The National Interest The Myth of Russian Invincibility July 29, 2025 By: Daryna Lesniak

 The National  Interest 

The Myth of Russian Invincibility

July 29, 2025

By: Daryna Lesniak

The prevailing assumption that Moscow has the “upper hand” in the Russia-Ukraine War is no longer tenable. 

In June 2025, Kyiv destroyed a third of Russia’s nuclear bomber fleet in a meticulously planned strike codenamed “Operation Spiderweb.” Ukrainian forces launched coordinated drone swarms from inside Russian territory, evading radar and targeting parked Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers with pinpoint precision. The operation, 18 months in the making, underscored Ukraine’s capacity to conduct complex, high-impact attacks independently of direct Western support.

Operation Spiderweb was one of Ukraine’s many successes that should prompt Washington to reassess Russia’s ability to prevail on the battlefield and acknowledge its growing vulnerabilities. In March, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a report that claimed that Russia had the “upper hand” in Ukraine and was “on a path to accrue greater leverage” to pressure Kyiv and its allies into a deal on Moscow’s terms. 

But months of fruitless negotiations between Ukraine and Russia have revealed just how poorly that prediction has aged. The report—and much of Western public discourse—overlooked Russia’s internal challenges and grossly overestimated its ability to sustain military successes. Behind the Kremlin’s confident posture lies a creaky war machine straining under economic pressure and battlefield exhaustion. 

Though sanctions and Western isolation haven’t stopped the Kremlin’s war effort, the Russian economy is starting to crack after three years of exorbitant military spending. Since 2022, Moscow has drained its National Wealth Fund from $112 billion to $37 billion, weakening its ability to finance the war. Military spending has inflated an economic bubble, crowding out civilian industries and investment. Sectors unrelated to the military are being squeezed as the Kremlin redirects resources toward the war effort. It’s increasingly difficult to attract workers to civilian industries like construction when defense manufacturing or military service offers substantially higher pay. 

Likewise, capital is being funneled overwhelmingly into military expenditures, leaving little room for investment in other areas of the economy. Even the Kremlin can no longer ignore the looming economic crisis. In June, following a warning from Russia’s economy minister that the country was nearing recession, President Vladimir Putin pledged to cut military spending, saying the government must avoid a downturn “under any circumstances.” 

The announcement exposed another challenge: Russia’s growing domestic political fragility. For too long, Putin has been perceived in the West as a dictator impervious to public opinion. But even in an autocracy like Russia, popular unrest can pose serious risks to regime stability. At the heart of this is a longstanding social contract: Russians are expected to stay out of politics, and in return, the state ensures a basic standard of economic security and order. Putin understands this—and history shows he is acutely aware of the dangers of alienating the public. 

In 2018, protests over a proposed pension reform led him to soften the plan. Similarly, fears that Russians might emulate Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity helped motivate Putin’s initial invasion of Ukraine that year. These examples underscore that, despite his grip on power, Putin remains, to a degree, dependent on both public acquiescence and elite support. He is therefore constrained in what he can do and must avoid policies like widespread conscription or total war economics, which could provoke a domestic backlash even if they might otherwise help Russia on the battlefield.

Russia’s military struggles reflect these broader weaknesses. Over the last year, Moscow has achieved essentially nothing from a strategic standpoint. Its summer offensive has failed to break through the 15–20 km gray zone of contested frontlines shaped by drone warfare. Desperate for results, Russian forces have turned to risky tactics—like deploying troops on motorcycles—that often end in disaster. In this context, increasing troop numbers does little to change the battlefield stalemate, nullifying Russia’s manpower advantage. 

Nevertheless, Moscow continues its recruitment drive, offering increasingly lucrative enlistment bonuses—now more than doubled to 400,000 rubles since last July, nearly five times the average monthly wage—in a bid to stave off politically untenable waves of forced conscription. These efforts are further draining the country’s already depleted coffers.