After nearly four months of war, President Donald Trump announced a “great deal” on Truth Social Sunday.
“The deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now complete. Congratulations to all,” he posted. “I hereby fully authorize the toll free opening of the Strait of Hormuz, and, simultaneously herewith, authorize the immediate removal of the United States Naval blockade. Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!” The Secretariat of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council confirmed the naval blockade would end Sunday night, with the formal signing ceremony set for Friday in Switzerland—though the text of the memorandum has not been publicly released.
The agreement is not a full peace treaty, leaves 60 days to negotiate a fuller deal, and is the latest twist in a war that has reshaped the Middle East and roiled the global economy.
On February 28, the United States and Israel launched a joint military operation against Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei alongside dozens of senior Iranian leaders and severely degrading Iran’s nuclear program. The war’s opening weeks were swift and overwhelming—what followed was anything but. Iranian retaliatory strikes have caused significant damage at U.S. military installations in the Middle East; 13 American service members were killed and hundreds more wounded; and the Pentagon has acknowledged the war has cost $29 billion, a figure other estimates put much higher. At home, the war has driven up prices. The new Iranian regime is even more hard-line than the one it replaced. A shaky ceasefire has been in effect for 10 weeks—and even on Sunday, an Israeli strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs threatened to derail a deal entirely.
The agreement paves the way for negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, with sanctions relief and billions in frozen assets on the table. What happens next is far from clear, but this struck us as an opportune moment to ask a range of contributors to weigh in on an urgent question: Was this war worth it? Their answers vary widely—and reflect the heated debate over the war that serves as the backdrop to the negotiations between Washington and Tehran.
Elliott Abrams: What Trump Could Still Throw Away
Whether the conflict with Iran has been worth it depends on the terms of the deal ending it, and Trump’s willingness to enforce them. Right now, both are very unclear.
The war has done serious damage to the Iranian economy and military machine. Unrest will likely continue in Iran, since the regime is even further from meeting the Iranian people’s political and economic demands than it was when this year—and widespread protests—began. If the regime falls in a few years, 2026 will be remembered as an important accelerant.
But the president can easily throw that all away in his remaining two and a half years in office if he enriches the regime by unfreezing tens of billions of dollars and lifting all sanctions—including those tied to human rights and terrorism; if he allows the regime to control the Strait of Hormuz by exacting tolls, however they are disguised; and if the deal includes Lebanon, in ways that legitimize Iran’s domination of Lebanon via Hezbollah while the United States tries to constrain Israel’s struggle against Hezbollah. Do all that and the war ends with an Iranian victory. Do all that and we would be abandoning the Iranian people.
“The war has done serious damage to the Iranian economy and military machine.” —Elliot Abrams
That is the central question, because the Islamic Republic has proved itself unreformable. The only long-term solution to its repression and aggression is regime change. In January, when the Iranian people rose up, Trump posted “Iranian Patriots, KEEP PROTESTING—TAKE OVER YOUR INSTITUTIONS!!! Save the names of the killers and abusers. They will pay a big price. I have cancelled all meetings with Iranian Officials until the senseless killing of protesters STOPS. HELP IS ON ITS WAY. MIGA!!!” On Sunday Trump said, “As far as regime change, I never cared about regime change. This is the third group we’ve dealt with, and this is the most rational group yet.” That looks like the “Venezuela option.” If it is Trump’s new Iran policy, all the achievements of the war will be thrown away.
Elliott Abrams is a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as Special Representative for Iran and Venezuela in Donald Trump’s first administration.
Sohrab Ahmari: A Bitter Vindication
As the war with Iran peters out, those of us who opposed it taste a bitter vindication. While the precise terms of the final settlement are unclear, the list of U.S. setbacks is already long: a hardened Iranian regime, newly conscious of a potency that was formerly only latent (the power to squeeze a global energy choke point); battered U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf region; strained Arab alliances; a big payday for the mullahs; diminished prestige for Uncle Sam.
I sounded the alarm about some of these outcomes in the lead-up to last year’s 12-Day War, when Jerusalem demanded Washington’s backing for its surprise operation. At the time, I was more worried about the chaotic breakup of Iran amid a regime collapse—even as I had spent years telling anyone who would listen that the Islamic Republic is more durable than it appears to those who base their analyses only on the wish-casting of exiled opposition leaders.
Yet here was President Trump—who had won the presidency by ridiculing the Iraq War and pledging “peace”—launching another regime-change war with rhetoric and assumptions seemingly borrowed from the Bushies. Except with far less planning and foresight than even the Bushies mustered. Sigh.
The silver lining: This turn of events will accelerate America’s departure from a region of secondary importance (at best) to the world’s No. 1 energy exporter, allowing Washington to focus on domestic reconsolidation and more critical foreign theaters, most notably the Pacific. And as my conversations daily confirm, the next generation of American security professionals, on the left and the right, are now doubly embittered about what they see as Benjamin Netanyahu’s overreach, about the excessive demands of a small client that too often forgets “who’s the fucking superpower here.”
Sohrab Ahmari is the U.S. editor of UnHerd. His next book, “The Triumph of Normal,” is forthcoming from HarperCollins.
Michael Oren: Which Way the Hinge Swings
The Iran war represented a historic hinge. By toppling the Iranian regime, dismantling its nuclear program, and eliminating its ballistic missile capabilities and support for terror proxies, the war could bring peace to the entire Middle East. Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and perhaps even a post-Ayatollah Iran—all could join the Abraham Accords. A restored Pax Americana would extend from the shores of the Mediterranean to the banks of the Ganges.
But if the deal fails to achieve these goals— if it lifts sanctions on Iran and leaves it in de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz—the war could revive and reinforce Iran’s regional hegemony. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis would receive a financial and strategic lifeline, assuring that Gaza and southern Lebanon remain battlefields. No longer trusting in American power, the Gulf states may rush to seek rapprochement with Tehran while the Abraham Accords fade into obsolescence. Iran may retain and expand its intercontinental ballistic arsenals and preserve its ability to become, once again, a nuclear threshold state. The Iranian people could lose all hope of someday gaining their freedom. The stage would be set for the next, and potentially far more devastating, war.
Though the agreement President Trump appears to have struck risks producing the latter, disastrous scenario, the hinge can still turn in either direction. The Iranian regime may yet die of the mortal wounds it sustained in this war, and the Iranian people may once again revolt. But irrespective of which way it swings, the hinge will be swayed less by raw military power than by the combatants’ willingness to use it and their ability to endure economic and political pain. The Islamic Republic, tragically, has so far surpassed the United States in both categories—but history’s hinge can still revolve toward peace.
Michael Oren is the former Israeli ambassador to the United States and the founder of the Israel Advocacy Group.
Aaron MacLean: Not a Peace Deal, Not Yet
At time of writing we await the text of President Trump’s memorandum of understanding with the Islamic Republic. No matter the contents, it will not be a “peace deal,” as the prime minister of Pakistan and many in the press now refer to it. Calling it that debases the English language. The memorandum’s essence appears to be a trade of blockades: Iran will end its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and the United States will end its blockade of Iranian ports—and if both follow through, the global and Iranian economies could benefit. But every original war aim, especially the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, would be left for future negotiations.
In what feels like a flashback to April 7, the date on which the current ceasefire began (though consistency requires we observe that this “ceasefire” has also not really been a ceasefire), the president preemptively announced that the agreement is “complete.” A digital signing could happen at any moment, and reports indicate a formal ceremony will occur on Friday in Geneva. The Iranian media suggests the text of the memorandum won’t be available until after that formal signing—which raises some doubt over whether the terms are actually settled after all. Other Iranian media reports indicate terms for the memorandum that are highly, even comically, unfavorable to the United States. When similar reports circulated last week the president strongly denied them.
The president has announced that the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports has been “immediately” removed. He also, strangely, “authorized” the “toll-free” opening of the Strait of Hormuz—in other words, the ending of the Iranian blockade. The Iranians haven’t seemed to need his authorization to conduct their blockade so far, and only they can decide to stop it.
The “toll-free” detail matters enormously. If Iran charges tolls in the strait, that would be a strategic defeat for the United States—our enemy would have ended the war in objectively stronger condition (in this regard) than at its beginning. But the president’s wording is notably limited. He refers only to “tolls.” Iranian media has reported in recent weeks that Iran will not charge tolls but will require “fees” in the strait. Even today Iranian media says that ships transiting the Gulf will be “regulated” by Iran. He who regulates may charge, and a “fee” is a “toll” by another name—has the president conceded their distinction? If not, why not say so? And what about the right of the U.S. Navy to transit the strait? If commercial shipping could have Iranian regulation, will our Navy be able to transit without a fight?
If anything like these conditions are allowed by the memorandum, then the war has resulted in catastrophe, at least for the time being. The agreement would mark American compliance with an Iranian racketeering scheme—America paying tribute in order for that scheme to replace the current blockade. Any further concessions, such as the United States restraining Israel in Lebanon, would be insult added to injury.
On the other hand, a clean trade—the American blockade for the ending of the Iranian closure of the strait, with no new funds available to Iran and a general punt on other issues—wouldn’t be ideal, but it would at least return us to where we were supposed to be on April 7. That was when President Trump announced a ceasefire with Iran, “subject to the Islamic Republic of Iran agreeing to the COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz.” When Iran failed to comply, he kept the American ceasefire in place, but then imposed the blockade.
But this could also be April 7 all over again—the president unilaterally declaring progress while Iran does not agree to the terms he is describing publicly. We will know when, and if, the actual text of the memorandum is published.
Aaron MacLean is a Free Press columnist, host of the “School of War” podcast, and a CBS News national security analyst.
Martin Gurri: Two Certainties, a Mystery, and an Existential Rage
Two certainties and a great mystery confront any attempt to parse the Iran war’s possible outcomes.
The first certainty concerns the war’s operational objectives, most of which were achieved within the first month of the conflict. Iran’s capacity to build and deliver a nuclear bomb was postponed for years, if not decades. Its military industries were pulverized. The regime itself was decapitated, and many top scientists killed. The Strait of Hormuz was controlled by the U.S. Navy, inflicting dire economic punishment on a country that lacks the means to support its terrorist proxies.
The second certainty concerns the awfulness of President Trump as a wartime communicator. Never in the history of human conflict have so many words been spewed to such baffling purpose. The president threatened to annihilate Iranian civilization but somehow didn’t; warned Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu not to retaliate against Iran, but he did; and announced dozens of times that a deal had been struck with the ayatollahs when it hadn’t. Lately he declared himself “bored” with the negotiations. Trump has managed to make himself look ridiculous.
“Seeking the destruction of the United States and
Israel is the oxygen the Iranian zealots breathe.
It isn’t
negotiable—it’s existential.” —Martin Gurri
The mystery is whether Trump has been transformed into Barack Obama in his eagerness to strike a deal. The former president surrendered billions to the ayatollahs in exchange for vague promises because he thought of this agreement as his legacy. Trump, master of the art of the deal, seems equally obsessed with getting signatures on a piece of paper. The administration’s demands appear reasonable enough, but almost all of them have been repudiated by some faction in Tehran.
That’s the sticking point for anything more than a ceasefire. Seeking the destruction of the United States and Israel is the oxygen the Iranian zealots breathe. It isn’t negotiable—it’s existential. Either the regime goes, or any agreement will be tactical and temporary. Obama made the Iranians happy by giving them everything they wanted. The question now is how far Trump is driven to head in that direction.
Martin Gurri is a former CIA analyst and current visiting research fellow at the Mercatus Center.
Roya Hakakian: How America Made Itself Small
The irony couldn’t be more apt: By signing the memorandum of understanding with Iran in its current form, President Trump—who had promised to make America great—will be the one to make America small. Infinitesimally so.
Some critics have said that this agreement would throw the people of Iran “under the bus.” But appeals on behalf of justice and human rights for other nations are things of the past in Washington, among Democrats and Republicans alike.
The real casualty of this agreement is America’s global standing. Its military, once believed to be the best in the world, will have proved to be only a facade of mightiness—its men and its weapons too precious to be tested against an enemy that thrives on cheap drones and dreams of martyrdom. Instead of spending billions on military readiness, the nation would have been far better served by a crash course in the history of the Islamic Republic: the myriad harms it has inflicted on its own people, the region, and beyond, and the greater harms it still promises to inflict—proclaimed on every mural, at every Friday prayer, and on every billboard. If this agreement gets signed, we will have all learned a most painful lesson: A country can have military readiness enough to face off with God, but it will still lose if its leader or nation lacks equal readiness.
Those pundits and activists who overstated the ripe conditions for social change in Iran, portraying the regime as hollow or vulnerable to dissent, inflicted harm of their own. The hijab did not prove to be Iran’s equivalent of the Berlin Wall. A nimble and shrewd regime chose survival over ideology and dropped its insistence on dress code enforcement months ago.
America’s humiliating departures from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan will pale against the humiliation of our exit from Iran. None of those countries, however oppressive, posed real threats to their neighbors, or harbored expansionist ambitions. But Iran, the world’s greatest state sponsor of terror, does. And now, with its proxies affirmed by the triumph of their patrons, it will fast move to become a terror-sponsoring empire.
Roya Hakakian is an Iranian American writer and the author of A Beginner’s Guide to America: For the Immigrant and the Curious.
Elliot Ackerman: The Siren Song of War
Christopher Nolan’s The Odyssey will hit theaters next month, a timely summer release given America’s involvement in yet another war of “twists and turns,” as Homer described Odysseus’ journey. In one of my favorite episodes from that epic, Odysseus and his men sail past the island of the Sirens, sea nymphs who have lured many men to their doom. The goddess Circe warns Odysseus about these sea nymphs:
. . . whoever comes their way. Whoever draws too close,
off guard, and catches the Sirens’ voices in the air—
no sailing home for him, no wife rising to meet him,
no happy children beaming up at their father’s face.
The high, thrilling song of the Sirens will transfix him.
Odysseus orders his men to plug their ears with beeswax, while he lashes himself to the mast of his ship, so he can hear the Sirens’ song of seduction. When Odysseus sails past, the Sirens aren’t singing about sex and physical pleasure; they’re singing about war and man’s glory in war. The ultimate seduction.
President Trump enjoyed a series of seductive military victories before deciding to launch the war in Iran. From the assassination of Qasem Soleimani to Operation Midnight Hammer and the Nicolás Maduro raid, it’s easy to understand how a surgical strike against the Iranian leadership followed by a popular uprising and regime change proved too much of a seduction to resist. But here we are, months later, with the regime still in place while we negotiate a framework similar to the ones negotiated by the Obama administration more than a decade ago.
Wars are easy to start. They are very difficult to end. And as Odysseus showed us millennia ago, the journey home is always long and treacherous.
Elliot Ackerman is a Free Press contributor and senior fellow at Yale’s Jackson School of Global Affairs. He is a veteran of the Marine Corps and CIA special operations.
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