Wednesday, March 4, 2020

Why America Must Lead Again by Josph R. Biden Jr.

Why America Must Lead Again
Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., served as Vice President of the United States from 2009 to 2017 and is a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.


By nearly every measure, the credibility and influence of the United States in the world have diminished since President Barack Obama and I left office on January 20, 2017. President Donald Trump has belittled, undermined, and in some cases abandoned U.S. allies and partners. He has turned on our own intelligence professionals, diplomats, and troops. He has emboldened our adversaries and squandered our leverage to contend with national security challenges from North Korea to Iran, from Syria to Afghanistan to Venezuela, with practically nothing to show for it. He has launched ill-advised trade wars, against the United States’ friends and foes alike, that are hurting the American middle class. He has abdicated American leadership in mobilizing collective action to meet new threats, especially those unique to this century. Most profoundly, he has turned away from the democratic values that give strength to our nation and unify us as a people.

Meanwhile, the global challenges facing the United States—from climate change [1] and mass migration to technological disruption and infectious diseases—have grown more complex and more urgent, while the rapid advance of authoritarianism, nationalism, and illiberalism has undermined our ability to collectively meet them. Democracies—paralyzed by hyperpartisanship, hobbled by corruption, weighed down by extreme inequality—are having a harder time delivering for their people. Trust in democratic institutions is down. Fear of the Other is up. And the international system that the United States so carefully constructed is coming apart at the seams. Trump and demagogues around the world are leaning into these forces for their own personal and political gain. 

The next U.S. president will have to address the world as it is in January 2021, and picking up the pieces will be an enormous task. He or she will have to salvage our reputation, rebuild confidence in our leadership, and mobilize our country and our allies to rapidly meet new challenges. There will be no time to lose.

As president, I will take immediate steps to renew U.S. democracy and alliances, protect the United States’ economic future, and once more have America lead the world. This is not a moment for fear. This is the time to tap the strength and audacity that took us to victory in two world wars and brought down the Iron Curtain.

The triumph of democracy and liberalism over fascism and autocracy created the free world. But this contest does not just define our past. It will define our future, as well.

RENEWING DEMOCRACY AT HOME

First and foremost, we must repair and reinvigorate our own democracy, even as we strengthen the coalition of democracies that stand with us around the world. The United States’ ability to be a force for progress in the world and to mobilize collective action starts at home. That is why I will remake our educational system so that a child’s opportunity in life isn’t determined by his or her zip code or race, reform the criminal justice system to eliminate inequitable disparities and end the epidemic of mass incarceration, restore the Voting Rights Act to ensure that everyone can be heard, and return transparency and accountability to our government. 

But democracy is not just the foundation of American society. It is also the wellspring of our power. It strengthens and amplifies our leadership to keep us safe in the world. It is the engine of our ingenuity that drives our economic prosperity. It is the heart of who we are and how we see the world—and how the world sees us. It allows us to self-correct and keep striving to reach our ideals over time.

As a nation, we have to prove to the world that the United States is prepared to lead again—not just with the example of our power but also with the power of our example. To that end, as president, I will take decisive steps to renew our core values. I will immediately reverse the Trump administration’s cruel and senseless policies [2] that separate parents from their children at our border; end Trump’s detrimental asylum policies; terminate the travel ban; order a review of Temporary Protected Status, for vulnerable populations; and set our annual refugee admissions at 125,000, and seek to raise it over time, commensurate with our responsibility and our values. I will reaffirm the ban on torture and restore greater transparency in U.S. military operations, including policies instituted during the Obama-Biden administration to reduce civilian casualties [3]. I will restore a government-wide focus on lifting up women and girls around the world. And I will ensure that the White House is once again the great defender—not the chief assailant—of the core pillars and institutions of our democratic values, from respecting freedom of the press, to protecting and securing the sacred right to vote, to upholding judicial independence. These changes are just a start, a day-one down payment on our commitment to living up to democratic values at home.
I will enforce U.S. laws without targeting particular communities, violating due process, or tearing apart families, as Trump has done. I will secure our borders while ensuring the dignity of migrants and upholding their legal right to seek asylum [4]. I have released plans that outline these policies in detail and describe how the United States will focus on the root causes driving immigrants to our southwestern border. As vice president, I secured bipartisan support for a $750 million aid program [5] to back up commitments from the leaders of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to take on the corruption, violence, and endemic poverty driving people to leave their homes there. Security improved and migration flows began to decrease in countries such as El Salvador. As president, I will build on that initiative with a comprehensive four-year, $4 billion regional strategy that requires countries to contribute their own resources and undertake significant, concrete, verifiable reforms.
I will also take steps to tackle the self-dealing, conflicts of interest, dark money, and rank corruption that are serving narrow, private, or foreign agendas and undermining our democracy. That starts by fighting for a constitutional amendment to completely eliminate private dollars from federal elections. In addition, I will propose a law to strengthen prohibitions on foreign nationals or governments trying to influence [6] U.S. federal, state, or local elections and direct a new independent agency—the Commission on Federal Ethics—to ensure vigorous and unified enforcement of this and other anticorruption laws. The lack of transparency in our campaign finance system, combined with extensive foreign money laundering, creates a significant vulnerability. We need to close the loopholes that corrupt our democracy.
Having taken these essential steps to reinforce the democratic foundation of the United States and inspire action in others, I will invite my fellow democratic leaders around the world to put strengthening democracy back on the global agenda. Today, democracy is under more pressure than at any time since the 1930s. Freedom House has reported [7] that of the 41 countries consistently ranked “free” from 1985 to 2005, 22 have registered net declines in freedom over the last five years.
From Hong Kong [8] to Sudan, Chile to Lebanon, citizens are once more reminding us of the common yearning for honest governance and the universal abhorrence of corruption. An insidious pandemic, corruption is fueling oppression, corroding human dignity, and equipping authoritarian leaders [9] with a powerful tool to divide and weaken democracies across the world. Yet when the world’s democracies look to the United States to stand for the values that unite the country—to truly lead the free world—Trump seems to be on the other team, taking the word of autocrats while showing disdain for democrats. By presiding over the most corrupt administration in modern American history, he has given license to kleptocrats everywhere.

During my first year in office, the United States will organize and host a global Summit for Democracy to renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world. It will bring together the world’s democracies to strengthen our democratic institutions, honestly confront nations that are backsliding, and forge a common agenda. Building on the successful model instituted during the Obama-Biden administration with the Nuclear Security Summit [10], the United States will prioritize results by galvanizing significant new country commitments in three areas: fighting corruption, defending against authoritarianism, and advancing human rights in their own nations and abroad. As a summit commitment of the United States, I will issue a presidential policy directive that establishes combating corruption [11] as a core national security interest and democratic responsibility, and I will lead efforts internationally to bring transparency to the global financial system, go after illicit tax havens [12], seize stolen assets, and make it more difficult for leaders who steal from their people to hide behind anonymous front companies.

The Summit for Democracy will also include civil society organizations from around the world that stand on the frontlines in defense of democracy. And the summit members will issue a call to action for the private sector, including technology companies and social media giants, which must recognize their responsibilities and overwhelming interest in preserving democratic societies and protecting free speech [13]. At the same time, free speech cannot serve as a license for technology and social media companies to facilitate the spread of malicious lies. Those companies must act to ensure that their tools and platforms are not empowering the surveillance state [14], gutting privacy, facilitating repression in China and elsewhere, spreading hate and misinformation, spurring people to violence, or remaining susceptible to other misuse.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE MIDDLE CLASS

Second, my administration will equip Americans to succeed in the global economy—with a foreign policy for the middle class. To win the competition for the future against China or anyone else, the United States must sharpen its innovative edge and unite the economic might of democracies around the world to counter abusive economic practices and reduce inequality.

Economic security is national security. Our trade policy has to start at home, by strengthening our greatest asset—our middle class—and making sure that everyone can share in the success of the country, no matter one’s race, gender, zip code, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. That will require enormous investments in our infrastructure [15]—broadband, highways, rail, the energy grid, smart cities—and in education. We must give every student the skills necessary to obtain a good twenty-first-century job; make sure every single American has access to quality, affordable health care [16]; raise the minimum wage to $15 an hour; and lead the clean economy revolution to create ten million good new jobs—including union jobs—in the United States.

I will make investment in research and development a cornerstone of my presidency, so that the United States is leading the charge in innovation. There is no reason we should be falling behind China or anyone else when it comes to clean energy, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, 5G [17], high-speed rail, or the race to end cancer as we know it. We have the greatest research universities in the world. We have a strong tradition of the rule of law. And most important, we have an extraordinary population of workers and innovators [18] who have never let our country down.

A foreign policy for the middle class will also work to make sure the rules of the international economy are not rigged against the United States—because when American businesses compete on a fair playing field, they win. I believe in fair trade. More than 95 percent of the world’s population lives beyond our borders—we want to tap those markets. We need to be able to build the very best in the United States and sell the very best around the world. That means taking down trade barriers that penalize Americans and resisting a dangerous global slide toward protectionism [19]. That’s what happened a century ago, after World War I—and it exacerbated the Great Depression and helped lead to World War II.

The wrong thing to do is to put our heads in the sand and say no more trade deals. Countries will trade with or without the United States. The question is, Who writes the rules that govern trade? Who will make sure they protect workers, the environment, transparency, and middle-class wages? The United States, not China, should be leading that effort.
As president, I will not enter into any new trade agreements until we have invested in Americans and equipped them to succeed in the global economy. And I will not negotiate new deals without having labor and environmental leaders at the table in a meaningful way and without including strong enforcement provisions to hold our partners to the deals they sign.
China represents a special challenge. I have spent many hours with its leaders, and I understand what we are up against. China is playing the long game by extending its global reach, promoting its own political model, and investing [20] in the technologies of the future. Meanwhile, Trump has designated imports from the United States’ closest allies—from Canada to the European Union—as national security threats in order to impose damaging and reckless tariffs. By cutting us off from the economic clout of our partners, Trump has kneecapped our country’s capacity to take on the real economic threat.

The United States does need to get tough [21] with China. If China has its way, it will keep robbing the United States and American companies of their technology and intellectual property. It will also keep using subsidies to give its state-owned enterprises an unfair advantage—and a leg up on dominating the technologies and industries of the future.
The most effective way to meet that challenge is to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners to confront China’s abusive behaviors and human rights violations, [22] even as we seek to cooperate with Beijing on issues where our interests converge, such as climate change, nonproliferation, and global health security. On its own, the United States represents about a quarter of global GDP [23]. When we join together with fellow democracies, our strength more than doubles. China can’t afford to ignore more than half the global economy. That gives us substantial leverage to shape the rules of the road on everything from the environment to labor, trade, technology, and transparency, so they continue to reflect democratic interests and values.

BACK AT THE HEAD OF THE TABLE

The Biden foreign policy agenda will place the United States back at the head of the table, in a position to work with its allies and partners to mobilize collective action on global threats. The world does not organize itself. For 70 years, the United States, under Democratic and Republican presidents, played a leading role in writing the rules, forging the agreements, and animating the institutions that guide relations among nations and advance collective security and prosperity—until Trump [24]. If we continue his abdication of that responsibility, then one of two things will happen: either someone else will take the United States’ place, but not in a way that advances our interests and values, or no one will, and chaos will ensue. Either way, that’s not good for America.

American leadership is not infallible; we have made missteps and mistakes. Too often, we have relied solely on the might of our military instead of drawing on our full array of strengths. Trump’s disastrous foreign policy record reminds us every day of the dangers of an unbalanced and incoherent approach, and one that defunds and denigrates the role of diplomacy [25].

I will never hesitate to protect the American people, including, when necessary, by using force. Of all the roles a president of the United States must fill, none is more consequential than that of commander in chief. The United States has the strongest military in the world, and as president, I will ensure it stays that way, making the investments necessary to equip our troops for the challenges of this century, not the last one. But the use of force [26] should be the last resort, not the first. It should be used only to defend U.S. vital interests, when the objective is clear and achievable, and with the informed consent of the American people.
It is past time to end the forever wars [27], which have cost the United States untold blood and treasure. As I have long argued, we should bring the vast majority of our troops home from the wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East and narrowly define our mission as defeating al Qaeda and the Islamic State (or ISIS). We should also end our support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. We must maintain our focus on counterterrorism, around the world and at home, but staying entrenched in unwinnable conflicts drains our capacity to lead on other issues that require our attention, and it prevents us from rebuilding the other instruments of American power.

We can be strong and smart at the same time. There is a big difference between large-scale, open-ended deployments of tens of thousands of American combat troops, which must end, and using a few hundred Special Forces soldiers and intelligence assets to support local partners against a common enemy. Those smaller-scale missions are sustainable militarily, economically, and politically, and they advance the national interest.
Yet diplomacy should be the first instrument of American power. I am proud of what American diplomacy achieved during the Obama-Biden administration, from driving global efforts to bring the Paris climate agreement [28] into force, to leading the international response to end the Ebola outbreak [29] in West Africa, to securing the landmark multilateral deal to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Diplomacy is not just a series of handshakes and photo ops. It is building and tending relationships and working to identify areas of common interest while managing points of conflict. It requires discipline, a coherent policymaking process, and a team of experienced and empowered professionals. As president, I will elevate diplomacy as the United States’ principal tool of foreign policy. I will reinvest in the diplomatic corps, which this administration has hollowed out [30], and put U.S. diplomacy back in the hands of genuine professionals.

Diplomacy also requires credibility [31], and Trump has shattered ours. In the conduct of foreign policy, and especially in times of crisis, a nation’s word is its most valuable asset. By pulling out of treaty after treaty, reneging on policy after policy, walking away from U.S. responsibilities, and lying about matters big and small, Trump has bankrupted the United States’ word in the world.

He has also alienated the United States from the very democratic allies it needs most. He has taken a battering ram to the NATO alliance, treating it like an American-run protection racket. Our allies should do their fair share, which is why I’m proud of the commitments the Obama-Biden administration negotiated to ensure that NATO members increase their defense spending (a move Trump now claims credit for). But the alliance transcends dollars and cents; the United States’ commitment is sacred, not transactional. NATO [32] is at the very heart of the United States’ national security, and it is the bulwark of the liberal democratic ideal—an alliance of values, which makes it far more durable, reliable, and powerful than partnerships built by coercion or cash. 

As president, I will do more than just restore our historic partnerships; I will lead the effort to reimagine them for the world we face today. The Kremlin fears a strong NATO, the most effective political-military alliance in modern history. To counter Russian aggression [33], we must keep the alliance’s military capabilities sharp while also expanding its capacity to take on nontraditional threats, such as weaponized corruption, disinformation, and cybertheft. We must impose real costs on Russia for its violations of international norms and stand with Russian civil society [34], which has bravely stood up time and again against President Vladimir Putin’s kleptocratic authoritarian system.

Working cooperatively with other nations that share our values and goals does not make the United States a chump. It makes us more secure and more successful. We amplify our own strength, extend our presence around the globe, and magnify our impact while sharing global responsibilities with willing partners. We need to fortify our collective capabilities with democratic friends beyond North America and Europe by reinvesting in our treaty alliances [35] with Australia, Japan, and South Korea and deepening partnerships from India to Indonesia to advance shared values in a region that will determine the United States’ future. We need to sustain our ironclad commitment to Israel’s security. And we need to do more to integrate our friends in Latin America and Africa [36] into the broader network of democracies and to seize opportunities for cooperation in those regions.

In order to regain the confidence of the world, we are going to have to prove that the United States says what it means and means what it says. This is especially important when it comes to the challenges that will define our time: climate change, the renewed threat of nuclear war, and disruptive technology.

The United States must lead the world to take on the existential threat we face—climate change. If we don’t get this right, nothing else will matter. I will make massive, urgent investments at home that put the United States on track to have a clean energy economy with net-zero emissions by 2050. Equally important, because the United States creates only 15 percent of global emissions [37], I will leverage our economic and moral authority to push the world to determined action. I will rejoin the Paris climate agreement on day one of a Biden administration and then convene a summit of the world’s major carbon emitters, rallying nations to raise their ambitions and push progress further and faster. We will lock in enforceable commitments that will reduce emissions in global shipping and aviation, and we will pursue strong measures to make sure other nations can’t undercut the United States economically as we meet our own commitments. That includes insisting that China—the world’s largest emitter of carbon— [38]stop subsidizing coal exports and outsourcing pollution to other countries by financing billions of dollars’ worth of dirty fossil fuel energy projects through its Belt and Road Initiative.

On nonproliferation and nuclear security, the United States cannot be a credible voice while it is abandoning the deals it negotiated. From Iran to North Korea, Russia to Saudi Arabia, Trump has made the prospect of nuclear proliferation, a new nuclear arms race, and even the use of nuclear weapons more likely. As president, I will renew our commitment to arms control for a new era. The historic Iran nuclear deal [39] that the Obama-Biden administration negotiated blocked Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Yet Trump rashly cast the deal aside, prompting Iran to restart its nuclear program and become more provocative, raising the risk of another disastrous war in the region. I’m under no illusions about the Iranian regime, which has engaged in destabilizing behavior across the Middle East, brutally cracked down on protesters [40] at home, and unjustly detained Americans. But there is a smart way to counter the threat that Iran poses to our interests and a self-defeating way—and Trump has chosen the latter. The recent killing of Qasem Soleimani [41], the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, removed a dangerous actor but also raised the prospect of an ever-escalating cycle of violence in the region, and it has prompted Tehran to jettison the nuclear limits established under the nuclear deal. Tehran must return to strict compliance with the deal. If it does so, I would rejoin the agreement and use our renewed commitment to diplomacy to work with our allies to strengthen and extend it, while more effectively pushing back against Iran’s other destabilizing activities.

With North Korea, I will empower our negotiators and jump-start a sustained, coordinated campaign with our allies and others, including China, to advance our shared objective of a denuclearized North Korea. I will also pursue an extension of the New START treaty [42], an anchor of strategic stability between the United States and Russia, and use that as a foundation for new arms control arrangements. And I will take other steps to demonstrate our commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons. As I said [43] in 2017, I believe that the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring—and, if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack. As president, I will work to put that belief into practice, in consultation with the U.S. military and U.S. allies.

When it comes to technologies of the future, such as 5G and artificial intelligence, other nations are devoting national resources [44] to dominating their development and determining how they are used. The United States needs to do more to ensure that these technologies are used to promote greater democracy and shared prosperity, not to curb freedom and opportunity at home and abroad. For example, a Biden administration will join together with the United States’ democratic allies to develop secure, private-sector-led 5G networks that do not leave any community, rural or low income, behind. As new technologies reshape our economy and society, we must ensure that these engines of progress are bound by laws and ethics [45], as we have done at previous technological turning points in history, and avoid a race to the bottom, where the rules of the digital age are written by China and Russia. It is time for the United States to lead in forging a technological future that enables democratic societies to thrive and prosperity to be shared broadly.

These are ambitious goals, and none of them can be reached without the United States—flanked by fellow democracies—leading the way. We are facing adversaries, both externally and internally, hoping to exploit the fissures in our society, undermine our democracy, break up our alliances, and bring about the return of an international system where might determines right. The answer to this threat is more openness, not less: more friendships, more cooperation, more alliances, more democracy.

PREPARED TO LEAD

Putin wants to tell himself, and anyone else he can dupe into believing him, that the liberal idea is “obsolete.” But he does so because he is afraid of its power. No army on earth can match the way the electric idea of liberty passes freely from person to person, jumps borders, transcends languages and cultures, and supercharges communities of ordinary citizens into activists and organizers and change agents.

We must once more harness that power and rally the free world to meet the challenges facing the world today. It falls to the United States to lead the way. No other nation has that capacity. No other nation is built on that idea. We have to champion liberty and democracy, reclaim our credibility, and look with unrelenting optimism and determination toward our future.

The Day after Putin by Stephen Sestanovich

The Day After Putin
Russia’s Deep State Holds the Key to Succession
Stephen Sestanovich
STEPHEN SESTANOVICH is George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Diplomacy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.


Who will rule Russia when Vladimir Putin is gone? The Russian president recently reignited speculation about his succession plans by proposing a series of constitutional changes, on which parliament will vote next week, and by installing Mikhail Mishustin, a near-anonymous technocrat who for years headed the country’s tax service, as his new prime minister. Some experts predict Putin will step down before his fourth and final term ends in 2024; others insist he aims to create a new position enabling him to evade term limits and rule indefinitely. Everyone wonders whether Mishustin is the cipher he seems or a successor in waiting. Nobody, to say the very least, has any idea.   

One reason so much analysis of Russia’s future reveals so little is that journalists, businesspeople, diplomats, and scholars—myself included—have too often asked the wrong questions. We focus too much on Putin himself, on his personality, his wealth, his approval ratings, his secret schemes. And we pay too little attention to the institutions that today define the Russian state. Putin’s single biggest achievement in two decades in power—his true legacy—has been to reempower the state bureaucracy. He has paid salaries on time, increased budgets, let the government control a larger share of the national economy, and looked the other way as officials abused their power. No part of this bureaucratic apparatus matters more than the national security establishment—the vast, hydra-headed complex of military, intelligence, and law enforcement ministries. These institutions may well determine not only who becomes the next president of Russia but what Russian politics will look like after Putin. 

REVENGE OF THE DEEP STATE

For decades before the communist order collapsed, Soviet officials assured Americans that the military, intelligence, and law enforcement bureaucracies deferred fully to the “civilian” authority of the Communist Party. It may even have been true. But now that a former KGB officer and head of state security has run the country for more than 20 years, that picture of how the system works badly needs updating. 

Consider what would happen if Putin dropped dead tomorrow. The succession process would at first probably follow the constitution, which says that the prime minister—Mishustin, in this case—becomes the acting president. Within 90 days, an election would be held for a new president, to serve a full six-year term. But that is not all that would happen. Soon after taking over as acting president, Mishustin would be on the phone to some of the people whose help he would need to win the election. Among them would be the heads of what Russians call the “power ministries”—the Interior Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the recently formed National Guard, and the intelligence and security services. (Mishustin tacitly acknowledged the importance of these institutions in one of his first actions as prime minister—doubling the pay of law enforcement personnel who deal with public disturbances.)  

To anyone who knows Russian history (or who saw The Death of Stalin, the 2017 comedy about the Soviet dictator’s demise and its aftermath), it may seem obvious that the power ministries will play an important role in any succession scenario. From compromising information and behind-the-scenes threats to truncheons and even tanks, they have a lot to offer a new president trying to consolidate power. But their impact reaches far beyond succession itself: how the Russian system evolves after Putin will depend on whether a new president—regardless of who it is—gets these institutions to do what he wants or whether they get him to do what they want. 

Russia’s power ministries have come to form a kind of “deep state”—in the same sense that Turks, Egyptians, and Pakistanis intend when they use that phrase to capture the outsize role that men in uniform play in their countries. Russians rarely speak of the deep state, but they talk all the time about the siloviki, a term some Western experts translate as “guys with guns.” It refers to a network of institutions whose leaders see themselves as responsible for assuring political continuity and social order (as well as their own privileged positions in that order). The siloviki’s institutions operate with considerable autonomy alongside the democratic play-acting of Russian politics. During Putin’s long tenure, these institutions have claimed, both legitimately and corruptly, a growing share of national resources and wealth. And they are almost never overruled by “civilians.” 

Grasping the role of Russia’s deep state has been made more difficult by competing conceptions of what Putinism is all about. We have been too impressed, for example, by its populist features. Putin is often lumped together with demagogic authoritarians such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban or Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Like them, he appeals to religious and cultural traditions and to national identity. But in Russia, these themes are mostly decorative and have little impact on how the country is actually run. The comparison to Erdogan is particularly inapt. From the moment he was elected, Erdogan saw the secular-minded generals of the Turkish deep state as an unacceptable check on his autonomy. Through co-optation, confrontation, and even imprisonment, he has largely broken their power. Putin, by contrast, has brought the Russian deep state roaring back to life.

Putin has further misled us by claiming to have restored top-down management to Russian state institutions—what he calls the “vertical of power.” He wants credit for the sharp contrast between his management style and the bureaucratic disorder and dysfunction that preceded him. But whether or not full vertical control was ever his goal, it is far from certain that he has achieved it. Empowering bureaucrats at all levels of the Russian state has ended up meaning the same thing it has meant for centuries—abundant opportunities to create self-dealing fiefdoms and ignore orders from above. 

Even Putin occasionally acknowledges the limits of his authority. He spent much of his January State of the Union address—the same speech in which he outlined his plan for constitutional reform—complaining that government ministries had failed to spend enough of the funds he allocated for so-called national projects (big-ticket programs to deal with infrastructure, education, digital innovation, and more). The result was a 2019 federal budget surplus of 1.9 percent of GDP—a mind-boggling amount that slowed last year’s economic growth and made Putin understandably angry. He had told the bureaucrats he wanted a big fiscal stimulus. For whatever reason, they didn’t give him one. 

Putin doesn’t generally complain that the siloviki defy him, of course. That would be embarrassing. But we should wonder about the reach of his power—and what it says about the system his successor will attempt to master. Take the dramatic 2015 murder of the well-known opposition leader Boris Nemtsov on a bridge just outside the Kremlin. Chechen thugs were convicted of the crime, but few, in Russia or beyond, believed they were the real masterminds. At no level of Russian law enforcement was there an appetite to go after those who were ultimately responsible.

Was that, as some Western commentators charged, because Putin himself ordered the hit? Perhaps. But it is more likely that the cover-up reflected the uneasy—and far from secret—mutual accommodation between the Moscow police and various criminal organizations, Chechen mafiosi among them. Russia’s police have a complicated and profitable relationship with organized crime, and they don’t want others—not even Putin—butting in. Seen this way, the next Russian president’s job may be less about controlling the vertical of power than about understanding when it and its many horizontal outgrowths are best left alone.

Similar questions about Putin’s control of the deep state arise from a strange episode in Russia’s intervention in Syria—a story that still has many analysts scratching their heads. In early 2018, a Russian mercenary outfit known as the Wagner Group launched an attack on U.S. and Kurdish units in eastern Syria. In so doing, it crossed an established “deconfliction” line that American and Russian military officers had agreed on so as to stay out of each other’s way.  Finding their own troops under attack, U.S. commanders warned their Russian counterparts that they intended to strike back. But even though the Wagner Group had close personal ties to the Kremlin (its leader is nicknamed “Putin’s chef,” and the company had a Russian government contract for its activities in Syria), the Russian military high command did nothing to ease the confrontation. Punishing U.S. airstrikes ensued. By failing to prevent the killing of many Wagner Group mercenaries, Russian military officers sent an unmistakable message: No matter how well connected they are, other people should stay out of our business.

Once the conflicting interests that animate different parts of Russia’s military, intelligence, and law enforcement complex become clear, many Kremlin actions and choices that have been treated as Putin’s own need to be reexamined. In some cases, the president will be fully involved and in control. In others, he may choose a broad direction but let others handle the follow-through. In still other cases, he may know little of deep state doings until they blow up in the headlines.

Is there any way to know which case is which? Can we say, for example, that Putin ordered the attempted 2018 murder in the United Kingdom of the former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter? Or whether the Defense Ministry alerted him that the new cruise missile it has been testing over the past decade violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty? Or exactly how much Putin knew of the 2016 hacking of the Democratic National Committee?  

Clues of various kinds (and sometimes highly classified intelligence) can help to answer these questions, but usually analysts have to settle for mere guesswork. The enormous size and divergent interests of the power ministries enable Russian officials at all levels to pursue their private agendas. Putin, moreover, has shown that he always stands behind his people. They don’t have to worry about getting into trouble just because they don’t get his approval in advance. Whether they are using exotic poisons, stealing emails, or assassinating politicians outside his office, the siloviki know Putin has their back. They will want the same of whoever succeeds him.

THE STRUGGLE AHEAD

This system—solidly in place after two decades of Putin—could make the coming transfer of power turbulent. Unlike the Turkish, Egyptian, or Pakistani version of the deep state, Russia’s version is too divided to have a single leader or spokesman, much less to install its own man in the Kremlin. General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi became president of Egypt in 2013 simply because he was the army’s senior officer. Russia’s military, intelligence, and law enforcement complex has no senior officer. Yet its pluralism also makes it hard to subdue. Especially under a new president—likely to be weaker than Putin—many different institutions will be able to defend both their turf and the policy control that makes that turf so valuable. 

Competition among elements of the deep state could, in an extreme case, turn violent. But even if the struggle stays peaceful, the price Russia’s next leader will have to pay for the siloviki’s support could be steep. The power ministries may want expanded autonomy, bigger budgets, perhaps even a greater say on issues beyond their existing domains. Mishustin surely knows that his pay increase for riot police won’t be the last inducement he offers the power ministries.

There is a warning in all of this for whoever becomes Russia’s next president. Taking on the deep state will be difficult, but failing to do so will mean accepting strict limits on presidential authority. In dealing with this dilemma, Putin’s successor will have several broad options. He could accept, at least at first, what the power ministries ask of him. He could try to play different institutions against each other in an effort to carve out more autonomy for himself. Or he could pursue some version of the bargain Putin proposed to Russia’s leading oligarchs soon after he became president in 2000: I’ll let you run your businesses, you let me run the country.

A final option would be to challenge the deep state and try to cut it down to size. This approach would be the boldest, the riskiest, and probably the most tumultuous. But it can’t be ruled out. Although deep states last a long time, they are not eternal. Periodically, they fall prey to domestic power struggles, losing their legitimacy, sense of purpose, and autonomy. (Just ask Erdogan’s generals.)

A less personalized, more institutionally focused public assessment of how the Russian system works won’t just provide a better indication of what the future holds; it can be part of the United States’ policy response. By obsessing so much about Putin himself—who has, alas, usually been the most popular part of his own system—all of us have made it easier for him to persuade his public that Western governments and societies are incorrigibly hostile to their country. If that is what ordinary Russians believe, they will be even less likely to turn against the deep state, even though it is among the least popular—and most predatory—components of Putinism. Only if our objections to Russian policy are taken more seriously by Russians themselves can they help spark the internal debate that will be needed for an eventual change of course. To do that, we need to start with a cool assessment of Russia’s institutions, one that its own citizens can recognize and that speaks to their own concerns. 

Tuesday, March 3, 2020

Türkiye 18 yılda nasıl bu hale düşürüldü? Cahit Armağan Dilek

Türkiye 18 yılda nasıl bu hale düşürüldü?

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04 Mart 2020
AKP-Erdoğan yönetimi, 18 yıl önce iktidara geldiklerinde PKK terör örgütüyle müzakere masasına oturmamış PKK'yı askeri olarak yenmiş teröristleri topraklarının dışına çıkarmış bir Türkiye teslim almışlardı.
Adana Mutabakatıyla Suriye, PKK'yı terör örgütü olarak kabul etmişti. Suriye yola gelmişti. 

Ortadoğu'da bütün ülkelerde büyükelçilerimiz vardı, diplomatik ilişkiler gelişiyordu. Türkiye saygın ve sözü dinlenen bir devletti.
İran-Irak savaşındaki arabuluculuk yapabilmiş Türkiye'nin, İran ve Irak ile ilişkileri dengeliydi. İran'daki dini rejime rağmen ilişkiler gelişiyordu.
Irak ile ilişkilerimiz 1991'deki ABD müdahalesi, Keşif Güç görevlerine rağmen iyiydi. Filistin-İsrail sorununda arabuluculuk yapabilecek güvenilen devlettik.
Libya ile ticari ilişkilerimiz gelişiyordu. Türkler büyük yatırım-inşaat ihaleleri almıştı.

Mısır devlet başkanı Suriye ile Adana Mutabakatının kolaylaştırıcısı olmuştu. Türk-Mısır ilişkileri sorunsuzdu.
Kıbrıs'ta ver kurtul fikri hakim değildi.
Ege'de 18 adamız henüz işgal edilmemişti.

Doğu Akdeniz'de, Rum-Yunan ikilisi bütün kıyıdaş ülkelerle üçlü ittifaklar oluşturmamış, bu ittifak halkalarını Doğu Akdeniz'den Balkanlara Türkiye'yi kuşatan bir ittifak zincirine dönüştürmemiş, Doğu Akdeniz'i paylaşmamışlardı.
NATO, Karadeniz'e davet edilmemiş, Karadeniz NATO/ABD gölü olmamıştı. Ruslar, Türk yurdu Kırım'ı ilhak etmemiş, Karadeniz'i askeri olarak tam kontrol altına almamıştı.

Ekonomik krizler aşılabiliyordu. G20'de bir ara16. sıralardaydık
Liste çok uzun ama geçen 18 yıl içinde yaşananlardan bazıları ve gelinen nokta şu:
Türkiye, tarihinin en derin ekonomik krizini yaşıyor. Kişi başı milli gelir azalıyor. G20'den çıkma riski var.

PKK iktidarı müzakere masasına oturttu, siyasi aktör muamelesi gördü, Suriye kuzeyinde 60-70 bin kişilik ABD özel kuvvetlerinden eğitim almış donatılmış ABD ve Avrupa ülkelerinden siyasi ve askeri tanınırlık gören bir yapıya dönüştü.

Yanlış Suriye politikaları nedeniyle Şam ile PKK ortaklık, Fırat'ın doğusunda PKKistan ilan aşamasına gelindi.
Musul başkonsolosluğumuz IŞİD terör örgütünce işgal edildi çalışanlar esir alındı. Irak'ın kuzeyinde PKK kontrolünde "no mans land" oluştu.

PKK hamisi Barzani, stratejik ortak ilan edildi, Barzani'nin özerkliğine ses çıkarılmadı, Irak'ın bölünmesinin önü açıldı. Şimdi aynı hatalı hamle ÖSO gibi gruplar ve oluşturulan yerel yönetimlerle Suriye'de yapılıyor.

PKK'nın hem ABD hem Rusya ile ortak olması engellenemedi.
Irak kuzeyi ile Suriye kuzeyinde oluşan özerk yapıların birleştirme projeleri görülemedi.

Kuzey komşumuz Rusya güney sınırlarımızdan kuşattı komşumuz oldu.
Libya iç savaşının bir parçası olundu.
Kıbrıs'ta, Türk kimliği silinme tehdidinde, ikinci Girit olma yolunda.

Irak'ta, Suriye'de Doğu Akdeniz'de Libya'daki bütün hatalı politikalar için Türk askeri sahaya sürüldü. Dış politikadan anladıkları sadece askeri gücü kullanmak oldu.

Hesapsız, öngörüsüz, anlık karalarla oluşturulan iç politikayı hedefleyen dış politika kararlarıyla 18 yılda Türkiye'nin her şeyi alt üs oldu, ters yüz oldu.

Türkiye'nin Irak'tan Libya'ya kadar uzayan cephede ateşe sürüklendi. Rusya ve ABD dört bir yandan Türkiye'yi çifte kuşatmaya aldı.

Gelinen noktada, Irak, Suriye, Libya'dan şehit haberleri sıradanlaştı. Siyasi hedefi nihai hedefi bilinmeyen belli olmayan İdlib'teki savaştan da şehitler gelmeye devam ediyor.

Tam da bu ortamda şehit edebiyatı piyasaya sürülüyor. Neymiş şehitler tepesi boş kalmamalıymış. Türk vatanında şehit kanıyla sulanmamış bir karış toprak var mı ki halen şehit gelsin diye dini duygular ve kavramlar istismar ediliyor?

Ve şehitlik edebiyatına vatan millet edebiyatı eşlik ediyor.
İktidarın küçük ortağına göre İdlib'ten çekilirsek Hatay'dan olurmuşuz.

Erdoğan'a göre "Bugün Kamışlı'da, Resulayn'da, Tel Abyad'da, İdlib'de vermediğimiz savaşı, yarın Şırnak'ta, Mardin'de, Gaziantep'te, Hatay'da vermek zorunda kalırız."

Bu edebiyatla hem başarısızlıkların üstü örtülüyor hem de sanki savaşa girmek, çok şehit vermek başarıymış gibi gösteriliyor.
Soralım: 80 yıl bölgesinde barış adası olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 18 yılda neden bu hale düştü? Neden engelleyemedi çevresindeki kuşatmayı?

Suriye'de Irak'ta olanları, ortaklık yapılan dış güçlerin asıl/nihai hedefinin Türkiye olduğu şimdi mi anlaşıldı?
İdlib'teki hatalı politikanın sonucu içine düşülen açmazların hesabı verileceğine Çanakkale ile bir tutularak milletin aklıyla dalga geçiliyor.

Çanakkale'de Türk'ün vatan toprağı işgalcilere karşı korunuyordu. Atatürk biliyordu ki, Çanakkale geçilirse vatan elden gidecekti. Onun için ölmeyi emretti. İdlib kimin vatan toprağı? Çanakkale ile ne ilgisi var?

Suriye'de, Süleymanşah türbesinin de bulunduğu vatan toprağı terk edip çekilmek ama Suriye toprağını Suriye ordusuna karşı korumak hangi aklın eseri veya hangi dış gücün dayatması?

Haydi gelin Türkiye'yi yönetemediğinizi ve politikalarınızın iflas ettiğini itiraf edin.

Kaynak Yeniçağ: ​​​​​​​Türkiye 18 yılda nasıl bu hale düşürüldü? - Cahit Armağan DİLEK

Monday, March 2, 2020

Statement y the Iranian Advisory Center in Syria

The Iranian Advisory Center in Syria, which takes part in the fighting in northern Syria, issued a press release through the news agency U-News in reaction to the recent confrontation between the Syrian army and the Turkish army. It should be noted that the Iranian Advisory Center is made up of the group of Iranian experts who advise the Syrian State and its armed forces, and that this is the first statement it has issued since the beginning of the war in Syria.
Full text of the statement
In reaction to the latest confrontation between the Syrian Arab Army and the Turkish Army, it is important for us to inform the public of the following:
First: We fought alongside the Syrian Arab army and supported it, at the request of the Syrian State, to open the M5 highway, with a Syrian force led by elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and of Hezbollah, and with the participation of factions of the Resistance within the force; and we have helped civilians and residents of the liberated villages.
Second: Protected by the Turkish army, the armed (terrorist) groups attacked the positions of the Syrian army, and so we participated in the fighting aimed at preventing the M5 highway to fall again in their hands.
Third: Since the beginning of the presence of our forces, the Turkish positions located in the Syrian territories have been in the sight of our forces, whether they comply with the Astana Agreements or violate them, but the elements of the Resistance did not strike these Turkish forces out of deference to the decision of their (respective) leaders, and this decision remains in effect until now.
Fourth: Four days ago, foreign elements, Tajiks from the Turkestan Party, elements from the Al-Nusra Front, as well as other terrorist factions, carried out a large-scale attack on the positions of the Syrian army. Our forces directly supported the Syrian Army to prevent the liberated areas from falling into their hands.
Fifth: Despite the defensive nature of the action of our forces, the Turkish army targeted our elements and our forces from the air, with precision missiles and artillery support, which prompted us to send mediators to the Turkish army to end its attacks and renounce this approach
Sixth: Our mediators announced to the Turkish army that the terrorists attacked our positions with their support, that our forces are there to confront the terrorists, and that we are on the side of the Syrian army for this mission; but unfortunately, the Turkish military ignored this request and continued its bombing, and a number of our fighters (Iranian & Hezbollah’s) were martyred.
Seventh: Syrian army artillery responded by striking the source of the fire; for our part, we did not retaliate directly, and once again, we announced to the Turkish army through mediators that we have no objective or decision to confront the Turkish army and that our leadership is determined to reach a political solution between Syria and Turkey.
Eighth: We have informed our forces since morning not to target Turkish forces inside Idlib in order to spare the lives of their soldiers, and our forces have not opened fire, but the Turkish army continues to shell the points and locations of the Syrian army (where we are also located) with artillery fire.
Ninth: The Iranian Advisory Center and the fighters of the Resistance front call on the Turkish forces to act rationally in the interest of the Syrian and Turkish peoples, reminding the Turkish people that their sons (soldiers) have been in our sights for one month and that we could have targeted them in revenge, but we did not do so in accordance with the orders of our leaders; we call on them to pressure the Turkish leadership to rectify its decisions and avoid spilling the blood of Turkish soldiers.
Tenth: Despite the current difficult circumstances, we reaffirm our continuing position alongside the people, the State and the army in Syria in their fight to defeat terrorism and preserve their full sovereignty over the Syrian territories, and we all call on actors to be rational and aware of the great risks of continuing the aggression against Syria.
Translation: resistancenews.org
02 march 2020