Beijing seeks to pull closer, will make the current dispute seem less like a binary clash between the United States and China. It could also compel China’s political leaders to take a more active role in managing Chinese actions around Second Thomas Shoal, rather than leave major decisions to military and paramilitary leaders, who may feel compelled to act in ways that heighten risk of dangerous escalation and be less inclined to explore off-ramps.

Additionally, successful negotiations among South China Sea claimants over their own maritime disputes will sharpen the contrast between responsible statesmanship and China’s bullying behavior. Washington should express support for efforts by Vietnam and the Philippines to negotiate their maritime boundaries and encourage other Southeast Asian claimants with disputes to follow suit.

Crucially, Washington policymakers will need to tune out U.S. security hawks who want to force a confrontation with China by using American military assets for resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal. Proponents of this approach argue that because China is not yet prepared for direct conflict with the United States, Beijing surely would back down if it realizes that Washington is ready to use force to protect its ally. Washington would be unwise to test the theory that China is a paper tiger that would back down in the face of concerted American action. Such reckless logic underestimates Chinese President Xi Jinping’s own political imperatives; although Xi may wish to avoid direct conflict with the United States, he is even more determined to avoid being perceived as weak or soft at home.

But de-escalation need not mean capitulation. Washington must not push Manila to yield to Chinese demands at Second Thomas Shoal, as this would amount to doing Beijing’s bidding. If Washington were to suggest to Manila that it abandon or weaken its position at Second Thomas Shoal, such a message would likely leak to the media, resulting in a loss of confidence among the United States’ allies about its willingness to stand up to China, to say nothing of the lasting damage it would do to the U.S.-Philippine alliance.

COOLER HEADS

Charting a middle path between aggression and acquiescence will require subtlety and patience. It will not yield any moment of triumph. And yet it holds the best hope of limiting the risk of a conflict involving the United States and China in the South China Sea.

To deter China, Washington must make clear to Beijing that it will respond to Chinese aggression by boosting its support for Manila. To that end, the United States must maintain a strong, persistent military presence in the region. Washington should also continue to invest in military facilities in the Philippines that Manila has allowed the United States to access under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. It could also announce plans for additional high-level delegations to expand economic investment in the country, building on Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo’s trade delegation in March.

Washington would also be wise to use this crisis as an opportunity to expand its visible presence in the region. Its recent ramping up of combined maritime patrols with allies in the South China Sea has been a good start and should be built upon. Additional U.S. freedom of navigation operations in other areas of the South China Sea could redirect Beijing’s focus away from Second Thomas Shoal. Investing in the capabilities of Southeast Asian partners such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam to operate more effectively in the maritime domain could also serve as a timely signal of U.S. displeasure at Beijing’s aggression in the South China Sea.

As fraught as the current moment feels, it is not the first time that China, the Philippines, and the United States have edged close to the precipice. There was a period of similarly elevated tensions in 2016 around Scarborough Shoal, a remote rock in the South China Sea roughly 120 miles off the coast of the Philippine island of Luzon. In that instance, leaders engaged directly and privately, and cooler heads prevailed.

Much has changed since 2016, but one thing remains the same: for all concerned, there is far more to lose than gain from a spiraling conflict. The situation at Second Thomas Shoal is a struggle between China and the Philippines that has been managed for decades and will need to be managed for many years to come. The United States’ best option for limiting risk is to chart a middle path between succumbing to a military test of wills and putting pressure on the Philippines to give in to Chinese pressure. Conflict is possible, but far from preordained.