GONUL TOL is Director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute. Follow her on Twitter @gonultol[1].
Before Turkey took an authoritarian turn under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, many thought that the former head of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) would go down in history as the leader who finally tamed Turkey’s military and resolved the country’s decades-long conflict with the Kurds. Such hopes now seem outrageously misplaced. Erdogan has given the military a blank check to wage war against Kurdish insurgents[2] and has struck a cozy alliance with the generals. For his part, Erdogan must believe he is killing several birds with one stone. The military campaign against the Kurds both weakens the country’s largest minority, which recently dealt a blow to Erdogan’s ambitions[3] for unchecked power, and consolidates his power among the country’s nationalists. Along the way, Erdogan might mend ties with the country’s long-estranged military, which could come in handy as his domestic and international opponents begin to encircle him. But for Erdogan, empowering the military could be risky. There are even those within his close circle, including some of his advisers, who fear that the president is riding a tiger that, after years of harsh treatment under the ruling AKP, is all the wilder and more vengeful.
The military has reason to hold a grudge. For much of Turkish history[4], it has held significant sway over political affairs, staging four outright coups, forcing several other political leaders to resign, and acting as an unquestioned guardian of secular democracy. Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP has whittled away at the generals’ influence, which has left Turkey’s once omnipotent armed forces weak and divided. To meet EU accession criteria,[5] Ankara implemented measures to bring the military within civilian control. It limited the jurisdiction of military courts in favor of civilian courts, and it started to play an active role in the appointments of top military commanders[6]. A further blow to the military’s standing came in April 2007, after the military posted to its website an ultimatum (later called the “e-coup”) to warn the AKP against backing Abdullah Gul[7], who previously belonged to an Islamist party and whose wife wears a headscarf, for the presidency. The public and the AKP were outraged, and Gul was elected. The military’s attempt to intervene against a popular party dealt a serious blow to its standing in society, and in an early vote held right after the e-coup, the AKP increased its vote share by 13 percent.
Around the same time, the government’s then allies in the judiciary, the Gulenists (an Islamic movement linked to the U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen), launched several criminal investigations of military officers. Under the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer prosecutions, which alleged a conspiracy to overthrow the AKP government, scores of generals were imprisoned and hundreds of retired military officers detained. The clash between the AKP government and the military culminated in the mass resignation of Turkey’s military high command in late July 2011, marking, as the Turkey expert Henri Barkey called it, “the day the military threw in the towel[8].”
Of late, however, the military seems to be experiencing a reversal of fortune. Since Necdet Ozel, an Erdogan loyalist, became military chief of staff after his predecessor resigned in protest, Erdogan and the armed forces have had somewhat improved ties, at least at the top levels. But the real thaw came when the Gulenists in the judiciary launched a corruption investigation that implicated Erdogan’s family and his close circle. Erdogan saw the military as a potential ally in what would become an all-out war against the Gulenists, his one-time partner. Following a statement from one of Erdogan’s close advisers, the military filed a complaint with the judiciary demanding a retrial of the defendants in the Sledgehammer case. The court then dismissed the whole case, arguing that the evidence was “fabricated[9],” and released the generals who had been jailed. The latest sign that the AKP and the military are back in each other’s good graces was the attendance of Hulusi Akar, the chief of the general staff, at Erdogan’s daughter’s wedding as one of the witnesses at the ceremony.
The recent breakdown of the cease-fire between the state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party[10] (PKK) has removed another sticking point in military-government relations. The military has always opposed the peace talks with the PKK and has accused the government of turning a blind eye to PKK activities in the Kurdish region. In 2014, military officials applied to carry out 290 operations against the PKK in the southeast. The government approved only eight, which was a sore spot between the two. Resumption of the fighting between the state and the PKK in the summer of 2015, therefore, paved the way for a closer alliance between the military and the government. The chaos engulfing Syria and Iraq and the tension between Turkey and Russia[11] also contributed to the military’s comeback as an internal and external power broker. Both Erdogan and the pro-government media that once hailed the criminal cases against the military as a major victory for democracy are now praising the “heroic efforts of the armed forces” in countering Turkey’s domestic and international foes. In a grand gesture to his new allies, Erdogan defended secularism following a call from his mentor, Ismail Kahraman, to drop all references to secularism[12] in Turkey’s constitution.
Erdogan is clearly betting that these gestures will keep a subdued military in line, but he is playing with fire; some fear the military might revert to its old habit of intervening in political processes if it sees an opportunity. In fact, the military might be down, but it is not out. It certainly retains considerable institutional autonomy. Kemalism, the founding ideology of the republic that has served for decades as a bulwark against Islamism and Kurdish separatism, still forms the ideological core of the curriculum at military high schools and academies. The only references to Islam at the academies is in the context of Ataturk. The military has even resisted calls from government circles to allow the enrollment in military academies of graduates from imam-hatip schools[13], vocational schools that educate state-employed imams and preachers. The military believes that such students might start the spread of religion in the ranks of the Turkish Armed Forces and lead to greater government control over the military. The defense budget remains largely immune to civilian oversight, and the military handles its own personnel management. Tellingly, the chief of the general staff is not subordinate to the minister of defense, and the Internal Service Law[14], which has been used to allow the army to intervene in politics, remains in place as well. The law states, “The duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined in the constitution.” The military cited this article as legal justification when it staged coups in the past[15].
Fatih Saribas / REUTERS Turkish army commandos walk on a snow-capped summit in the mountains near the southeastern Turkish town of Sirnak, February 2008.
For all this, the military does not seem particularly interested in intervening in the political processes, at least for now. After the public’s reaction to the e-coup, it seems to prefer to stay out of politics. The general staff recently issued a strongly worded statement categorically denying allegations[16] from pro-government circles that the military was planning a coup. It further threatened legal action against those media outlets covering the news. The military has always relied on public support when it decided to intervene in politics. The 1980 military coup, the bloodiest military takeover in Turkish history, for instance, was highly supported by the public, which viewed military intervention as necessary to restore stability. But today, the military knows full well that any intervention against Erdogan and his AKP, which received almost 50 percent of the vote in the latest election, would win little public backing and crush the military’s efforts to reclaim its standing in society.
As unlikely as a coup might be for now, there is still a scenario in which the military might intervene. Fourteen years of AKP rule has somewhat softened the military’s stance on secularism, but Kurdish separatism still remains the armed forces’ redline. The military might act if fighting between the PKK and the state spirals out of control, if mass violence in western urban centers leads to a security collapse and a major economic downturn, and if the government becomes increasingly authoritarian. Such circumstances could trigger massive antigovernment protests. If Erdogan responds with a brutal police crackdown and more chaos and bloodshed ensues, there could be growing public demand for the generals to take action. Even under these dangerous and undesirable scenarios, the generals would probably prefer to intervene by political rather than military means in pressuring the government to resign. Turkey has come too far in its political and economic evolution to be governed by a military junta.
But until then, the military and government are likely to remain on good terms. It is essential, however, to highlight the tactical nature and limitations of this alliance. Their interests might be aligned for now, but they still disagree on many issues. Erdogan’s increasing authoritarianism, his frequent zigzags on the Kurdish question, and his Middle East–focused and aggressive foreign policy have alienated Turkey’s traditional Western allies and raised eyebrows within the ranks of the armed forces.
Erdogan has not let down his guard against the military, either. The government’s decision to detach the Gendarmerie General Command, Turkey’s paramilitary rural police force, from the general staff of the Turkish Armed Forces and attach it to the Ministry of the Interior was an attempt to fill Gendarmerie ranks with AKP supporters and counterbalance the military. But ultimately it is the Kurdish question[17] that will determine not only the future course of this marriage of convenience but also the military’s role in Turkish politics.
by Robert Olson
The reestablishment of Turkish-Israeli diplomatic relations has been bruited about for the past several months. Expectations increased when Dore Gold, the director of Israel’s foreign ministry, arrived in Istanbul on March 20 to retrieve the bodies of three Israelis who had been killed in a terrorist attack on March 19. Reportedly, full diplomatic relations could be restored soon.
The two countries severed diplomatic relations when Israeli commanders attacked and boarded the Blue (Mavi) Marmara, a ship belonging to Turkey’s Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), on May 31, 2010 while it was attempting to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Nine Turks and one Turkish-American were killed. Israeli authorities stated that the incident was staged with the approval of Turkey’s Intelligence Agency (MIT) in order to strengthen Turkey’s relations with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and with Hamas in particular. Ambassadors were withdrawn, and full diplomatic relations have remained stalemated.
At the time of the incident, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan were indeed trying to curry favor with the PA and Hamas in order to strengthen their Islamist credentials in largely Sunni Arab countries in the Middle East. Tensions Escalate
Tensions between the two countries grew after Erdogan clashed with Shimon Peres at Davos on January 29, 2009. During a bitter exchange between the two men, Erdogan demanded “one minute, please” from the moderator. He then said to Peres, “When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill.” Erdogan was referring to the Israel-Hamas war of 2008-09 in which significant numbers of Palestinians and some Israelis were killed and wounded.
After the commencement of the “Arab Spring” in December 2010 in Tunisia, Erdogan visited both Tunisia and Egypt encouraging democracy and secularism. Turkey strongly supported Mohammad Morsi when he came to power in 2012 until his overthrow on July 3, 2013.
Morsi’s removal limited Turkey’s leverage in the civil war that broke out in Syria in March 2011. Erdogan, like Morsi, was a strong supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Turkish leader expected strong support from Morsi’s government and from the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan in removing Bashar al-Assad from power. Such a development would have allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to take a leading role in whatever government would prevail in Syria.
By the end of 2013 it was clear that Bashar al-Assad was not going to be toppled any time soon. By 2014 new geopolitical configurations were forming in the eastern Mediterranean. Syria and Iraq were failed and collapsed states. Whatever geopolitical configurations emerged in the eastern Mediterranean, Israel and Turkey would continue to be major players. Although Egypt is a large state and has also discovered large gas deposits in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the Mediterranean coast, its economic and political challenges are so great that it cannot challenge the power of Turkey and Israel in the eastern Mediterranean. Petropolitics
Since 2010 Israel has discovered two large gas fields—Tamar and Leviathan—in its EEZ that may have gas reserves of around 800 billion cubic meters, enough gas to last Israel for 40 or more years. These fields are now supplying more than half of Israel’s electricity needs.
Turkey is an energy-starved country and has not had much luck in finding significant amounts of oil or gas in the Mediterranean, Black, Marmara or Mediterranean Seas. Ankara’s rising tensions with Russia since Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet fighter in November 2015 increased Turkey’s efforts to access sources of energy other than Russian. Other sources available are from the Kurdistan Regional Government, Iran, and international markets. The Turkish economy produces a Gross National Product of around $800 billion a year, with great potential to grow much larger.
Turkey would like to participate with Israel, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus in the transport of gas from the Tamar and Leviathan fields as well as from fields in Greece and Cyprus. The best outlets from these fields would be via Turkey, which would also benefit from the transport costs of carrying the gas to Europe in already existing pipelines.
It is in Turkey’s and Israel’s interest to restore full diplomatic relations in order to benefit from Israel’s gas fields as well as to cooperate more fully on security matters that effect both countries. The two countries already cooperate substantially on defense matters. Trade between them stood at $5.6 billion in 2015. In January 2016 Erdogan told reporters, “Israel is in need of a county like Turkey in the region. We have to admit that we also need Israel.”
Although the Blue Marmara incident and its aftermath still rankle, Ankara has indicated that it would acquiesce to the blockade of Gaza but wants access by sea or land in order to bring construction materials and other goods and services to the people in the territory. This would ensure ardent Muslim supporters of the AKP that the party still supports the Palestinian cause. Many of Erdogan’s policies, both domestic and foreign, are under attack and a good-will Israeli gesture would be welcomed.
Russia’s dispatch of aircraft, missiles, tanks, and 6-7,000 troops to Syria in September 2015 has slowed the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Israel wants better relations with Turkey but not at the expense of worsening relations with Moscow, with which it has extensive ties. Israel is also concerned about what geopolitical configurations might emerge in Syria and in Iraq.
Turkey and Israel will likely contest for geopolitical advantage in Syria. Erdogan and the AKP are hoping to use the 2.7 million Syria refugees in Turkey to expand geo-economic influence in northern Syria. On the other hand, Israel is strengthening its hold over the Golan Heights and solidifying its military and economic relations with Jordan. Within a decade, gas from Israel’s Mediterranean gas fields may well be available in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan.
On March 27, Israel’s High Count of Justice struck down an agreement regarding the Leviathan gas field between the government and project developers headed by Noble Energy, a Texas-based energy company partnered with Israel’s Delek Group. The High Court of Justice objected to the part of the agreement “that prohibits changes to regulations affecting the project for ten years.” The resulting settlement will not likely affect a potential gas pipeline from Cyprus to Turkey. This is the opposite of what Turkey, the AKP, and Erdogan wanted to achieve at Davos in January 2010.
Robert Olson is Professor of Middle East history and politics at the University of Kentucky (Emeritus). He is the author of ten books of various aspects of Middle East history and politics. His major books are: The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman- Persian Relations: 1718-1743; The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion: 1880-1925; Turkey's Relations with Iran, 1979-2004;The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations:From World I to 2000; Blood, Beliefs and Ballots: The Management of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey, 2007-2000; The Kurdish Nationalist Movements in Turkey: 1980-2011; The Goat and the Butcher: Nationalism and State Formation in Kurdistan-Iraq since the Iraqi War War. He is the author of 75 referred research articles and 60 edited research articles. He was distinguished Professor of the University of Kentucky in 2000. He is married and lives in Lexington, Kentucky.
