ICG (International Crisis Group) 21 July 2025 A Three- point Plan for Consolidating the Israel- US - Iran Ceasefire

 ICG (International Crisis Group) 21 July 2025 

A Three- point Plan for Consolidating the Israel- US - Iran Ceasefire

The Middle East seems yet  again to have dodged what could have been devastating all-out  war. But the ceasefire between Iran, on one side, and the duo of Israel and the U.S. is tenuous. To shore it up, the parties must reach a deal.

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Following a twelve-day war in June, a truce is holding between Iran, on one side, and Israel and the U.S., on the other, but it rests on shaky ground. While the Middle East seems to have dodged what could have been a much more devastating conflagration, the June conflict has established a dangerous dynamic that could lead to bigger wars in the future. Each of the three parties claims to have won the war, but all three victory narratives have sizeable holes. With each party still in some measure exposed, there is ample room for hawks in all three polities to argue for a return to arms. If that happens, the risk of major escalation – mercifully contained in the June conflict – will return. Diplomacy is the most reliable way to keep the war from reigniting. A deal that addresses nuclear concerns and fortifies the existing truce into a non-aggression understanding is necessary both to meet the immediate challenge and to put in place arrangements that can stabilise the region. 

Porous Victory Narratives

When Israel started the twelve-day war, launching its Operation Rising Lion on 13 June, it had three key goals: to set back what it regarded as an Iranian nuclear program “approaching the point of no return”, given rapidly growing stockpiles of high-enriched uranium and what it asserts was weaponisation-related work; to knock out a significant number of Iran’s ballistic missiles; and to further crimp the Islamic Republic’s ability to project power in the region, whether by itself or via proxies. Israeli officials also noted that the strikes could destabilise the Iranian government or even pave the way for regime change, citing the Islamic Republic’s fragility and encouraging the Iranian people to rise up against their rulers. Another, implicit aim may have been to derail nuclear diplomacy and undermine the possibility of a renewed deal between the U.S. and Iran, as Israel’s surprise attack took place just two days before a sixth round of talks was scheduled to take place in Oman. The strikes further pointed to Israel’s political will to use military force expansively and the paucity of meaningful internal or external forces capable of holding it back. 

Rising Lion was also a demonstration of Israel’s ability to draw the U.S. into a conflict that U.S. President Donald Trump did not appear to want, and had actively sought to discourage, having long railed against U.S. intervention in the region. On 22 June, U.S. planes dropped huge “bunker buster” bombs on Iranian nuclear sites. The next day, Iran responded with what appeared to be a calibrated missile attack on al-Udeid, the large U.S. military base in Qatar – a strike that caused no casualties likely because of Tehran’s advance warning to Doha and Washington. Taking the off-ramp that this moment provided, Trump announced on 23 June that the U.S. had (with help from Qatar) secured a ceasefire that would commence in phases over the next twelve hours. Israel and Iran silenced their guns shortly thereafter – following a push by Trump to abort a final flight of Israeli fighter-bombers.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared the war a resounding victory, and Israeli officials backed him up with assessments that the Israeli and U.S. strikes had significantly retarded Iran’s nuclear program, some even saying by years, with physical losses complemented by the elimination of senior nuclear scientists who would presumably be key to developing a viable weapon (though Israel has presented no concrete evidence of recent weaponisation-related activities). Israel claims to have destroyed 800-1,000 ballistic missiles, as well as at least half of Iran’s missile launchers. Israeli jets and drones flew more than a thousand sorties over Iranian territory in twelve days, striking nuclear and military sites almost at will, while the pinpoint targeting of senior officials – more than two dozen military commanders were killed – and operations on the ground proved that the Mossad spy agency had penetrated the Iranian establishment on Iranian soil. Israel parried most of Iran’s own thrusts, claiming to have shot down some 86 per cent of the 500-plus missiles Tehran fired and all but one of the over 1,000 drones. Israel also believes Iran’s regional standing, already weakened by a string of blows to its state and non-state allies over the past year, to be diminished. Of Iran’s regional allies, only Yemen’s Houthis tried to enter the fray. Lebanese Hizbollah, once the most formidable of Tehran’s friends, said early on that it would stay out. 

Washington, too, offered a victory narrative, with the Trump administration projecting nothing but bullish confidence in the efficacy of its 22 June strikes, particularly the blow they dealt to Iran’s heavily fortified nuclear enrichment facility at Fordow. The U.S. hit Fordow with 30,000-pound GBU-57s, the largest of the “bunker busters” it has been developing for decades, dropping these bombs in combat for the first time. The White House announced that “President Donald J. Trump obliterated Iran’s nuclear facilities” and Trump himself has repeatedly reinforced that message. CIA director John Ratcliffe also asserted that “Iran’s nuclear program had been severely damaged by the recent, targeted strikes”, and Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, posted on social media that “new intelligence” confirmed that “Iran’s nuclear facilities have been destroyed”. The Trump administration has also cast doubt on less rosy initial assessments reportedly undertaken by the Defense Intelligence Agency, with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth accusing media outlets of spinning their coverage to hurt the president. 

For the Islamic Republic, meanwhile, surviving a high-octane campaign by two nuclear-weapon states reasonably intact was a victory – even if to outside observers it seemed a pyrrhic one. For all the casualties it claimed, Israel did not take out Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or any other key political figure who was rumoured to be in its sights. In the Iranian narrative, though Israel and the U.S. achieved tactical surprise, causing significant damage, the regime not only stayed on its feet but also counterstruck in the heart of Israeli cities, to the extent that within two weeks, the other side was compelled to accept a ceasefire. Iran’s missile salvos were largely blocked, but those that got through caused extensive damage. Tehran showed a capacity to hit strategic sites, including an oil refinery, a technical university and defence installations. Israel was rattled enough to impose strict censorship, and it has not, to date, revealed how much the heavy deployments of its high-tech air defences (which were augmented by the U.S. and other allies) cost or by how much its stock of interceptors was depleted. 

Inside Iran, the war’s impact could have been much worse.

Inside Iran, the war’s impact could have been much worse. The Iranian state machinery continued to function throughout the twelve days, with access to basic goods and services largely uninterrupted. While cracks between state and society were visible, there were no major anti-government protests, even as Israel extended its target list to elements of Iran’s security and law enforcement apparatus. Moreover, the conflict gave the Islamic Republic an opportunity to rally popular sentiment behind Iranian sovereignty and national defence, even as it has been cracking down on alleged infiltrators. 

For all the bravado, however, each of the victory narratives has significant gaps. As good as Israeli and U.S. leaders say they feel about the strikes, big questions linger about how extensive the damage really was and how quickly Tehran might be able to reconstitute elements of its nuclear program. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has ventured that resuming uranium enrichment could take only a few months. A mid-July U.S. assessment reportedly concluded that while the strikes did significant damage to Fordow, they did less to facilities in Isfahan and Natanz. Without an on-the-ground evaluation, no damage estimate is likely to be definitive, and none is now possible: in early July, the UN’s nuclear watchdog had to pull out its remaining inspectors after the Iranian government, prodded by parliament, suspended cooperation with the agency. Meanwhile, Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium has disappeared from view. It may be buried or inaccessible at one of at the targeted facilities, but it could also have been spirited away and hidden. Nor has Iran lost all its indigenous nuclear expertise, which despite the deaths of many top scientists cannot be easily destroyed. Feeling backed into a corner, Tehran could conceivably attempt to quickly reassemble its nuclear program, but now with less transparency, a smaller footprint and a different strategic calculus as to whether to pursue a nuclear weapon. It could also seek to build up its ballistic missiles stores, air defence systems and the arsenals of its regional surrogates. 

Yet much as Iran’s leadership seeks to project resilience, it is hardly in a good place. It can try to rebuild the nuclear program, and move toward a weapon, but its chances of success are dubious. Its air defences are demolished; its security establishment is penetrated by Israeli intelligence; and its nuclear activities are under intensified surveillance by both the U.S. and Israel. Meanwhile. Netanyahu’s confidence in the use of military force is further bolstered, and, perhaps most importantly, Trump has set a precedent for U.S. strikes on Iranian territory. Arguably, the more progress the Islamic Republic makes toward regaining its pre-13 June nuclear capacity, the more it risks Israel and/or the U.S. scrambling bombers once again. Nor is it clear that the Iranian system can absorb the shock of further, potentially wider strikes in continued nuclear roulette.

The Risks of Round Two

Against this backdrop, the danger of renewed conflict is clear. It is all too easy to imagine Israel, seeing Iran bloodied but unbowed, tempted to keep bombing Iran periodically, with the goals of thwarting the nuclear program’s reconstitution, further weakening the Islamic Republic and/or chipping away at Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, duplicating the “mow the grass” model it has used elsewhere in the region, including to suppress Hizbollah in Lebanon. Prime Minister Netanyahu might hope to have Washington’s acquiescence for additional sorties or even to draw in the U.S. again, relying on hawkish elements in the Trump administration, the Republican Party and the U.S. media to press his case with the White House. 

If he does, Washington’s hawks could well prevail. Trump has also staked his credibility on the effectiveness of the U.S. strikes and might feel compelled to order further operations if evidence emerges that Iran’s nuclear program is moving ahead. That impulse may be bolstered following Iran’s telegraphed and symbolic retaliation at al-Udeid, which may have deepened the impression that it is unlikely to lash out in ways that could court full-on conflict with the U.S. Trump is already hinting at willingness to return to combat, with comments to the effect that the U.S. does not need to negotiate with Iran to curb its ambitions and that Washington can instead rely on deterrence alone. 

As for Iran, hardliners in the Islamic Republic will now have a much easier time arguing that the U.S. cannot be trusted, pointing to the fact that the U.S. bombed Iran while it was at the bargaining table and may even have continued the dialogue as a means of creating a ruse to camouflage pending military action. In addition, Israel’s mid-July strikes in Syria are seen by some in Tehran as confirmation that even a conciliatory policy may provide no reprieve.  

But if any of the three parties believes that a new round of war is worth the risks, it should think again. Start with Israel, which should not assume that its “mow the grass” tactics can transfer easily to Iran. Making occasional strikes on non-state actors in Lebanon, Syria or even Yemen, where there are few if any checks on Israeli freedom of operation, may cost it little, but Iran is a case apart. While outgunned by Israel’s firepower and outmatched in intelligence capabilities, Tehran nevertheless showed during the twelve-day war that it can bring Israel’s economy to a standstill and cause death and destruction on the Israeli home front, sending the entire citizenry into shelters. Tehran’s largely performative strike in Qatar also underscored other ways in which it could escalate a future conflict, both by drawing in other states and by increasing the harm it does to U.S. personnel and interests in the region. 

For Trump,  renewed war carries several hazards.

For Trump, renewed war carries several hazards. There is the geopolitical risk of seeing the U.S. become mired in another major Middle East conflict or dealing with the turmoil of regime collapse, when it prefers to shift resources to other theatres – particularly to compete with China in the Indo-Pacific. But there is also a level of political exposure. Trump established his political brand in part by taking on the hawks in his own party who backed the U.S. misadventure in Iraq, and important parts of his right-populist base continue to deeply oppose major foreign interventions. Such opposition could create real backlash against Trump and his circle if the U.S. gets pulled back into conflict with Iran – particularly if U.S. engagement starts to look like an open-ended commitment or the U.S. suffers casualties. Hence the administration’s fierce insistence that the “bunker busters” achieved nothing short of “obliteration” in the face of evidence to the contrary and Trump’s rejection of broader military plans that would have taken weeks to conclude. 

As for the Islamic Republic, it may be tempted to pursue nuclear ambiguity by continuing to bar the UN inspectors’ access or to demonstrate a lingering capability for uranium enrichment, on the basis that it must at minimum show it is not playing with an empty hand. It could also quietly begin a full sprint to acquire a weapon with the idea that only a bomb will provide the deterrence its adversaries will respect. Yet any gambit by which Iran tries to improve its nuclear lot may hasten more Israeli and/or U.S. military action, especially when the threshold for unilateral or joint strikes may be far lower going forward and the targeting broader and deeper, to include strategic assets and more senior officials. Even without a resort to force, greater pressure through further U.S. sanctions will deepen the country’s existing economic malaise. Further, since Israel launched its military campaign following Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attacks, Iran and its partners have repeatedly miscalculated as to Israel’s willingness to use force in novel ways and to assume much greater risk. Pushing the envelope on the nuclear file at this juncture may create existential peril for Tehran. 

Time is not an ally, either – failure to make headway toward some form of diplomatic solution in the coming weeks increases the likelihood that European powers will move to restore pre-2015 UN Security Council resolutions – which they have suggested they may do by the end of August. Triggering the snapback mechanism before it expires in October is one of the most significant leverage points Western powers maintain: it would restore international demands for a cessation of uranium enrichment and restrictions on Iran’s arms trade, as well as a host of other measures targeting the Islamic Republic’s shipping and banking sectors. But it could also push Iran to follow in North Korea’s footsteps and become only the second country to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which could only raise tensions with Israel and the West. 

From Vinegar to Honey: A Three-point Plan

The twelve-day war does not have to be the prelude to further – potentially bigger and more dangerous – exchanges. There is an opportunity to put in place a durable arrangement for securing the peace, if the parties are bold enough to seize it. 

The first step should be ensuring that the current ceasefire is a pivot to serious dialogue rather than a pause between rounds of hostilities. Washington and Tehran should quickly renew their diplomatic contacts with a specific set of opening objectives in mind. One option to create some space would be a UN Security Council resolution in which the U.S. commits to refrain from additional strikes – and, implicitly, restrain Israeli strikes – in return for Iran not restarting its enrichment program for the duration of the negotiations and resuming its cooperation with the IAEA. 

In order to fulfill this requirement, the Islamic Republic would need to restore access for UN monitors, who would be tasked with accounting for its remaining fissile material. Relations between Iran and the IAEA, which would be central to such monitoring, have gone from acrimonious to hostile. Even before the bombs dropped in June, Iranian officials were highly critical of the IAEA director general for what they claimed was a biased safeguards probe that led the Agency’s Board of Governors to find Iran non-compliant with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet giving the inspectors free rein will be a sine qua non requirement for an agreement, not least to report on the status of Iran’s nuclear facilities and account for its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Progress on these issues, along with restoration of IAEA oversight, should give the UK, France and Germany (known as the E3) enough to avert snapback for the time being; a UN Security Council resolution could extend the October deadline to keep the option available while giving time for additional diplomacy.

As a second step, the parties would then need to address the fundamental disagreement that hung up U.S.-Iranian talks for months – the U.S. and Israeli demand that Iran cease enriching uranium. Little suggests that the U.S. will soften its terms now that Iran’s nuclear program has been degraded and its conventional military strength weakened. The best available deal for Tehran is probably one that recognises in principle Iran’s right to enrich uranium, but in practice limits that right to participation in a future multilateral consortium that includes other regional powers. Iran can agree to extend the suspension of its enrichment activities, now paused because of the damage its facilities have sustained, until such a consortium is operational. Or it could start building the consortium in cooperation with its Gulf Arab neighbors and other willing stakeholders, ideally including the U.S. The consortium’s activities could be concentrated in one location – such as an island in the Gulf – or divvied up among the participating states. As a face-saving move, some have suggested, Iran might be invited to produce the centrifuges that are used for the enrichment, which could happen in a neutral Gulf state, like Oman. In return for these two steps, the U.S. would offer Iran relief from nuclear-related sanctions.

The third and most novel part of such an agreement should involve an effort to manage enmity between Israel and Iran. The core of it could be a mutual non-aggression pledge, adopted as a quiet understanding or enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution and backed by assurances from Washington. On the Israeli side, the pledge would put a lid on overt and covert operations against Iran. On the Iranian side, it would prohibit direct strikes on Israel and, importantly, any military or financial support from Tehran for any state or non-state actor seeking to carry out such attacks. The thinking would be that, if the Iranian threat to Washington’s most important regional partner can be thus contained, the U.S would then be able to countenance more expansive sanctions relief for Iran. As part of any such arrangement, the U.S. would commit to restraining Israel from further bombing so long as Iran is in full compliance with its commitments. 

These elements could be adopted as part of a comprehensive three-point plan, though the parties might also consider a phased approach – in which case solidifying the current ceasefire through a Security Council resolution could help forestall the looming snapback with all the escalatory risks that it entails. 

An Uphill Climb

To be sure, reaching such a deal would be an uphill climb. Leaders in Israel, the U.S. and Iran are all still absorbing lessons from the twelve-day war, and some of their advisers may conclude that negotiations are futile. But a realistic view of the other options is that they are worse. 

Iran still has some cards, but it is playing a weak hand. This three-point plan offers a way out. For the Islamic Republic to move in the direction of a non-aggression pledge after committing itself for years to Israel’s annihilation would in some sense just be an acknowledgement of reality. Israel has decimated the so-called ring of fire – Tehran’s network of regional allies – and investing in its reconstitution would likely just be throwing good money after bad. Nor is there a strategic reason that Iran ought to be investing in Israel’s destruction rather than, for example, putting resources into its own people and infrastructure. Indeed, beyond reckoning with the exposure in recent months of its “forward defence” strategy in the region, the Islamic Republic’s hopes of firm backing from non-Western powers such as Russia and China and keeping a “resistance economy” afloat increasingly look like chimeras. 

As for Israel, even if its officials believe they can manage the public’s general war fatigue, they should think twice about how far they wish to test Israel’s relationship with the U.S. While Israeli officials may have a very high level of risk tolerance when it comes to the prospect of regional escalation, and wish to see the Iranian regime either further weakened or destroyed, the White House is almost surely in a different place – wary of being drawn into protracted conflict and concerned about the prospect that Iran could collapse into a huge failed state sitting in the middle of a volatile region with all the attendant risks.    

At the end of the day, though, the question of whether a deal like the one outlined here can get off the ground will depend mainly on President Trump. With Iran vulnerable and Israel dependent on U.S. patronage and support, there is a deal to be had, if Washington pursues it with sufficient energy. Because of Trump’s capacity to bend political gravity and his willingness to buck foreign policy convention, he has space to manoeuvre between the parties that is rare, if not unique among recent U.S. presidents. Thus far in his presidency, Trump has shown the ability to create diplomatic openings through his iconoclasm, but he has lacked the discipline and patience to turn these into durable deals. With respect to Israel, when it has come to the crunch, he has shied away from imposing his will on Netanyahu. This time around, though, Trump has a strong incentive to act more forcefully: the three-point plan would give him an exit from the persistent risk of a major Middle East conflict that the U.S. neither wants nor needs. It would provide a chance to strike a more enduring deal on Iran’s nuclear program and regional power projection that has eluded previous presidents and help build the peacemaking image that he so ardently desires.