By Jason M. Brodsky
A familiar pattern emerged this week in Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s Iran. Mohammad Bagher Kharrazi, brother of the wife of Mojtaba’s brother Masoud, claimed in a revealing interview that President Masoud Pezeshkian had offered to resign 28 times.
The situation, according to Kharrazi, has become so fraught that Mojtaba lashed out at Pezeshkian, saying, “[I]f he resigns one more time, I will approve it. I will write ‘approved’ underneath it, and that will be the end of it.”
Kharrazi’s assertions were later denied by the Office of the President and the Office of the Supreme Leader. However, news media reported previously about Pezeshkian submitting an official letter of resignation to Mojtaba. In May 2026, Iran International TV reported that the president had done so after being sidelined by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in decision-making.
While Kharrazi has a history of making controversial statements, he does enjoy access to the inner circles of power in the Islamic Republic. In addition to his status as an in-law of the Khamenei family, he is the son of Mohsen Kharrazi, who has been a member of the Assembly of Experts. Additionally, Mohammad Kharrazi’s uncle, Kamal, served as foreign minister and then chairman of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, advising the supreme leader. Kamal was killed in an Israeli airstrike during the current war.
There is a long history of Iranian presidents feeling marginalized and constrained by the more powerful Office of the Supreme Leader and the IRGC, especially under the Khameneis’ rule. When Mohammad Khatami served as president from 1997 to 2005, he offered to resign multiple times as his reform agenda was blocked. His successor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, also was confronted with the choice to resign after a tussle over his sacking of the intelligence minister or accept the supreme leader’s choice for the position. Hassan Rouhani likewise offered to resign at least twice during his tenure.
However, each time a president came close to quitting, then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei usually nixed it. Thus, given these precedents, it’s conceivable that Pezeshkian has offered to resign. Mojtaba, or the IRGC, seeking to keep Pezeshkian in office for now would be consistent with Ali Khamenei’s example. Especially now, in a wartime situation, the system is trying to create the illusion of cohesion, unity, and stability. A Pezeshkian resignation could rupture that strategy.
The IRGC also likely finds it useful to retain Pezeshkian, and his foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, as softer faces to dispatch for negotiations to play good cop, bad cop with the United States and its allies. This oft-practiced regime ploy overhypes divisions within the Islamic Republic’s political elite and allows officials perceived as “moderate” to extract concessions from Western officials, who believe they are empowering “moderates” at the expense of “hardliners.” Of course, this belief comes despite the reality that the Office of the Supreme Leader and the IRGC drive foreign policy decision-making, with the president and foreign minister largely mere implementers.
The plausibility of Kharrazi’s claim raises additional questions. If Mojtaba Khamenei is taking extraordinary security precautions and is inaccessible and invisible to the most senior state officials, how would Kharrazi—an in-law—have such access to the supreme leader in this environment? Araghchi himself has admitted that he has never personally interacted with Mojtaba—both before Operation Epic Fury and since. Even Mojtaba’s father-in-law, Gholamali Haddad-Adel, recently told state media that “for the time being, due to certain issues, [Mojtaba] is not in contact with any person or institution, but God willing, he is healthy.” A cleric close to the Khamenei family disclosed that Mojtaba’s own children haven’t seen their father since the airstrike that killed Ali Khamenei and allegedly severely injured Mojtaba on February 28.
In the end, the rumors about Pezeshkian’s resignation are unsurprising given the difficulties his predecessors as president encountered. However, it would be unusual if Mojtaba accepted Pezeshkian’s resignation, as doing so would break from Ali Khamenei’s practice of ensuring his presidents complete their terms. Ultimately, the competition over power among various factions within the Islamic Republic’s political elite continues—and becomes louder and more pronounced without an accessible and visible supreme leader. Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) | 
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