The Jamestown Foundation - Global Research and Analysis - How to Negotiate with Moscow Based on Experience of a Ukrainian Diplomat By: Roman Bezsmertny July 20, 2025 11:03 AM

 The Jamestown Foundation -Global Research and Analysis

How to Negotiate with Moscow Based on Experience of a Ukrainian Diplomat

By: Roman Bezsmertny

July 20, 2025 11:03 AM Age: 5 days

(Source: BelTA)

We are publishing this piece because Roman Bezsmertny is a Ukrainian diplomat who participated in nearly 60 rounds of talks with Russian representatives during the Minsk peace process. His experience and advice offer unique insight into Moscow’s negotiating tactics. This holds immediate implications for the ongoing efforts by Ukraine and its partners in bringing Moscow, despite its regular delays and intensified attacks on the Ukrainian population, to the negotiating table to achieve a meaningful and lasting peace agreement.

Bezsmertny is a former deputy prime minister, ambassador, election strategist, historian of Soviet ideology and modern diplomacy, and a co-author of the Constitution of Ukraine. He participated in the Minsk negotiations with Russia, survived the Russian invasion in his native village of Motyzhyn near Kyiv, and now runs a growing YouTube platform as an independent analyst and educator.

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Стаття доступна українською мовою тут.

Executive Summary:

Moscow views negotiations as a strategic tool in its arsenal of war to delay, deceive, and destabilize its opponents.

Russia enters any future negotiations from a position of weakness as its military failures, economic strain, and international isolation leave it with no credible leverage or path to lasting gains.

Meaningful negotiation with Russia requires pressure, preparedness, consistency, accountability checking in real time, and speed to define the outcomes of the talks before the Kremlin dominates the public narrative.

On July 8, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reaffirmed his country’s readiness to host the third round of talks between Ukraine and Russia. Turkish media reports that Fidan is awaiting Ukraine’s response (Shafaq News, July 8). The previous two rounds of negotiations on May 16 and June 2, facilitated by the United States, achieved some progress, including prisoner exchanges. The talks, however, did not achieve their stated goal to establish a ceasefire and move to trilateral talks to reach a just and lasting peace (see EDM, May 19 [1] [2], June 2, 5, July 7; The Kyiv Independent, July 1).

Moscow has consistently delayed progress toward any meaningful peace agreements, both directly toward Ukraine and in discussions with the United States (Ukrainska Pravda, July 4; see EDM, July 14). It continues to “stall for time while it bombs civilian targets in Ukraine, as stated by U.S. Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg (X/@generalkellog, June 30). As discussed by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the lack of “flexibility on the Russian side to bring about an end to this conflict” is disappointing and frustrating (U.S. Department of State, July 10).

Russia, similar to the Soviet Union before it, sees diplomacy as a tool in its arsenal of war. This is contrary to the Western approach to negotiations, which is a search for mutually beneficial solutions. Russia’s approach to negotiations is not unique. Since ancient times, rulers have used diplomacy and negotiations to create favorable international conditions for waging wars, including eliminating the enemy’s allies, luring neutral parties to their side, and weakening the enemy by creating obstacles to their trade (Min, Words of War, February 15). There are, however, several steps, based on this author’s experience, that can aid in overcoming Moscow’s negotiating tactics, outlined as follows:

Ten Principles When Negotiating with Moscow:

Negotiate from a position of strength: Only strong pressure on Russia would compel it to adhere to the constraints of international law, thereby allowing for any progress in negotiations. Denying Ukraine military assistance and loosening Russian sanctions yields the opposite outcome as Moscow intensifies its assault on Ukrainian civilians (United Nations, June 30).

Come prepared: When interacting with the Kremlin, it is essential to be thoroughly familiar with their perspectives, intentions, terminology, and relevant international law, as discussed later in this article.

Check every claim in real time: Negotiators need to stay in communication with a support team that monitors the live feed of the talks and verifies every claim, as well as the legal norms that Moscow cites to support its claims. Even if a quote is correct, aids need to ensure that it is the most recent legal understanding of the phenomenon.

Keep the same team throughout the negotiations: Breaking the team into working groups or replacing its members would allow Moscow to exploit the breakdown in communication.

Leave all decisions to the leaders: The negotiation team should have a clear directive for the talks and stay within its boundaries. Pressure and confusion during negotiations may corrupt the decision-making process.

Dominate the process: There is no need to overestimate the negotiation skills of Russian diplomats. Come prepared, drive the agenda, and have several prepared solutions for each point of contention. Let them adjust their strategies on the fly. The same is true for psychological pressure. Learn everything you can about each member of the Russian team and apply individual pressure strategically.

Be flexible: Do not self-impose deadlines and avoid letting the Russian side create artificial limitations on the talks process, which can create additional mental pressure leading to poor decisions. Be prepared to walk away from the talks if needed.

Record every single word: Seriously, Record. Every. Single. Word.

Do not allow Moscow to obfuscate its intentions with terminology: Ask Russian delegates in advance to define every term they use. They might suggest different definitions that the other team can use to its advantage.

Most importantly, define the results of the talks before Moscow has the opportunity to do so: The media plan—including talking points for the post-summit press conference, draft press releases, and news updates during the talks—must be prepared in advance. Release your statement right away. Do not let Moscow exploit the pause and define the results of the talks. The media coverage of the talks might be more important than the talks themselves. Communication defines reality.

In addition to the above principles of negotiating with Moscow, it is important to understand the Kremlin’s instrumentalization of language and discourse that enables it to twist and manipulate international norms and concepts. Moscow consistently creates its own interpretations of fundamental international acts and historical precedents (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 4). Talking to Russian diplomats, therefore, is a disorienting experience. Although this author speaks Russian as a native language, it often felt as if we were speaking different languages on different topics without an interpreter. Over time, a reasonable person begins to feel they are losing their sense of reality, common sense, and morality as they are swept into a whirlpool of duplicity.

The most recent Istanbul talks initially appeared to proceed positively, with both sides discussing the exchange of prisoners of war (POWs) (Ukrainska Pravda, June 9). The Russian side gradually introduced the topic of civilians, children, and journalists into the POWs conversation (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 16). This bewildered the Ukrainian side. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy later said, “The Russians actually proposed this: we give them soldiers, and they give us children. It’s simply beyond comprehension and beyond international law” (Ukrinform, June 16). There are no international norms that govern the trade of prisoner soldiers for hostage children. There are no historical precedents for such a scenario. Deporting and illegally transferring children constitute a war crime (United Nations, December 4, 2024). This is a violation to be resolved via the Geneva Conventions and the International Committee of the Red Cross, whose mission is “to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict,” rather than a subject of peace talks as Moscow attempts to exchange children for soldiers (International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed July 10).

One of the terms at the core of the negotiation discussions, both between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and between the United States, the European Union, and Russia, is what Moscow calls the “elimination of root causes” (RIA Novosti, January 24; President of Russia, May 8). On July 3, Russian President Vladimir Putin told U.S. President Donald Trump during their phone call that Russia would not back down from its goal of “the elimination of the well-known root causes that led to the current state of affairs,” according to the Kremlin’s report on the conversation (President of Russia, July 3). Eliminating root causes, in Moscow’s view, means returning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its 1991 borders, referring to the alleged violation of NATO commitments not to expand eastward (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 29, 2024; Magyar Nemzet, July 7).

Moscow regularly uses the term “legitimate territorial interests” during negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has defined Russian “legitimate territorial interests,” here expressed as “Russian sovereignty,” as equal to the “real situation on the ground” or “sphere of influence” (Sputnik, December 29). Lavrov has said that “the grounds on which Russia exercises sovereignty over the above territories” (referencing the referenda which annexed five Ukrainian territories to Russia) are based on the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (Magyar Nemzet, July 7). Western countries have denounced the referenda as illegal (The Kyiv Independent, March 16, 2024). The U.S. State Department called the referenda “sham elections” used by Moscow to “undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence” (X/@Department of State, March 14, 2024).

Another one of Moscow’s lines during negotiations is the “indivisibility of territorial security.” The 2023 “Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” defines the defense of territorial integrity “from destructive foreign influence” as one of its primary goals (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2023). Moscow understands its security interests as expanding far beyond its borders. The 2021 Russian-proposed draft agreement with the United States requested that the two countries “not implement security measures … that could undermine core security interests of the other Party” (RBC, December 15, 2021; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 17, 2021). According to the proposal, the United States should prevent further eastward expansion of NATO.  In the proposal with NATO issued on the same day, Moscow would require NATO to deploy no forces or weapons in countries that joined the Alliance after May 27, 1997 (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 17, 2021).

The Kremlin further believes that the concept of “the right of nations to self-determination,” as Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin wrote in 1914, does not apply to Russia’s sphere of influence (Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, 1914). Instead, Moscow’s interpretation of “elimination of root causes,” “legitimate territorial interests,” and “indivisibility of territorial security” undermines principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the people who happen to live on territories that Russia views as its sphere of influence. The principles of global security do not envision one country achieving its security interests at the expense of another.

As a result of Moscow’s tactics, the negotiation venue has become a place where the Russian side hands Ukrainians another ultimatum and interprets the international order according to its own legal concepts and understandings that do not exist in, or are even contrary to, international law. Conversely, the Ukrainian side responds with notions of the foundations of international law, including the UN Charter and other norms.

Moscow enters negotiations from a position of strategic weakness, despite its attempt to exploit negotiations to gain time, manipulate perceptions, and undermine international norms. This strategy has thus far been effective in stalling progress and delaying meaningful negotiations. In reality, Moscow’s battlefield goals remain unmet, its economy is strained under sanctions, and its international isolation deepens with each war crime committed. Any progress made in negotiations will expose these disadvantages rather than accommodate them.