Saturday, March 21, 2026

GREEK REPORTER - Is Greece Replacing Turkey as the US’s Main Strategic Ally in the Region? By Nick Kampouris March 21, 2026

Is Greece Replacing Turkey as the US’s Main Strategic Ally in the Region?

March 21, 2026

USS Harry S Truman at the NATO Marathi Pier Complex in Souda Bay, Crete, Greece. Credit: US Navy

There is a massive logistical shift of US military power toward Greece underway, and it is happening largely under the radar. While much of the world is absorbed by daily diplomatic dramas and the unfolding consequences of the war in Iran, the Pentagon is quietly redrawing the map of American presence across the broader region.

Historically, the US maintained close military ties with Turkey. For over seventy years, Turkey served as NATO’s indispensable eastern anchor. The strategic significance of Anatolia’s geography made it the primary staging ground for American power projection into the Middle East and the Black Sea—first against the USSR and now in relation to Russia.

The history of the strategic military partnership between US and Turkey

Looking back at the historic military alliance between the US and Turkey, it’s clear that Turkey’s location—straddling the crossroads of Europe and Asia—made it the ultimate staging ground for American power projection. It served as the perfect launchpad for monitoring the Middle East, controlling maritime traffic in and out of the Black Sea, and anchoring NATO’s southeastern frontier.

This partnership was highly operational. The crown jewel of the arrangement was always Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey. Throughout the Cold War, Incirlik was arguably America’s most critical forward operating base. It hosted US nuclear weapons, launched U-2 spy plane missions deep into Soviet airspace, and operated essential radar stations to track missile activity.

Notably, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the base remained invaluable to the United States. Whenever the Pentagon needed to project force into the Middle East—whether during the Gulf War, post-9/11 operations, or the complex air campaigns against ISIS in Syria and Iraq—Turkish bases were the primary jumping-off points. Their proximity allowed US fighter jets and drones to reach active combat zones far faster than from any other location in the region. For decades, the logic in Washington was straightforward: to operate effectively in such a volatile part of the world, you absolutely needed Ankara on your side.

Incirlik air base in Turkey — A United States Air Force F-15 fighter jet lands at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. Credit: Staff Sgt. Eboni Reams. United States Air Force

When things started to shift: Greece as a key US military ally in the region

However, the situation has been gradually changing for years. The U.S. is now actively building a highly sophisticated military footprint in Greece, establishing a strategic alternative so it doesn’t have to rely so heavily on Ankara in times of a regional crisis.

Why this pivot? The answer comes down to a serious breakdown in trust. The turning point was the failed Turkish coup in July 2016. During the chaos, Turkish authorities cut commercial power to Incirlik Air Base and locked down the perimeter, amid widespread suspicion among Erdogan supporters that the coup was US-driven.

This was a major signal to Washington: US combat missions were grounded within seconds, exposing just how vulnerable the United States was by putting all its eggs in Turkey’s basket.

Trust suffered another severe blow when Turkey purchased Russian S-400 missile defense systems. The S-400 system cannot be integrated into NATO’s air defense network because it is built on completely different technology and does not share the alliance’s secure systems. However, the main concern is that if it operates alongside NATO aircraft, it can gather detailed radar data on them, including advanced jets. That information could potentially be accessed by Russia, allowing it to better understand how to detect or track NATO aircraft, which raises serious security concerns for the alliance.

US officials made it clear that such Russian hardware cannot coexist with advanced American technology, leading Washington to remove Ankara from the F-35 stealth fighter program and impose sanctions. The message was unmistakable—the United States could no longer count on Turkey as it once had.

Souda Bay, Crete

To address this vulnerability, the Pentagon began seeking alternatives. In recent years, it has invested heavily in the Souda Bay military base on Crete, transforming it into a maritime powerhouse.

With the continuous expansion of Pier K-14, massive nuclear-powered aircraft carriers can now dock directly, turning this Cretan outpost into the operational epicenter for the American fleet across the region. Souda Bay reduces critical logistics time, enhances the safety of US forces, and provides the freedom to operate across the Mediterranean and monitor North Africa—without relying on an increasingly unpredictable ally who flirts with Moscow and Tehran and repeatedly threatens Israel.

Alexandroupolis

Another key concern is the Bosphorus Strait. Historically, control of this narrow waterway has given Turkey a decisive advantage in moving heavy armor into the Black Sea, a strategic leverage dating back centuries to the Ottoman era. To bypass this dependency, the US has steadily upgraded the deep-water port of Alexandroupolis in northeastern Greece. The port has essentially become a “Bosphorus Bypass,” allowing the US military to operate quickly and efficiently across the broader Eastern European region without relying on Turkey.

Heavy military equipment can now be unloaded from transport ships directly onto commercial trains in Thrace and shipped onward to Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland— no Turkish straits, no unpredictable leadership, and no trust issues. Alexandroupolis has already facilitated the movement of thousands of pieces of gear for heavy brigade deployments, particularly in support of Ukraine during its war against Russia. This small Greek city has proven it can be a game-changer for Southern and Eastern European military logistics.

US soldiers stage M1 Abrams tanks at the Port of Alexandroupolis, Greece, March 21, 2022. Credit: Army Spc. Austin Steinborn/DoD

Larissa and Volos Stefanovikio Air Base

At the same time, Greece is emerging as a serious hub for air power and surveillance. The country hosts a permanent fleet of MQ-9 Reaper drones at Larissa Air Base in central Greece, keeping constant watch over the Aegean and Black Sea—not just for Athens, but for its allies as well. Further south, bases at Stefanovikio near Volos regularly hosted rotations of American Army aviation. Another notable factor is increasing hardware alignment. Greece is purchasing Black Hawk helicopters, making joint training operations between Greek and US forces practically seamless.

F-35 supersonic stealth strike fighters and Andravida Air Base

Greek military — A Rafale taking off at the Andravida Air Base. Credit: Collin Cook, Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 2.0

The contrast in the skies is striking. While Turkey operates an aging fleet of F-16s, Greece recently signed a deal for twenty advanced F-35 stealth fighters and has upgraded most of its fleet to the new F-16 Viper standard. Andravida Air Base is already being prepped for complex fifth-generation warfare simulations, and it’s only a matter of time before the formidable Hellenic Air Force receives its first 5th-generation aircraft from the US.

ExxonMobil and the Vertical Corridor

This isn’t just about military hardware. There is also a significant economic and energy dimension. The US security umbrella out of Souda Bay provides the stability for energy giants such as ExxonMobil to invest billions in ultra-deepwater natural gas exploration south of Crete, strengthening Greece’s maritime sovereignty in the broader Mediterranean.

Additionally, the new “Vertical Corridor” of pipelines, fueled by the upgraded port facilities at Alexandroupolis, will transport American liquefied natural gas north from the Aegean into the EU and Ukraine. This effectively bypasses Turkish territory and the Russian TurkStream pipeline, providing Europe with a major boost in energy independence from Russia.

What is becoming increasingly clear is that the US presence in Greece functions as the ultimate strategic insurance policy in a region defined by volatility. Turkey remains a major land power with significant regional influence, but its own decisions are gradually isolating it from Western defense networks. Greece, in contrast, has stepped up as the Eastern Mediterranean’s new logistical super-connector, offering Washington exactly what it needs—a reliable, liberal partner capable of navigating the unpredictable decades ahead.

FP Argument - March 17, 2026, 6:44 AM - An expert’s point of view on a current event. The Israel Lobby’s Responsibility for the Iran War Advocates for the U.S.-Israeli special relationship have played a special role.

Argument

An expert’s point of view on a current event.

The Israel Lobby’s Responsibility for the Iran War

Advocates for the U.S.-Israeli special relationship have played a special role.

Walt-Steve-foreign-policy-columnist20

Stephen M. Walt

By Stephen M. Walt, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

Donald Trump addresses the annual policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) March 21, 2016 in Washington

March 17, 2026, 6:44 AM

News flash: The war in Iran is not going as expected. I could say not going as “planned,” except that word seems completely inappropriate in this case. As Americans and others experience yet another Middle East debacle, they want to know who is responsible. It is vitally important to place blame where it belongs, but equally important that those who are not responsible not be wrongly accused.

Not surprisingly, some observers think this is a war being fought on Israel’s behalf. As evidence, they point to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement that the administration knew Israel was going to attack, anticipated that Iran might retaliate against U.S. forces in the region, and therefore chose to preempt. Furthermore, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had been pushing hard for another war for months, and there are plenty of pro-Israel pundits—like former Jerusalem Post editor in chief and current New York Times columnist Bret Stephens—who have repeatedly called for war on Iran in the past and are defending the current war even now.

This raises an obvious question: To what extent does the “Israel lobby” here in the United States also bear some responsibility for the war? Before I consider that question in detail, however, two notes of caution are in order.

First, it is still early days, and more evidence for how and why this happened is bound to come to light in the months ahead, along with the usual efforts to kick up dust and shift the blame if things go further south. Unlike the 2003 war in Iraq, this conflict was not preceded by a long campaign to sell the war to the American people, so it’s harder to know exactly who was pushing for it and who was raising doubts.

Second, in trying to gauge the impact of any lobbying effort, it is essential to define it properly. As John Mearsheimer and I made clear in our 2007 book on this topic, the Israel lobby is not defined by religion or ethnicity, but rather by the political positions its members try to advance. It is a loose coalition of groups and individuals whose common aim is maintaining a “special relationship” between the United States and Israel. In practice, this special relationship means providing Israel with generous military and diplomatic support no matter what it does. The lobby is comprised of both Jews and gentiles, and many American Jews are not part of the Israel lobby and do not support the special relationship. Moreover, some key parts of the lobby (such as Christian Zionists) are not Jewish.

It would therefore be both analytically wrong and dangerously divisive to blame the American Jewish community for the war, just as it was wrong to blame that community for the 2003 war in Iraq. Indeed, back in 2002-03, surveys showed that Jewish Americans were less supportive of going to war against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein than the American population as a whole. Although Israel’s Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) recently released a poll purporting to show that a majority of Jewish Americans supports the current war against Iran, these results are from a carefully selected and decidedly unrepresentative group of respondents and are almost certainly bogus. (As a side note, it’s irresponsible for JPPI to release such dubious findings, as it risks fueling precisely the sort of antisemitism that all of us want to prevent.) It is also worth noting that J Street, the largest mainstream liberal pro-Israel group, and progressive groups like New Jewish Narrative and Jewish Voice for Peace have already issued public statements condemning the war.

So who is responsible?

First and most obviously, President Donald Trump, and his collection of feckless and incompetent loyalists. Like George W. Bush in 2003, he made the decision, and he bears the ultimate responsibility for the consequences. And, of course, Netanyahu, who is trying to establish Israeli hegemony over the entire region but has no chance of doing so without active U.S. support, bears direct responsibility as well.

But no president acts entirely alone—whatever Trump wants us to believe—and it is well established that Trump can be swayed by what he hears from those around him. And Trump’s inner circle includes many people who are staunch defenders of Israel, longtime beneficiaries of Israel-related campaign contributions, or both. Trump’s two Middle East envoys—Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner—are both ardent supporters of Israel, as is U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee. Rubio, who also serves as national security advisor, was a reflexive proponent of the special relationship during his Senate career and one of the biggest recipients of pro-Israel campaign funding. Current White House chief of staff Susie Wiles worked as a consultant for Netanyahu’s 2020 reelection campaign. Except for Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, who questioned excessive U.S. support for Israel in her pre-MAGA career, it is hard to think of anyone in the upper reaches of the administration who publicly favors distancing the United States from Israel.

Second, Trump himself has acknowledged his own debt to ardent pro-Israel figures such as the late Sheldon Adelson and his widow, Miriam. As Eli Clifton and Ian Lustick recount in a recent article in the Nation (and a soon-to-be-published book), Trump singled out Miriam Adelson—the largest single contributor in recent U.S. elections—during his address to the Knesset in October 2025, and even speculated that she might love Israel more than the United States. Similar concerns may also explain why some Democratic Party leaders have been reluctant to criticize Israel for starting the war or the Trump administration for joining in and have focused instead on the failure to plan the war more carefully.

Third, this war did not come out of nowhere. To be sure, the United States and Iran have been at odds for decades, and neither Israel nor the lobby is solely responsible for the suspicion with which each country views the other. Nonetheless, lobby groups such as AIPAC, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the Zionist Organization of America, and United Against Nuclear Iran have worked to demonize Iran over the years, prevent U.S. companies from doing business there, and derail prior attempts by former Iranian presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammed Khatami to improve relations. (For evidence on the latter point, check out chapter 10 of our 2007 book.) Unlike J Street, these groups worked overtime to thwart the 2015 agreement that reduced Iran’s enrichment capacity and nuclear stockpile, and they eventually persuaded Trump to tear up the deal in 2018 even though Iran was in full compliance. Had Trump not done so, of course, there would be much less reason to worry about Iran’s nuclear program today.

Finally, by making it almost impossible for either Democratic or Republican presidents to put meaningful pressure on Israel, the lobby has enabled Netanyahu to engage in “reckless driving” all over the region, whether in Israel’s sustained efforts to oppress its Palestinian subjects or in its repeated attacks on Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iran, and even Qatar. Although Steven Simon is correct to say that Israel did not “compel” the U.S. into this latest war—the Trump administration jumped in voluntarily and enthusiastically—the lobby’s role in defending the special relationship and enabling Israel to keep disturbing the peace helps us understand why Americans keep finding themselves embroiled in costly conflicts far from home.

The bottom line: As this latest disaster unfolds, Americans and others will rightly want to hold those responsible to account. They should focus on the specific groups and individuals—from the president on down—who embraced Israel’s approach to the region and managed to convince themselves that yet another orgy of violence would be in the U.S. interest. Until the lobby’s influence is reduced and the United States establishes a more normal relationship with Israel, such episodes are likely to be repeated, making the United States look like a heartless bully and leaving all of us worse off.

This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage. Read more here.

Stephen M. Walt is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. Bluesky: @stephenwalt.bsky.social X: @stephenwalt

Vox.com .Why the US wants to protect Iran’s oil and gas -- Story by Joshua Keating • 18h (March 21,2026)• 5 min read

Vox.com

.Why the US wants to protect Iran’s oil and gas

Story by Joshua Keating • 18h • 5 min read

Markets today

INX

▼‎-1.51%‎

DJI

▼‎-0.96%‎

COMP

▼‎-2.01%‎

Gas tower in flames.

The Trump administration’s rhetoric on the war in Iran tends to be heavy on words like “lethality” and “obliteration,” so it was notable that the president seemed almost apologetic on Wednesday, when discussing an Israeli strike on Iran’s South Pars gas field, which prompted Iranian retaliation against natural gas facilities in Qatar and sent global energy prices skyrocketing.

“The United States knew nothing about this particular attack, and the country of Qatar was in no way, shape, or form, involved with it, nor did it have any idea that it was going to happen,” President Donald Trump wrote on Truth Social. (Israeli officials say the US was informed ahead of time.) He added that “NO MORE ATTACKS WILL BE MADE BY ISRAEL pertaining to this extremely important and valuable South Pars Field” unless Iran launched more attacks against Qatar.

Trump’s reluctance to get drawn into a tit-for-tat energy war with Iran makes sense: it’s an escalation scenario guaranteed to drive up the global economic costs of this war.

The imperative of keeping global oil flows moving has already led to some fairly drastic steps. Last week, the administration temporarily lifted the sanctions meant to prevent countries like India from buying oil from Russia, upending the US strategy to pressure the Kremlin into a peace deal in Ukraine.

Related video: Iran war escalates as energy concerns grow (FOX 9 Minneapolis-St. Paul)

FOX 9 Minneapolis-St. Paul

Iran war escalates as energy concerns grow

week and there are no signs the US is pulling

Current Time 0:04

Duration 2:05

View on Watch

Now, the US is considering unsanctioning Iranian oil that’s already on the water, or as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent put it in an interview with Fox Business, “In essence, we will be using the Iranian barrels against the Iranians to keep the price down for the next 10 or 14 days, as we continue this campaign.”

On paper, it seems very strange for the US to take steps to make it easier for the country it’s currently at war with to export oil, particularly as the biggest customer for Iran’s oil is China, another US rival. But it speaks to the strange role oil plays in modern warfare, one in which countries sometimes paradoxically want their adversaries to keep selling energy.

An energy truce breaks down

One might think that when fighting an adversary, such as Iran, that relies on energy exports as the lifeblood of its economy and the primary funding source for its armed forces, that those resources would be the first thing attacked. In practice, economic stability and the desire to keep the lights on and avoid voter backlash often take precedence over military expediency.

The war in the Middle East, and Iran’s effective shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, have obviously roiled global energy markets, and there have been some previous strikes against oil facilities. But until now there appeared to be an unspoken agreement against major attacks on energy infrastructure in either Iran or the Gulf.

“It’s common, when warfare is happening, to have different stages of escalation, with certain things that start out as off-limits,” said Rosemary Kelanic, an analyst at Defense Priorities and expert on the geopolitics of oil. Until now, Kelanic says, “it was a good balance. We didn’t hit these Iranian energy sites, and then they didn’t hit the many more energy sites in the Gulf states.”

In recent days, however, that truce appears to have broken down. The Iranian attacks on Qatar knocked out 17 percent of the emirate’s natural gas production capacity, causing an estimated $20 billion in lost revenue and disrupting supplies to Europe and Asia. Natural gas is extracted from fewer sites globally than oil and the technical process is more complex, meaning the costs are likely to be higher than attacks on oil facilities. On Friday, Iran followed up with an attack on an oil refinery in Kuwait.

If the truce has broken down, that’s bad news politically for a US administration already concerned about the impact of rising oil and gas prices. But it’s not the first war in which they’ve faced this dilemma.

The Ukraine precedent

The Trump administration’s desire to keep oil off-limits in this war in some ways mirrors the Biden’s administration’s approach to Ukraine. In 2024, the Financial Times reported that the White House had urged Ukraine to refrain from long-range strikes on Russia’s energy infrastructure out of concern that it would drive up global energy prices and provoke energy retaliation by Russia.

When the war broke out, the US had considered sanctions to disrupt Russia’s seaborne oil exports, but held back after estimates suggested this could drive oil prices to over $200 a barrel. Instead, US and European officials devised a complex “price cap” to force Russia to sell its oil at a discount. This would, as one Treasury official put it, “limit Kremlin profits while maintaining stable energy markets.”

The most extreme example of keeping oil off-limits may be that Ukraine continued to maintain and repair the network of pipelines on its soil used to export Russian oil and natural gas to Europe, even as the war raged. The concern was that cutting off these supplies entirely would alienate the European allies Ukraine relied on for economic and military support and doom the country’s aspirations for EU membership. The gas exports were finally shut down at the beginning of 2025, but Ukraine is currently under pressure from European countries to repair a pipeline used to carry Russian oil.

While there is evidence that a pro-Ukraine group destroyed the controversial Nord Stream pipeline carrying Russian gas to Europe under the Baltic Sea, the Ukrainian government has consistently denied involvement, perhaps due to the sensitivity of the target among its allies.

Destroying Iran’s oil, or taking it?

There may be another reason why Trump is reluctant to destroy Iran’s oil industry: he’d rather take it over. The president has been talking about grabbing Iran’s oil fields since first considering a run for office in the 1980s. During this conflict, he has said it’s too soon to talk about seizing Iran’s oil industry but hasn’t ruled it out, and has linked the operation to the recent US intervention in Venezuela, where a more pliant leader is now willing to give US firms a role in the country’s struggling oil industry.

Trump’s desire to keep Iran’s oil industry intact, whether to play a future role in managing it or just to avoid driving prices up any further, could put him at odds with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

“Bibi wants to wreck Iran’s economy and decimate its energy infrastructure. Trump wants to keep it intact.” one US official told the Washington Post this week.

But it seems increasingly unlikely that Trump will be able to fight a war in which energy targets on both sides of the Gulf are kept out of bounds.

Yazar: YetkinReport / 20 Mart 2026, Cuma - Bayram Motorin Zammıyla Geldi, Diğerleri Sırada, Fatura Halka Çıkıyor

Bayram Motorin Zammıyla Geldi, Diğerleri Sırada, Fatura Halka Çıkıyor

Yazar: YetkinReport / 20 Mart 2026, Cuma / Oda: Ekonomi

İran savaşıyla tırmanışa geçen petrol fiyatları bayramın ilk günü ağır

motorin zammına yol açtı. Savaş uzadıkça bununla sınırlı kalacak gibi

de görünmüyor.

Hükümet, Ramazan Bayramı’nın ilk günü olan 20 Mart 2026’da motorine şimdiye kadarki en ağır zamlardan birini yaptı. Pompa fiyatlarına net 5,18 TL artış yansıdı, Ankara’da pompa fiyatı, litrede 72,5 liraya çıktı. ABD-İsrail ittifakının İran’a son saldırıları ve İran’ın Körfez’deki Arap ülkelerini vurmasıyla fırlayan petrol fiyatları nedeniyle 5,76 lira olması tahmin edilen zammın 58 kuruşu eşel-mobil (échelle mobile-hareketli ölçek) sistemiyle tamponlandı.
Yine de savaşın başladığı 28 Şubat’ta (Ankara’da) 61,45 lira olan motorinin litre fiyatı üç hafta içinde, eşel-mobil takviyesine rağmen, yüzde 18 artışla 72,5 liraya çıktı. Aynı süre içinde, petrol fiyatları ise yaklaşık yüzde 50 artışla, varili 72-73 dolardan, 20 Mart itibarıyla 107-109 dolara fırladı.
İran savaşının sürmesi ve dünya petrol trafiğinin yüzde 25’inin, doğal gaz trafiğinin yüzde 20 kadarının geçtiği Hürmüz Boğazı’nın tıkanması ihtimali halinde küresel enerji sıkıntısının tırmanması kaçınılmaz görünüyor. Buda ABD ve AB’nin Ukrayna savaşı nedeniyle Rusya’ya uyguladığı yaptırımların da payı var.

Motorin ile Kalmayacak

Hükümet 18 Mart’ta benzine de zam yapmıştı, ancak yeni gelişmeler üzerine motorin gibi benzin ve otogaz fiyatlarına, doğal gaz fiyatlarına da zam gelmesi ihtimali var.
Petrole gelen zam sadece ulaştırma sektörünü (şehir içi ve şehirlerarası) kötü etkilemekle kalmayacak. Aynı zamanda sanayi ürünlerinden inşaat sektörü girdilerine ve tarım ürünlerine dek nakliye fiyatları da artacak.
Motorin zammının traktör yakıtından nakliyeye dek tarımsal ürün fiyatlarını artırma riskine, doğal gaz kullanımına bağlı olan gübre üretimi girdisini ve yem fiyatlarını da katmak gerekiyor.
Doğal gaz zammının bir etkisi de elektrik fiyatlarına olabilir.
Bu durum, hükümetin yüzde 16 olarak ilan edilen 2026 sonu enflasyon hedeflerini tutturamamasına yol açacak gibi. Nitekim Merkez Bankası 19 Mart’ta AK Parti hükümetine yazdığı açık mektup ile, hedeflerden sapma olacağını, bunun başlıca nedenleri arasında ise gıda, enerji, eğitim, ulaştırma fiyatları gibi TCMB’nin elinde olmayan nedenlerin payı olduğunu söylemişti.
Savaşın uzamasının Türk ekonomisi üzerindeki yükü ile halkın geçim sıkıntısı yükünü de artıracağı görülüyor.

Yetkin Report - Yazar: Faik Tunay 1 Mart 2026, Cumartesi - Gıda Fiyatları ve Tarım Sorunu: Toprak Değil, Beka Meselesi

Gıda Fiyatları ve Tarım Sorunu: Toprak Değil,

Beka Meselesi

Yazar: Faik Tunay 1 Mart 2026, Cumartesi / 2/ Oda: Ekonomi, Siyaset

Son on yılda yaklaşık 2,7 milyon hektar, yani yaklaşık 4,5 İstanbul

büyüklüğünde bir alan, tarım üretiminin dışında kaldı. Son yirmi

yılda tarım dışına çıkan kişi sayısı 600 bine yaklaştı. (Foto: Maxim Berg on Unsplash)

Merkez Bankası’na göre gıda fiyatlarındaki durdurulamayan artış enflasyon hedeflerinin tutmamasının birinci nedeni. ABD-İsrail’in başlattığı İran savaşı nedeniyle artan petrol fiyatları tarım ve hayvancılıktaki girdi fiyatlarını daha da artırıyor.

Tarım sektörüyle az çok hemhal olanların son yıllardaki ana gündem maddelerinden biri de kaybolan tarım arazileri. Bir başka ifadeyle, imar ve rant hırsına kurban edilen, betona feda edilen bereketli topraklarımız.

Hukuki prosedüre göre, bir tarım arazisinin imara açılabilmesi için “alternatif alan bulunamaması” ve valilik bünyesindeki Toprak Koruma Kurulu’ndan “kamu yararı” kararı çıkması şarttır. Peki, ülkemizde çarklar gerçekten böyle mi işliyor? Maalesef hayır. Kısa vadeli çıkarlar uğruna paha biçilemez araziler heba ediliyor.

Burada hemen şu soruyu sormak lazım: Tek suçlu yönetenler mi? Vatandaşın hiç mi günahı yok? Ama tarım ve hayvancılık gerçekten para kazandırsa, yüksek maliyetler çiftçinin belini bükmese, kim toprağının imara açılmasını ister? Kim verimli arazide apartmanların yükselmesini, havasının kirlenmesini, huzurunun kaçmasını tercih eder? Eminim ki vatandaşlarımızın yüzde 95’i bu yolu mecburiyetten seçiyor.

Toprak mı, Arsa mı?

Milletçe toprağa bakışımızda trajik bir paradoks var. Bir yandan Aşık Veysel’in diliyle toprağı “sadık yar” görüyor, onu kutsal sayıyoruz; diğer yandan hızlı zenginleşme aracı olarak “arsa” kültürünü, üretici kimliğimizin önüne koyuyoruz. Bu, ciddi bir özeleştiri gerektiren toplumsal bir dönüşümdür. Artık “üretmek” yerine “rant elde etmek” zihinlere baskın hâle geldi.

Rakamlar bu acı tabloyu tüm çıplaklığıyla özetliyor:

Kaybedilen Alan: Son on yılda yaklaşık 27,8 milyon dekar (2,7 milyon hektar) tarım arazisi üretimden koptu.
Vahametin Boyutu: Bu miktar, tam 4,5 İstanbul büyüklüğünde bir alanın artık ekilmediği anlamına geliyor.

Büyükşehir Yasası ve Tarımdan Kaçış

Bu çöküşün elbette pek çok nedeni var, ancak benim de TBMM çatısı altında milletvekili olduğum dönemde yasalaşan “Büyükşehir Kanunu” bu sürecin en büyük tetikleyicilerinden biri oldu. Binlerce köyün bir gecede “mahalle” statüsüne geçmesi, mera ve tarım arazilerinin imar planlarına dahil edilmesini hukuken kolaylaştırdı.

Son yirmi yılda tarım dışına çıkan kişi sayısı 600 bini buldu. Keşke bu insanlar sanayileşip fabrikalarda iş sahibi oldukları için toprağı bıraksalardı; ama gerçek bu değil. Girdi maliyetlerindeki durdurulamaz artış, çiftçiyi toprağına küstürdü. Tarlasından ayda 30 bin TL gelir elde edemeyen bir vatandaş, müteahhide verdiğinde milyonlarca lira kazanacağını görünce -bile isteye- üretimden vazgeçiyor. Fakat asıl mesele, vatandaşı bu çıkmaza sürükleyen sistemdir.

Borç Sarmalı ve Gıda Güvenliği

Hükümet, kendi çıkardığı Tarım Kanunu’na bile uymuyor. 2006 yılında çıkan yasaya göre tarıma ayrılması gereken destek miktarı GSYH’nin %1’inden az olamazdı. 2025 yılı verilerine bakalım:

Verilmesi gereken destek: 615 milyar TL.
Verilen destek: 135 milyar TL.

Bu uçurumun sonucu ise devasa bir borç yükü. Çiftçinin bankalara olan borcu bir yılda 869 milyar liradan 940 milyar liraya fırladı. Takipteki borçlar ise iki katından fazla artarak 8 milyar liraya ulaştı.

Sonuç olarak; Üretmeyenin tükendiği bir dünyada işimiz her geçen gün zorlaşıyor. Yarın bir gün pandemi benzeri küresel bir felaket kapıyı tekrar çaldığında, gıda egemenliğini yitirmiş ülkelerin hali perişan olacak.

Unutmayalım; tarım arazilerini korumak sadece bir çevre meselesi değil, doğrudan bir millî bekâ meselesidir.