ekathimerini - OPINION An authoritarian Turkey and Greek illusions - Antonis Klapsis 07.06.2026 • 20:16

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OPINION

An authoritarian Turkey and Greek illusions

The recent events in Turkey are not just another episode in the domestic political confrontation of the neighboring country. The judicial intervention against the leadership of the CHP, the police pressure put on the opposition and the broader shrinking of political pluralism confirm that Turkey is increasingly moving away from the principles of the rule of law and institutional regularity

An authoritarian Turkey and Greek illusions

Police use water cannon to disperse supporters of Turkey's main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Izmir, Turkey, Tuesday, during a rally in support of party's deposed leader Ozgur Ozel. [Erdem Sahin/AP Photo]

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An authoritarian Turkey and Greek illusions

Antonis Klapsis

07.06.2026 • 20:16

  

The recent events in Turkey are not just another episode in the domestic political confrontation of the neighboring country. The judicial intervention against the leadership of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the police pressure put on the opposition and the broader shrinking of political pluralism confirm that Turkey is increasingly moving away from the principles of the rule of law and institutional regularity. For Greece, this development is not only of theoretical interest. It has direct strategic importance.

Turkey has long abandoned the prospect of Europeanization. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan does not want a Turkey that will be bound by the European acquis, by independent institutions, by rules of accountability, and by restrictions on the exercise of state power. On the other hand, the European Union does not seem to want or be able to integrate Turkey due to its size, its political physiognomy and its strategic self-perception. Thus, a framework that in the past brought (false, as it turned out) hope that it would function as an effective mechanism for taming Turkish behavior in the international environment – at least toward Greece and Cyprus – is gradually being lost.

Authoritarianism is not a neutral factor in foreign policy. The concentration of power in one person or in a narrow circle of people, the weakening of institutional accountability, the minimization of checks and balances, and the instrumentalization of nationalism facilitate the transformation of foreign policy into a means of domestic legitimization. In such regimes, external crises do not always arise as a result of cold calculation of interests. They can also be produced as a result of political necessity, personal strategy, or an attempt to rally around the leadership.

In the case of Turkey, this is linked to a broader perception of the country’s role in the region. Erdogan’s neo-Ottomanism does not aim to reconstitute the Ottoman Empire in territorial terms. However, it aims to form zones of influence that will correspond to the Ottoman era. Turkey seeks to become a hegemonic power in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. It is not enough for it to be a strong regional state. It wants to be able to shape the rules of the game – or, where that is not possible, to challenge them in practice.

The debate in Turkey on the enshrining of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine into law must also be assessed in this light. It goes without saying that a Turkish law cannot produce international legal effects to the detriment of Greece or the Republic of Cyprus. However, this does not make it politically indifferent, as, whether we like it or not, it codifies and emphatically underlines Turkish perceptions on the distribution of rights and the manner in which they are exercised.

The casus belli of 1995 is also illegal and contrary to the UN Charter. Nevertheless, for three decades it has been shaping a specific psychological and political environment in Greek-Turkish relations, influencing the way in which Greek governments face the prospect of expanding territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 nautical miles. The same applies to the Turkish-Libyan memorandum signed in November 2019 (we may not realize it, but six and a half years have already passed since then). Its legal weakness did not prevent Ankara from using it as a diplomatic and strategic reference point.

The government policy of “calm waters” is, of course, welcome. De-escalation reduces the risk of an accident, allows for communication channels and creates a more manageable environment. However, it should not be perceived as a change in Turkey’s strategic orientations. Ankara has not abandoned its claims. It has not withdrawn the casus belli. It has not revised the “Blue Homeland.” It has not accepted that the only Greek-Turkish dispute is the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), nor has it of course agreed to refer the matter to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

The perception that Erdogan’s departure from power will automatically lead to an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations is also unfounded. The current Turkish opposition does not accuse Erdogan of being too aggressive toward Greece, but of being too conciliatory. Therefore, Turkey in the post-Erdogan era may become more dangerous, especially if the political change is accompanied by nationalist narratives.

Greece has nothing to gain from a destabilized Turkey. However, it absolutely needs to read the Turkish strategy without illusions. The absence of tension does not equate to an absence of a threat. And the authoritarian slide of the neighboring country is not only a problem of democracy. It may also prove to be a factor of instability in its foreign policy.

Antonis Klapsis is an associate professor of contemporary history and international politics at the University of Peloponnese.