CHATHAM HOUSE - Understanding Russia’s Black Sea strategy - How to strengthen Europe and NATO’s approach to the region - Research paper Published 28 July 2025

 CHATHAM  HOUSE 

Understanding Russia’s Black Sea strategy

How to strengthen Europe and NATO’s approach to the region

Research paper

Published 28 July 2025

ISBN: 978 1 78413 654 3

Image — An aerial view of a Turkish naval minesweeper as it takes part in an operation to counter the threat of mines in the Black Sea, 26 June 2022, Erdek district of Balikesir, Turkey. Copyright © Ali Atmaca/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.

Turkish minesweeper at work in the Black Sea

Natalie Sabanadze

Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

Galip Dalay

Senior Consulting Fellow, Turkey Initiative, Middle East and North Africa Programme

For the best part of two decades, Europe and NATO have underestimated Russia and its motivation to dominate the Black Sea region. Understanding the patterns of consistency and adaptation in Moscow’s Black Sea posture is essential for anticipating the country’s future strategic behaviour. Russia’s continued use of hybrid and full-scale warfare in the Black Sea, if successful, would have devastating repercussions for the wider region.  

Central to Black Sea security is ensuring that Ukraine retains control of Odesa and its adjacent coastline. Any ceasefire or future peace agreement must include provisions for long-term deterrence against renewed Russian efforts to sever Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea. Such a move would not only undermine Ukraine’s economic viability but also diminish its broader strategic relevance.

Ankara’s adherence to the Montreux Convention, which prevents military vessels from entering the Black Sea region during wartime, has had a significant impact on Russia’s ambitions. Consequently, Turkey will continue to be a pivotal actor in the Black Sea and a vital partner for the West, due to the country’s control of the Turkish Straits, its possession of the longest coastline in the region and its significant geopolitical weight.  

DOI: 10.55317/9781784136543

Topics

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Peacekeeping and intervention

Regions

Russia Ukraine Turkey Central and Eastern Europe

Departments

Russia and Eurasia Programme

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Summary

01 Introduction

02 Russia’s use of conflicts in the Black Sea region

03 Threat perceptions and the failure of signalling

04 Russia’s global agenda through the Black Sea

05 Russia–Turkey competition, cooperation and counterbalancing

06 Russia and China: Leveraging partnership and delaying rivalry

07 Russia’s relations with Romania and Bulgaria

08 Russia’s advantages and constraints in the Black Sea region

09 Conclusion: Trends of continuity and adaptation

About the authors

Acknowledgments

Summary

The Black Sea is integral to Russia’s reimagining of its neo-imperial identity, its pursuit of great power status and its broader geopolitical calculus. It is in this region that Russia’s post-Soviet revisionism is most prevalent. Understanding the patterns of consistency and adaptation in Moscow’s Black Sea posture is essential for anticipating the country’s future strategic behaviour.

The war in Ukraine, to a significant extent, is Russia’s attempt to secure its long-standing ambition to dominate the Black Sea, including critical trade and energy corridors. While the war marks an escalation, it does not represent a fundamental shift in Moscow’s strategic outlook – one rooted in resisting Western, particularly EU and NATO, influence in the region. As such, Russia is likely to be even more hostile to Ukraine’s potential EU membership than Moscow’s official rhetoric suggests. In this context, the recently announced EU Black Sea strategy must be operationalized with urgency and credibility, signalling a firm commitment to regional security and deterrence.

Central to Black Sea security is ensuring that Ukraine retains control of Odesa and its adjacent coastline. Any ceasefire or future peace agreement must include provisions for long-term deterrence against renewed Russian efforts to sever Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea. Such a move would not only undermine Ukraine’s economic viability but also diminish its broader strategic relevance.

The EU and NATO have, until recently, misjudged Russia’s strategic intentions and underestimated its resolve to pursue them. During the Cold War, NATO’s core function was to deter and defend against the Soviet threat. As the Soviet Union’s successor, Russia has consistently perceived NATO not merely as a threat due to the alliance’s expansion, but as a hostile organization formed of the Kremlin’s Cold War adversaries. Russia opposes NATO’s very existence. While credible deterrence continues to dissuade direct conventional confrontation with NATO members, Moscow is increasingly turning to hybrid tactics, such as political influence and information campaigns, to achieve its aims.

With a declining US security footprint in the region, the risks to the Black Sea and wider European security are mounting. In this context, clearly defining modalities of cooperation among the EU, UK and Turkey is essential. Strengthening collaboration among NATO’s Black Sea coastal allies is equally urgent. The ongoing demining initiative led by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey presents a promising model of functional cooperation – one that could be expanded into other domains. Russia is keenly aware of such coordination and will likely seek to undermine it through disruption and disinformation.

Rather than pursuing a cooperative regional security architecture, Russia’s vision for the Black Sea rests on a de facto condominium with Turkey, reminiscent of Cold War-era dynamics – Moscow asserting control over the northern basin, and Ankara over the south. This approach requires Russia to navigate an increasingly complex and transactional relationship with Turkey, particularly as Ankara’s foreign and security policy shows signs of renewed convergence with the West. Turkey remains the pivotal actor in the Black Sea, due to its control of the Turkish Straits, its possession of the longest coastline in the region, and its significant geopolitical weight.

Turkey opposes an expanded NATO footprint in the Black Sea, yet equally rejects the prospect of Russian dominance. Ankara’s strategic posture is thus centred on preserving a regional balance of power – supporting Ukrainian capabilities and countering Russia’s hegemonic ambitions, while avoiding a significant expansion of NATO’s direct involvement. In light of a possible reduction in US regional engagement, Baltic and Black Sea defences need a joint strategy to contain Russia. A strong, resilient Ukraine, underpinned by sustained European support and robust regional partnerships, remains essential to safeguarding long-term security in the Black Sea.

If Russia can claim victory in Ukraine – or even if it is merely perceived as victorious – such an outcome will have serious consequences for Russia’s wider neighbourhood. Emboldened by success, Moscow would likely pursue a more assertive approach to reshape the region in its own image. For many neighbouring states, this could mean having little choice but to align with Russia under pressure. The Black Sea, South Caucasus and Central Asia are interconnected within the framework of Russia’s evolving neighbourhood strategy. This reality must shape the Euro-Atlantic response, which should work towards coherent and interconnected policies across these regions to counterbalance Russian influence and reinforce regional resilience.

China’s economic presence in the Black Sea region, though still limited, is steadily expanding, contributing to a growing perception of regional multipolarity – one that Russia will increasingly need to navigate. Unlike Moscow, Beijing is unburdened by imperial legacies, which allows it to engage regional actors with fewer historical constraints. While China does not explicitly endorse Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions, it does not oppose Russia’s vision of multipolarity grounded in exclusive spheres of influence. For Moscow, multipolarity is less about diversity of power than about constructing an anti-Western framework for global reordering. In the medium term, Russia is likely to tolerate – and even welcome – China’s regional footprint as a counterweight to the West. In the longer term, however, this pragmatic alignment could give way to strategic competition, especially as Chinese influence deepens.