STIMSON

Europe’s Long Overdue Identity Crisis Is Upon Us

A Europe willing to step up to its own security threats can increasingly be in charge of its own destiny

The intersection of the three-year-old Ukraine conflict and Donald Trump’s return to the White House has forced Europe to face a rapid sequence of reckonings on the nature of the transatlantic relationship and Europe’s sense of responsibility for its own security. To meet both challenges, the action required is the same – Europe must take immediate steps to update its purpose and identity. Who are the Continent’s lasting allies, partners, and adversaries? And how does Europe navigate transforming values to operate in a more transactional global setting? These questions, honestly answered, can aid a European reinvention to meet a global landscape that has utterly transformed in recent years.

Much has changed since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 – not just on the battlefield, but across Europe. In the three years since, the conflict has set off countless rounds of alternating self-examination and recrimination about European security and the importance of the transatlantic security framework, which has maintained peace since the end of World War II. Still, a true European reckoning over the last three years was buffered by leadership from Washington that re-energized NATO and succeeded in rallying an ad hoc coalition of over fifty nations to support, in ways they saw fit while backstopping Ukrainian defense from Washington with the provision and delivery of military assistance sorely needed by Kyiv. A Russian failure to make much headway as the conflict stretched from months to years, combined with Russia’s loss of control of a chunk of its own territory last year, further solidified the sense that Western backing could buttress Ukraine at least to fight to a standstill.

Although Europe has, at times, been a quarrelsome security partner, the U.S. commitment to European security remained ironclad since World War II. This dynamic has bred a certain complacency on both sides of the Atlantic, convinced that things are indefinitely fated to remain the same. Among other things, this dynamic has also meant a broad acceptance of an asymmetry of security provision and leadership, assuring U.S. primacy and a more docile Europe with only limited security concerns.

Still, a faint specter of a U.S. historical tendency toward isolation behind expansive oceans has lurked – if mostly confined to the fringes in recent decades. The 2024 re-election of Donald Trump brought fringe skepticism to the mainstream, throwing traditional foreign policy ideals and America’s role in the world into stark – and unsparing – relief.

Now, barely a month into a second Trump term, the torrent of U.S. statements and actions about the conflict, allied responsibilities, and a resetting of relations with Moscow have deeply rattled Europe’s leaders and forced them to question, at last, fundamental assumptions about their own security as the continent contemplates an alternative future.

Europe’s reality check has been disorienting in its speed and depth, but it is also delinquent. It is past time for NATO allies to face up to a new reality.

Is Europe Up to It?

For now, it would appear Europe is failing to meet the moment. Outright divisions over the degree of the threat and the possible responses are not yet visible, but neither has a single leader established a confident way forward to consolidate European support. Events are moving fast, making the implications difficult to comprehend and assess.

Traditional leaders of larger European powers are hobbled by political weaknesses and vulnerabilities, compounded in some cases by looming elections that are likely to be either inconclusive or result in the need to admit extremist parties into ruling coalitions. These vulnerabilities have fed a continuing reluctance on the part of some countries to face up to the realities of raising defense spending in line with NATO commitments to match at least 2% of GDP. Other potential gaps opening among European nations lie in how seriously to take the threat from the east, with the concentration of concern radiating out from easternmost Europe, largely mapping onto each country’s proximity to Russia.

Looking to the West, European perceptions of relations with the United States are increasingly shifting from a close and broad-based partnership to one that is much more adversarial in areas ranging from economic cooperation, environmental activism, global responsibilities, and attitudes toward Moscow. Differing views on the importance of and responsibility for European security will be compounded by suspicion and skepticism in the value of the transatlantic relationship. As we look to the coming months, Washington will most likely disengage from the specifics of European security as it pursues a more transactional agenda, including big-picture bilateral deals with Moscow to rewrite the international order, bring an abrupt end to the conflict, and secure resources. This future is being written today – one need only look at the most recent negotiations with Russia and the likely trajectory of U.S. military support. Still, whether this results in a visibly reduced U.S. security commitment to Europe through fewer or no U.S. troops stationed there, or a significantly less credible NATO alliance remains an open question.

Either way, Washington’s dominant global position is likely to have a powerful influence on conversations about the future of European security. Trump and his team have been vocal about deprioritizing European security, thereby lofting the ball into Europe’s court to respond. For their part, European leaders must now face up to the challenge of supporting Ukraine and standing firm against any further aggression from Moscow. What’s more, they will likely have to do this with Washington acting as a lightning rod, not a manager or coordinator. Success will require Europe to forge a new outlook grounded in a sense of European shared cooperation and collective responsibility.

The action demanded by this moment is unquestionably a historic challenge. But it may also be a valuable opportunity. Freed from the constraints of coordinating with a Washington looking past Europe toward deal-making with China and Russia while also planning its big moves in the Indo-Pacific, Europe can now focus on its own needs in ways that could better resonate with public preferences. A collateral benefit to these actions might also the reclamation of energy and attention that far-right parties are lately leveraged for a seat at the governing table.

What Comes Next?

An immediate first step for Europe might be simply to sidestep further confrontation with the United States over Ukraine or on relations with Moscow to instead double down on resourcing a credible full-spectrum package of assistance for Kyiv coupled with steady political support and a variable geometry of security guarantees. However, ensuring this posture is credible and durable will require leaning into a vitalized identity for Europe that will empower it to take on full responsibility for its own security and future. Such a refurbished identity will need to be reflective of the Continent’s history and geography, resonant with its values and beliefs, and articulate a future that is both attainable and attractive to a full range of voters.

This will not let the United States off the hook. Even by the more transactional metrics of Trump’s Washington, U.S. support for European security will remain in Washington’s interest. Securing continued U.S. commitment to Europe would need to demonstrate that it meets Secretary of State Rubio’s famous three tests: making the U.S. stronger, more secure, and more prosperous. A cross-cutting argument for the American national interest triad would be the lasting importance of burden sharing, particularly from a Europe committed to devoting a greater share of government budgets to defense and possessing a world-class defense industrial base.

Perhaps this reckoning on Europe’s identity is long overdue. Ukraine was the first trigger, Trump’s re-election a more acute one. Perhaps this reckoning is also a realization that institutional incrementalism through subtle tweaks to the EU and NATO, while necessary, is ultimately insufficient to move the needle in dramatically changing times. Whatever the context, the result required is the same – a Europe willing on its own to face up to its own security threats and, thus, increasingly in charge of its own destiny.