Welcome to another special edition of Home & Away. One month into the Iran War, a debate has emerged between those looking for a negotiated way out and those favoring the expanded use of military force. The latter position – expressed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, conservative commentators including Brit Hume and Matthew Continetti, and the leaders of several Arab countries – is often articulated as “finishing the job.”
Motivating their call is an understandable concern over having to contend with an even more hardline Iran in control of the Strait of Hormuz and with even more incentive to develop nuclear capabilities. Implicit in their stance is a belief that more military force, especially ground forces, is the best and only way to bring about an acceptable outcome.
On closer inspection, though, it turns out that “finishing the job” is more slogan than strategy. First, there is no consensus on what “the job” is. Some are calling for regime change. For others, the objective is taking out Iran’s remaining ballistic missiles, ending its nuclear program and support for proxies, seizing its enriched uranium, and/or ending its exclusive control of the Strait of Hormuz. And for some, it is all of the above.
There is no doubt that regime change, if defined as the emergence of a benign Iran that rejects terror, eschews nuclear weapons, and is willing to live peacefully and cooperatively with its neighbors, would be the ideal outcome. But there is no way to assign this mission to military forces. It can reasonably be argued that the use of military force to date has made such an outcome less likely, as the war has brought to the fore more radical leaders and has shifted popular focus away from the regime’s mismanagement of the economy and its brutal crackdown on dissent. Regime change might one day come to Iran, but its uncertainty today rules it out as a policy, especially as no one can count on it coming about before the global economy is in deep recession and Iran is in possession of nuclear weapons.
Using ground troops to seize Iran’s enriched uranium would be an extraordinarily difficult task. It would require sustained military operations deep inside the country for weeks. Casualties would inevitably be high. The mission would be dangerous and difficult, with the potential for catastrophe if the enriched uranium were to escape from the containers in which it is being held. And even if such a mission were successful, elements of Iran’s nuclear program would exist hidden around the country.
Taking and holding Kharg Island, Iran’s principal terminal for exporting oil and gas, has been floated by President Trump several times, including as recently as yesterday in an interview with the Financial Times. It would be doable, although again it would entail casualties. It would not give the United States control of Iran’s energy resources so much as its ability to export them. But the operation would require holding Iranian territory, which is sure to further inflame nationalism and precipitate extreme responses by the regime. It certainly would not prevent Iran from retaliating against the energy infrastructure of other countries in the region, which would send oil prices even higher.
History also has something to say about “finishing the job.” It was precisely this thinking in 1950 that led President Truman to yield to pressure from General Douglas MacArthur to try to unify the Korean Peninsula by force after the United States (working under a United Nations banner) liberated the south of the country. The attempt drew China directly into the conflict; not surprisingly, the bulk of American casualties came in this latter phase of the Korean War.
More recently, George W. Bush, in the 2003 Iraq War, sought to finish the job eschewed by his father some twenty years before. Bush 41 was content to liberate Kuwait. It turned out that going to Baghdad and ousting Saddam Hussein triggered chaos requiring a difficult occupation, the outcome of which did not begin to justify the costs.
The Alternatives
But to argue against the use of ground troops in Iran is not to argue for walking away. “We Broke it, You Own it” would not just leave America’s reputation in tatters; it would leave Iran with unacceptable influence over the global economy and the Middle East. Even those, such as myself, who opposed the use of force at the outset of this conflict need to recognize that we now have a situation that cannot just be allowed to remain as is.
There are two overriding goals in the short run. The first is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to shipping. Without this, the world faces not just an energy shortfall but also a food and supply chain crisis. We would soon find ourselves in a deep recession or worse.
Iran cannot be allowed to continue to run the Strait as if it were its own, deciding which ships can pass and levying a toll on all of those that are granted passage. The best course would be for the United States and the Arab countries bordering the Strait to establish a “Strait of Hormuz Authority” that would govern the use of an open Strait.
If Iran rejects such a proposal, then the United States and its partners should adopt what I have called a policy for the Strait of “Open for All or Closed to All” and impose it by a blockade in the Gulf of Oman. This action (which would deny Iran the ability to raise revenue by exporting its energy) would be far less demanding militarily (and far less costly) than seizing Kharg Island. The blockade would be lifted as soon as Iran agreed to the terms of the proposed Authority.
Two associated points. The United States should announce that neither it nor Israel will attack any targets associated with Iran’s energy resources—but that they will respond proportionately against Iran’s energy resources and infrastructure should Iran attack the energy resources or infrastructure of local states. Think of this as the “Eye for an Eye” doctrine.
Second, all targeted killings of Iranian leaders should stop. These killings are not bringing about regime change. Instead, they are making negotiation all the more difficult. Strikes on military targets in civilian areas should also be avoided, as they are alienating the populace more than anything else.
Iran’s nuclear program should, if possible, be managed through negotiation. Iran would agree that the known enriched uranium would go to another country, possibly Russia. An open-ended ceiling on permissible nuclear-related activities and an intrusive inspections regime would be established. Economic sanctions would be eased considerably in return.
Failing such a negotiated approach, the United States and Israel would declare their position that Iran would not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon, and that any ceasefire agreed to would be conditional on Iran not taking steps in that direction. If such steps were observed, and if Iran did not undo them to the satisfaction of Israel and the United States, limited military operations would be conducted against the relevant sites.
Some will reject this approach, arguing that it would not solve the problem posed by Iran. They are right: it would not. But short of the emergence of a democratic Iran that wishes to be integrated into the region and the world, that will not happen. Alas, that sort of regime change is not something that can be engineered from the outside or expected from within. As a result, U.S. policy must be based on managing the Iran that is, not the one we would prefer.
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